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ABSTRACT 
 
This study was designed to evaluate the quality of informed consent practiced by healthcare 
professionals in South Africa using an empirical quantitative methodology combined with medico-
legal analysis to produce an interdisciplinary thesis on bioethics and medical law. Informed 
consent is an ethical and legal doctrine derived from the principle of respect for autonomy, 
whereas the rights to bodily integrity, privacy and human dignity are constitutionally protected in 
South Africa. The National Health Act 61 of 2003 codified requirements for informed consent by 
stipulating that healthcare providers must inform healthcare users about diagnosis, risks, benefits, 
treatment options, and the right of refusal, while taking into consideration users language and 
literacy levels. However, African communities are inherently challenged by problems of poverty, 
poor education, power asymmetry, and unfamiliarity with libertarian rights-based autonomy, which 
could affect informed consent practice. An empirical study was conducted at randomly selected 
public hospitals in EThekwini metropolitan municipality involving 927 participants; comprising 168 
medical doctors, 355 professional nurses, and 404 patients. The study showed that healthcare 
professionals had limited knowledge regarding ethical and legal requirements for informed 
consent, and were partially compliant with current informed consent regulations. Barriers to 
informed consent identified were language, poor education, workload, and lack of interpreters.  
Most patients attending public hospitals were indigent, but preferred full information disclosure, 
and a shift from informed to shared-healthcare decision-making. The study recommends that a 
corps of trained interpreters should be introduced at public hospitals. This will improve provider-
patient communications and minimize workloads, increase job satisfaction, and the overall quality 
of healthcare service delivery. Analysis of recent South African case law on informed consent 
revealed vacillations between the “reasonable doctor” and “prudent patient” standards of 
information disclosure which are inconsistent with the jurisprudence from comparative foreign 
common law jurisdictions. Therefore, South African court judgments on informed consent ought 
to be re-evaluated to establish a uniform standard of information disclosure consistent with 
international jurisprudence, current legislation, and constitutional protections relating to human 
dignity and security of the person. 
 
Key terms: Empirical bioethics; Doctors, Health law, Informed consent, Medical Law, Legislation, 
Nurses, Patients, Public hospitals, Regulation, Jurisprudence, South Africa 
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PART ONE 
CHAPTER 1- ORIENTATION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
 
Informed consent (IC) in medical practice is derived from the ethical principle of respect 
for autonomy, which refers to self-determination, or freedom of choice.4 The idea that 
every person has a right to determine what can be done to his or her own body, has found 
expression in many national and international statutes and ethical codes through the 
doctrine of IC.5 It has been argued that autonomy itself has never been found to be a 
legally enforceable right; rather two rights derived from the principle of respect for 
autonomy have been universally accorded legal protection.6  These are the right to bodily 
integrity protected by legal rules against assault or battery, and the right to bodily well-
being, protected by rules against professional negligence.7 Supporting these is the right 
to liberty or the condition of being free.8  Coggon and Miola have described autonomy in 
medical law as relating to free will, whereby an “autonomous agent” is one with the free 
will to act, while liberty refers to the freedom to act without interference from another.9 It 
has been submitted by South African scholars on medical jurisprudence that IC before 
medical treatment is a constitutionally protected right.10 This was demonstrated in the 
                                                          
4  Chima SC “Respect for autonomy as a prima facie right: Overriding patient autonomy in medical 
 practice” 2009 Transactions: Journal of the Colleges of Medicine of South Africa (CMSA) 38-44. 
5  National Health Act 61 of 2003 see also United Nations International Convention on Civil  and 
 Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966 Article 7 and UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
 Human Rights 2005.   
6  Schultz MM “From informed consent to patient choice: A new protected interest” 1985 Yale L 
 J 219-299. 
7  Jennings S “Medical law and individual autonomy- competing perspectives” 2003 
 http://www.nuigalway.ie/law/GSLR/2003/MedicalNegligence.pdf (Date of use: 20 July 2009). 
8  Chima SC “Evaluating the quality of informed consent and contemporary clinical practices by 
 medical doctors in South Africa:  An empirical study” 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [1-17]. 
9  Coggon J and Miola J “Autonomy liberty and medical decision-making” 2001 Camb Law J 
 523-547. 
10  Van Oosten FFW “Castell v De Greef and the doctrine of informed consent: Medical 
 paternalism ousted in favour of patient autonomy” 1995 De Jure 164‑179 see also Carstens 
 P and Pearmain D Foundational principles of South African medical law (LexisNexis Durban 
 2007) 29-32. 
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case of Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba,11 where the police wanted a court order 
to compel an accused person to undergo a surgical procedure in order to obtain a bullet 
to be used as evidence in his prosecution. The court held that such and order would violate 
the defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity and privacy. The South 
African Constitution of 1996 (hereinafter the Constitution), recognized the rights of 
autonomy by codifying the rights to human dignity, and bodily integrity in sections 10 and 
12(2).12 Section 12 of the Constitution stipulates that everyone has a right to bodily and 
psychological integrity, which includes the right not to be subjected to medical or scientific 
experimentation without their informed consent.13 It has been argued that when sections 
12(2) of the Constitution, "everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity”, 
and 12(2)(b) which includes the right "to security in and control over their body" are read 
together, this makes it clear that decisions regarding one's body relate to both a physical 
and psychological dimension.14 Accordingly, IC as a requirement for lawful medical 
interventions is a well-established principle in South African law.15 Van Oosten has long 
suggested that patients consent, as a requirement for all lawful medical interventions, has 
been recognized as a well-established principle in South African common law.16 Leading 
cases on the legal doctrine of informed consent in South Africa include Stoffberg v Elliot 
1923,17 and Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal 195718 (hereinafter the Esterhuizen 
case). In the former case a patient whose penis was wrongfully amputated due to penile 
cancer without consent, sued his doctors for damages for assault. While instructing the 
jury Watermeyer J opined that:   
 
In the eyes of the law, every person has certain absolute rights, which the law protects. 
They are not dependent upon a statute or upon a contract, but they are rights to be 
respected, and one of those rights is the right of absolute security of the person….Any 
                                                          
11 Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D). 
12  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
13  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 29. 
14  Mswela M “Cultural practices and HIV in South Africa: A legal perspective” 2009 PER 197. 
15  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 164‑179 see also Carsten and Pearmain Foundational Principles 
 29-32. 
16  Van Oosten FFW The doctrine of informed consent in medical law (LLD Thesis University of 
 South Africa 1989). 
17  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148-150. 
18  Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T). 
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bodily interference with or restraint of a man’s person which is not justified in law or 
excused by law, or consented to, is a wrong, and for that wrong the person whose body 
has been interfered with has a right to claim such damages as he can prove he has 
suffered owing to that interference. 19 
 
In the Esterhuizen case, a 10-year-old child diagnosed with Kaposi’s sarcoma, was initially 
treated with superficial radiation with parental consent. Later, due to tumour recurrence, 
the child was subjected to radical radiation therapy resulting in severe tissue damage 
necessitating amputation of the limbs. In an action for damages by the child’s mother 
against the treating doctors, the court held that while the superficial radiation was duly 
performed with appropriate consent from the parents, the latter procedure was performed 
without full information disclosure and IC from the child’s guardians, though there was 
adequate time to do so. The court rejected the defendant doctor’s argument that IC was 
implied because the parents had brought the child to hospital previously and consented 
to initial treatment. The court also rejected arguments that treatment was in the child’s 
best interests, holding instead that the child’s guardians ought to have been adequately 
informed of the dangers inherent in more radical treatment for such consent to be 
considered valid.20 A more recent South African case of Castell v De Greef 199421 
(hereinafter the Castell case) appears to have consolidated the doctrine of IC into South 
African medical jurisprudence, leading to the adoption of the following ethical and legal 
principles: 
- A shift from medical paternalism to patient autonomy 
- A shift from a ‘reasonable doctor’ standard to the ‘prudent patient’ standard  
- A shift in information disclosure to the ‘material risk’ standard, where the level of disclosure 
required is what a reasonable patient would consider important before making a  
healthcare decision 
- Places IC within the legal framework of volenti non fit injuria or voluntary assumption of 
risk rather than delict22  
                                                          
19  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148. 
20  Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T) see also Carstens and Pearmain 
 Foundational Principles 500-501. 
21  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501(C).  
22  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501[719]. 
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1.2  Recent developments in South African case law since the Castell case and 
enactment of the National Health Act 2003.23 
Following the judgment of Ackerman J in in the Castell case,24 some legal scholars have 
argued that South African Courts have not endeavoured to develop the common law on 
informed consent as envisaged by the Constitution.25 These commentators have 
suggested that in several cases brought to South African courts since the National Health 
Act (NHA)26 was implemented the Courts have been reluctant to apply the regulations laid 
down in the NHA with regards to the legal application of the IC doctrine in medical 
practice.27,28 Some of the pertinent cases which have been tried by South African Courts 
following the Castell case include Broude v McIntosh and Another 1998.29 In this case a 
claimant brought an action against a surgeon for negligence following facial paralysis 
occurring secondary to an operation which the claimant alleged had been wrongfully 
performed. The claimant also alleged that the defendant surgeon had failed to obtain 
appropriate informed consent, and had also failed to warn of the risk of facial paralysis 
prior to surgery. The provincial High Court dismissed the claim based on the fact that the 
claimant had failed to prove any negligent conduct on the part of the surgeon. The 
claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) based on two heads of 
argument: (a) That the respondent wrongfully failed to obtain the appellants real or 
informed consent for the surgical procedure and that the respondent therefore committed 
an assault on the claimant by performing the surgery (b) alternatively, that in carrying out 
the surgical procedure on the patient, the surgeon acted in a negligent and unskilful 
manner by failing to inform the clamant before performing the surgery regarding the risks 
and hazards involved in the procedure and the availability of alternative treatments.30 In 
                                                          
23  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (hereinafter National Health Act or NHA). 
24  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501(C). 
25   The Constitution. 
26  National Health Act. 
27  Britz R and Roux-Kemp A “Voluntary informed consent and good clinical practice for clinical 
 research in South Africa: Ethical and legal perspectives” 2012 SAMJ 746-748. 
28  Thomas R “Where to from Castell v De Greef? Lessons from recent developments and abroad 
 regarding consent to treatment and the standard of disclosure” 2007 SALJ 188-215. 
29  Broude v McIntosh and Another 1998 (3) SA 60 (SCA).  
30  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 681. 
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arriving at a decision, the SCA opined that while the sole interest of the surgeon or doctor 
was to alleviate the suffering of the patient, it was somewhat strange that the doctors’ 
actions in this case should be considered an assault due to failure to disclose some risks, 
which if disclosed may have caused the patient to abandon the surgery by withholding 
consent. The Court suggested that this was unusual and concluded in part that such an 
approach might be unsound. However, on the facts of the case the SCA rightfully held 
that failure to obtain real informed consent should in fact be considered an assault. The 
SCA also considered in detail the judgment of Ackerman J in the Castell case31 but did 
not overrule the judgment in that case. However Marais J expressed an orbiter dictum 
regarding his reservations about the observation that failure to disclose material risks 
which were in the opinion of a doctor likely to lead to a patient withholding consent could 
constitute assault.32,33  In a another South African case Louwrens v Oldwage 2006 34 
(hereinafter the Oldwage case), Yekiso J sitting in the High Court found based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, that there was a failure to obtain informed consent by a 
vascular surgeon in performing a procedure on a patient, based on several grounds, 
including the fact that the said surgical procedure as noted on the informed consent 
document signed by the patient and submitted as evidence in court, was different from 
the procedure that  was eventually performed on the patient. Secondly, that the surgeon 
could not recall when such consent was obtained from the patient, and thirdly that the 
doctors clinical notes regarding his consultations with the patient could not be found and 
could not be presented as evidence in court, and might have been shredded by the 
surgeon prior to expiry of the time legally required for the preservation of medical notes.35 
Despite noting the obiter dictum of Marais J in Broude v McIntosh,36 the trial Judge Yekiso 
J concluded that he was legally bound by the opinion of the full bench of the High Court 
in the Castell case which held that failure to disclose material risks to a patient and obtain 
valid informed consent prior to surgery amounted to assault.37 In the subsequent appeal 
                                                          
31  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501. 
32  Broude v McIntosh and Another 1998 (3) SA 60 (SCA).  
33  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 682. 
34  Louwrens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA). 
35  Louwrens v Oldwage 2004 CASE NO: 10253/01 (CPD) [76-85]. 
36  Broude v McIntosh & Others 1998 (3) SA 60(SCA) at 671. 
37  Louwrens v Oldwage 2004 CASE NO: 10253/01 (CPD) [99]. 
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heard by the SCA, the higher Court overruled the judgment of Yekiso J, arguing that on 
the issue of informed consent, the surgeon had duly informed the patient of the 
appropriate surgery based on the opinion of expert witnesses who stated that the 
difference between the surgical procedure stated on the informed consent document as 
‘femoro-femoro bypass” and the procedure subsequently performed by the surgeon an 
“illio-femoral bypass” was merely semantic in that the two expert witnesses for the defence 
and prosecution concurred that both procedures were generally referred to as “femo-
femoro bypass”. Similarly on the issue of whether the illio-femoral bypass was the cause 
of the patients subsequent development of a “steal syndrome”, the SCA held that the 
patients expert witness’ argument based on 1976 clinical evidence that the incidence of 
such complications occurred in 4% of cases, was not acceptable in 2007. Rather the Court 
preferred the evidence of the appellants’ expert witness who contended that because of 
modern techniques now available, the incidence of such complications was in the region 
of 2%.38 The claimant had argued that based on the judgment reached by the court in the 
Castell case, the patient ought to have been warned about material risks as outlined 
Ackerman J, where he said that for consent to be used as a defence, the following 
conditions must be satisfied:  
(a) The consenting party must have had knowledge and been aware of the nature and 
extent of the harm or risk; 
(b) The consenting party must have appreciated and understood the nature and extent of 
the harm or risk; 
c) The consenting party must have consented to the harm or assumed the risk; 
d) The consent must be comprehensive, that it extends to the entire transaction, inclusive 
of its consequences.39  
The Castell court further held, that a medical practitioner has a duty to warn a patient of a 
material risk associated with a procedure, whereby risk is regarded as material where: 
(a) A reasonable person in the position of the patient, if so warned of the risk, would be 
likely to attach significance to it; or  
                                                          
38  Louwrens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA) [20-25]. 
39  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501[425]. 
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(b) The medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the patient, if warned, 
would be likely to attach significance to it.40  
 
In arriving at its decision in the Oldwage case, the SCA referred to the “reasonable doctor 
standard” as elucidated in Richter and Another v Estate Hamman41 rather than the 
subjective “prudent patients’ standard” of information disclosure as arrived at in the Castell 
case.42  South African legal scholars have since argued that the SCA erred in its judgment 
in the Oldwage case, because it applied the discredited reasonable doctor standard of 
information disclosure rather than the more accepted prudent patients’ standard as 
established in the Castell case.43 It can be further argued that in arriving at its decision in 
the Oldwage case, the SCA did not pay attention to the judgments from similar cases in 
other comparable common law jurisdictions like England, where the English Court of 
Appeals (CA), held in cases such as Chester v Afshar,44 that failure of a doctor to disclose 
serious risks in the range of 1-2% amounted to negligence. Similarly in the Canadian case 
of Reibl v Hughes,45  the Canadian Supreme Court held that failure to disclose material 
risks in the range of 1% could also amount to actionable negligence. Therefore the 
judgment of the SCA in the Oldwage case has been generally criticized by several 
commentators based on these grounds.46,47,48  Firstly, it has been argued that though the 
SCA first set out to answer the question of whether “the claimant gave informed consent 
to the surgical procedure performed by the defendant, in the absence of that, whether 
such a surgical intervention would have amounted to assault.”49 The Court ended up not 
addressing this question, it rather concluded that the absence of informed consent was 
not proven and failure to obtain consent did not amount to assault. Secondly, in Broude v 
McIntosh,50 the Court had alluded to the need for the SCA to review the issue of whether 
                                                          
40 Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501[426]. 
41  Richter and another v Estate Hamman1976 (3) SA 226 (C) [232G-H].   
42  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501[425 H-I]. 
43  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 685-687 see also Britz and Roux-Kemp 2012 
 SAMJ [746] and Thomas 2007 SALJ [192]. 
44  Chester v Afshar [2002] 3 All ER FR 552 (CA). 
45  Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 (SCC). 
46  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 685-687. 
47  Britz and Roux-Kemp SAMJ 2012 [746]. 
48  Thomas 2007 SALJ 188-215 [192]. 
49  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 685-687. 
50  Broude v McIntosh and Another1998 (3) SA 60 (SCA). 
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failure by a doctor to obtain informed consent amounted to assault. When confronted with 
this argument, the SCA did not refer to this particular case in its judgment, neither did it 
review the arguments from that case or answer the query from the lower court. Thirdly, 
while the SCA accepted and applied the principles elucidated by Ackerman J in the Castell 
case,51 it subsequently also accepted and eventually applied the discredited “reasonable 
doctor standard” arrived at in Richter and Another v Estate Hamman52 in its judgment 
thereby creating some confusion in the interpretation of cases regarding informed consent 
in South Africa. It has been argued that by doing so, the SCA did not provide needed 
clarity as to whether the principle of respect for autonomy should take precedence over 
medical paternalism.53 Further, it has been suggested that this failure to clarify issues do 
not appear to be consistent with constitutional provisions for respect for security, privacy 
and bodily integrity as elucidated in section 12 of the Constitution.54 Further, the SCA 
judgment in the Oldwage case was also inconsistent with the constitutional provisions to 
expand the common law by reference to judgments in foreign legal jurisdictions when 
interpreting the bill of rights or when interpreting any South African legislation.55 It can also 
be argued that the SCA should have also taken into consideration the current regulations 
and legislation regarding informed consent as elucidated in the National Health Act.56 In 
another recent judgment in the case of McDonald v Wroe 2006,57 a Western Cape High 
Court found that failure of a dentist to warn a patient of the risks of permanent nerve 
damage subsequent to extraction of an infected wisdom tooth amounted to violation of 
the patients right to bodily integrity as enshrined in section 12 (2) of the Constitution.58 
Further, the Court held that the patient was subjected to surgery without real informed 
consent due to incomplete disclosure of the material risks.59 In arriving at its decision the 
High Court applied the rule established by Ackerman J in the Castell case while 
                                                          
51          Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425H-I].   
52  Richter and Another v Estate Hamman 1967 (3) SA 226 (C). 
53  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 686. 
54  The Constitution s12. 
55  The Constitution s39. 
56  National Health Act s7. 
57  McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C). 
58   The Constitution s12 (2). 
59  Nicola McDonald v Dr Graham Wroe (2006) 3 All SA 565 (C) [37-39] see also Carstens and 
 Pearmain Foundational Principles 687 and Esterhuyse S “Medical negligence” 
 www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/tax/medical-negligence (Date of  use: 25th October 2017). 
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emphasizing that in South African law there is a duty upon a medical practitioner to 
disclose the material risks of a planned procedure to the particular patient, whereas it has 
been determined that, in order for consent to be used as a defence, the patient must have 
knowledge of the risks, understood the risks, assumed the attendant risks and all its 
consequences. 60  
 
The National Health Act (NHA) 61codified the requirements for informed into South African 
law.  Section 7 of the NHA stipulates:  
 
(1) Subject to section 8, a health service may not be provided to a user without the user’s informed 
consent, unless: 
(a) The user is unable to give informed consent and such consent is given by a person- 
(i) Mandated by the user in writing to grant consent on his or her behalf; or 
(ii) Authorised to give such consent in terms of any law or court order; 
(b) The user is unable to give informed consent and no person is mandated or authorised to give 
such consent, and the consent is given by the spouse or partner of the user or, in the absence of 
such spouse or partner, a parent, grandparent, an adult child or a brother or a sister of the user, in 
the specific order as listed; 
(c) The provision of a health service without informed consent is authorised in terms of any law or 
a court order 
(d) Failure to treat the user, or group of people which includes the user will result in a serious risk 
to public health; or 
(e) Any delay in the provision of the health service to the user might result in his or her death or 
irreversible damage to his or her health and the user has not expressly, impliedly or by conduct 
refused that service.  
(2) A health care provider must take all reasonable steps to obtain the users informed consent  
 
The NHA62 further requires that:  
 
(1) Every health care provider must inform a user of- 
                                                          
60  Baron M “The medical duty of care revisited: McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA (C) Deneys Reitz 
General Case Law Update March 2007 
http//:www.deneysreitz.co.za/directors/Monique_baropn.html (Date of use: 15 July 2017). 
61  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
62  National Health Act s6. 
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(a) The user’s health status except in circumstances where there is substantial evidence that the 
disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the best interests of the user; 
(b) The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the user; 
(c) The benefits, risks, and consequences generally associated with each option; and 
(d) The user’s right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, obligations of such 
refusal. 
(2) The health care provider concerned must, where possible, inform the user as  contemplated in 
 subsection (1) in a language that the user understands and in a manner  which takes into account 
 the user’s level of literacy.  
 
South African Courts has previously debated the issue of how much information should 
be disclosed to a patient prior to informed consent since the case of Lymberg v Jeffries 
1925,63 where the court was of the opinion that a “doctor is not obliged to disclose all the 
conceivable complications that may arise during a medical procedure.” This opinion was 
probably based in part on the precedent case of Van Wyk v Lewis 1924,64 where the court 
held that “in deciding what is reasonable, the Court will have regard to the general level 
of skill and diligence possessed and exercised at the time by members of the branch of 
the profession to which the practitioner belongs”.65 However, the Castell court concluded 
that a doctor is obliged to warn the patient of all “material risks” inherent in the treatment, 
where such “material risks” are based on a “prudent patient standard”.66 Therefore the 
requirement for information disclosure in South African law tends towards the practice in 
North American jurisdictions where libertarian rights-based autonomy is predominant. In 
the context of comparative international law, the “prudent patient standard” of information 
disclosure has become the accepted standard as opposed to the “reasonable doctor standard” of 
information disclosure. As explained by a recent judgment of the UK Supreme Court, Scotland, in 
the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] UKSC 1167 (hereinafter the Montgomery case) 
where the High Court argued that:  
 
                                                          
63  Lymberg v Jeffries 1925 AD 236.  
64  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 [444]. 
65  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 364. 
66  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501[426]. 
67  Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] UKSC 11[75]. 
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Since Sidaway68… it has become increasingly clear that the paradigm of the doctor-patient 
relationship implicit in the speeches in that case has ceased to reflect the reality and complexity 
of the way in which healthcare services are provided, or the way in which the providers and 
recipients of such services view their relationship. One development which is particularly 
significant in the present context is that patients are now widely regarded as persons holding rights, 
rather than as the passive recipients of the care of the medical profession. They are also widely 
treated as consumers exercising choices: a viewpoint, which has underpinned some of the 
developments in the provision of healthcare services. In addition, a wider range of healthcare 
professionals now provide treatment and advice of one kind or another to members of the public, 
either as individuals, or as members of a team drawn from different professional backgrounds 
(with the consequence that, although this judgment is concerned particularly with doctors, it 
is also relevant, mutatis mutandis, to other healthcare providers).69  
 
The UK Supreme Court then concluded that: 
  
The correct position, in relation to the risks of injury involved in treatment, can now be seen to be 
substantially that adopted in Sidaway by Lord Scarman,70 and by Lord Woolf MR in Pearce, 71  
subject to the refinement made by the High Court of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker,72….An adult 
person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to 
undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is 
undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient 
is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable 
alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the 
particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance 
to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely 
to attach significance to it.73  
 
In light of the above judgments, it has become apparent that South African Courts ought 
to take into consideration the opinions expressed by foreign legal jurisdictions on informed 
consent, consistent with the injunction in section 39 of the Constitution.74 
 
                                                          
68 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
69  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
70  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
71  Pearce v United Bristol NHS Healthcare Trust [1998] 48 BMLR 18. 
72  Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; 175 CLR 479.  
73  Montgomery v Lanarkshire [2015] UKSC 11 [87]. 
74  The Constitution s39. 
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1.3 Informed consent, the socio-cultural milieu and patient rights’ in South Africa 
 
In complex multicultural societies and resource-poor countries like South Africa; where 
education standards and literacy levels are low, in addition to high levels of poverty and 
cultural influences.75 In these situations, knowledge and power asymmetry usually exists 
between patients and healthcare professionals.76,77 It has been suggested that it is 
important to recognize the backdrop of marginalization and ongoing challenges of poverty 
during the IC process. In spite of such challenges however, doctors and other HCPs still 
have a duty to explain clinical procedures to patients or their surrogates without turning 
them into students of medicine.78 Since it is uncertain how much information healthcare 
providers should actually disclose to patients before they feel empowered enough to make 
a healthcare decision, building trust between healthcare providers and patients may be 
critical to obtaining IC and enhancing the doctor-patient relationship.79,80,81 Further, the 
ability to use written information is important to comprehension and understanding.82 
Barriers to communication arising from illiteracy and language differences may prevent a 
common understanding of medical procedures, thereby putting a patient at risk of 
providing consent without comprehension.83,84,85,86 But how does a HCP ensure that a 
                                                          
75  Chima SC "Because I want to be informed, to be part of the decision-making": Patients' insights 
 on informed consent practices by healthcare professionals in South Africa” 2015 Niger J Clin 
 Pract 49. 
76  Tindana PO, Kass N and Akweongo P “The informed consent process in a rural African setting: 
 A case study of the Kassena-Nankana district of Northern Ghana” 2006 IRB 5-6. 
77  Irabor DO and Omonzejele P “Local attitudes, moral obligation, customary obedience and 
 other cultural practices: Their influence on the process of gaining informed consent for surgery 
 in a tertiary institution in a developing country” 2009 Dev World Bioethics 37. 
78  Lore W “Medical ethics in the protection of patients’ rights” 1993 Medicus 227-229 as cited in 
 Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics 13. 
79  Appelbaum PS “Assessment of patients’ competence to consent to treatment” 2007 N Engl 
 J Med 1834-1835. 
80  Appelbaum PS and Grisso T “Assessing patients' capacities to consent to treatment” 1988 N 
 Engl J Med 1635. 
81  Chima Niger J Clin Pract 54. 
82  Green JB et al “Putting the ‘informed’ into ‘consent’: A matter of plain language” 2003 J 
 Paediatric Child Health 700. 
83  Lindegger G and Richter LM “HIV vaccine trials: critical issues in informed consent” 2000 S Afr 
 J Sci 313. 
84  Schlemmer A and Mash B “The effects of a language barrier in a South African district hospital” 
 SAMJ 2006 1085-1086.  
85  Flores G “Language barriers to healthcare in the United States” 2006 N Engl J Med 230. 
86  Clark S et al “The informed consent: A study of the efficiency of informed consents and the 
 associated role of language barriers” 2011 J of Surg Educ 145-146. 
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patient understands a proposed treatment or procedure prior to providing consent? Some 
authorities have suggested a verbal or written test to ascertain patient capacity, 
competence or understanding before considering IC to be valid.87  In South Africa, about 
25% of the population is unemployed, with a low labour force participation rate of 54% 
compared to a global average of 69%.88,89 There are also historical inequities within racial 
population groups.90,91,92 In this situation basic health care is unaffordable and out of reach 
for a majority of the population, as reported in a previous aspect of this study, where it 
was shown that a majority of the patients attending public hospitals in KwaZulu-Natal 
province South Africa are unemployed and indigent.93 Therefore any offer of medical 
assistance is often seen as better than nothing, thereby encouraging undue influence and 
paternalism.94 Further, there is a dichotomy in the organization of the South African 
healthcare system, which is dual in nature consisting of private hospitals or private 
healthcare services which are patronized by the fewer patients (20%), who have health 
insurance or financial means to pay, compared with the public health services which 
accounts for the majority (80%) of indigent patients and citizens.95,96 This dual healthcare 
system is further characterized by better infrastructure in private hospitals because of 
commercial competition and better funding, and arguably better educated and more 
knowledgeable patients and consumers of healthcare services.97 Ideally, in order for a 
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doctor or other HCP to obtain a patients valid consent to medical treatment, the HCP must 
fully explain the proposed procedure, the short-term risks and long-term consequences, 
the available alternatives, their risks and benefit and the consequences of delaying or 
declining treatment. The patient should also be made aware of both short term costs such 
as pain, recovery time and length of confinement to the hospital. Long term costs such as 
loss of functioning and physical scarring or loss of function must also be divulged.98  The 
HCP must also disclose all information that would be regarded as “material” by a 
reasonable person, with material defined as any information that would make a particular 
patient choose a different option.99,100,101Legally securing consent without providing 
adequate information constitutes redressable negligence.102,103Despite these established 
legal requirements, in developing countries such as South Africa, where the doctor-patient 
ratio is rather high, though it may be ethically desirable, and legally required for patients 
to be as fully informed as required by the NHA,104 and  HPCSA guidelines,105 doctors may 
not have the time to spend on unduly lengthy explanations of all the ramifications of 
treatment.106,107 This presents a challenge in ensuring that patients are armed with 
sufficient, relevant and accurate information before they consent to any medical procedure 
or treatment. Comprehension is another key element of informed consent that focuses on 
ensuring that a patient is not only informed, but that the patient understands the 
information provided. According to the Belmont report,108 information must be provided in 
a language that can be understood bearing in mind the level of intelligence, rationality, 
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education and maturity of the patient. The ability to comprehend the information may be 
determined by the language of communication and the literacy levels of the patient 
concerned. Discussion of a clinical procedure therefore needs to be carried out in a non-
technical language so that maximal exchange of information between a patient and the 
HCP can occur.109 Even when dealing with educated people, it has been argued that 
explanations of the details of the medical procedure are mandatory.110 The requirement 
of comprehension imposes on a doctor the duty to assess whether a person is capable of 
making a rational decision based upon the information provided by evaluating whether the 
patient understands the information. While it may be easier to assess the adequacy of 
information disclosed and imparted, it is far more difficult to assess whether the 
information is understood by the patient or research subject.111,112 The causes of 
misunderstanding among such patients include differences in language, culture, level of 
education, and lack of a shared understanding between the HCP and the patient about 
health and disease.113 In another African study from Nigeria, it was reported that 18 
patients (1.5%) out of 133 patients had difficulties understanding the information given to 
them. They complained that the doctors used technical terminology. Nevertheless, the 
patients gave consent to prevent their operations or surgical procedures being 
cancelled.114 These findings make it clear that even where consent is given, it may not 
always be fully informed or valid based on legal and ethical requirements for validity.  
 
Another component of informed consent is voluntariness. Volition is concerned with the 
protection of the patient’s right to make health care choices free of coercion or undue 
influence.115 In medical law generally, consent obtained through threat or intimidation for 
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a clinical procedure may not be valid and the doctor may be held liable for assault or 
trespass to the person.116,117 The power imbalance between a patient and a doctor also 
creates a danger of undue influence,118 since a patient cannot obtain treatment without 
an agreeable healthcare professional.119 In such cases the patient can do little more than 
respond to treatment offered by the HCP lest they are labelled as rude and 
uncooperative.120 Chima recently reported that patients in South Africa might consent 
without asking questions when they are afraid to forfeit free medical treatment benefits.121 
Patients are also often anxious at the time consent is sought, thereby making them even 
more vulnerable and subject to undue influence and coercion122 and manipulation by 
HCPs during the informed consent process.123  
 
In Africa, unlike the more developed countries of the West, the appropriateness of first 
person informed consent has been questioned in the cultural context, where people are 
seen as part of a community and not as an isolated individual. Here, consent is usually 
first sought from community elders, and in case of married women permission is sought 
from their husbands. It is therefore questionable whether such consent is autonomous 
and free from coercion or undue influence.124,125 The real question on volition then is 
whether patients’ consent is freely given, or whether their decision is influenced by 
patients’ relationship to the HCP or surrogate/persuader as demonstrated in the case of 
Re T126  where a mothers influence on her daughter was said to have overborne her 
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daughters volition to the extent that she refused life-saving blood transfusion since the 
mother was a Jehovah’s witness. Some researchers and legal scholars hold the view that 
sometimes the influence of parents on their children or of one spouse on another, or 
master over a servant, may result in coercion, and undue influence due to the asymmetric 
power relationship.127 From the foregoing, it is clear that there are challenges that exist in 
the process of obtaining informed consent.  
 
In some instances, the information given is not sufficient and/or is inaccurate. In other 
instances the information maybe too technical that it cannot be understood by an ordinary 
patient based on language barriers, low education, poverty or other cultural barriers, or 
sickness which may all impact on the patients sense of vulnerability. In yet other instances, 
patients may feel intimidated by the power asymmetry due to differences in knowledge 
and influence between the patient and the HCP,128129 or the hospital environment, so that 
they do not consent freely or may feel intimidated.130 Finally, it is debatable whether all 
individuals giving consent have the legal capacity to give consent. This study will seek to 
shed some light on these aspects of the informed consent process in public hospitals 
within an urban setting in South Africa.  
 
1.4 Justifications for using empirical methods to study informed consent 
 
In recent times applied ethicists have frequently combined established social scientific 
methods of inquiry with normative ethical reflection and analysis.131,132 This is based on 
the criticism that philosophical bioethics is too abstract and insensitive to social realities 
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and context.133,134 According to a study by Braunack-Mayer,135 critics of mainstream 
bioethics, particularly from the social sciences, argue that the forms, styles and language 
of bioethics bear little relationship to the ways in which ordinary people describe and 
explain their moral problems. According to Ezekiel Emmanuel,136 the two most common 
criticisms of bioethics is that it is divorced from reality and the actual issues that arise in 
medical practice, research, and health policy debates; and secondly that bioethicists may 
be willing to layout arguments but are skittish about actually deciding anything. One 
symbol of this divorce from reality is the lack of engagement with empirical data or 
‘experience’.137 On the other hand, moral philosophical ethicists have charged that one of 
the problems of empirical ethics or bioethics is the conflict with certain meta-ethical 
fallacies including the is-ought gap of Hume,138 which argues that one cannot derive moral 
conclusions from factual premises, or otherwise one could violate the fact-value distinction 
amongst other alleged fallacies.139 However, it has been observed that although there 
could be many ways of doing empirical ethics, they all have certain basic objectives in 
common which states that “the study of peoples actual moral beliefs, intuitions and 
reasoning yields information that is meaningful for ethics and should be the starting point 
of ethics”.140   
 
Others have attempted to define empirical ethics as ‘normatively oriented bioethical or 
medical ethical research that directly integrates empirical research”.141 In this formulation 
of empirical ethics, the key elements of its application are that it (a) encompasses 
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empirical research, as well as (b) normative arguments and analysis, and (c) tries to 
integrate both elements in such a way that new knowledge is produced, which might not 
have been possible without combining both methods.142 According to Emmanuel, the 
issue is not whether bioethics should focus on conceptual analysis or empiric research 
but that it must focus on both.143 Borry and others144 citing McHale et al,145 assert that 
empirical ethics can assist with ethical reflection and decision-making in several different 
ways:146  
 
i. It can challenge established authority and experience by showing how practice 
varies. 
ii. It can illuminate understanding of the reality of ethical decision-making 
iii. It can raise awareness of the underlying important questions and ethical 
implications of various practices 
iv. It can explore the limits of what is tolerable or acceptable 
v. It can give insight into what constitutes a good process 
vi. It can offer insight on what others think about a certain situation or moral dilemma 
vii. It can provide a comprehensive picture of the situation at hand. 
 
De Vries and Gordijn further grouped some of these uses of empirical ethics into 5-fold 
typology of potential usage:147 
 
A. Description and analysis of the actual conduct of a group with respect to a morally 
relevant issue 
B. Identification of moral issues that have escaped the attention of ethicists, but may 
be relevant in a specific context. 
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C. Description and analysis of actual moral opinions and reasoning patterns of those 
involved in certain practices 
D. Making ethics more context sensitive or realistic 
E. Description of facts relevant to normative arguments.  
 
Sulmasy and Sugarman148 argue that two potential reasons may exist for studying the 
actual conduct of a group, with regards to compliance with moral and ethical dilemmas. 
One would be to describe compliance with existing moral norms, and secondly, to 
determine whether policies and procedures designed to operationalise certain moral 
norms have been successful. In terms of practical applications of empirical bioethics, 
Emmanuel has suggested that empirical bioethics serves three valuable functions in 
healthcare or contemporary medical practice and enriches the field of bioethics,149 where 
bioethics are defined as “a discipline concerned with the ethical dimensions of health care 
and the biomedical sciences”.150 In this context, empirical data or bioethics can assist with 
(a) debunking widely held but erroneous views, (b) assessing the importance of ethical 
concerns; and (c) facilitating the realization of certain ethical values.151 Emmanuel was 
able to substantiate his views by citing contemporary empirical studies that have been 
able to show that rather than the generally held belief that pain is the most difficult or 
predominant issue with regards to euthanasia and end-of-life care. He observed that 
contrary to such beliefs, empirical data demonstrate that depression, hopelessness, and 
general psychological distress are consistently associated with interest in physician-
assisted-suicide and euthanasia. Other areas in which empirical bioethics and data 
analysis could play a role would include “assessing the importance of ethical concerns”.152 
For example, by helping to resolve the conflict in informed consent regarding the 
comprehensiveness of information disclosure and understanding of information disclosed, 
as well as determining the methodological or the ethical concerns surrounding the storage 
and use of human biological specimens. Empirical bioethics can also assist with the 
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realization of ethical values such as respect for autonomy, and in some cases distributive 
justice such as the just allocation of scarce healthcare resources.153 Other empirical 
studies have shown that people generally have problems in understanding the risks and 
benefits of medical treatment and decision-making, and this could influence the actual 
application of existing laws.154 For example, a study by means of a questionnaire on Dutch 
nurses charged with taking care of nursing home residents with due respect to the patients 
autonomy rights and liberty revealed that the nurses did not comply with the existing 
regulations on patient care in Dutch nursing homes.155  
 
Based on the various observations and illustrations above, it has been suggested by 
Birnbacher that to guide action; ethical guidelines, codes and rules must be based in 
reality and should be formulated in such a way that it is continuous with accepted moral 
norms.156 Others have suggested that empirical ethics should be used to defend or 
criticize concrete moral principles or practices rather than make general claims about 
moral concepts.157 Consequently, in recent times, applied ethicists have shifted towards 
combining empirical, especially social scientific research with normative ethical analysis. 
Proponents of this approach called empirical ethics or bioethics have argued that the study 
of people’s actual moral beliefs, behaviour and reasoning should be the starting point of 
ethics. It has also been acknowledged that the methodologies of the social sciences, 
especially quantitative and qualitative research, using surveys, interviews and 
questionnaires is probably the best way to map the reality of peoples actual moral 
norms.158 Finally, it has been suggested that the ultimate goal of empirical inquiry is to 
improve the quality of healthcare.159 In this role, Alexander Kon160 has described four 
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hierarchical categories of empirical bioethics, which can build on one another to assist in 
ethical decision-making. These categories of empirical ethics enquiry are described as: 
 
I. “Lay of the land” studies which are usually overviews of current practices and the 
status quo  
II. “Ideal versus reality studies” which attempt to map out how well clinical practice 
matches normative ethical principles or ideas 
III. “Improving care studies” which focuses on how we can bring ethical ideals closer 
to match normative practice, and   
IV. “Changing ethical norms” studies which focus on how we can bring together data 
from various empirical studies to inform or change current ethical norms.161  
 
Other ethicists such as Borry and others162 have described three possible roles for 
empirical research in bioethics. First, it can assist in describing morally relevant facts; 
secondly, it can assist in the analysis of moral questions since empirical research 
possesses “the normative power of the factual”.163 Therefore in this study, I decided to 
evaluate the practice of informed consent as stipulated by the South African common law, 
and the NHA and its regulations,164 by actually conducting a field study using quantitative 
empirical data, to determine whether HCPs, in this case doctors and professional nurses, 
are actually practicing in compliance with the current regulations, and also to evaluate 
from the point of view of patients, how compliant the HCPs are with regard to the legal 
requirements and ethical regulations. In view of this, the rationale or point of departure of 
this study, as well as the aims and objectives of this study, are as outlined below. 
 
1.5 Rationale for the study 
 
Reports in the scientific and medico-legal literature indicate that medical procedures are 
conducted globally in violation of the ethical principle of respect for autonomy and 
                                                          
161  Kon AA 2009 AJOB 59-62. 
162 Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 41-53 
163  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 43. 
164  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
23 
 
sometimes without valid IC. This is most evident in developing countries such as South 
Africa, where the health system is poorly developed, and where the doctor to patient ratio 
is high, and long queues outside doctors’ clinics and public hospitals are everyday 
features. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for doctors and other HCPS to spend 
enough time with patients in order to provide adequate information to enable valid IC.165,166 
The poor educational standards, high illiteracy levels, language difficulties, cultural belief 
systems, and the power/information asymmetry that exists in the doctor-patient 
relationship in this setting also makes it difficult for a large proportion of vulnerable African 
population groups to comprehend the medical procedures as described by 
HCPs.167,168,169,170 Consent documents, including forms and information sheets for 
treatment procedures are often written in a language that cannot be clearly understood by 
the majority of patients.171,172,173 Translation, on the other hand, may also not provide an 
accurate picture of what is at stake. Worse still, voluntary consent is sometimes 
problematic and difficult to obtain since any offer of medical assistance or other assistance 
incidental thereto will be accepted as better than nothing, based on a therapeutic 
misconception,174 which encourages undue influence. Further, the power imbalance that 
exists between a doctor and a patient may create an intimidating environment that inhibits 
patients from providing voluntary consent. 175,176,177  
 
Since the end of the apartheid era in South Africa, new laws have been introduced to 
safeguard individual human rights including provisions within the final Constitution in 
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1996.178,179,180,181 Furthermore, the evident dichotomy in the provision of health services 
in South Africa182 may also influence the practice of informed consent in this setting, 
considering that indigent patients are predominant in using overstretched public health 
facilities, while the affluent and arguable better educated patients would generally 
patronize private healthcare services.183 Moreover, most African societies, being culturally 
complex and paternalistic in nature may require that consent or approval be obtained from 
community elders/extended family members, or men as heads of households before the 
actual patients/human subjects can provide consent to medical treatment or 
research.184,185  Therefore the challenge in this type of situation is how to ensure that 
informed consent is truly voluntary and that community or surrogate consent is not 
substituted for individuals’ consent, which ideally should be obtained voluntarily in the 
absence of coercion.186 In view of the above factors, it is arguable whether the healthcare 
providers (HCPs) and healthcare users (patients) are fully aware of the current applicable 
laws and ethical regulations regarding IC in South Africa. This study, therefore, seeks to 
investigate how all these factors play themselves out in clinical practice in South Africa.  
 
1.5.1 Aims and objectives of this study 
 
 In the light of the foregoing, this study is designed to establish whether the informed 
consent obtained from patients in clinical practice in South Africa is fully informed, 
comprehensible, voluntary, and is obtained within the context of applicable local laws and 
regulations; when compared to internationally acceptable standards. The general 
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objective of this study is to establish whether informed consent is obtained from patients 
prior to involvement in clinical procedures and medical treatment in South Africa. 
 
1.5.2 The study addressed the following hypotheses: 
 
1) That there is no relationship between sufficiency of information provided to patients 
and informed consent. 
2)  That there is no relationship between comprehension of information given to 
patients and informed consent.  
3) That there is no association between mental capacity of patients and informed 
consent. 
4) That there is no association between language and informed consent. 
5) That there is no association between volition of patients and informed consent. 
6)  That there is no association between valid informed consent and clinical practice 
in South Africa. 
 
1.5.3 Specific objectives 
 
While the general objective of this study was to establish whether informed consent is 
obtained from patients prior to involvement in medical treatment or procedures in South 
Africa, the specific objectives of the study are: 
I. To find out whether sufficient information is provided to patients in clinical practice 
before consent is sought. 
II. To establish whether patients involved in clinical procedures understand the 
information provided. 
III. To establish whether consent is obtained from patients voluntarily and without 
coercion or undue influence. 
IV. To establish whether informed consent provided by patients in clinical practice in 
South Africa is truly valid. 
V. To evaluate by means of a review of the legal literature, whether South African 
courts are applying the requirements of recently enacted laws, specifically, the 
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National Health Act 61 of 2003,187 when arriving at legal decisions pertaining to 
informed consent in medical practice. 
 
1.5.4 Research questions 
 
1) Is sufficient information provided to patients involved in clinical practice before 
consent is obtained in South Africa? 
2) Do patients understand the medical procedure or treatment option before they 
provide consent? 
3) Are patients undergoing medical procedures in South Africa generally competent 
to consent to such treatment? 
4) Do patients involved in medical procedures in South Africa consent voluntarily?  
5)  Is the informed consent given by patients in medical practice in South Africa truly 
valid? 
 
1.6 Significance of the study 
 
The study will be significant by improving the quality of informed consent and care 
provided to patients in clinical practice in South Africa. It will also enhance the protection 
of human rights and respect for persons; reducing potential litigation arising due to failure 
to obtain valid IC from patients, thereby enhancing the ethical and human rights 
responsibilities of HCPs towards healthcare users. The results of the study will assist in 
improving patients’ education and awareness; reinforcement of patients’ human rights and 
protections; and be beneficial to lawmakers in drafting better regulations, and in enforcing 
current laws and regulations to assist in medical practice. The study may also assist in 
the design of improved and new consent documents and information sheets, aimed at 
obtaining valid informed consent from patients undergoing medical procedures in clinical 
practice. The study results will disseminated via published academic papers and a thesis 
designed to further knowledge  and future investigations in the field of informed consent, 
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healthcare law, and medical jurisprudence with particular relevance to South Africa, and 
other African countries, and common law jurisdictions.  
 
1.7 Research design and methodology 
 
The empirical design for this study is based on a quantitative descriptive cross sectional 
design in contemporary clinical practice settings. This approach was followed because 
the time between procuring informed consent and medical treatment is very short and 
patients are normally in hospital for a limited time. The descriptive approach allowed HCPs 
and patients to describe their experience with the informed consent process as it 
happened, thereby bringing out the required information. In addition I analysed the current 
relevant case law from South Africa and other common law jurisdictions, as well as the 
current academic literature pertaining to informed consent;  to  elucidate any similarities 
or differences between the practice of informed in South Africa and similar legal 
jurisdictions within the context of an interdisciplinary legal analysis. 
 
1.7.1 Triangulation 
 
Triangulation refers to a “combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon,”188 or the use of multiple data sources in an investigation to produce 
understanding.189 The original purpose of triangulation was to seek confirmation of 
apparent findings, or in other words, consistency. More recently, it has also been used for 
completeness purposes. Triangulation also refers to the use of multiple references to draw 
conclusions about what constitutes the truth.190,191 Generally, four types of triangulation 
have been described,192 comprising: 
                                                          
188 Denzin NK (ed) Sociological methods: A sourcebook (Routledge New York 2017) 31. 
189  Robert Wood Johnson Foundation “Triangulation” Qualitative Research Guidelines Project 
 www.qualres.org/HomeTria-3692.html (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
190  Begley C “Using triangulation in nursing research“1996 J Adv Nurs 122-128.  
191  Taylor BJ Research in nursing and practice: Evidence for practice (Cengage Australia 2006) 
 235. 
192  Patton MQ “Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis” 1999 HSR: Health 
 Services Research 1189-1208 see also Robert Wood Johnson Foundation “Triangulation” 
 www.qualres.org/HomeTria-3692.html. 
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I. Data triangulation - this involves the use of multiple data sources in a study to get 
diverse points of view as an aid in validating the conclusions. Data triangulation 
may include either  
a) Time triangulation-whereby the researcher collects data from the same sources at 
different points in time; 
b) Space triangulation-whereby the researcher collects data from different locations 
during the same study; or 
c)  Person triangulation-whereby the researcher collects data from different 
individuals or groups to as part of the same study. 
II. Investigator triangulation - this refers to the use of two or more trained 
researchers to analyse and interpret the same set of data in arriving at a 
conclusion. 
III. Theory triangulation - this is the use of competing theories or hypotheses in the 
analysis and interpretation of a single set of data. 
IV. Method triangulation - this would involve the use of multiple methodologies in 
collecting data about the same phenomenon). 193,194 
Therefore, triangulation may involve the use of: 
 different data collection tools with the same sample of participants; 
 different qualitative methodologies to answer the same research question; 
 a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methodologies to answer the 
same research question; 
 the same data collection tools with different samples.195  
Redfern and Norman (1994)196 summarized the advantages of triangulation to include the 
following: 
                                                          
193  Denzin N The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods to 3rd ed 
 (McGraw-Hill New York 1989) 297. 
194  Begley 1996 J Adv Nurs 122-128. 
195  Taylor Research in nursing and practice 235. 
196  Redfern SJ and Norman J “Validity through triangulation” 1994 Nurse Researcher 41-56. 
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- overcoming the bias of single-method, single-observer and single theory studies; 
- increasing confidence in the results; 
- providing an understanding of the domain; 
- overcoming the elite bias of naturalistic research; 
- allowing divergent results to enrich explanation.197,198 
 
In the present study, I applied the techniques of ‘data triangulation’ in the form of person-
triangulation, whereby I collected data from doctors, nurses and patients. Further I have 
used a form of ‘space triangulation’ whereby I have collected data from different public 
hospitals and clinical sites to evaluate the practice of informed consent in different clinical 
settings and locations in order to check for consistency and completeness of data, and to 
validate the results of the study reported in this thesis. 
1.8 Study populations and sources of data  
 
1.8.1 Target population groups 
 
Practicing healthcare professionals (medical doctors and professional nurses) and 
healthcare users (patients), attending selected provincial public hospitals within 
EThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban), Kwazulu-Natal Province (KZN), were 
selected by random sampling to participate in this study. Randomization occurred at the 
level of health care facility, whereby provincial hospitals in EThekwini were stratified 
alphabetically and then randomly selected for inclusion in the study. Individual participants 
at the selected institutions, whether doctors, nurses or patients had an equal chance to 
participate voluntarily in the study. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
197  Begley J Adv Nurs 1996 122-128. 
198  Taylor Research in nursing and practice 235. 
30 
 
1.8.2 Categories of nurses in South Africa 
 
There are three main categories of registered nurses in South Africa. These are 
professional nurses, staff nurses and nursing auxiliaries. There are also nursing assistants 
and student nurses.199  
i. Professional nurse - A professional nurse (PN) or registered nurse or 
midwife (RN) (sometimes called a nursing sister), is an individual who has 
completed a four-year programme at university or a nursing college. This 
person is educated and competent to practice comprehensive nursing and 
midwifery.200  
ii. Staff nurse - A staff nurse also known as an enrolled nurse refers to a 
registered nurse with a minimum of two years tertiary nursing education. 
iii. Auxiliary nurse - These are nurses with one year of nursing education from 
a nursing school.201 
iv. Inclusion criteria:  As stated, there are three categories of registered 
nurses in South Africa, professional nurses, staff nurses and nursing 
auxiliaries as described above. In this study only nurses in the categories of 
“professional nurse” and “enrolled or staff nurse’” were included. Nurses 
working in the surgical, internal medicine, paediatric, obstetrics and 
gynaecology, wards and clinics that were available and willing to participate 
during the site visit and study period were given an equal opportunity to 
participate in the study. 
v. Exclusion criteria:  Apart from the  two categories of registered nurses as 
specified above; all other categories of nurses, including student nurses 
studying for Bachelor degrees, were excluded from this study. The objective 
was to ascertain the level of knowledge of practising professional nurses in 
the field. 
 
                                                          
199  South African Nursing Council (SANC) Strategic plan for nurse education training and practice 
 2012/13 – 2016/17 (SANC Pretoria 2012) 21. 
200  Health Personnel www.hst.org.za/healthstats/index (Date of use: 28 February 2011). 
201  SANC Strategic plan for nurse education training and practice 21.  
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1.8.3 Medical Practitioners  
 
For medical doctors, all qualified medical doctors including specialists registered with the 
Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and currently engaged in clinical 
practice and working in the selected hospitals, who voluntarily agreed to participate in the 
study, were included. 
1.8.4 Patients 
 
a) Inclusion criteria:  All patients in the selected hospitals in the surgical, internal 
medicine, paediatric, obstetrics and gynaecology, wards and outpatient clinics had an 
equal chance of participating in the study, if they were available and willing to 
participate voluntarily during the site visit to the hospital.  
b) Exclusion criteria:  Patients with severe mental incapacity due to mental health or 
behavioural disorders such as unconsciousness, and those who are unable to provide 
informed consent either by themselves or by means of a guardian, were excluded from 
the study. Similarly, minors below the legal age of consent whose guardians or parents 
were absent during the study to provide informed consent, were excluded from the 
study. 
1.9 Research Setting 
1.9.1 Study location 
 
This study was carried out at selected public hospitals within EThekwini metropolitan 
municipality (Durban city and environs) in KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. 
EThekwini metropolitan municipality comprises a major urban city (Durban) and semi-
urban areas (townships) with a population of around 3.2 million people (2010 estimate).202 
Based on statistics from KZN department of Health, there are 17 public hospitals in 
EThekwini municipality.203 According to Terre-Blanche and others, 30% of the population 
                                                          
202  Statistics South Africa http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=ethekwini-municipality 
 (Date of use: 26 April 2016). 
203  KZN Department of Health http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/district1.htm (Date of use: 12 April 
 2016). 
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is adequate when conducting a descriptive study.204 Therefore, six (6) provincial/public 
hospitals were finally included in this study.205 Figure 1 below shows a map of EThekwini 
municipality showing the approximate locations of Level 1 healthcare facilities (district and 
regional hospitals) included in the study. 
 
1.9.2 Selected hospitals and sampling procedures 
 
As mentioned above, citing Terre-Blanche (2008),206 thirty percent of any population is 
generally adequate when conducting a cross-sectional descriptive study. Since this study 
was limited to public hospitals, out of the 17 public hospitals, six were randomly selected 
as study sites for this research study.  Multi-stage stratified random sampling was used to 
select eligible hospital sites. The hospitals were first stratified by authority (provincial or 
private) and then selected using systematic random sampling. This was done by arranging 
the public hospitals by name alphabetically. Then every third hospital from the list was 
then selected. Further, purposive sampling was used to include the two central tertiary 
teaching hospitals within eThekwini municipality, because they were likely to yield the 
largest number of study participants, i.e. professional nurses, doctors at all levels including 
specialists and interns and a variety of patients and HCPs in various clinical departments 
to assist with a more robust sample population. The rest of the hospitals within the 
municipality were randomly sampled as described above. Random selection of the public 
health hospitals for the study ensured that patients from all socio-economic strata were 
covered and eligible for inclusion. Further, HCPs with different types of clinical practice 
experience regarding informed consent were thereby included in the study.  
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 Press Cape Town 2008) 50. 
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1.10 Research instruments 
 
Data was collected using separate questionnaires for HCPs and healthcare users 
(patients). Two different semi-structured questionnaires with open and close-ended 
questionnaires were applied to patients and HCPs. The questionnaires used are included 
in Appendices 1 and 2 of this thesis.207 Further, patient questionnaires were further 
translated from English into the dominant South African language spoken in KZN 
province-IsiZulu (Appendix 3). Translation of this questionnaire was done by a qualified 
translator from the Department of IsiZulu Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN). 
The patient interviews were conducted in the surgical, internal Medicine, paediatrics, 
obstetrics, gynaecology, departments of the hospitals under study, including inpatient, and 
outpatient departments. The questionnaires were distributed by hand to HCPs working in 
the selected hospitals under study. Further, patients had the option of completing the 
interviews in either English or IsiZulu, and had the option of filling the questionnaires out 
by themselves or having the questions read out by a trained bilingual research 
assistant/interviewer who recorded the answers verbatim. Three research assistants who 
were trained on the questionnaire and interview methods conducted the patient 
interviews. HCPs completed the questionnaires on their own after providing and signing 
informed consent documents.  Therefore, in this study, I used two separate semi-
structured questionnaires for HCPs and another for the patients.  Samples of both 
questionnaires are shown in appendices 1 to 3 of this thesis.  
 
1.10.1 Description of questionnaire for healthcare professionals (HCPS)  
 
The questionnaire for HCPs (doctors and nurses) was designed in 4 sections as shown 
in Appendix 1, but a brief description is provided here. The first section was used to obtain 
information about respondent demographics or dependent variables, such as age, sex, 
job title, position, department in the hospital, years of professional experience, clinical 
speciality, etc. The second part of the questionnaires contained questions about informed 
consent practices such as; time spent on obtaining informed consent, patient workload,  
                                                          
207   See appendices 1 to 3. 
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information disclosed to patients, language and methods used to communicate with 
patients; understanding of information by patients and challenges faced by HCPs when 
obtaining informed consent from patients. The third section of the questionnaire asked 
general knowledge questions about local healthcare laws such as ‘age of consent to 
medical treatment’ and ‘age of consent to termination of pregnancy’, and standards of 
information disclosure. The fourth section solicited questions about HCPs knowledge and 
practices regarding implied or presumed consent in clinical practice. The questionnaire 
for HCPs was first circulated for comment by a small sample of doctors and nurses and 
was then modified based on comments from initial participants prior to distribution to all 
eligible and agreeable HCPs. The questionnaires were distributed by hand at all selected 
hospital sites by research assistants and retrieved by hand after completion by 
respondents at their own convenience. Participation in the study and completion of the 
questionnaire was entirely voluntary. 
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Figure 1:  Approximate location of level 1 healthcare facilities in EThekwini municipality208 
                                                          
208  CSIR “Geographic accessibility study of social facility and government service points for the 
 Metropolitan cities of Johannesburg and eThekwini 2011/12” CSIR/BE/SPS/ER/2012/0061/B 
 (2012) (Date of Use: 15 October 2017). 
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1.10.2 Description of questionnaire for patients 
 
The main study instrument for patients was a semi‑structured questionnaire in English 
language, which was also translated into IsiZulu, the dominant language spoken by about 
81% of the population of KZN.209 Professional translation of this questionnaire was done 
by the Department of IsiZulu studies, UKZN. The questionnaire consists of three sections 
as shown appendices 2 and 3. The first section collected sociodemographic data; 
including age, sex, marital status, employment status, educational level, income and living 
situation of patient participants. These served as dependent variables. The second part 
of the patient questionnaire was used to gather information on independent variables such 
as details of patient experiences of IC when interacting or when receiving treatment from 
HCPS. The section contained questions about time spent on the clinical encounter, 
information disclosed by HCPs to patients before obtaining consent, methods and 
language used to communicate with patients, satisfaction level with information 
disclosure, and completeness of information disclosure, understanding and the absence 
of coercion or undue influence by HCPs during clinical encounters. The third part of the 
patient questionnaire asked questions about patient’s general knowledge, understanding, 
and opinions on IC, such as ‘the legal age of consent to treatment’, who assisted patient 
in obtaining informed consent, or making decisions regarding medical treatment as well 
open ended questions regarding patients level of satisfaction with their clinical encounters 
and communications with local HCPs. Participants were interviewed by three trained 
bilingual research assistants. Those patients who were able to read and write and 
preferred were allowed to complete the questionnaire by themselves and return to 
research assistant at the same clinical site during the site visit.  Patient respondents had 
the option of completing questionnaires either in English or IsiZulu or their preferred 
language. Patient participation was entirely voluntary and questionnaires were completed 
by parents or guardians in the case of children or individuals not capable of giving 
informed consent themselves. 
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1.11 Sampling procedures  
 
Multi-stage stratified random sampling was used to select participating hospitals. 
Purposive sampling was used to include the two central/ regional tertiary hospitals within 
eThekwini municipality because they contain the largest number of medical doctors 
including specialists as well as professional nurses. The rest of the district hospitals within 
the municipality was randomly sampled.  A total of five hospitals from Durban and one 
outlying hospital in nearby Pietermaritzburg with rotating surgical registrars from Durban 
were included in the study. Therefore, a total of six provincial/public hospitals were 
included in this study population. 
 
1.11.1  Sample size calculations 
 
Preliminary sample size for each group of study participants was calculated using a web 
based sample size calculator by Raosoft ®.210 Based on the formula for sample size with 
the margin of error set at 5%. Based on the above assumptions the estimated sample size 
for each category of participants was: 
 
A. 360 Medical Practitioners (doctors including specialists) 
B. 373 Professional nurses 
C. 385 Patients 
 
The above numbers gave an estimated total sample size for this study cohort at 1118 
participants.  This served as a baseline for the number of participants to be recruited in 
each respondent/ participant category for the entire study. Participant recruitment and 
hospital site visits were conducted during a 3-month period extending from March to June 
2012. Multiple visits to study sites were made to selected hospitals during this period after 
obtaining research ethics approval from the various regulatory authorities and gate-
keepers at each institution.  The actual distribution of the questionnaires was conducted 
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by three trained research assistants who also were at the minimum bilingual in 
(English/Zulu/Xhosa/Sotho). The research assistants distributed the questionnaires to 
willing participants and made arrangements to collect same at the respondents’ 
convenience. Multiple visits were made to the various study sites to aid participant 
recruitment until the maximum number willing to participate was reached. In case of 
patients, the estimated sample size for patients was exceeded by 5% (20) patients to 
compensate for incomplete forms or ineligibility. 
 
1.12 Data collection, storage and analysis 
 
Primary data was collected using questionnaires and patient interviews as described 
above. Further, case law and statutes from data available in the public domain, as well as 
applicable regulations were obtained by review of literature. In addition, currently used 
standard consent documents or consent forms were collected from the various selected 
hospitals. The data from the questionnaires was filled out by hand and stored in a locked 
cabinet to maintain participant confidentiality and security. Then at the end of each 
collection date or site visit, the questionnaires were entered into a single laptop computer 
by one of the trained research assistants who also doubled as a data capturer. The raw 
data was evaluated for completeness and accuracy by the principal investigator (myself) 
and also cross-checked prior to analysis by a qualified biostatistician.  
 
1.12.1 Statistical methods 
 
The software used for data capturing storage and analysis was the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS versions 18- 22 IBM Corporation Armonk New York).211  
Descriptive statistics such as proportions, median, mode and interquartile range were 
used to summarize the data. Bar charts, pie chart and graphs were used to present the 
results, using Microsoft Excel.212 The scores for comprehension of informed consent were 
worked out from the responses. The Mann-Whitney test was used to examine the 
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212  Microsoft Corp Microsoft Excel for Windows (Microsoft Corp Seattle 2010). 
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difference in scores between doctors and nurses and other applicable variables. Kruskal-
Wallis test was used to examine the relationship between (1) education level and the 
scores, (2) Clinical department and scores and (3) Profession and the scores, income 
level and scores etc., as will be described in the results and findings sections. Chi-squared 
tests or Fisher’s exact test were used to test association between any categorical 
variables in the study, as well as analysing and comparing the informed consent 
aggregate scores (ICAS) scores between various cadres of HCPs as will be detailed 
further in chapters 5-7 of this thesis. 
 
1.12.2 Validity and reliability of statistical methods 
 
 
The study design and statistical methodology proposed for this study were reviewed and 
validated by a consultant biostatistician at College of Health Sciences, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The statistical methodology of the study was further 
evaluated and approved by the knowledge management and strategic services division of 
the KZN Department of Health, before approval of the proposed research proposal (see 
annexure 5). 
 
1.12.3 Work Units  
 
The wards and clinics in each participating hospital were also be randomly sampled. The 
aim was to sample about 30% of the wards at each selected hospital.213 Thereafter eligible 
HCPs and patients in the wards and outpatient clinics who were willing to participate in 
the study were all given a chance to participate in the study by completing the 
questionnaires. Generally, the OPDs were randomly selected on the day of visit by the 
researcher and research assistants. Patients and HCPs were then approached by the 
research assistants, those who were willing participants were given the informed consent 
documents to read and sign. Then the study instrument (questionnaire) was handed over 
to the participant to complete for HCPs, and for patients those who preferred were given 
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the questionnaires to complete by themselves, while those who wanted the questions to 
be read out, the research assistant would read out the questions and record the answers 
given by the patients verbatim onto the questionnaire. 
 
1.13 Ethical considerations 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from a subcommittee of UNISA Research Ethics 
Committee (annexure 4), and local permits were obtained from the KZN Department of 
Health knowledge and strategic management division as well as the eThekwini 
municipality department of health after review of the research proposal (annexure 5). 
Further approvals were contained from each selected local hospital administration after 
evaluation of research proposals and ethical approvals (annexure 6). Finally, informed 
consent was obtained from every participant in the research study, after full information 
disclosure and signing of the consent form prior to participation in the study (appendices 
4 and 5). Participant confidentiality was maintained by safe storage of data and 
anonymization of data, research results were also be reported anonymously. 
 
1.14 Scope and limitations of the study 
 
Due to limited resources, the length of time allocated and data collection procedures for 
this study were limited to selected public hospitals within eThekwini metropolitan 
municipality, KZN, province, South Africa. The study among HCPs was also limited to 
medical practitioners and professional nurses in the clinical departments or units of 
Internal medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Paediatrics at the selected 
hospitals. The study period was also limited to a 3-month period from April to June 2012 
due to resource limitations. 
 
1.15 Assumptions of the study 
 
In carrying out this study, it is assumed that medical doctors, nurses and patients in the 
selected hospitals and departments will freely and willingly provide the requisite 
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information. It was further assumed that HCPs and patients will be willing to give accurate 
information. It was also assumed that necessary ethical approvals will be given by the 
regulatory authorities and participants. 
 
1.16 Definition of key concepts and terms 
 
i. Information disclosure in this study will be defined as sufficient and adequate 
when it includes diagnosis, risks, benefits, alternatives to the procedure, and the 
right of refusal. 
ii. Comprehension in this study will be defined as the ability to understand, in a 
language or signs that can be communicated between the doctor and the patient. 
iii. Volition in this study will be defined as free from coercion, undue influence or 
deception.  
iv. Valid informed consent in this study will be defined as comprising five key 
elements, information disclosure, competence, comprehension, voluntariness and 
consent or agreement to the procedure. 
v. Capacity in this study will be defined as the legal capacity to consent to a medical 
intervention or procedure. 
vi. Professional nurse - a professional nurse (PN) or registered nurse or midwife 
(RN) (sometimes called a nursing sister), is an individual who has completed a four 
year programme at university or a nursing College. This person is educated and 
competent to practice comprehensive nursing and midwifery.214  
vii. Enrolled or staff nurse - a staff nurse refers to a registered nurse with a minimum 
of 2-years tertiary nursing education.215 
viii. Medical Practitioner - a qualified medical doctor including specialists registered 
with the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) and currently 
engaged in clinical practice. 
ix. Healthcare user or patient – a person attending the hospital or healthcare facility 
to seek treatment. 
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x. Public hospital - refers to a hospital owned and managed by a provincial 
government in South Africa.  These hospitals are usually non-profit and free to the 
public. There are three main categories of public hospitals in South Arica, namely:  
tertiary (specialist, teaching hospitals), regional (specialized), or district hospitals 
(general medical services). 
 
1.17 Summary of chapter 1 and conceptual outline of the study 
 
This study may be described as a multidisciplinary legal research because it draws on 
an integration and application of the disciplines and methodologies of law, medicine, 
social sciences, biostatistics and epidemiology to evaluate the quality of informed 
consent as practiced in South African public hospitals. At the same time, this is an 
example of interdisciplinary legal research by definition because it was conducted by a 
researcher with advanced expertise in medicine and law.216 Since this is an 
interdisciplinary/ multidisciplinary thesis, the empirical studies included in part two of this 
thesis have been written using a recognizable  method for reporting scientific papers 
the-the IMRaD format.217 IMRaD is an acronym for introduction- methods-results-and-
discussion. The IMRaD format is a way of structuring a scientific article. It is often used 
in health care and the natural sciences, but unlike articles or theses in the social 
sciences, the IMRaD format does not include a separate theory chapter,218 and 
therefore there may be noticeable theoretical repetitions in this thesis. However, a 
synthesis of both the theoretical and empirical research results are fully integrated and 
discussed in chapter 8 of this thesis.  
                                                          
216  Kroeze IJ "Legal research methodology and the myth of interdisciplinarity” 2013 Potchefstroom 
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 http://www.jpgmonline.com/documents/author/24/2_Aggarwal_10.pdf see also 
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In concluding this chapter, one may argue that this study is consistent with Kon’s 
hierarchies of empirical ethics research219 whereby Kon describes four categories of 
empirical ethics enquiry as: 
I.  “lay of the land” studies which are usually overviews of current practices and the 
status quo,  
II. the second level of study involves “ideal versus reality studies”, which attempt 
to map out how well clinical practice matches normative ethical principles or ideas, 
III. the third level of this hierarchy involves “improving care studies” which focuses 
on how we can bring ethical ideals closer to match normative practice,  
IV. the fourth element of these hierarchy “changing ethical norms” studies focuses 
on how we can bring together data from various empirical studies to inform or 
change current ethical norms  
This study is consistent with Kon’s categories 1 and 2 which are described as “lay of the 
land” studies designed to evaluate current practice of informed consent by HCPs at public 
hospitals in South Africa. It also includes elements of “ideal versus reality” type study 
designed to map out how well current clinical practice matches normative principles of 
ethics and current legal regulations regarding informed consent as laid down by and 
contained in case law, current legislation, and ethical guidelines, especially in the context 
of the regulations regarding informed consent as codified in the National Health Act 61 of 
2003.220 
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CHAPTER 2 – BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In chapter one, I provided a detailed overview and orientation to this thesis. In this 
chapter, I elaborate further on the background studies underlying this thesis starting with 
definitions of consent, consent to treatment, and what makes consent valid. This will be 
followed by a discussion of the key elements of informed consent, starting with 
competence or decision making capacity (DMC), including analysis of standards of 
DMC, fluctuating capacity, and DMC in incompetent patients as well as children 
including ‘mature minors’. I will also explore the unique context of consent to termination 
pregnancy in South Africa. Furthermore, I will discuss the other key elements of IC 
including voluntariness, and forms of undue influence affecting IC. This will be followed 
by analysis of information disclosure, including standards for information disclosure in 
the context South African law, as well as comparative analysis of the South African case 
law with other common law jurisdictions. As previously discussed in chapter one, there is 
a paucity of legal discourse and clarity regarding information disclosure in South African 
case law. Some South African legal scholars have suggested that South African courts 
have not endeavoured to develop the common law on informed consent as envisaged 
by the Constitution.221 Such commentators have also suggested that in several cases 
brought to South African courts, since the National Health Act (NHA)222 was enacted, the 
courts have been reluctant to apply the regulations laid down in the NHA with regards to 
the legal application of the IC doctrine in medical practice.223,224 In addition, some South 
African legal scholars have since argued that the SCA might have erred in its judgment 
in the Oldwage case,225 because it applied the discredited reasonable doctor standard of 
information disclosure rather than the more accepted prudent patients’ standard as 
established in the Castell case.226 Furthermore, it has been suggested that in arriving at 
                                                          
221  The Constitution s39. 
222  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
223  Britz R and Roux 2012 SAMJ 746-748. 
224  Thomas R 2007SALJ 188-215. 
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its decision in the Oldwage case,227 the SCA did not pay attention to the judgments from 
similar cases in other comparable common law jurisdictions like England,228 Canada,229 
and Australia.230  it has also been argued that this failure to clarify issues do not appear 
to be consistent with constitutional provisions for respect for security, privacy, and bodily 
integrity as elucidated in section 12 of the Constitution.231 Further, it has been suggested 
that the judgment of the SCA in the Oldwage case,232 and other judgments in Richter 
and Another v Estate Hamman,233 and the recent judgment by a full bench of the Cape 
High Court in the case of McDonald v Wroe,234 might be inconsistent with the 
constitutional provisions to expand the common law by reference to judgments from 
foreign legal jurisdictions when interpreting the Bill of Rights or when interpreting any 
South African legislation.235 It can also be argued that the SCA should have taken into 
consideration the current regulations regarding informed consent as elucidated in 
the National Health Act.236 Therefore, to correct or address this anomaly, it was 
important in this thesis to discuss and refer to case law from other common law 
jurisdictions in North America, England and Australia when discussing the standards of 
information disclosure and other key elements of IC in this thesis. The rest of chapter 
two then discusses briefly the differences between IC in biomedical research and 
treatment.  I also discuss the exceptions to the IC doctrine including public policy, the 
doctrine necessity including the Roman-Dutch law doctrine of negotiorum gestio, 
Further, I elaborate on the doctrines of best interests, therapeutic privilege and waivers 
to informed consent. The rest of the chapter then focuses on factors affecting the 
comprehension of IC including the problem of language barriers and information 
overload. Moreover, I explore other factors that would make consent or agreement 
to medical treatment valid or what constitutes the elements of ‘true’ or valid consent. 
Finally I discuss the different types of IC including express consent, ‘broad’ or open 
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consent, implied or presumed consent, the problems and implications of consent forms, 
and the limits, durations, and refusals of informed consent. 
 
2.1 What is consent? 
 
Consent may be defined as the voluntary and ongoing permission of an individual for a 
particular purpose. The Oxford English dictionary237 defines consent as a noun, 
‘agreement’, or as verb ‘permission’. From its etymological origin in Latin, ‘consent’ is 
derived from two words ‘con’-‘together’ and ‘sentire’- feel. Therefore, consent may be 
described roughly as ‘feel together’, which denotes shared decision-making. However, 
this practice of shared decision-making has never been fully recognized in medical 
practice, with doctors and other HCPs generally requiring patients to give permission or 
agree to medical interventions without a complete understanding by the patient, or full 
disclosure by the HCP, of what the patient is required to consent or agree to.  It has thus 
been suggested that consent in healthcare can have several meanings. On the one hand, 
consent as an agreement can create a ‘contract’, which is generally binding on both 
parties. This was demonstrated in the American case of Grimes v Kennedy Krieger 
Institute (hereinafter Grimes v KKI),238 where the Maryland Court of Appeals, held that 
consent can create a contract enforceable by law if consent agreements contain 
provisions where “mutual assent, offer, acceptance, and consideration exist”.239 The Court 
held that researcher/human subject consent in nontherapeutic research can create a 
contract, where a contract would mean “a written or spoken agreement intended to be 
enforceable by law”,240 although the Court refused to make a determination as to whether 
IC in a therapeutic research context or medical treatment can create contractual 
obligations.241 According to Gillon,242 consent as a simple agreement is not applicable to 
medical treatment. He suggests that consent to treatment means “a voluntary, uncoerced 
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decision, made by a sufficiently competent or autonomous person on the basis of 
adequate information and deliberation, to accept rather than reject some proposed course 
of action that will affect him or her.”243  
 
It has been suggested that consent, when viewed as a contractual agreement would not 
normally give the patient or consenter the unilateral and autonomous right to withdraw 
from a medical procedure which entails invasion of bodily integrity, privacy and self-
determination.244, 245 As demonstrated in Ciarlariello v Schactr:246  
 
 An individual’s right to determine what medical procedure will be accepted must include the 
 right to stop the procedure…the patients right to bodily integrity provides the basis for the 
 withdrawal of a consent to a medical procedure even while it is underway. Thus if it is found 
 that the consent is effectively withdrawn during the course of the procedure, then it must be 
 terminated.247  
 
On the other hand, it has been suggested that in South Africa, where the law on consent 
to treatment is based on the Roman-Dutch law maxim of volenti non fit injuria or voluntary 
assumption of risk, the particulars of claim in cases of lack of consent before treatment 
would if based on legal principles include a “breach of contract, or alternatively breach of 
a legal duty [delict], or alternatively assault”.248 The authors conclude that in the absence 
of these elements in a particulars of claim when failure to obtain IC is alleged, this 
illustrates that consent to treatment in medical law may transcend the boundaries of 
law.249 This observation somehow corroborates Gillon’s assertion that consent as a simple 
agreement or contract is not applicable in the context of medical treatment.250 These 
observations were further reinforced by the judgment of the Missouri Court of Appeals in 
the case of Moore v Webb,251 where the court opined that the relationship between doctor 
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and patient is based on a fiduciary duty of trust and not merely contract as in other trade 
agreements, stating: 
 
This question is not to be ruled by the law of trade and commerce governing transactions  between 
parties who deal at arms-length in the market place. It is to be viewed in the light of the physician-
patient relationship which existed between the parties…A physician occupies a position of trust and 
confidence as regards his patient - a fiduciary position. It is his duty to act with the utmost good 
faith. This duty of the physician flows from the relationship with his patient and is fixed by law - not 
by the contract of employment….The law's exaction of good faith extends to all dealings between 
the physician and the patient. A person in ill health is more subject to the domination and influence 
of another than is a person of sound body and mind. The physician has unusual opportunity to 
influence his patient. Hence, all transactions between physician and patient are closely scrutinized 
by the courts which must be assured of the fairness of those dealings. In regard to any contract 
between physician and patient, it is the rule that the physician has the burden of proving that the 
patient entered into it voluntarily  and advisedly, and without undue influence.252 
The above observations may have led Maclean to conclude that “consent to treatment is 
either not an agreement or it is a particular kind of agreement that does not impose a 
binding obligation on the consenter”.253 He suggests that one can therefore conceive of 
consent to treatment and healthcare decision-making as comprising of two aspects which 
include consent as an ‘agreement’ and consent as ‘permission’. Whereas the former 
creates obligations between the HCP and the patient, the latter waives the obligation of 
non-interference with the patient’s bodily integrity and well-being.254  
Other commentators have conceived of consent to treatment as a process of shared 
healthcare decision-making that can encompass both the ethical principles of respect for 
autonomy and beneficence, in the doctor-patient relationship. 255 Ultimately, consent in 
medical law has the function of licensing that which would otherwise be regarded in some 
jurisdictions as battery.256 Further, consents other role during medical treatment is to 
provide the rights bearer with control of that right, by transforming an ordinarily illegitimate 
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act into a permitted one.257 According to Alexander,258 consent functions as a moral 
transformative by altering the obligations and permissions that determine the rightness or 
wrongfulness of others actions.259 The concept of consent to treatment as being part of 
the fiduciary duty between doctors and patients was demonstrated in Moore v Webb, as 
summarized above.260 In this case, a patient brought an action in trespass against a 
defendant dentist for removing all her teeth without her permission. The facts were that 
the patient had agreed with her personal physician for partial removal of some teeth, which 
were contained in a referral note to a dentist to carry out the procedure. The patient 
presented the note to the dentist; whereby the dentist without obtaining additional IC or 
further discussion; and while the patient was under the influence of pre-anaesthetic drugs, 
requested that she sign a consent form. The dentists then proceeded to remove all of the 
patients’ teeth. The patient brought and action in trespass against the dentist and she was 
awarded damages by a lower court. The dentists appealed the lower court decision based 
on the fact that she had signed a consent document entitled: “Permit for Operation", which 
stipulated that: "This is to certify that I, the undersigned, consent to the performing of 
whatever operation may be decided upon to be necessary or advisable, and the use of 
local or general anaesthetic as indicated. I desire to have Extraction or Surgery as shown 
upon the examination chart above". 261 The appellant dentists argued that this "permit" 
provided a general authority enabling them to take out all of plaintiff's teeth if required. 
They argued that such a written instrument which plaintiff should have read, and that she 
is estopped from avoiding it by her failure to do so. In support of this proposition 
defendants relied upon the general law of contract and cases involving commercial 
contracts and releases.262 The Missouri Court of Appeals disagreed (citing various 
authorities); and stated in their judgment that consent to treatment agreements are to be 
viewed in the light of the physician-patient relationship which exists between both 
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parties.263 The Court argued that physician occupies a position of trust and confidence as 
regards his patient, that is, a fiduciary position. It is therefore the doctor’s duty to act with 
the utmost good faith. This duty of the physician flows from the relationship with his patient 
and is fixed by law and not by the contract of employment.264 Hence, all transactions 
between doctors and patients’ are closely scrutinized by the courts, which must be 
assured of the fairness of those dealings, with regards to any contract between physician 
and patient.  It is the rule that a doctor has the burden of proving that the patient entered 
into the agreement voluntarily and advisedly, and without undue influence.265  From the 
above one can conclude that the consent between a physician and the patient is governed 
not only by contractual obligations, but also by the professional and ethical rules of truth 
telling and fidelity, which go beyond the ordinary rules of general contractual agreements. 
2.2 Consent to treatment 
 
The question arises whether there is any self-evident principle, which compels patients to 
consent to medical treatment without their consent. In the United Kingdom, Judge LJ 
denied the existence of such an ‘axiomatic principle’ by borrowing the words of 
McCullough J in R v Hallstrom when he said:  
 
There is… no canon of construction which presumes that Parliament intended that people should, 
against their will, be subjected to treatment which others, however professionally competent, 
perceive, however, sincerely and however correctly, to be in their best interests ...It goes without 
saying that unless clear statutory authority to the contrary exists, no one is to be detained in hospital 
or to undergo medical treatment or even to submit himself to medical examination without his 
consent. That is true for a mentally disordered person as that of anyone else.266  
 
Similarly, in the American case of Re Cruzan,267 the United States Supreme Court averred 
with regard to an individual’s right to autonomy and bodily integrity, where Rehnquist CJ 
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opined that: “[n]o right is held more sacred or is carefully guarded by the common law. 
Than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free 
from all restraint or interference of another;”268 quoting the judgment of the US Supreme 
Court in Union Pacific Railway v Botsford 1891 with agreement ,269 where Gray J stated 
that “No right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded in the common law than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others unless by clear unquestionable authority of law.”270 In 
this context, Gray J was citing Cooley J who averred that “the right to one’s person may 
be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let alone”.271 Therefore, it is an 
established ethical and legal principle that a medical doctor or other healthcare 
professional who provides medical treatment or performs a surgical procedure on a patient 
without his or her consent is prima facie guilty of both a tort (or a delict) and a crime.272 
The crime would be tantamount to an assault or trespass to the person, and the tort or 
delict would be based on negligence due to failure to follow established professional rules 
enforced by law.273 In this context, the UK Law Commission274 proposed that: “A person 
should not be guilty of an offence, notwithstanding that he or she causes injury to another, 
of whatever degree of seriousness, if such injury is caused during the course of proper 
medical treatment or care administered with the consent of that other person.” The 
commission goes further to define ‘medical treatment’ as: 
 
Medical treatment or care administered by or under the direction of a duly qualified medical 
practitioner. This includes not only surgical and dental treatment or care, but also procedures taken 
for the purposes of diagnosis, prevention of disease, the prevention of pregnancy or ancillary to 
treatment.275 
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In this thesis ‘medical treatment‘ will be applied as generic terminology covering all forms 
of medical examination, assessment, diagnosis, and all procedures whether surgical, 
medical or psychiatric, dental or nursing, which involve any physical touching or 
penetration of the patient’s body, however trivial.276 Medical treatment should also be 
distinguished from ‘medical research’, which the Council for International Organizations 
of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) defines as a class of activity designed to develop or 
contribute to generalizable knowledge in the form of theories, principles or relationships, 
or the accumulation of information on which they are based, that can be corroborated by 
accepted scientific methods of observation and inference. 277 In this context ‘research’ 
includes both medical and behavioural studies pertaining to human health. Usually 
research is modified by the adjective ‘biomedical’ to indicate its relation to health. 
However, sometimes, research and treatment are conducted simultaneously, such as 
when research is designed to obtain new information about the efficacy of new drugs or 
other therapeutic, diagnostic or preventive modality usually in clinical trials, most 
commonly in randomized clinical trials (RCT).278 Because of the conceptual difference 
between the regulations governing consent in biomedical research as opposed to medical 
treatment, in that consent to research is reviewed prospectively while consent to treatment 
is ordinarily subject to retrospective review, consent to treatment is mostly subject to 
judicial review while consent to research is reviewed by administrative bodies, such as 
research ethics committees (RECs). Therefore, the amount of information disclosed in 
research has been based on rules set up by regulatory bodies, ethical codes or statute.279 
On the other hand the IC doctrine pertaining to medical treatment has developed out of 
judicial deference to individual autonomy in common law jurisdictions led by American 
courts and medico-legal jurisprudence. This is based on the prevalent belief that 
individuals ought to be free from non-consensual interference with their bodily integrity. It 
is also related to the ethical and moral principle that an individual’s autonomy and right of 
self-determination must be respected, and the idea that it is wrong to force another to act 
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against his or her will, or to undermine an individual’s freedom of choice.280 In the 
American case of Mohr v Williams 1905, the Supreme Court of Minnesota asserted that 
“the free citizens first right and greatest right, which underlies all others [is] the right to 
himself.”281 Based on this opinion the court extended the concept of consent beyond 
intentional unauthorized touching regarded as trespass or assault to include the patients’ 
rights to weigh reasonably the benefits and risks of treatment prior to consent. It has been 
suggested that it is important to distinguish between the medical and legal interpretations 
of IC. The first sense denotes autonomous action by the patient while the second notion 
conforms to institutionalized rules necessary to obtain legally effective IC.282 The legal 
sense involves more of risk disclosure and preventing professional liability by HCPs, 
rather than promoting autonomous choices of patients.283 This observation may have 
prompted Pellegrino to proclaim that:  
 
To obstruct the capacity for autonomy is to assault an essential part of a person’s humanity, 
because the choices we make are so much an expression of our membership in the human 
community, of who we are or what we want to be as individual members of that community. 
[Therefore] human beings are owed respect for their autonomy because they have inherent 
dignity284 
 
2.3 What makes consent valid? 
 
Before a person can give a valid or true consent in the context of medical treatment, this 
requires that such a patient’s decision must be based on an adequate understanding of 
what is involved in the medical procedure before giving permission to, or refusing the 
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medical treatment in question. This generally requires broadly that such a decision must 
be made by a person with – 
 
(a) capacity,  
(b) based on adequate information, and 
 (c) voluntarily, that is, without any undue influence or coercion.285, 286 
 
This is eloquently captured by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (DC) in the 
case of Canterbury v Spence:287 
True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that 
entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks 
attendant upon each. From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and 
in turn the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such 
a decision possible...the patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty 
to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough 
information to enable an intelligent choice. 
 
The court asserts further that the patient’s reliance on the physician for information is 
“well-nigh abject” because of the asymmetry of knowledge between a learned/trained 
physician and a patient. 288 Accordingly: 
 
[…]To the physician, whose training enables a self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may 
seem clear, but it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for 
himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie. To enable the patient to chart his 
course understandably, some familiarity with the therapeutic alternatives and their 
hazards becomes essential…289   
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The Court argues further that the duty of risk disclosure to a patient to enable an informed 
decision is part of the fiduciary duty entrenched within the doctor-patient relationship, 
which goes beyond the duty required in ordinary arm’s length transactions290 as 
demonstrated in Moore v Webb.291 This reinforces the observations made by other 
commentators that the physician-patient relationship consists of a type of ‘special 
relationship’ which makes consent in this context more than the consent or agreement as 
envisaged in ordinary contractual relationships. The Canterbury court292 suggested that 
apart from the physician's overall obligation to the patient, there is an additional duty of 
reasonable disclosure of the choices with respect to proposed therapy and the dangers 
inherently and potentially involved. This disclosure requirement would reflect much more 
of a change in doctrinal emphasis than any substantive addition to malpractice law. It is 
trite law that a HCP must seek and secure the patient's consent before commencing any 
medical procedure. It is also an established rule that any therapy not authorized by a 
patient may amount to the common law tort of battery or assault. It therefore becomes 
self-evident that it would be normally impossible to obtain a valid or true consent worthy 
of its name unless the HCP first clarifies the options and the risks of the proposed 
treatment for the patient’s enlightenment.293 Ultimately, doctors and other HCPs have long 
had a duty, on pain of liability for unauthorized treatment, to make adequate disclosure to 
their patients before commencing any medical treatment.294  
 
Len Doyal295 has suggested that HCPs have three broad duties in healthcare: 
 
 (i) To protect the life and health of their patients  
(ii) Respect the autonomy of patients   
(iii) And, to do both of these things in a fair and just way.296 
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However, it has been argued that though consent may give doctors permission, it cannot 
relieve them of their duty to take responsibility for an independent moral judgment. 
Therefore, a valid consent does not mean that the consenter has no right to complain if 
they are harmed by the act.297 According to Linde J in the Canadian case of Allan v Mount 
Sinai Hospital,298 “[i]t is the patient not the doctor who decides whether surgery will be 
performed, where it will be done, when it will be done, and by whom it will be done.”  The 
judgment in Canterbury v Spence299 thus emphasises that true/real or valid consent must 
be based on adequate information disclosure, and that the extent and level of disclosure 
is shaped by the patients’ needs. This is echoed in the legal requirements for valid 
informed consent in South Africa and elsewhere, discussed later in this thesis. 
 
I will now go on to analyse whether there are any other key issues or considerations that 
could impact on the patient’s understanding of the information disclosed by the HCP, to 
enable the patient make an informed decision in order to provide a legally valid consent. 
 
2.4  Elements of a true, real or valid consent 
 
Consent may be defined as the voluntary and continuing permission of an individual for a 
particular purpose, which in its ideal legal, regulatory, philosophical and ethical context 
requires five key elements to establish validity.300’301 These key elements generally 
comprise of: 
 
(i) Competence or capacity  
(ii) Voluntariness 
(iii) Information disclosure 
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(iv) Understanding, and   
(v) Authorization or refusal to give consent302  
 
Depending on whether consent involves medical treatment only, or is combined with 
research, or just non-therapeutic research, these elements could be broken down into:  
 
(A) Pre-conditional elements - capacity, competence and voluntariness.  
(B) Informational elements - disclosure of information such as a care plan for treatment 
and understanding of that information.  
(C) Consent elements - comprising of a decision by the patient to accept or refuse the 
proposed treatment, in the absence of coercion and any overriding influence, and finally 
authorization by the patient to proceed with treatment or participation in a research 
project.303 Based on the above criteria therefore, IC may be preliminarily defined as “an 
autonomous authorization by individuals of a medical intervention or participation in 
research based on full information disclosure and complete understanding of all the 
consequences.”304 Phrased differently, IC can be described as the social rules of consent 
in institutions that must obtain legally valid consent.305,306 In its ideal form the process of 
obtaining informed consent should consist of a conversation between a HCP and a 
patient, initiated by the HCP, which involves complete transparency, engagement by both 
parties and is continuous. This conversation may require evidence that it occurred, such 
a witnessed signature, a signed consent form or doctors medical notes.307 This consent 
may also be withdrawn at any time by the patient and could be vitiated by any changes in 
circumstances, which are not communicated to, or approved by the patient.308  
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It has been suggested that the five-step definition of IC outlined above309 is superior to the 
legal connotation of IC which consists essentially of information disclosure or disclosure 
of risks.310 This one item definition, focusing on risk disclosure, is based on legal 
convention and the adversarial litigation process, which does not take into consideration 
the moral and ethical requirements of the patient’s rights of self-determination, moral 
agency and bodily well-being.311 The key elements of informed consent outlined above 
merit further analysis in order to establish their validity and importance in the IC process 
discussed further below. 
 
2.4.1 Capacity or competence to make healthcare decisions or decision-making 
capacity (DMC) 
 
It has been suggested that the doctrine of IC as founded on the premise that self-
determination should not to be blind.312 That a patient’s interests and well-being are best 
served when patients understand their medical situation and participate in decisions 
affecting their own health status or treatment.313 Appelbaum and Roth314 have argued that 
the requirement that consent to treatment be made by competent patients ensures that 
some policy goals regarding the IC doctrine are actually achieved. Firstly, that the 
autonomy of the competent patient is recognized; secondly that the rights of the 
incompetent patient is protected, and thirdly, that the mandate which requires that the 
wishes of a competent patient is respected fosters respect for individual autonomy.315 
Some commentators distinguish between judgments of capacity and judgments of 
competence by arguing that HCPs would normally determine capacity and incapacity, 
whereas the courts will usually make judgments about competence and incompetence.316 
However others have suggested that when doctors make a determination that a patient 
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lacks decision-making capacity (DMC), the practical effect is the same as a legal 
determination of incompetence.317,318 Nevertheless it has been established in English 
common law since the 1914 case of Richmond v Richmond319 that: 
 
Capacity is ultimately a legal not a medical decision… it is for the court to decide the question of 
capacity, although the court must pay attention to the evidence of experts in the medical profession 
who can indicate the meaning of symptoms and give some idea of the mental deterioration which 
takes place in cases of this kind…”320  
Further, it has been argued that although competency is a legal concept and all adults are 
presumed by law to be competent until proven otherwise by objective means, the practical 
realities of clinical practice require that doctors, especially psychiatrists or other mental 
health practitioners, make their own assessment as to whether a patient is competent or 
not, to consent to medical treatment. This has been described as “psychological capacity” 
rather than legal competence.321 However, the impact of the doctor’s determination of 
patient capacity or competence is as important as the legal competence established by a 
court of law. In clinical practice, it is usually the psychiatrists who are often called upon 
during clinical care to assess patients DMC because frequent involvement of the courts is 
impracticable and not cost effective.322 It is important to note that in South Africa, in terms 
of the Mental Health Care Act,323 all medical doctors in South Africa are also considered 
to be mental health care practitioners who may be legally required to assess and make 
determinations regarding patients DMC.  
 
In view of the above observations and the simple definition of capacity as “the ability to 
perform a task”,324 I shall confine myself to the use of the terminology decision making 
capacity (DMC), as suggested by the President’s commission on bioethics, where the 
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commission stated that the terms “decision making capacity and incapacity are used to 
avoid the sometimes confounding legal overtones associated with the terms competence 
and incompetence”.325 Generally, conclusions regarding a patient’s DMC reflects a 
balancing of two important, and sometimes competing objectives; the first is to enhance 
the patient’s well-being, and secondly, to respect the person as a self-determining 
individual.326  
 
At common law, there is a presumption of capacity in that any adult is presumed to have 
the DMC to consent to, or refuse any medical treatment unless proven otherwise by 
acceptable objective evidence. However, this right to presumption of capacity is a 
rebuttable right, as argued by Lord Donaldson in Re T327  
 
Prima facie every adult has a right and capacity to decide whether or not he will accept medical 
treatment, even if refusal may risk permanent injury to his health or even lead to premature 
death…However, the presumption of capacity to decide, which stems from the fact that the patient 
is an adult is rebuttable…An adult may be deprived of his capacity to decide either by long-term 
mental incapacity, or retarded development, or temporary factors such as unconsciousness or 
confusion, or the effects of fatigue, pain or drugs.328 
 
The common law test for determining a patient’s mental capacity was outlined by the 
English Court of Appeals (CA) in Re MB329 as follows: “A person lacks capacity if some 
impairment or disturbance of mental functioning renders the person unable to make a 
decision whether to consent to or to refuse treatment. That inability to make a decision 
will occur when: 
 
a. The person is unable to comprehend and retain the information which is material to the decision, 
especially as to the likely consequences of having or not having the treatment in question. 
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b. The patient is unable to use the information and weigh it in the balance as part of the process of 
arriving at a decision.”330 
 
Similarly, it has been suggested that that any determinations of a patient’s ability decide 
on a course of treatment must relate to a patients individual ability, and the requirements 
of the task at hand. Thus, DMC, to greater or lesser extent depends on three things:  
 
i. The possession of a set of values and goals; 
ii.  The ability to communicate and to understand information; and  
iii.   The ability to reason and to deliberate about one’s choices.331  
  
It has been suggested that the third element of the above test, that is, reasoning and 
deliberation would include the ability to compare the impact of alternative healthcare 
choices on the individual’s personal goals and life plans.332  
 
Thorpe J later summarized a three-way test for DMC in Re C333 as follows:  He argued 
that the patient must be able to:  
 (a) Comprehend and retain the information 
 (b)  Believe it 
 (c)  And weigh it in the balance so as to arrive at a choice. 
 
The above test has been frequently applied in English case law, however due to some 
conflicting interpretations; the UK Mental Capacity Act 2005334 attempted to further 
simplify this into a single test. The current test states that a person is deemed incapable 
of making a decision or is lacking DMC and the ability to exercise autonomy rights where 
the person is unable: 
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I. To understand the information relevant to the decision, 
II. To retain that information 
III. To use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
IV. To communicate his or her decision (whether by talking, using sign language or 
any other means).  
 
It should be noted that the Mental Capacity Act335 only applies to competent adults 
accorded a presumption of capacity. Further, a basic understanding, demonstrated 
through any means including the use of sign language, visual aids or any other means, 
will suffice to satisfy the first part of the test.336,337 
 
2.4.2 Standards for assessing DMC 
  
It has been argued that the actual measurement of the various abilities by a patient to 
demonstrate DMC may be quite complicated and complex, because virtually all conscious 
and competent adults are usually able perform some tasks but not necessarily others. In 
the context of IC however, what is critical is a patient’s capacity to make a specific 
healthcare or medical decision.338 In order words, incompetence in one area does not 
mean incompetence in all areas.  Generally, one can only speak of competence to do a 
particular thing.339 Therefore, the assessment of an individual’s DMC must consider the 
nature of the particular decision to be made in light of considerations of whether the patient 
possesses the ability to understand the relevant facts and alternatives, as well as, whether 
the patient is weighing the decision based on his or her own personal values and goals. 
Further, it should be determined whether the patient can provide reasons for the decision, 
based on the facts of the case, the alternatives, and the impact of the decision on the 
patient’s own objectives and value system.340 In some cases, it has been suggested that 
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a patient may indeed possess these abilities, but may not be able to exercise them, or 
refuses to exercise these abilities. This may occur where the decision may be the result 
of a mistaken understanding of the facts or a defective reasoning process as shown in 
cases where a patient presents with false beliefs, or delusions, or bias against a particular 
physician or group of physicians that may preclude acceptance of any rational 
explanation. 341,342 In such instances, the obligation of the HCP is not to declare, on the 
basis of a wrong or irrational decision, that the patient lacks DMC, but rather to work with 
the patient toward a fuller and more accurate understanding of the facts and a sound 
reasoning process.343  
 
Since the assessment of capacity must balance competing considerations of well-being 
and self-determination, the prudent course is to take into account the potential 
consequences of the patient’s decision. In view of this, some have recommended that 
where assessment of DMC is being conducted in a non-emergency setting, more than 
one evaluation session should take place to accurately evaluate a patient’s DMC.344  
Further, it has been suggested that where the consequences for well-being are 
substantial, there is a greater need to be certain that the patient possesses the necessary 
level of DMC. However, when little turns on the decision, then the level of DMC required 
may be appropriately reduced, even though the constituent elements of capacity or 
competence should remain the same.345 Thus, a particular patient may be capable of 
deciding about a relatively inconsequential medication, but not about the amputation of a 
gangrenous limb as demonstrated by the English CA in Re C.346 Here the court found that 
a patient with schizophrenia could subjectively refuse amputation of his gangrenous limb, 
based on the observation of the court that the patient possessed a ‘conception of the 
good’ amongst other personal moral values and subjective rights.347 Similarly, Weinstock 
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and others348 were able to show that most patients with schizophrenia and bipolar 
disorders in a hospital cohort were capable of consenting to medical treatment using 
relevant criteria, even if their consent were merely passive. They also reported that only 
patients with organic brain syndromes were found incompetent. Further, patients 
generally referred for psychiatric evaluation were those who refused recommended 
treatment. The authors concluded that sound DMC assessments are essential because 
consent or refusals of treatment would both be invalid in an incompetent patient.349 In light 
of the above, the President’s Commission rejected as the standard for DMC, any test that 
looks solely to the content of the patient’s decision, arguing that any standard based on 
“objectively correct” or “rational” decisions would only allow HCPs or other third parties to 
declare that a patient lacks DMC whenever such patients behaved wrongly, irrationally, 
or in any other way which appears incompatible with the evaluator’s view of the patients’ 
best interests.350 This supports arguments against giving doctors or other HCPs greater 
access to the use of the doctrine of “therapeutic privilege”351,352 or “therapeutic 
exception”353 during healthcare decision making. The doctrine of therapeutic privilege as 
an exception to IC354 will be discussed in more detail below.  It  has been suggested that 
use of an objective standard to determine DMC would be in sharp conflict with most of the 
values that support self-determination and individual autonomy because it would take the 
decision whether to consent to or refuse recommended treatment away from the patient 
and place it in the hand of others, such as HCPs. This would not adequately reflect the 
subjective nature of each individual’s conception of what is they consider morally good or 
acceptable based on their own personal values.355 Accordingly, in English law, it has been 
suggested that in the case of refusal of medical treatment by a competent patient, the 
reasons for refusal need not be rationally defensible, as explained by Donaldson LJ in Re 
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T356: “It matters not whether the reasons are rational or irrational, unknown or even 
nonexistent…”357 Further, Butler-Sloss LJ opined in Re MB as follows:  
 
A competent woman who has the capacity to decide, may for religious reasons, other reasons, for 
rational or irrational reasons or for no reason at all, choose not to have medical intervention, even 
though the consequence may be the death or serious handicap of the child she bears, or her own 
death. In that event the courts do not have the jurisdiction to declare medical intervention lawful and 
the question of her own interests objectively considered, does not arise[…].358 
 
Other legal authorities have suggested that one must take other factors into consideration 
when assessing an individual’s capacity to consent to or refuse treatment. Based on an 
empirical study of competency to psychiatric hospitalization, Appelbaum et al concluded 
that though the evidence from empirical studies were supportive of the hypothesis that it 
is the patients underlying psychiatric illness which may have impaired such a patients 
DMC, other factors such as the stress surrounding hospitalization, whether psychiatric or 
medical, could contribute to a failure of rational modes of thought, in addition to relative 
ignorance about the medical issues involved in treatment.359 Therefore, one can 
summarize the following points with regards to determination of a person’s DMC: 
 
I.  A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he or she 
lacks capacity by objective criteria 
II. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable 
steps to help him or her to do so have been taken without success. 
III. A person is not to be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he 
makes an unwise or irrational decision. 
IV. An act done or decision made for or on behalf of a person who lacks capacity must 
be done, or made, in his or her best interests. 
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V.  Before such an act is done, or decision made, regard must be had as to whether 
the purpose for which it is needed can be as effectively achieved in a way that is 
less restrictive of the person's autonomy.360,361 
 
Finally, a lack of DMC cannot be established merely by reference to a person’s age, 
appearance, intelligence, level of education, or any condition or aspect of behavior, which 
might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about their DMC.362,363 It has been 
argued that judgments about DMC are pivotal to health care, since they determine the 
ability of patients to make choices about their care. Therefore HCPs, especially doctors, 
should understand the concept of DMC and how to assess it. Many patients clearly have 
the capacity to make health care decisions, and others, such as unconscious patients lack 
this capacity. In other cases, physicians may disagree about whether a patient has 
sufficient DMC. Therefore, DMC is a complex concept, since it is based on four abilities: 
 
 (a) The ability to express a choice, 
 (b) The ability to understand relevant information, 
 (c) The ability to appreciate the significance of that information for one’s own situation, 
and  
(d) The ability to engage in basic reasoning regarding treatment options.364 
  
It has been argued that there is no simple algorithm for determining DMC, since the 
capacity to make a decision varies with the complexity of the decision to be made. 
Therefore, DMC must be assessed relative to the decision at hand.  It has been suggested 
that HCPs must strive to avoid commonly held misconceptions about DMC, for example, 
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that any patient with cognitive impairment or mental illness automatically lacks DMC. 
365,366,367 
 
2.4.3 The rights of incompetent patients  
 
This category of patients would include temporarily or permanently incapacitated adults, 
infants and children below the legally defined age of consent, which will  vary depending 
on individual jurisdictions and national laws. For example, the legal age of consent in 
England is 16:368 “The consent of a minor who has attained the age of while the age of 16 
years, to any surgical, medical or dental treatment, which in the absence of consent, would 
constitute a trespass to the person shall be effective as it would be, if he were of full 
age.”369 On the other hand consent to routine medical treatment in South Africa is currently 
12 years of age.370 As a general rule, patients who are incompetent should be treated 
based on the doctrines of ‘necessity’ and ‘best interests’ as explained by the English 
House of Lords in Re F:371  “Not only must there be necessity to act when it is not 
practicable to communicate with the assisted person, but also, the action taken must be 
such as a reasonable person would in all the circumstances take in the best interests of 
the assisted person.”372 Further, in Re T373  an English court concluded that though there 
is a prima facie presumption of capacity for all adult patients, such an assumption, which 
arises out of the fact that the person is an adult, is a rebuttable right, which can be 
compromised by short or long-term mental incapacity.374 With regards to the patients ‘best 
interests’, the House of Lords in F v West Berkshire HA375 stated while considering the 
sterilization of a mentally retarded patient that “…a doctor can lawfully operate on or give 
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treatment to adult patients who are incapable for one reason or another, of consenting to 
his doing so provided that the operation or other treatment concerned is in the best 
interests of the patient,”376 especially where it is carried out to preserve the life or prevent 
deterioration of the patient’s condition.377 Further, it has been argued that “[…] the 
imposition of medical treatment, without consent of a mentally competent adult patient, 
would interfere with a person’s physical integrity in a manner capable of engaging the 
rights protected …. under Article 8 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR)”.378 
 
In the context of South African law, the Children’s Act of 2005379 specifies that the legal 
age for consent to treatment in children aged less than 18 years is the age of 12 years, 
provided such children also have sufficient maturity to understand the information 
disclosed prior to providing consent. To clarify what constitutes medical treatment, it may 
be necessary to refer to the dictionary definitions of the word “treatment”. Stedman’s 
concise medical dictionary defines “treatment” as, “medical or surgical management of a 
patient”.380 Furthermore, Harrap’s medical dictionary defines ‘operation’ as “any form of 
surgical procedure major enough to require anaesthesia”, while ‘treatment’ is defined as 
“care, in terms of medication, nursing and any other therapy, designed to cure a 
disorder”.381 Perhaps, to avoid such controversies and misunderstanding the Chlidren’s 
Act clearly stipulates as follows in section 129:382 
 
Consent to medical treatment and surgical operation: 
 (1) Subject to section 5(2) of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1996 (Act No. 92 of 
 1996), a child may be subjected to medical treatment or a surgical operation only if consent for 
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 such treatment or operation has been given in terms of either subsection (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) or 
 (7). 
 (2) A child may consent to his or her own medical treatment or to the medical treatment of his 
 or her child if- 
 (a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
 (b) The child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
 risks, social and other implications of the treatment. 
 (3) A child may consent to the performance of a surgical operation on him or her or his or her 
 child if- 
 (a) the child is over the age of 12 years; and 
 (b) The child is of sufficient maturity and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, 
 risks, social and other implications of the surgical operation; and 
 (c ) the child is duly assisted by his or her parent or guardian. 
 
In simple terms one can conclude from the above that a child over the age of 12 years 
who is sufficiently mature and has the DMC to provide IC, can consent to or refuse 
medical treatment including ‘surgical operations’ not requiring ‘anaesthesia’ or those 
which are not life threatening which may require overriding of such consent or refusal by 
a parent, guardian or court of law, as the case maybe.  Examples of such consent, 
which may require overriding by a parent, or guardian, or court of law, may include 
consent to organ transplantation, or amputation of a major limb, etc. The Children’s Act 
further specifies in section129 (4-10), the mechanisms to be followed in the case of 
children below the age of 12years or in the case of children who are found 
incompetent.383 Details of such consent or refusal are further discussed below on pages 
75-79. 
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2.4.4 Refusal of treatment and the patients decision making capacity (DMC) 
 
It is and established fact that every adult has the DMC to decide whether he or she will 
accept or refuse any medical treatment.384 However, this presumption of DMC is 
rebuttable in that sometimes an adult may be deprived of his or her DMC due to some 
forms of mental incapacitation. Generally, if an individual did not have the DMC to 
decide at the time of purported refusal, in such cases it becomes the duty of the doctors 
or other HCP to treat the patient in whatever way they consider, based on their clinical 
judgment, and prevailing circumstances, to be in the best interests of the patient. 385 
However, doctors faced with refusal of consent have to give very careful and detailed 
consideration to what was the patient’s DMC at the time of refusing the proposed 
treatment, because sometimes it may not be a case of DMC or lack thereof, it may 
simply be a case of reduced capacity.  In such situations, what matters most is whether 
the patient’s DMC was reduced below the level required in the case of a refusal of that 
importance, due to the fact refusals can vary in importance. Some refusals may put the 
patient’s life in danger to the extent of losing their life or causing an irreparable damage 
to the patients’ health, while others may not.386 Therefore, incompetence or lack DMC in 
one area does not necessarily meant that the patient lacks DMC to make any decision 
whatsoever, because health care decisions may vary in importance, with some requiring 
only minimal DMC, while others will require all mental faculties of the patient to consider 
the consequences and arrive at decision. Therefore, a patient’s lack of capacity in one 
area or instance does not mean the patient lacks DMC in all areas; one can merely 
speak of the competence or capacity to do a particular thing or act. This has led to 
suggestions in the case of psychiatric patients, that there may be need to do away with 
the requirements of giving meaningful/ true/ valid IC on admission or assessment, which 
would mean that a lower standard, such as ‘assent’, could be adopted instead. While 
this may diminish somewhat the requirements of respecting an individual’s autonomy, it 
would have the virtue of avoiding pretence, and enhancing truth telling. Further, the 
lowered standard of patient consent or assent could be augmented by internal review 
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processes,387 such as those embedded in the Mental Health Care Act,388 whereby each 
patient admitted due to suspected psychiatric illness or observation are subjected to  
review by two independent qualified mental health practitioners within 48 hours of 
admission,389 before a further 72-hour assessment, which must be reported to the 
Mental Health Review Board, before further decisions could be made regarding 
involuntary admission of the patient, or community based treatment by a HCP.390  
 
Finally, the issue of a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment was analysed by the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria in the case of MDCN v Okonkwo 2002.391 In this case the 
Medical and Dental Council of Nigeria (MDCN) equivalent to the HPSCA in South Africa, 
brought charges against a medical doctor for failure to transfuse a Jehovah’s Witness 
patient who had declined blood transfusion which eventually led to her death. The doctor 
was charged with two offences based on the Medical and Dental Practitioners Act.392 On 
the first count, the doctor was charged with attending to the patient in a negligent 
manner and thereby conducting himself infamously in a professional respect contrary to 
the prevailing medical ethics code.393 In the second count, the doctor was charged with 
acting contrary to his oath as a medical practitioner and thereby conducting himself 
infamously in a professional respect contrary to the same section of the Act.394  In the 
first instance, the Medical and Dental Practitioners Tribunal found the doctor guilty of 
these charges. The doctor then appealed to the Nigerian Court of Appeals where the 
doctor was acquitted. The MDCN then appealed this judgment to the  Nigerian Supreme 
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Court. In arriving at its judgment, Ayoola JSC argued with regards to patients’ refusal of 
proposed medical treatment as follows: 
 
 The scope and limit of the duty of a practitioner faced with a patient's refusal to give informed 
 consent to life-saving medical treatment cannot be considered in isolation of the right of the 
 patient. Although, there is a dearth of local authorities in this area of our law, there are ample 
 provisions of the Constitution which show the basis on which the Court should proceed in 
 these matters. It is expedient at the outset to recognize that a consideration of a religious 
 objection to medical treatment involves a balancing of several interests, namely: the 
 constitutionally protected right of the individual, state interest in public health, safety and  welfare 
 of society; and, the interest of the medical profession in preserving the integrity of medical ethics 
 and, thereby, its own collective reputation. 395  
 
The Supreme Court further asserted that the patient's constitutional right to object to 
medical treatment is founded on fundamental rights protected by the Nigerian 
Constitution 396 as follows: (i) right to privacy: section 34; (ii) right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion in section 35.397 According to the Supreme Court, the right to 
privacy implies a right to protect one's thought, conscience or religious belief and 
practice, from coercive and unjustified intrusion, and one's body from unauthorized 
invasion. The right to freedom of thought, conscience or religion implies a right not to be 
prevented, without lawful justification, from choosing the course of one's life, fashioned 
on what one believes in, and a right not to be coerced into acting contrary to religious 
belief.398 The limits of these freedoms, as in all cases, are where they impinge on the 
rights of others or where they put the welfare of society or public health in jeopardy. The 
sum total of the rights of privacy and of freedom of thought, conscience or religion which 
an individual has, put concisely, is that an individual should be left alone to choose a 
course for his life, unless a clear and compelling overriding state interest justifies the 
contrary.399 The law's role is to ensure the fullness or liberty when there is no danger to 
public interest. In arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court cited judgments from the 
                                                          
395  Medical and Dental Council (MDCN) Tribunal v Okonkwo (2002) AHRLR  159  
 (NgSC 2001) [72]. 
396  Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. 
397 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 s34 and s35. 
398  MDCN v Okonkwo (2002) AHRLR 159 (NgSC 2001) [73]. 
399  MDCN v Okonkwo (2002) AHRLR 159 (NgSC 2001) [73]. 
73 
 
“United States of America where this area of law has received considerable judicial 
attention.”400 In its judgment, the court referred to two pertinent cases including the case 
of Re Yetter (1973),401 where upon evidence that the patient was a mature, competent 
adult, who had no children, and had not sought medical attention and then attempted to 
restrict it. The court concluded that the constitutional right of privacy includes the right of 
a competent, mature adult to refuse treatment that may prolong his or her life even 
though that refusal may seem unwise, foolish or ridiculous to others.  Similarly, in the 
case of Re Osborne (1972),402 an American superior Court affirmed a lower court's order 
refusing to appoint a guardian to give consent for the administration of a blood 
transfusion to a patient who had refused it on religious grounds, and whom the physician 
feared would die without blood. In coming to a conclusion, the Nigerian Supreme Court 
held that: 
 
  Since the patient's relationship with the practitioner is based on consensus, it follows that the 
 choice of an adult patient with a sound mind to refuse informed consent to medical treatment, 
 barring state intervention through judicial process, leaves the practitioner helpless to impose a 
 treatment on the patient.403 
 
The Nigerian Supreme Court concluded that the principle of the American cases is 
reflected in the opinions in the UK House of Lords in the Sidaway case,404 where Lord 
Scarman was of the opinion that “[t]he courts should not allow medical opinion of what is 
best for the patient to over-ride the patient's right to decide for himself whether he will 
submit to the treatment offered him.”405 In the same case, Lord Templeman concluded 
that: 
 The patient is free to decide whether or not to submit to treatment recommended by the doctor 
 ... If the doctor making a balanced judgment advises the patient to submit to the operation, the 
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402  Re Osborne (1972, Dist Col App) 294 A 2d 372. 
403  MDCN v Okonkwo (2002) AHRLR 159 (NgSC 2001) [75]. 
404  Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
405  Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 [644-649]. 
74 
 
 patient is entitled to reject the advice for reasons which are rational or irrational or for no 
 reason.406 
 
From the above judgment, one can argue that the sentiments expressed by the Nigeria 
Supreme Court in the case of MDCN v Okonkwo (NgSC 2001)407 are consistent with the 
rights guaranteed under sections 12, 14 and 15 of the South African Constitution, which 
guarantees in section 12 “right to freedom and security of the person”, section 14 “right 
to privacy” and section 15 “right to freedom of religion, belief and opinion.408 
 
Again, in terms of South African law, there are very few cases, if any, where the 
issue of adult refusal of medical treatment has been adjudicated. However, the NHA 
provides some guidelines on refusal of medical treatment where it requires as part of the 
IC process that HCPs are obliged to inform patients of their right of refusal. In this case 
the NHA stipulates that HCPs must inform the user of “[t]he user’s right to refuse health 
services, including an explanation of the implications, risks and obligations of such 
refusal”.409 This form of refusal has been described as an “informed refusal”.410 
Furthermore, it has been argued that while competent adults are legally free to refuse 
any medical treatment, life-saving treatment can be administered to such patients if they 
are incompetent and in an emergency. However, this is only applicable where “the user 
has not expressly, impliedly or by conduct refused that service”.411 One can therefore 
conclude that once a legally competent patient has given ‘informed refusal’ to medical 
treatment, such a patient cannot be given emergency treatment against his or her will.412 
 
Similarly children who over the legal age to consent to medical treatment (that is,  
the age of 12 years as defined by South African law), who are legally competent  
to make that decision, can consent to medical treatment or surgical operation as 
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the case maybe, in accordance with the Children’s Act 2005.413 It has been argued that 
such children are also legally competent to refuse medical treatment,414 except where 
such treatment is a life-saving treatment, in that case, such refusal could be overridden 
either by a parent, guardian, or a court as the upper guardian of all children,415 based on 
the consideration that in all matters concerning children, the best interest of the child 
should be of paramount consideration.416 In the case of minors under the age of 12 
years who are not legally competent to refuse or consent to medical treatment or 
surgical operation, a parent or guardian, a hospital superintendent, or a court of law as 
the case maybe can provide such consent.417 However it has been argued that such 
children under the age of 12 years who are capable of understanding should be 
provided with similar information as required by the NHA, and should then also give 
‘assent’ to the proposed treatment.418 The Children’s Act 2005419 provides and exception 
to age of consent or refusal of medical treatment the context of termination of 
pregnancy. In terms of the Choice on termination of pregnancy Act 1996, “any woman of 
any age” can consent to termination of their pregnancy.420 It has been suggested that 
HCPs should consider that although age may not be a barrier to consent to TOP, lack of 
mental capacity to understand the consequences of the procedure, maybe a barrier to 
IC in these cases.421 Furthermore, while female children of any age may refuse to 
undergo TOP, there is a need for HCPs to ensure that such children are fully aware of 
the risks and benefits of such a procedure through non directive counselling as required 
by the Act.422 Finally, it has been suggested that where HCPs are unsure of the 
understanding or capacity of the female child to consent to termination of pregnancy in a 
life threatening situation, such TOP may be performed in the child’s best interests.423 
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However, one would like to suggest that in such cases the guidelines laid down in the 
Children’s Act,424 should be followed by HCPs confronted by such dilemmas, in other 
cases, court adjudication maybe considered if there is sufficient time to do so.  
 
Therefore, in the context of South African law the applicable legal principles on  
the issue of whether a court could authorise medical treatment for a child to preserve 
a child’s life despite parental objection based on religious reasons were elucidated by  
Modiba AJ in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Lower Division, Johannesburg,  
in the case of Life Healthcare and another v JMS 2014.425 In this case, the Court held  
That:  
 In terms of section 129 (4) (a) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (the Act), the parents of a child under 
the age of 12 are authorised to consent to the child’s medical treatment. In terms of section 129 
(10), no parent may withhold consent for the medical treatment of a child by reason only of religious 
or other beliefs, unless the parent can show that there is a medically accepted alternative choice to 
medical treatment. Section 126 (9) gives the High Court or the Children’s Court jurisdiction to 
consent to the medical treatment of a child in any instance where a person authorised by the Act to 
consent refuses or is unable to give consent.426  
 
The court further argued that such cases create conflicts between parental rights and 
children’s’ rights. Such conflicts would include the parental rights to freedom of religion 
versus the child’s right to life, and right to have best interests guide any decisions affecting 
all children.427 The court further held that under the Constitution, everyone has the right 
to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion.428 The court further held 
that everyone has a constitutional right to life,429 and that a child’s best interests are of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning a child.430 The Gauteng High Court in 
this case cited with agreement the judgment of the court in the case of Hay v B and others 
2003,431 arguing that though the judgment in this case was rendered prior to the Children’s 
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Act coming into effect, the dicta in Hay v B upholds the letter and spirit of the section 129 
(10) of the Children’s Act.432  In the case of Hay v B, the court held that parental right to 
religion is not unfettered, and that the right to life is an inviolable right, to the extent that 
parental rights potentially violates the child’s right to life. Moreover, the content of a child’s 
right to life would include the right to receive medical treatment, especially where such 
treatment would preserve the child’s life.433 The court opined that: 
  In my view, the limitation imposed by section 129 (10) on the parent’s right to object to the 
 medical treatment of a child for religious reasons reflects a balancing of the child’s right to life 
 and to have his best interests inform all decisions concerning the child against the parents’ right 
 to religion.434 
 
In arriving at its decision, the Guateng High Court cited the Constitutional Court judgment 
in S v Makwayane, where the court held that the right to life is the most constitutionally 
protected value. 435 The court further cited the Constitutional Court judgment in Christian 
Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 where the Court opined that: 
 Courts throughout the world have shown special solitude for protecting children from what they 
 have regarded as the potentially injurious consequences of their parents religious practices. It 
 is now widely accepted that in every matter concerning the child, the child’s best interest must 
 be of paramount importance.’436  
The Gauteng High Court therefore concluded that it was in the child’s best interests that 
his life is preserved,437 even against parental objections. From the foregoing, one can 
conclude from South African law, those children below the legal age of consent and even 
up the age of consent and of sufficient maturity who refuse lifesaving treatment, such 
treatment can be administered against their will, in order to preserve the child’s life. Finally, 
perhaps when interpreting or applying the new Children’s Act,438 it may pertinent to keep 
in mind that one of the reasons for lowering the age of consent to treatment from 14 years 
to 12 years was to enable child-headed households which had increased in proportion in 
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South Africa as a consequence of the AIDs epidemic, for such minor to have independent 
access to healthcare including HIV-AIDS treatment and counselling. Therefore it would 
be conceivable that such children should be able to consent to ‘minor’ surgical 
‘operations’, 439independently, in the absence of parents or guardians within the 
household.440 
 
2.4.5 DMC in children 
 
With regard to children, the age of consent to treatment or refusal was legally defined as 
after the age of 18 in English law,441 except where such children are regarded as mature 
minors based on Gillick442 competence, or in accordance with other foreign regulations, 
such as US regulations.443 Similarly, in South Africa, the age of majority is 18, although 
the age of consent to routine medical treatment is currently pegged at 12 years.444,445 In 
the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk AHA446 the Court of Appeal ruled that children 
of a certain age, in this case girls under the age of 16, could be given prescriptions for 
contraceptive pills without parental consent. However, this ruling did not necessarily 
translate into the ability to consent to or refuse all medical procedures such as 
transplantation, or participation in biomedical research. As noted by an English court in 
Re W,447 “nothing in the above Gillick case shall be interpreted to include procedures 
which do not constitute treatment, such as organ donation, and blood procedures.”448  
Commenting on the Gillick case, Lord Scarman stated that such a patient should have 
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sufficient maturity to understand, the moral social and emotional impact of the decision.449  
Similarly Van der Walt has suggested that “[...] the child must have the mental capability 
and maturity to evaluate responsibly the nature, and extent and implications of his consent 
or assumption of risk”.450,451 Similarly the Children’s Act 38 of 2005452 was recently 
amended to take into consideration the considerable number of child-headed households 
in South Africa, and to give such child patients the opportunity to access treatment and 
voluntary counselling and testing for HIV-AIDs and contraceptives in the absence of 
parents or guardians.453  
 
Further, in the American case of Grimes v KKI,454 the court was of the opinion that children 
should not necessarily be included in non-therapeutic research as a matter of course 
based on parental consent, since the most overriding issue was the best interests of the 
child. The court went further to suggest that such situations including organ or tissue 
transplantation and participation in non-therapeutic or therapeutic research with more than 
‘minimal risk’ should be subjected to judicial review. 455 The NHA456 stipulates that children 
or incompetent adults, who may not necessarily be capable of giving legal consent, should 
generally give “assent” to the proposed treatment.457 Therefore, competence to consent 
medical treatment is legally determined based on age, DMC of the patient, and the 
prevailing circumstances surrounding the decision to consent or refuse the proposed 
therapy.   
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The American Guttmacher Report on Public Policy458 emphasizes the notion “that many 
minors have the capacity and indeed the right to make important decisions about health 
care, has been well established in federal and state policy.”459 In South Africa, the 
currently prescribed age at which children can consent to routine medical treatment is 12 
years, as codified in the Children’s Act.460 Section 17 of the Act further specifies that a 
child, whether male or female, attains majority upon reaching the age of 18 years.461 
However, this does not mean that minors below the age of 18 can generally refuse all 
medical treatment, as this refusal can be overridden by a person having parental authority 
or by a court of law, as upper guardian of children,  based on the child’s best interests,462 
as demonstrated in the case of Hay v B,463 where a court overruled parents refusal of life-
saving blood transfusion for a child because the parents were Jehovah witnesses. 
 
2.4.6 Mature minors 
 
The question as to whether a child is Gillick-competent or a mature minor is a question of 
fact, based on a developmental concept of sufficient maturity and intelligence to 
understand the nature and implications of the proposed medical treatment.464 The Gillick-
competent child however does not have the power to consent to or refuse all forms of 
medical treatments.465 This is based on the concept of DMC and the magnitude of risk 
involved in the proposed medical procedure. In other words, the higher the magnitude of 
risk, the higher the DMC required to consent or refuse such treatment. Therefore it can 
be presumed that in cases of high-risk medical procedures, such as organ transplantation 
or donation and treatment using other types of human tissues e.g. lifesaving blood 
transfusion. The consent or refusal of a Gillick-competent or mature minor may be 
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overruled by a court of law or parent or guardian.466 As explained by Lord Donaldson in 
Re W467:  
 
There can therefore be no doubt that [the court] has the power to override the refusal of a minor 
whether over the age of 16 or under that age but Gillick competent…such a refusal is a very 
important consideration in making clinical judgments and for parents in deciding whether 
themselves to give consent. Its importance increases with the age and maturity of the minor.468 
 
2.4.7 Children under the legal age of consent who are not considered ‘mature minors’ 
 
Children under the age of consent who are not categorized as ‘mature minors’ generally 
do not have the capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment. Under normal 
circumstances, consent has to be obtained from the parent or guardian. As a rule, any 
person with parental responsibility can give consent on behalf of a child who is below the 
age of consent. However, the treatment consented to must be in the child’s best interests. 
When there is dispute amongst parents with one refusing, and the other giving consent, 
the doctor or HCP is sometimes confronted by an ethical and professional dilemma. 
However, this is not a legal dilemma because the HCP has prima facie consent to treat 
children based on their best interests as shown in Re R.469 However, where such 
treatment is non-therapeutic, as in Re J (circumcision),470 judicial review may be required. 
This type of ethical dilemma was resolved by the court in the South African case of Hay v 
B,471 where parents refused to give IC for blood transfusion to a child, basing their decision 
on the fact that they were practicing Jehovah’s witnesses. The court as upper guardian of 
all minors authorised the procedure against the parents’ wishes, based on the best 
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interests of the child,472 and as discussed in the above on pages 75-79 of this thesis, citing 
the court judgment in Life Healthcare and another v JMS 2014.473 
 
Similarly, in non-therapeutic research the child’s best interest should be the primary 
consideration as suggested by the Maryland Court of Appeals in Grimes v KKI.474 Here 
the Court held that consent to non-therapeutic research, entered into by parents, that 
exposed children to the danger of lead toxicity, was not in the children’s best interest. 
Similarly, in Ref F,475 Lord Donaldson was of the opinion that consent entered into on 
behalf of a child by the parents was invalid and such treatment could constitute assault by 
the HCP. Arguing that the right of parents to make decisions on behalf of their children is 
a dwindling right, Lord Fraser in Gillick476 adopted the words of Lord Denning in Hewer v 
Bryant477 where the latter opined that “[t]he legal right of a parent to the custody of a child 
ends at the 18th birthday, and even up till then it is dwindling right which the courts will 
hesitate to enforce against the wishes of a child, and the more so the older he is. It starts 
with a right of control and ends with little more than advice.”478 Similarly, the NHA479 
provides that even if a person does not have the legal capacity to consent, he or she must 
still be consulted, and that children below the age of consent who could understand, 
should be asked to give “assent” to the treatment consented on their behalf by a parent 
or guardian.480 Jane Fortin concurred with the opinion of Lord Fraser in the Gillick case by 
suggesting that parental right yields to the child’s right to make his or her own decisions 
when he or she reaches a sufficient understanding and intelligence.481 In support of the 
best interests principle when dealing with children, the UN Convention on Children’s 
Rights482 states that: “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
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private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”483 The best interest 
standard in all cases where a child’s rights and interests are affected is also entrenched 
in section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
 
2.4.8 Consent to termination of pregnancy in South Africa  
 
There is a unique situation in South African law, whereby the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act484 states that “any woman of any age” can legally consent to termination 
of pregnancy for various reasons.485 This may create a misunderstanding with the legal 
age of consent to treatment, which is stipulated as 12 years of age.486 It is established that 
this requirement is legally binding and that medical doctors and other HCP such as nurses 
and midwives ought to be conversant with this regulation. However, it has been 
demonstrated by recent research reports arising from this thesis, that only about 30% of 
medical doctors487 and 8% of professional nurses488 in South Africa can accurately answer 
the question regarding the age of consent to termination of pregnancy in South Africa. 
Therefore, as will be demonstrated later in part two of this thesis: doctors, professional 
nurses and patients in South Africa are not very conversant with the basic laws concerning 
medical treatment in South Africa. Therefore, such potential ambiguities should generally 
be explained or clarified to practicing HCPs, who are responsible for applying such laws 
during clinical practice, since most of them are not conversant with the fine nuances of 
interpreting the law. 
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2.4.9 Fluctuating capacity 
 
 A patient’s capacity may fluctuate, and if so, this may mean that he or she effectively 
lacks capacity where there is a need to submit to regular treatment. In the English case 
of Re D,489 where D suffered from long standing psychiatric illness and was found to lack 
capacity to take decisions and exercise judgment with regard to his medical treatment, 
independent psychiatric evidence concluded that:  
 
 On consideration, I find the patient lacks capacity, although I believe he can at times understand 
 the purpose and nature of his proposed treatment at considerable extent at others, I consider 
 his appreciation and his understanding is critically defective and he is unable to retain 
 information and weigh it in the balance. In circumstances where he needs to submit regularly 
 and reliably to treatment, such fluctuating capability effectively means he lacks capacity.490  
 
With regards with fluctuating capacity, the Health Professions Council of South Africa 
(HPCSA)491 has made the following recommendations regarding IC and care of patients 
with fluctuating capacity: 
 
a. Where patients have difficulty retaining information, or are only intermittently competent to make 
a decision health care practitioners should provide any assistance they might need to reach an 
informed decision. 
b. Health care practitioners should record any decision made while the patients were competent, 
including the key elements of the consultation. 
c. Health care practitioners should review any decision made whilst the patients were competent, 
at appropriate intervals before treatment starts, to establish that their views are consistently held 
and can be relied on.492 
 
Further, the National Health Act (NHA)493 makes provision for certain persons to consent 
on behalf of mentally incompetent patients to an operation or medical treatment where 
such patients are unable to give the necessary consent and have not mandated, while still 
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mentally competent, somebody else in writing to give consent on their behalf. The Act sets 
out a priority list of persons who can give proxy consent in such circumstances: 
 
i. A person authorized by the court (e.g. a curator personae);  
ii. In order of priority, the patient's spouse, partner, parent, grandparent, major child or brother or 
sister.  
 
The NHA also allows patients, while still mentally competent, to mandate another person 
in writing to give consent on their behalf.494 Therefore, where HCPs are treating a patient 
who has lost the capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment, for example, after 
the onset or progress of a mental disorder or other disability, they should try to find out 
whether the patient has previously mandated someone else in writing to make decisions 
on their behalf; or has made a “living will” or provided “advanced directives” that could 
guide provision of care. Finally, the HPCSA suggests that HCPs must respect any refusal 
of treatment given when the patient was competent, provided the decision in the advance 
statement is clearly applicable to the present circumstances, and there is no reason to 
believe that the patient has changed his or her mind in the interim. Where an advance 
statement of this kind is not available, the patient's known wishes must be taken into 
account,495 as further discussed on pages 127-129 below. 
 
2.4.10 Summary of criteria for determining DMC prior to informed consent 
 
Finally, one can summarize the criteria that may disqualify a patient and could assist HCPs 
in determining a patient’s competence or DMC to consent to medical treatment as follows: 
 
 (a) Inability to express or communicate a preference 
 (b) Inability to understand one’s situation and its consequences  
(c) Inability to understand relevant information e.g. due to language differences, 
information not explained in simple language, or information overload due to excessive 
disclosure. 
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(d) Inability to give reasons or rationalize reasons for a decision 
(e) Inability to analyse information and give risk/benefit-related reasons  
(f) Inability to reach reasonable decision  
(g) Coercion, undue influence, or manipulation interfering with capacity to comprehend 
or communicate a preference. 496,497,498 
 
All of the above may have an impact on a patient’s DMC or competence to consent to, or 
refuse any medical treatment, and may ultimately impact on and even invalidate such 
consent. 
 
2.5 Voluntariness 
 
Voluntary consent lies at the heart of respect for autonomy, based on the tenets of 
freedom and human rights as stipulated in the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights ( ICCPR),499 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),500 and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR);501 which 
underlie contemporary theories on the interdependence and indivisibility of civil, political 
and socio-economic rights. It has been argued that the implications of this full conception 
of human rights and individual autonomy for effective enjoyment of these bundles of rights 
as enshrined in the above documents have not been fully explored. Consequently, the 
importance of individual autonomy for the enjoyment of socio-economic rights is rarely 
emphasized.502  The ICCPR states that no one should be involved in research or scientific 
experimentation without his or her free and voluntary consent (Art 7 ICCPR).503 This 
element of voluntariness in research is also part and parcel of self-determination and 
autonomy in medical treatment. The voluntary consent of the individual has been adopted 
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by all ethical codes and statutory laws regarding IC including the Helsinki Declaration, 504  
which states that human subjects of biomedical research must be volunteers and informed 
participants in the research project. Similarly the Nuremberg Code505 states unequivocally 
that:  
 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. This means that the person 
involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise 
free power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-
reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and 
comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved, as to enable him to make an 
understanding and enlightened decision.506  
 
Some authorities have analysed voluntariness in IC in terms of the presence of adequate 
knowledge, absence of psychological compulsion or external constraints.507 Others have 
argued that such a broad application encompasses the whole gamut of autonomous 
action.508 Instead, Beauchamp and Childress have suggested that a patient acts 
voluntarily to the degree he or she wills that action into being, in the absence of external 
control. They further suggest that while all control by another person may represent some 
form of influence, not all influences can be considered as controlling. The broad category 
of influences may range from love, threat, persuasion, education, lies, emotional appeals, 
and manipulation. All of which can vary in their level of influence on the individual.509 
However, according to Lord Donaldson in Re T,510 not all influences will lead to involuntary 
action unless they lead to a change of will, in the individual concerned as explained below:  
 
If his will was overborne; the refusal will not have represented a true decision. In this context the 
relationship of the persuader to the patient-for example, spouse, parents or religious adviser-will be 
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important, because some relationships more readily lend themselves to overbearing the patient’s 
independent will than others. 511 
 
Voluntariness is another important requirement for IC, based on the fact that the patient’s 
participation in the ultimate decision to accept or refuse treatment must be voluntary. A 
choice that has been coerced, or that resulted from serious manipulation of a person’s 
ability to make an intelligent and informed decision, will not be considered the person’s 
own free choice. This has long been recognized in law, in that consent coerced or forced 
by threats or induced by fraud or misrepresentation is legally viewed as no consent at all. 
From the perspective of ethics, a consent that is substantially involuntary does not provide 
moral authorization for treatment because it does not respect the patient’s autonomy and 
dignity and may not reflect the values and objectives of the patient.512 
 
2.5.1 Forms of undue influence 
2.5.1.1 Coercion   
 
Coercion occurs when one uses a credible threat or force to try and control another. For 
a threat to be real, both parties must believe it, and the perpetrator must convince the 
victim of the realness of the threat. Coercion occurs if a credible and intended threat 
displaces a person’s self-directed actions or intentions. Coercion may void an act of 
autonomy by rendering even intentional and well-informed behaviour non-autonomous.513 
Concern is accordingly at its greatest effect when there is a disproportion in power or other 
significant inequality between one individual and another and this lends credibility to the 
threat of harm where the perceived interests of the individuals diverge.514 The disparity in 
power or power asymmetry between a patient and the HCP could be slight or substantial, 
depending on the nature of the patient’s illness, institutional setting, personalities of the 
individuals involved, and several other factors. It has been suggested that there are a 
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number of reasons why power asymmetry exists between doctors and patients. These 
would include: 
 
(i) there social position  
(ii) the doctor’s superior knowledge  
(iii) the control over access to healthcare  
(iv) the patients illness, and  
(v) the fact that the patient has come to the HCP for help.515’516  
 
Further, it has been stated that in non-emergency settings, a patient can usually avoid 
this imbalanced power relationship by changing HCPs or simply foregoing treatment, thus 
avoiding the potential for coercion.517 Although HCPs may sometimes have interests that 
are distinct from, and which may appear to be in conflict with those of their patients, strong 
social and professional norms usually ensure that priority is accorded to patients’ welfare. 
Sometimes coercion can be exercised based on benevolent and paternalistic motives of 
the HCP where the HCP and the patient differ in their assessments of how the patient’s 
welfare is best served. When isolated instances of abuse or coercion do occur, the law 
provides some remedies for the patient.  It has been argued that patients’ surrogates may 
play a useful role in this decision-making process.518 Sometimes surrogates may also try 
to coerce a particular decision from the patient based on interests of their own.519 This 
was demonstrated in the case of Re T520 where a Jehovah’s Witness mother unduly 
influenced her daughter to the extent that her will was said to be overborne when the 
daughter rejected recommended life-saving blood transfusion. In such cases where there 
are differences of opinion between the patient and HCPs, it has been suggested that the 
HCP’s first loyalty should be to the patient. HCPs should attempt to enhance the patient’s 
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ability to make a voluntary, uncoerced decision and to overcome any coercive 
pressures.521 
 
2.5.1.2  Persuasion  
 
In persuasion, a patient must come to believe in something based on the moral suasion 
and reasons another person advances, for example, the HCP or family member. Influence 
by appeal to reason is different from appeal to emotions. The key is to balance the 
information disclosed to patients who may be psychologically fragile so that their fear or 
panic would not overwhelm their ability to reason and to make a voluntary decision.522 
 
2.5.1.3 Manipulation   
 
Some HCPs have argued against IC by suggesting it is as mere window dressing on the 
basis that most doctors can usually manipulate a patient’s decision to accede to any 
request made by a trusted physician. This can sometimes be achieved by persuasion, 
which may not be unethical. However, sometimes such conduct, capitalizes on the 
disparities in knowledge, position, and influence, and the power asymmetry between 
doctor and patient. It has been argued that such actions which are manipulative in 
character impair the voluntariness of the patient’s choice.523 Manipulation is a generic term 
for many forms of undue influence, which are designed to get patients to behave in one 
way or another, which may not be necessarily coercive or persuasive.524 In healthcare, 
the primary form of manipulation is information manipulation, whereby the HCP can by 
tone of voice or careful selection of information, either negatively or positively presented, 
to influence patient choice. For example, a physician can say, “we succeed most of the 
time with this therapy” rather than “we fail in 30% of cases with this other therapy.”525 
HCPs that are aware of the effects of such minor variations can choose their language 
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with care; if, during discussions with a patient, they sense any unintended or confused 
impressions being created, they can adjust their presentation of information accordingly 
and because many patients are often fearful and feel unequal to their physicians in status, 
knowledge, and power, they may be particularly susceptible to manipulations of this 
type.526 This type of potentially manipulative behaviour has been observed by studies 
amongst radiology resident physicians in the USA, with regard to the daily practice of IC 
in a healthcare setting.527 Other extreme forms of manipulative behaviour include lying 
and withholding of information as a form of “therapeutic privilege”,528 in order to get 
patients to act in one way rather than the other.529, 530 In view of the above, it has been 
proposed that HCPs should present information in a way that fosters patient 
understanding of their medical prognosis and the implications of different treatment 
options as recommended by the National Health Act.531 The difficulty in distinguishing 
between rational persuasions on the one hand, and objectionable forms of influence or 
manipulation on the other, should be avoided.532  Since voluntariness is one of the key 
elements of informed consent, HCPs have an ethical obligation to avoid coercion and 
manipulation of their patients. It has been argued that while the law may penalise those 
who ignore the requirements of IC, or who directly or indirectly coerce patients, it can do 
little about subtle manipulations of healthcare users, without disrupting fiduciary 
obligations of the doctor-patient relationship. Therefore true voluntariness and avoiding 
undue influences on patients would be best achieved through more ethical behaviour and 
practice by HCPs.533 This may involve elements of virtue ethics such as the requirement 
for truth-telling, honesty, and the character of HCPs coming into play in the in the doctor-
patient  alliance.534 It has been argued that socio-economic deprivation can make patients 
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vulnerable to these types of manipulations in healthcare.535 For example, where a patient 
is in desperate need, such that the lack of a particular medication could expose such an 
individual or a loved one to irreparable harm. Attractive offers such as extra money or free 
medication can leave such patients without a choice, which may influence their decision. 
Such patients are constrained by a desperate situation and not necessarily by the 
manipulation of another.536 Some have suggested that in certain circumstances, 
individuals can perceive excessive offers of either financial rewards or perhaps a rare 
experimental therapy as threat to patients in such desperate need.537 It has been 
suggested that while there is no evidence that HCPs routinely manipulate patients, it must 
be noted that some patients are susceptible to such manipulations and undue influence, 
and this has to be guarded against, or that patients may need to be protected from it.538  
 
However, it has also been maintained that executional autonomy need not be 
accompanied by a decline in decisional autonomy. This observation was based on reports 
that caregivers in adult nursing homes often, neglect, misunderstand, or override 
resident’s autonomous decisions in some geriatric nursing homes.539 Finally, HCPs must 
remember the observation by Brody that “the physician has the power to improve the 
patients’ health status to the extent that he or she can alter the meaning that the patient 
attributes to the illness in a positive way.”540  
 
2.6 Information Disclosure 
 
One of the more contested and controversial areas in IC and healthcare decision-making 
revolves around the amount of information to be disclosed to a patient to elicit true/real or 
valid consent. Generally, lawful consent is out of the question unless the consenting party 
knows and appreciates what it is that he or she is consenting to. The foundational 
requirements for lawful consent relate to the knowledge, appreciation and acquiescence 
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on the part of the patient, and in the absence of knowledge and appreciation of 
information, real consent will be lacking.541 The doctor or other HCP such as a 
physiotherapist,542 as an expert, has the legal duty to provide the patient with the 
necessary information to enable an informed choice,  as established in the landmark 
American case of Canterbury v Spence:543 
 
[…] In our view, the patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. That 
right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an 
intelligent choice… This disclosure requirement, on analysis, reflects much more of a change in 
doctrinal emphasis than a substantive addition to malpractice law. It is well established that the 
physician must seek and secure his patient's consent before commencing an operation or other 
course of treatment…It is a settled rule that therapy not authorized by the patient may amount to a 
tort -- a common law battery -- by the physician…it is evident that it is normally impossible to obtain 
a consent worthy of the name unless the physician first elucidates the options and the perils for the 
patient's edification. Thus the physician has long borne a duty, on pain of liability for unauthorized 
treatment, to make adequate disclosure to the patient…”544 
 
Similarly in Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University, which pioneered the use of the 
terminology ‘informed consent,545 the court held that: 
 
 A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he withholds any facts 
which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed 
treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation 
in order to induce his patient's consent…...The instruction given should be modified to inform the 
jury that the physician has such discretion consistent, of course, with the full disclosure of facts 
necessary to an informed consent.546 
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Instructing the jury further, the Salgo court was of the opinion that there were exceptions 
to the IC rule such as extreme psychological threat or based on the different idiosyncrasies 
of individual patients, thereby recognizing the doctrine of ‘therapeutic privilege’. The rule 
of information disclosure was further reinforced in Natanson v Kline547 where the court 
stated with regard to informed consent that: 
 
This rule in effect compels disclosure by the physician in order to assure that an informed consent 
of the patient is obtained. The duty of the physician to disclose, however, is limited to those 
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar 
circumstances.548 
 
In Natanson the court opined on the extent of disclosure required the physician or HCP 
as:  to “[…] disclose and explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary the 
nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, the probability of success or 
of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions 
within the body…”549 Therefore in, the American cases of Canterbury v Spence;550 
Natanson v Kline;551 and Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University;552 the courts established 
a duty of information disclosure, albeit limited by exceptions for therapeutic privilege and 
the reasonable doctor standard.553 The Canterbury court went further to debate and 
rejected the objective reasonable doctor and reasonable patient standards as a basis for 
evaluating the extent of information disclosure, arguing that:   
 
Consonantly with orthodox negligence doctrine, the physician's liability for nondisclosure is to be 
determined on the basis of foresight, not hindsight; no less than any other aspect of negligence, the 
issue on nondisclosure must be approached from the viewpoint of the reasonableness of the 
physician's divulgence in terms of what he knows or should know to be the patient's informational 
needs.554 
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The Canterbury court also alluded to the ‘subjective patients’ and ‘material risk’ standards, 
by adding that: 
 
The scope of the physician's communications to the patient… must be measured by the patient's 
need, and that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether 
a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentially 
affecting the decision must be unmasked. And to safeguard the patient's interest in achieving his 
own determination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate 
disclosure…Optimally for the patient, exposure of a risk would be mandatory whenever the patient 
would deem it significant to his decision, either singly or in combination with other risks. Such a 
requirement, however, would summon the physician to second-guess the patient, whose ideas on 
materiality could hardly be known to the physician. That would make an undue demand upon 
medical practitioners, whose conduct, like that of others, is to be measured in terms of 
reasonableness…If, but only if, the fact-finder can say that the physician's communication was 
unreasonably inadequate is an imposition of liability legally or morally justified…555 
 
2.6.1 Standards of information disclosure: What must be disclosed to enable valid 
consent? 
 
The amount and nature of the information given to a patient or research subject, in order 
to obtain valid consent is a critical issue in both treatment and research and has been the 
subject of both legal and ethical controversy in various jurisdictions.556 Previously it was 
alleged that English courts opted for a paternalistic approach by following the reasonable 
doctor standard which bases disclosure on the clinical judgement/accepted practice or 
substantial/normal/usual risk principles.557 English common law principles and 
jurisprudence with reference to information disclosure and medical negligence have 
generally revolved around the Bolam principle as outlined by McNair J in Bolam v Friern 
HMC 1957,558 where the judge stated that: 
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I myself would prefer to put it this way, that he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in 
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that 
particular art… Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is acting in accordance 
with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who would take a contrary view…559 
 
Therefore the true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment is defined in 
legal terms as, “whether the health professional has been proved to be guilty of such 
failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary 
care.”560According to Lord Scarman in Sidaway,561 the rule is expressed as follows:  
 
The Bolam principle may be formulated as a rule that a doctor is not negligent if he acts in 
accordance with a practice accepted at the time as proper by a responsible 
body of medical opinion even though other doctors adopt a different practice. In short, the law 
imposes the duty of care: but the standard of care is a matter of medical judgment.562 
 
This means that a doctor, nurse or any other HCP, is expected to provide care that any 
other HCP practicing in the same specialty or branch of medicine would provide, i.e. the 
minimum expected standard for care and treatment. The test is “the standard of the 
ordinary skilled man exercising and professing to have that special skill”.563 Accordingly, 
Lord Templeman in Sidaway concluded that:  
 
 […] At the end of the day, the doctor bearing in mind the best interests of the patient and bearing 
 in mind the patient’s right to information which will enable the patient to make a balanced 
 judgment, must decide what information should be given to the patient, and in what terms that 
 information should be couched.”564   
 
Therefore English common law practice has controversially been limited to the reasonable 
doctor standard which generally supported limited information disclosure as demonstrated 
in cases such as Chatterton v Gerson,565 where Bristow J said that the patient should 
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generally be informed in ‘broad terms’: “…Once the patient is informed in broad terms of 
the nature of the procedure which is intended, and gives consent that consent is rea.”566  
Thereby implying that not all information is required to be disclosed to patients and the 
nature and amount of information to be disclosed to a patient would be based on a 
reasonable doctor standard, rather than on the requirements of the patient.  
 
However, in Sidaway Lord Scarman argued for a prudent patient standard as practiced in 
other jurisdictions such as Canada, USA, and even Germany.567 By contrast, the courts 
in North America have held in cases such as Canterbury v Spence568 and Reibl v 
Hughes569 that a patient must be informed of ‘all material risks’ subject to some form of 
therapeutic privilege. Where those ‘material risks’ consist of what a reasonable person, in 
such a patients position, would be likely to attach significance to, in deciding whether to 
accept or forego the proposed therapy.570 This requirement for a ‘material risks’ standard 
of information disclosure has been reaffirmed in more recent  American cases such as 
Grimes v KKI571 where Cathell J stated that a human subject is entitled to all material 
information.572 The current situation in English common law is that Lord Scarman’s 
prudent patient standard is becoming more recognized and accepted as shown in cases 
such as Pearce v United Bristol Health Trust,573 where Lord Woolf held that a doctor 
should inform the patient of any significant risks which would affect the judgment of a 
reasonable patient. Further, in Chester v Afshar,574 Sir Dennis Henry argued that it would 
be considered negligent if the omission to disclose risks fell below the professional 
standard, stating:  
 
The purpose of the rule requiring doctors to give appropriate information to their patients is to enable 
the patient to exercise her right to choose whether or not to have the particular operation to which 
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she is asked to give consent. English law has rejected the proposition that a failure to give adequate 
warning vitiates the patient’s consent… But the patient does still have the right to choose what will 
and will not be done with her body and the doctor must take care expected of a reasonable doctor 
in the circumstances giving her the information relevant to that choice.575 
 
In supporting the majority judgment in Chester v Afshar,576 Lord Steyn outlined a number 
of relevant factors that ought to be considered in disclosing information to patients: 
 
i. When assessing the rights and duties of patients, the departure point should 
always be patient autonomy because “every individual of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to decide what may or may not be done with his own body”, 
citing the maxim of Cardozo J in Schloendorf v Society of New York Hospital.577  
ii. He goes on further to say that even a decision which a physician regards as “ill-
advised should be respected because in modern law medical paternalism no 
longer rules and the patient has a prima facie right to be informed by a surgeon 
of a small, but well established  risk of serious injury as a result of surgery”. 
iii. He noted that all rights are not equally important but that a patients right to an 
appropriate warning, must be given effective protection wherever possible. 
iv. Finally, the rule requiring a physician to obtain informed consent from a patient 
serves two purposes (a) it avoids occurrence of an injury for which the patient 
is not prepared and (b) it respects the autonomy and dignity of each 
patient.578,579 
 
In his dissenting opinion in Sidaway, Lord Scarman argued as follows:  
 
In my view the question whether or not the omission to warn constitutes a breach of the doctor's 
duty of care towards his patient is to be determined not exclusively by reference to the current state 
of responsible and competent professional opinion and practice at the time, though both are, of 
course, relevant considerations, but by the court's view as to whether the doctor in advising his 
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patient gave the consideration which the law requires him to give to the right of the patient to make 
up her own mind in the light of the relevant information whether or not she will accept the treatment 
which he proposes.580  
 
In coming to this conclusion he referred to the north American cases of Canterbury v 
Spence581 and Reibl v Hughes582 which held that the "duty to warn" arises from the 
patient's right to know all material risks, a right which in turn arises from the patient's right 
to decide for himself or herself whether or not to submit to the medical treatment 
proposed.583 In Chester v Afshar584 the CA found a consultant surgeon negligent for failing 
to disclose a 1-2% risk of nerve damage even when this enquiry was made by the 
patient.585 The Bolam principle has persisted in English legal jurisprudence on IC and 
information disclosure despite the dissenting opinion of Lord Scarman in Sidaway586 and 
the more recent judgment of the House of Lords in Bolitho v City and Hackney,587 where 
it was finally suggested that decisions regarding information disclosure based on the 
reasonable doctor standard must be judicially reviewed for logicality and reasonableness.  
 
In other common law jurisdictions, such as Australia, the standard of disclosure has 
tended towards the North American standards as established in Reibl v Hughes588 and 
Canterbury v Spence.589 Similarly, in the case of F v R 1983,590 the Australian Supreme 
Court per King CJ, was of the opinion that: 
 
The ultimate question, however, is not whether the defendant's conduct accords with the practices 
of his profession or some part of it, but whether it conforms to the standard of reasonable care 
demanded by the law. That is a question for the court and the duty of deciding it cannot be delegated 
to any profession or group in the community.591  
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He further argues that the amount of information to be disclosed to a patient by a 
responsible doctor, was determined by many complex factors including “the nature of the 
matter to be disclosed; the nature of the treatment; the desire of the patient for information; 
the temperament and health of the patient; and the general surrounding 
circumstances.”592 The judge therefore concluded that, "to allow expert medical evidence 
to determine what risks are material and, hence, should be disclosed and, correlatively, 
what risks are not material is to hand over to the medical profession the entire question of 
the scope of the duty of disclosure, including the question whether there has been a 
breach of that duty.”593 He suggested that while expert medical evidence was relevant to 
findings as to the risks that reside in or are a result of recommended surgery or other 
treatment, it will also have a bearing on their materiality, but this is not a question that is 
to be concluded on the basis of the expert medical evidence alone:594  
 
The issue under consideration is a different issue from that involved where the question is whether 
the doctor carried out his professional activities by applicable professional standards. What is under 
consideration here is the patient's right to know what risks are involved in undergoing or foregoing 
certain surgery or other treatment.595  
 
The Australian court in Rogers v Whitaker,596 concurred with all the observations of King 
CJ in F v R, concluding that “ the law should recognize that a doctor has a duty to warn a 
patient of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk is material if, in the 
circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient's position, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical practitioner 
is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, would 
be likely to attach significance to it. This duty is subject to the therapeutic privilege.”597 
According to King J, the central argument regarding risk disclosure was based on a 
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balancing of the doctor’s duty of beneficence and non-maleficence,598 otherwise doing 
what the HCP thinks would be in the best interest of the patient against the right of the 
patient to self-determination and freedom of choice. He therefore argued that the 
governing principle would be the right of every human being to decide what should happen 
to his or her own life, and in doing so to decide which risks he or she is willing or not willing 
to take.599,600 King CJ further argues that the court has an obligation to scrutinize 
professional practices, to make sure that they conform with the standard of 
reasonableness and disclosure required by the law, consistent with opinion of the English 
house of Lords in Bolitho,601 because it is more than likely that some HCPs may resort to 
unreasonable practices especially in terms of information disclosure which may be more 
convenient or which better served their own personal interests.602 Generally, Australian 
laws accord with the practice in Canada as outlined in Reibl v Hughes603 where the court 
held that information disclosure based on the reasonable doctor standard would only 
serve the effect of handing over to the medical profession the entire scope of the duty of 
disclosure, including the question of whether there had been a breach of that duty.604,605  
 
It has been reported that disclosure standards based on the prudent patient standard 
rather than the reasonable doctor standard, are prevalent in European countries such as 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland and France.606 In France, it has been stated that the 
individual’s interest in his or her own bodily integrity requires that all medical procedures 
be based on the patients free and clear consent. Therefore, a doctor or other HCP is 
required to provide the patient with all the information which would enable the patient to 
conduct a cost/ benefit analysis on the possible consequences and risks entailed, before 
deciding whether to undergo or forego the proposed treatment. Similarly, in Germany the 
Federal Supreme Court was of the opinion that “the sick person who lacks experience in 
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medical matters is dependent upon the doctor to provide expert advice and information. 
This would represent proper respect for the patient’s right of self-determination and 
enhance the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient relationship. To respect the patient’s 
own will is to respect his freedom and dignity as a human being.” 607,608   
 
Further, in the newly emergent republics of South-eastern Europe such as Croatia, 
Croatian legislation governing IC, “The Act on the Protection of Patients’ Rights”,609 
requires full information disclosure, stating “the patient has the right to all information, 
regarding his or her health condition, planned medical procedures, and all risks and 
complication of refusing and accepting them. To ensure complete comprehension of 
planned medical treatment, the information provided must be understandable, in a form 
adjusted to the patient’s age, education and mental abilities. Only after having understood 
all the information, should patients express their acceptance or rejection of the medical 
procedure by signing the consent form.”610 Therefore, in terms of Croatian legislation, IC 
is required for all medical procedures, although implementation in practice is not fully 
compliant with the law.611 Therefore, in most European countries the standard of 
information disclosure required is based on the prudent-patient standard,612 except in 
some Scandinavian countries, such as Denmark, where it has been reported that the 
reasonable doctor standard is still relatively prevalent.613  
 
In a final analysis, based on the recent judgment of the UK Supreme Court (Scotland) in 
the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,614 the court, having taken into 
consideration the various judgments by English courts in recent times, including the 
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Sidaway case,615 Pearce v United Bristol,616 subject to the opinion of the High Court of 
Australia in Rogers v Whitaker,617 concluded that:  
 
The correct position, in relation to the risks of injury involved in treatment, […] An adult person of 
sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment to undergo, and 
her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. 
The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of 
any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or 
variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the 
doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach 
significance to it.618 
 
The above position on information disclosure, is subject to certain exceptions including 
the doctrines of ‘therapeutic privilege’ and necessity, according to the Supreme Court.619 
 
2.6.2 Information disclosure in the context of South African law 
 
In the context of South Africa, prior to the judgment in the Castell case620 and legal rules 
regarding IC introduced by the NHA,621 one may argue from early case law, that doctors 
were not required by law to disclose all possible consequences and complications of 
medical treatment. It was enough that the patient was informed in broad terms about the 
serious risks and dangers inherent in the treatment. This was demonstrated in cases such 
as Lymberg v Jefferies622 and Richter v Estate Hamman,623 where the court suggested 
that doctors were not expected to disclose to their patients unusual, uncommon or remote 
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risks or complications.624 However, in cases such as Rompel v Botha625 and the 
Esterhuizen case,626 the courts suggested that patients should generally be informed of 
any ‘serious risks’ related to the proposed treatment or medical procedure.627 It has been 
argued that the duty to disclose in South African common law consists in fully informing 
patients’ of “the nature purpose and benefits and the probable, substantial and inevitable 
risks and consequences of the medical intervention, irrespective of whether it is 
therapeutic or diagnostic in nature.”628 However, such information disclosure maybe 
subject to certain exceptions which would include: 
 
a.  That the medical doctor may be obliged to inform the patient about medical 
treatment but not necessarily the diagnosis;629 
b. Where the patient waives the right to information disclosure, this would also be 
legally acceptable;630 
c. In certain circumstances, information may be withheld from the patient based on 
the doctrine of ‘therapeutic privilege or contraindication.631 One example would be 
where a patient who is being treated for a serious condition would then after 
disclosure refuse further treatment, or where disclosure may unnecessarily distress 
the patient, or where disclosure would be contrary to the patients best 
interests.632,633 
 
More recently the South Africa standard for information disclosure appear to have 
changed with the judgment of the Ackerman J in the Castell case,634 where the court was 
of the opinion that for consent to be informed, the patient needs to fully appreciate the 
nature of the harm or the risk to which he or she is consenting. Further, the court 
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suggested that the standard of disclosure required is the ‘material risks’ standard, where 
the test of materiality would be based on what a reasonable person in the patients’ position 
would likely attach significance to in coming to a decision, or alternatively, what the doctor 
ought to have known would be of significance to that particular patient in arriving at 
decision with regards to information disclosure.635 It has been suggested that the rationale 
for the court’s decision in the Castell case636 arose from the South African Constitution637 
which recognizes the rights of autonomy, by entrenching and codifying the rights to human 
dignity and bodily integrity in sections 10 and 12(2) of the Constitution and the Bill of 
rights.638 Moreover, section 12 of the Constitution stipulates that everyone has a right to 
bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right not to be subjected to medical 
or scientific experimentation without their informed consent.639 It has been suggested that 
when sections 12(2)(a), e.g. "everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity,” 
and 12(2)(b), e.g. the right "to security in and control over their body" are read together it 
is clear that decisions regarding one's body relate to both a physical and psychological 
dimension.640 Generally, a patient can only be expected to take responsibility for a 
particular decision where the person has been provided with enough information to make 
an informed decision. Therefore, legal disclosure only sets out a minimum standard of 
information to be disclosed to enable informed decision-making. Based on the judgment 
in Castell case,641 the minimum level of information required to render consent valid in 
terms of South African law should be that: 
 
i. the consenting party must have had knowledge and been aware of 
the nature and extent of the harm or risk 
ii. the consenting party must have appreciated  and understood the 
nature and extent of the harm or risk 
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iii. the consenting party must have consented to the harm or assumed 
the risk 
iv. the consent given by the consenting party must be comprehensive, 
that is, extends to the entire transaction, inclusive of the 
consequences642,643,644, 645,646 
 
Therefore in terms of South African law and based on Castell case,647 a doctor needs to 
disclose all material risks associated with the proposed treatment, based on a “prudent 
patient standard”, which is a subjective standard of information disclosure rather than an 
objective reasonable person standard. It has been suggested that the actual common law 
test for materiality is based on question whether “a risk is material if the person who 
consented would not have done so, had the risk been known to him or her”.648 This test 
was then applied by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) in the case of Broude v 
McIntosh,649 without the SCA overruling the judgment of the High Court.650  
 
The NHA651 codified the requirements for IC and information disclosure as part of the 
legislative framework regulating healthcare services in South Africa. The law recognises 
the principle of individual autonomy and differentiates between ‘users’ of healthcare 
services or patients and ‘healthcare providers’ which refers to all providers of health care 
services registered in terms of the Health Professions Act,652 and other related laws  such 
as the Nursing Act.653  This means that the requirements for IC are not limited to doctors 
but includes all health care professionals (HCPs) mutatis mutandis, consistent with the 
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opinion of the UK Supreme Court, Scotland in Montgomery v Lanarkshire.654 The NHA655 
further stipulates that all healthcare users have a right to IC and that users have a right to 
participate in decisions affecting their personal health, and consequently must have full 
knowledge regarding the proposed treatment. The law further describes informed consent 
in section 7 as meaning “consent for the provision of a specified health service given by a 
person with legal capacity to do so and who has been informed as contemplated in section 
6”.656 This means that a healthcare user is required to have full knowledge and must be 
informed of:  
 
(a) The user health status [diagnosis];  
(b) The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the 
user  
(c) The benefits, risks, costs and consequences generally associated with each option  
(d) The user’s right to refuse health services and the implications, risks, obligations of 
such refusal.657  
 
However section 6(1)(a) of the NHA provides an exception which allows the HCP not to 
inform a user of the user’s health status, in circumstances where there is substantial 
evidence that the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the best 
interests of the user, thereby supporting the exception of therapeutic privilege.658 Other 
exceptions to information disclosure are noted in section 7 of the NHA; for example, where 
the user is unable to give IC and this is provided by a proxy previously mandated by the 
user in writing, or consent is given by another person mandated by law or by the patients 
recognized next of kin. IC can also be waived where such waiver is approved by law 
s7(c),659 or where failure to treat the user will lead to a serious risk to public health  
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s7 (d),660 or where delay in providing care to the user can cause irreversible damage to 
the user’s health or may lead to patient’s death.661 As previously discussed on page 78 of 
this thesis, The Constitutional Court in the case of S v Makwayane, held that the right to 
life is the most constitutionally protected value. 662 However, it must be noted that in 
section 7 (e) of the NHA, lifesaving treatment may not be administered to an adult patient, 
where such a patient has ‘expressedly or impliedly or by conduct refused such 
treatment’.663 The NHA further requires that if IC is provided by a proxy or surrogate 
decision-maker, such a proxy must consult the user if at all possible, or where the user is 
unable to participate in decisions regarding his or her health, the patient must be informed 
soon after the fact, except where such disclosure of information would be contrary to the 
users best interests.664 HCPs are also required to inform the user of all this information in 
a language the user understands, and in a manner that takes into account the user’s 
literacy level, by implication the users’ level of education.665 This level of detail as provided 
for by the NHA arguably supersedes the information disclosure requirements outlined in 
the Castell case.666 It is has been suggested that the requirement of full disclosure, and 
the right of users to participate in healthcare decision-making pertaining to their health, as 
well as the users right of refusal, ensures that the NHA667 gives effect to respect for 
patients autonomy and self-determination as well as enhancing patients’ dignity, which is 
equally enshrined in section10 of the Constitution, where it states that “everyone has 
inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected”.668 However it 
has been reported that so far the disclosure requirements as outlined in the NHA have 
rarely been applied in any judicial decisions by South African courts.669,670,671 
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2.6.3 The prudent patient standard of information disclosure and problems of 
‘hindsight’ 
 
It has been suggested that one of the problems militating against general adoption of the 
prudent patient standard in court decisions has been the fact that it places an 
unreasonable burden on doctors or other HCPs to try and unravel what would be the 
particular patient’s interest with regards to information disclosure. As outlined in 
Canterbury v Spence:672 
Optimally for the patient, exposure of a risk would be mandatory whenever the patient would deem 
it significant to his decision, either singly or in combination with other risks. Such a requirement, 
however, would summon the physician to second-guess the patient, whose ideas on materiality 
could hardly be known to the physician. That would make an undue demand upon medical 
practitioners, whose conduct, like that of others, is to be measured in terms of reasonableness. 
Consonantly with orthodox negligence doctrine, the physician's liability for nondisclosure is to be 
determined on the basis of foresight, not hindsight; no less than any other aspect of negligence, the 
issue on non-disclosure must be approached from the viewpoint of the reasonableness of the 
physician's divulgence in terms of what he knows or should know to be the patient's informational 
needs. If, but only if, the fact-finder can say that the physician's communication was unreasonably 
inadequate is an imposition of liability legally or morally justified. 673 
Generally, in order to prove causation in negligence cases where lack of IC or failure to 
provide adequate information disclosure by the HCP is alleged, and where such a risk 
eventually materialises, it has been argued that to substantiate such claims, patients 
would have to admit that, if such a risk had been disclosed, he or she would have not 
undergone the procedure or assumed the risk in question. It has been suggested that 
German law may have an answer for this conundrum. According to a German Supreme 
Court ruling in 1984,674 in order to defend the accusation that the claimant’s decision was 
not based on the “hindsight” of the risk materializing, patients/ claimants should be obliged 
to substantiate and defend the allegation that they would not have undergone the 
treatment if the risk had been disclosed. The court would then evaluate these reasons 
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against the patient’s personal circumstances and the facts of the case. The reasons 
presented by the patient must be such, as to enable the court to be satisfied that the 
patient, had he or she received the information in question, would have been faced from 
their own perspective with a real conflict which would have made acceptance of such a 
risk impossible.675,676 
 
2.7 Some differences between consent to medical treatment versus biomedical 
research 
 
Another contentious area with regards to determining the level of information disclosure 
to patients is the issue of the different standards of information disclosure required for 
involvement in biomedical research when compared to medical treatment. It has been 
suggested that these differences might seem obvious because research is generally 
experimental in nature, while standard medical therapy is based on tried and tested 
methods and medications.677 However, such arguments have been challenged by some 
others, who assert that the use of newer and better drugs may actually be more beneficial 
than older outdated therapy. Further, when a doctor compares a newer drug against and 
old established drug in a clinical trial, the physician/researcher is generally required to 
seek ethical approval from a research ethics committee (REC). However, when another 
doctor decides to change his or her patient’s medication as part of standard treatment 
regimen in a clinic or medical ward, even though this is somewhat experimental in nature, 
this latter doctor is not required to obtain any approval other than routine IC from the 
patient. This has been viewed as contradictory because one could argue that the 
physician/ researcher who obtains regulatory approval prior to embarking on the clinical 
trial, may be more ethically astute and admirable, also the patient in this situation may be 
better protected.678 The question has been asked why international research ethical 
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codes679,680 focus more on the physician/researchers who are testing new drugs, rather 
than the new innovations which may be achieved in the process. The answer seems to lie 
in the belief that research is considered hazardous because the physician/researcher 
conducting research is only interested in gathering generalizable knowledge,681and is 
therefore using the patient as a means to an end.682 Contrary to the moral philosophy and 
categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant who asserted that people should never be used 
as a means to an end,683 rather any decision taken must be generally universalisable and 
must be used for the benefit of the individual and not for others nor for benefit of society 
in general.684,685 Therefore biomedical research somehow changes the nature of the 
doctor-patient relationship from a fiduciary relationship which is designed to cater for the 
welfare and well-being of the individual patient, to a situation where the patient is now 
being used to further the aim of generalizable knowledge which may only benefit others, 
and society in general.686,687  
 
It has therefore been suggested that the role of ethical codes and regulatory approvals in 
medical research as opposed to treatment is to try and ameliorate this conflict.688 
Therefore, the physician’s role in the doctor-patient relationship may be regarded as 
different from the researcher’s role in the researcher/ human subject relationship, even 
when the doctor and researcher are the same person. The physician’s primary 
responsibility is usually the health and well-being of the patient, whereas the researcher’s 
primary responsibility is the generation of new knowledge, which may or may not 
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contribute to the research subject as patients’ health and wellbeing. 689,690 Thus, there is 
a potential for conflict between the two roles. When this occurs, the physician’s role must 
take precedence over that of the doctor as researcher. According the National Bioethics 
Advisory committee (NBAC):691 
 
When research involves human participants, the uncertainties inherent in any research study raise 
the prospect of unanticipated harm…therefore, there can be a conflict between the need to test 
hypotheses and the requirement to respect and protect individuals who participate in research. This 
conflict and the resulting tension that can arise within the research enterprise suggest a need for 
guidance and oversight.692 
 
Further, it has been suggested that because medical research is commercialized and well-
funded, physicians can sometimes be lured by the financial or other benefits generated 
by research as shown in the case of Moore v Regents of University of California.693 In this 
case, full information disclosure was not provided to a patient whose tissues were used to 
generate commercial cell-lines, which generated enormous profit for the patient’s 
physician and his employers. This led the Supreme Court of California to declare that “a 
physician who is seeking a patients consent for a medical procedure, [must] in order to 
satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patients ‘consent, disclose personal interests 
unrelated to the patients’ health, whether research or economic, that may affect his 
judgement.”694 Therefore, it has been suggested that the HCPs interest in obtaining some 
of these ancillary benefits, can sometimes conflict with the duty to provide the patient with 
the best available information and treatment. It can also conflict with the right of the patient 
to receive all the necessary information to make a fully informed decision whether or not 
to participate in a research study.695 These observations led legal commentators like 
Morin696 to argue that: 
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It is essential to recognize that society’s interest in knowledge may not coincide with and individual 
subject’s interest. The individual subject stands to gain nothing and may lose everything including 
his or her right of self–determination…Failing to recognize that subjects who volunteer for the sake 
of advancing scientific knowledge are differently situated from patients who stand to benefit from 
treatment, results in an analysis that misconceives the purpose of disclosure. Beyond informing the 
patient as to the means of available to treat him or her, a subject must become a voluntary and 
willing participant in an endeavor that may yield no direct benefit to him or her, or worse, that may 
cause harm.”697 
 
Reservations regarding these potential conflicts of interests may have prompted Cathell 
J to declare in Grimes v KKI698 that:  
 
Researchers cannot ever be permitted to completely immunize themselves by reliance on consents, 
especially when the information furnished to the subject, or the party consenting, is incomplete in a 
material respect. A researcher’s duty is not created by or extinguished by, the consent of a research 
subject or institutional review board approval. The duty to a vulnerable subject is independent of 
consent, although obtaining of consent is one of the duties a researcher must perform…Such legal 
duties, and legal protections, might additionally be warranted because of the likely conflict of interest 
between the goal of the research experimenter and the health of the human subject, especially, but 
not exclusively, when such research is commercialized.”699,700 
 
Finally, in view of the above arguments the WMA has declared that “in medical research 
on human subjects, considerations related to well-being of the human subject should take 
precedence over the interests of science and society […]”701 It has been suggested that 
these ethical conflicts between biomedical research and medical treatment can be 
overcome based on the doctors and HCPs ethical behaviour and virtues, such  as the 
ethical values of compassion, competence, autonomy, all of which should apply to the 
medical researcher as well. Consequently, there may be no inherent moral conflicts in the 
role of the biomedical researcher or physician, as long as doctors understand and follow 
the basic rules of research ethics; they should have no difficulty participating in research 
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as an integral component of their clinical practice and medical treatment.702,703 
Nevertheless, the level of information disclosure required in research is somewhat higher 
than that of medical treatment and this can be ascertained by looking at case law from 
North American courts where cases involving biomedical research have been litigated 
over a long period of time.704 For example in the 1965 case of Halushka v University of 
Saskatchewan,705 Hall J argued that:  
 
In order for consent to be effective, it must be informed consent, freely given and it is the duty of 
the doctor to give a fair and reasonable explanation of the proposed treatment including the 
probable effect thereof and any special or unusual risks. Such being the duty owed by a physician 
to his patient in ordinary medical practice, the duty to inform is at least as great if not greater in the 
case of those engaged in medical research. To persons who offer themselves as subjects for 
experimentation, because in the latter case, there can be no exception the requirements of full 
disclosure whereas it may be necessary to keep certain things from the patient, in the interest of 
peace of mind, when a medical operation is being performed. 
 
Similarly in the case of Weiss v Solomon706 the Supreme Court of Quebec concluded that 
in a purely experimental research program (non-therapeutic research); the doctor must 
disclose all known risks, including those which are very rare or remote and a fortiori those 
whose consequences could be grave. This level of disclosure is somewhat different from 
that in therapeutic research where there may be some beneficial treatment accruing to 
the patient, as demonstrated in Zimmer v Ringrose707 where the Supreme Court of 
Alberta, Canada did not extend the full disclosure principle established in Halushka to a 
case of sterilization performed as part of experimental procedures, similarly also in Moore 
v Regents of the University of California (hereinafter the Moore case),708 regarding the 
misappropriation of a surgically removed diseased spleen for use in research. The patient 
had consented to the splenectomy as part of his medical treatment, but did not consent 
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to its use for commercialized research. The Supreme Court of California held that though 
there may be some information that is so remote from the patient’s decision that it would 
not need to be disclosed in some cases, medical research would not fall into this category. 
Rather, the Court held that a physician who has an interest in research on tissue taken 
from a patient has potentially conflicting interests, which may render the physician to 
consciously or unconsciously recommend a particular procedure or treatment as opposed 
to the other. Therefore, disclosure of any research and other related interests is 
required.709 On the issue of misappropriation of patient’s tissue however, the Court found 
that a patient has no proprietary rights to his or her own tissue. While acknowledging that 
the patient has rights of privacy and autonomy to his own body, the Court felt that these 
rights were fully and equally protected under the right of full information disclosure and 
informed consent.710 The Moore case711 illustrates the fact that information disclosure is 
necessary to comply with a physician’s fiduciary duty to respect the patient’s autonomy, 
and to protect his or her property and privacy rights. It illustrates further that where the 
patient has derived some benefit from medical treatment combined with research, the so-
called “therapeutic research”, the courts may be reluctant to rule against HCPs. The 
requirements for information disclosure were earlier analysed by an American court in 
Salgo v Leland Stanford (1957)712 where the term “informed consent” was first introduced 
into legal parlance. The Salgo court argued that the duty to disclose the risks and 
alternatives of treatment was a logical extension of the already established duty to 
disclose the treatments nature and consequences. The court hence focused not only on 
whether consent had been given, but whether that consent was based on adequate 
information.713 Similarly, in Natanson v Kline (1960),714 which pioneered the legal charge 
of “negligence” in informed consent cases, the Kansas Appeals Court required the 
physician to disclose and explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary, the 
nature of the ailment, the nature of the proposed treatment, success, failure, 
                                                          
709  Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 (P2d) 479-523. 
710  Biering JR “Informed consent in the practice of pathology” 2001 Arch Pathol Lab Med 1425-
 1429. 
711  Moore v Regents of the University of California (1990) 793 (P2d) 479. 
712  Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees 317 P 2d 170 CA (1957). 
713  Salgo v Leland Stanford Jr University Board of Trustees 317 P 2d 170 CA (1957) 154 Cal App 2d 
 578 [para 12-15]. 
714  Nathanson v Kline 186 Kansas 393 350 P2d 1093 (1960) 
116 
 
alternatives.715 More recent American cases point to an even stricter standard of 
disclosure in “non-therapeutic research” as shown in Whitlock v Duke University.716 Here 
a District Court in North Carolina held that the applicable standard in research was that 
established in US v Karl Brandt717 as stipulated by the Nuremberg Code.718 The Whitlock 
court was of the opinion that the Nuremberg standard is higher than the ‘informed consent’ 
standard used in medical treatment, in that the researcher is put under a duty to disclose 
all the ‘material risks’ which are reasonably foreseeable; and not just the most frequent, 
most common, or most severe risks.719 In addition, the Nuremberg code puts the 
researcher under an obligation to disclose to the subject all the risks, which he or she may 
personally suffer, as opposed to those risks which a reasonable person may be expected 
to suffer during participation in research. This means that the level of disclosure is specific 
for each individual participating in a research project based on a subjective prudent 
patient’s standard. Therefore, one may conclude that the requirements in the Nuremberg 
code720 are based on a ‘subjective’ patient’s standard as opposed to the reasonable doctor 
standard adopted in the Declaration of Helsinki.721 The Whitlock court therefore concluded 
that the degree of disclosure of risks is higher in non-therapeutic research than that 
required in therapeutic research.722 It appears, however, that United States courts have 
been reluctant to impose the Nuremberg code standard in private actions for research 
conducted in violation of US regulations as being in violation of the subject’s rights to 
privacy and dignity as demonstrated by the case of Robertson v McGee 2002.723 Here the 
court held that the standard in the United States for conducting research on human 
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subjects was limited to the US Code of Federal Regulations,724 and there was no need to 
resort to international law to impute another standard.  
 
On the other hand, English common law has still not fully differentiated between the 
requirements for full information disclosure in research, from that in medical treatment, 
preferring to lump both together under the Bolam725 principle, based on the reasonable 
doctor standard. In view of the above analysis, one can conclude that the amount of 
information disclosure required to comply with IC in research, appears to be more rigorous 
and higher than those required for medical treatment, especially where such research is 
considered to be non-therapeutic or commercialized research.726 Some commentators 
have argued that while the standards of IC in research are unnecessarily exhaustive, the 
requirements with regards to medical treatment are uneven, being alternatively scanty or 
comprehensive, depending on individual HCPs. Therefore, the artificial dichotomy 
between IC in research compared to treatment may be fundamentally flawed and does 
not really serve the bests interests of patients.727  
 
Finally, the extent of information disclosure required can also be influenced by socio-
cultural factors, leading the NBAC to recommend that “researchers should develop 
culturally appropriate ways to disclose information that is necessary for adherence to the 
substantive ethical standards of informed consent.” 728 
 
2.8 What should generally be disclosed to a patient by healthcare professionals? 
 
It has been shown that certain factors influence the ability or willingness of HCPs to 
disclose healthcare information to patients. These would include the patient’s ability to 
understand the disclosed information and cope with the disclosure, the seriousness of the 
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patient’s health condition, and the patient’s desire to know about their current health 
status.729 From the foregoing one can summarize the requirements for information 
disclosure to patients, which can be generally classified into several broad areas: 
 
I. The patient’s current medical status- this would include current medical diagnosis, 
prognosis, and the need or otherwise of medical treatment at this time and the likely 
course of the patient’s condition if no treatment is administered. 
II. The medical interventions or treatment that might improve the patients prognosis, 
including a description of the potential procedures involved, a characterization of 
the associated risks and benefits, and the likely course of the patient’s condition 
with or without therapy. 
III. The doctors or HCPs professional opinion as to the best course of action in this 
case in light of their expert knowledge, taking into consideration what they know 
about the patient’s personal values and condition including for example, the costs 
of the different types of treatment based on the HCPs knowledge of the patients’ 
economic situation, health insurance status or family situation. 
IV. The uncertainties associated with the proposed treatment and the likelihood of 
success or failure and the likely consequences of treatment or non-treatment, 
including any ‘bad news’ which may be associated with the patient’s current 
condition e.g. quality of life issues, life expectancy or the impact of any 
experimental therapy. Where the overall effects of the therapy may be associated 
with the patient’s idiosyncrasy, or where the proposed therapy would be part of a 
clinical trial, which would require the patient to be randomized to a placebo or 
treatment group, in which case the eventual outcome could be unknown.  
V. The patient’s right of refusal. Patients should also be informed of their right to refuse 
the proposed medical intervention and the likely consequences of such refusal. 
The idea of IC is to enhance and respect the patient’s right of self-determination 
and autonomy,730 as suggested by Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland731when 
he stated:  
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It is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given 
to the wishes of the patient, so that if a patient of sound mind refuses, however 
unreasonably to consent to treatment or care by which life would or might be prolonged, 
the doctors responsible for his case must give effect to his wishes, even though they do not 
consider it to be in his best interests to do so.732 
 
Overall, one can conclude by saying that generally the law requires disclosure of risks that 
are material as judged by the seriousness or chance of occurrence.733 Material information 
was described in the case of McKinney v Nash 1981734 by the California CA as follows: 
 
Material information is that which the physician knows or should know would be regarded as 
significant by a reasonable person in the patient’s position when deciding whether to accept or reject 
the recommended medical procedure. To be material, a fact must also be one which is not 
commonly appreciated. If he physician knows or should know of a patient’s unique concerns or lack 
of familiarity with medical procedures, this may expand the scope of required disclosure. 735,736 
 
A comparative analysis of the above disclosure requirements will show that they are 
generally consistent with the requirements adumbrated in the National Health Act 737 and 
in the Castell case,738 as well as the criteria outlined by various South African legal 
scholars.739,740,741,742 
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2.9 Exceptions to full information disclosure during informed consent 
 
Informed consent is derived from the ethical principle of respect for autonomy, which 
together with the principles of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice, form the core 
principles of the principlism account of ethical reasoning as postulated by authorities such 
as Beauchamp and Childress.743 Some have argued against the principlism methodology 
because of the presumed elevation and pre-eminence of “respect for autonomy” above all 
other ethical principles or moral theories. However, Beauchamp and Childress744 have 
firmly denied these observations and argue that the principle of respect for autonomy has 
only prima facie right which can lawfully and ethically overridden when in competition with 
other equally compelling ethical principles. Therefore, in the realm of medical practice with 
particular reference to the IC doctrine, one can argue that respect for autonomy can be 
overridden in certain circumstances when there are other equally compelling ethical 
reasons. Hence the right to IC is only a rebuttable right which may be set aside when 
there are other overriding moral considerations and ethical dilemmas,745  as noted by Lord 
Donaldson in Re T.746  
 
Despite the overriding importance of information disclosure in order to obtain valid 
informed consent during medical practice, overriding patient autonomy and the 
requirements of informed consent can create a moral dilemma where a conflict arises 
between two equally compelling moral imperatives. This  constitutes a central dilemma in 
biomedical ethics and medical practice, whereby a moral dilemma is created by the 
doctors’ duty of professional beneficence and non-maleficence versus respect for the 
patient’s autonomy. The principles of beneficence and non-maleficence require a doctor 
or other HCP to maximize the good and minimize harm to the patient, while respect for 
autonomy requires the HCP to respect the patients’ right to self-determination and 
freedom of choice.747 It is said that persistence or overreliance on the doctrine of 
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beneficence by the HCP may promote or encourage paternalism. 748, 749, 750 Despite the 
above observations, it has been recognised that there are certain circumstances in 
medical practice where the overriding of a patient’s IC could be legally and morally 
justified. Such situations can be grouped into five general categories, which are the 
following:751,752,753,754 
 
I. Based on legal requirements or public policy 
II. Based on the doctrine of necessity or emergency 
III. Based on the patient’s best interests or incompetency 
IV. Based on the doctrine of therapeutic privilege 
V. Based on patient’s waiver of information disclosure or informed consent 
 
2.9.1 Public policy or legal requirements 
 
In cases of public policy generally, utilitarian principles take precedence over respect for 
autonomy. Globally, legal statues or international human rights conventions generally 
support or guarantee a right to life755 and a right to health.756  
 
In the United Kingdom, the UK Human Rights Act (1998)757 states that  “[e]veryone’s right 
to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in 
the execution of a sentence of a court following conviction of a crime for which this penalty 
is provided.”758  However in certain medical situations, for example where a patient has 
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been declared to be in a persistent vegetative state (PVS), legal authorities have 
derogated from these guaranteed rights by sanctioning the withholding and withdrawal of 
life sustaining nutrition and hydration which usually lead to the patient’s death. This was 
demonstrated in diverse jurisdictions such as the English cases of Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland,759 and NHS Trust A v; NHS Trust B v H,760 and similarly also in the American cases 
of Cruzan761 and Re Conroy,762 as well in the South African case of Clarke v Hurst.763   
 
Some legal and ethical authorities have argued against of these actions by suggesting 
that it might be in the interests of society to conserve scarce resources, rather than utilizing 
such resources to maintain patients with terminal diseases or irreversible conditions at 
public expense.764,765 However, other arguments supporting these decisions have centred 
on the need to respect those patients’ rights of autonomy and dignity.766 Some 
professional authorities such as the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) 
have supported the view that there may be circumstances where withholding treatment 
even if it not in the best interests of the patient, may be justifiable in the face of resource 
scarcity.767 In addition, while the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
guarantees a right to liberty and security of the person;768 similar to the South African 
Constitution which guarantees individual rights in section 12(a) “not to be deprived of 
freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; (b) not to be detained without trial, and (c) to free 
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from all forms of violence from either public or private sources.”769 The ECHR, on the other 
hand, provides an exception where a person’s liberty could be curtailed including “the 
lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious disease, of 
persons of unsound mind, or drug addicts or vagrancy.”770 This may justify the detention 
of patients for the treatment of infectious disease such as extremely drug resistant 
tuberculosis (XDR-TB), or compulsory immunization in school children, based on the 
utilitarian principle of limiting an individual autonomy rights to prevent harm to another. As 
postulated by JS Mill in his treatise On Liberty, where he argued that “the only part of 
conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns 
others.”771,772 
 
2.9.2 The doctrine of necessity   
 
The second criterion under which IC may be legally overridden is based on the doctrine 
of necessity, which is a recognized doctrine in common law jurisdictions and is routinely 
applied during emergency medical treatment. This doctrine allows doctors or other HCPs 
to treat patients within the limits of what is medically necessary to preserve life or prevent 
irreversible damage to the patients’ health. As outlined in section 7(e) of the NHA.773 This 
doctrine maybe applied where “any delay in the provision of the health service to the user 
might result in his or her death or irreversible damage to his or her health and the user 
has not expressly, impliedly or by conduct refused that service.”774 As explained by Lord 
Golf in F v Berkshire HA775: “That there exists in the common law a principle of necessity 
which may justify action, which would otherwise be unlawful, is not in doubt”.776 Further, 
                                                          
769  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s12 
770  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council 
 of Europe 1950). 
771  Mill JS On Liberty 1859 (Batoche Books Kitchener Ontario Canada 2001) [52-53 and 69-70]. 
772  Burrows RC and Hodgson RE “De facto gatekeeping and informed consent in intensive care” 
 1997 Med Law 17-27. 
773  National Health Act 61 of 2003 s7 (e). 
774  National Health Act 61 of 2003 s7. 
775  F v Berkshire Health Authority (Mental Health Act Commission intervening) 1989 2 All ER 
 545. 
776  F v Berkshire Health Authority1989 2 All ER 545. 
124 
 
Lord Brandon in the case of Re F777 also agreed that “in many cases, however, it will not 
only be lawful for doctors, on the ground of necessity, to operate on  or give other medical 
treatment to adult patients disabled from giving their consent; it will also be their common 
law duty to do so.” 778 Brooke LJ later summarized three requirements for the application 
of the doctrine of necessity in Re A779 as follows: 
 
a. The act is needed to avoid inevitable or irreparable evil 
b. No more should be done than is reasonably necessary for the purpose to be achieved 
c. The evil inflicted must be disproportionate to the evil avoided.780,781 
 
Some other authorities have argued that the harm caused should be weighed against the 
potential benefit before deciding on the best course of action via a risk/benefit analysis.782 
Lord Goff LJ however cautioned in the same case that “[e]mergency is however not the 
criterion or even a pre-requisite: it is simply a frequent origin of the necessity, which impels 
intervention. The principle is one of necessity, not of emergency”.783 He also added that 
the doctrine should be strictly confined to “action taken to preserve the life, health or well-
being of another who is unable to consent to it”.784 Based on the above considerations, 
two basic requirements for applications of the doctrine of necessity were outlined in 
English common law: 
 
1. There must be necessity to act when it is not practicable to communicate with the 
assisted person. 
2. The action taken must be such as a reasonable person would in all circumstances take, 
acting in the best interests of the assisted person.785 
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South African law is derived in part from Roman Dutch Law786 (to which the concept of 
negotiorum gestio belongs), and English common law to which the doctrine of necessity 
belongs. One can argue that the NHA does not specify which derivative of South African 
law is applicable when providing treatment in an emergency situation. One can assume 
that either the Roman-Dutch principle of negotiorum gestio, or the doctrine of necessity 
is equally applicable with regards to interpretation of the exceptions to IC outlined in 
s7(a-e) of the NHA.787 As previously discussed in the introduction to chapter two of this 
thesis, the reasons for the frequent citation of foreign case law to support arguments in 
this thesis is based on the fact that many of the legal principles outlined in the NHA have 
not been tested in South African courts, and the courts in many cases have been 
reluctant to delve into detailed interpretations of the IC doctrine even where litigants 
have requested the courts to do so. 788Again, there may be no contradiction as the 
common law does not distinguish between negotiorum gestio and the doctrine of 
necessity, under English common law the doctrine applicable is the doctrine of 
necessity, as outlined by the dictum of Lord Goff in Re F where he said that “emergency 
is however not the criterion or even a pre-requisite: it is simply a frequent origin of the 
necessity which impels intervention. The principle is one of necessity, not of 
emergency”.789 One can therefore conclude that the NHA does not specifically 
differentiate between the doctrine of necessity, or negotiorum gestio. One can argue that 
either principle is applicable when interpreting this regulation depending on the 
jurisdiction concerned. Having regards to the observations above, the principle of 
negotiorum gestio is further discussed below with some differences to the doctrine of 
necessity highlighted. 
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2.9.2.1 Negotiorum gestio (unauthorized administration) 
 
This is another condition, which may allow provision of medical treatment to an ailing 
individual in Roman-Dutch law, which is distinguishable from the doctrine of necessity, but 
is more closely aligned to the best interests of the patient as will be discussed further 
below. Negotiorum gestio is distinguished from the doctrine of necessity based on the 
following criteria: 
A. Necessity involves the sacrifice of the interests of a harmless third party, whereas 
negotiorum gestio involves two parties, the caretaker and the beneficiary. 
B. Necessity protects the interests of society, whereas negotiorum gestio protects the 
rights and interests of the individual.790 
 
Based on the above considerations unauthorized treatment or negotiorum gestio may be 
justified under the following circumstances: 
 
a) There must be a situation of emergency, which necessitates the intervention or 
action taken. 
b) The patient must be incapable of consenting or unaware of the situation. If the 
patient has some capacity to provide consent, then it must be obtained. The 
defence is only allowable where it is impossible to obtain the patients consent. 
c) The intervention must not have been expressly prohibited by the patients will. For 
example, if there is an advance directive or a living will which prohibits such 
intervention, then the HCP cannot go against the prohibited action.  
 
This may be illustrated by the landmark Canadian case of Malette v Shulman.791 In this 
case, Mrs Malette was carrying with her an unsigned Jehovah’s Witness card, which 
prohibited blood transfusion. She was involved in a motor vehicle accident and was 
unconscious, but required blood transfusion to save her life. Dr. Shulman authorized a 
blood transfusion that saved her life, even when he became aware of corroborative 
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information from a family member to confirm that she was indeed a Jehovah’s Witness. 
The patient recovered and sued the doctor for violation of her rights. The Canadian court 
awarded damages against the doctor, not for negligence, but for violation of the patient’s 
rights to privacy and bodily integrity, arguing that the presence of the Jehovah’s Witness 
card served as an advance directive that prohibited the blood transfusion, and ought not 
to have been ignored by the doctor. According to Robins J of the Ontario Court of Appeals, 
“the instructions imposed a valid restriction on the emergency treatment that could be 
provided…and precluded blood transfusions.”792  
 
It has been suggested that the doctrine of negotiorum gestio or unauthorized treatment is 
recognized by the National Health Act in section 7, where it states: 
 
  (1) Subject to section 8, a health service may not be provided to a user without the 
 User’s informed consent unless- 
(e) Any delay in the provision of the health service to the user might result in his or her death 
or irreversible damage to his or her health and the user has not expressly, impliedly or by conduct 
refused that service.793 
 
Other factors, which may apply to the doctrine of negotiorum gestio, may include: 
 
i. That the HCP or doctor who comes to treat a patient based on unauthorized 
administration has a duty to complete the treatment; that is, the healthcare 
professional is under obligation to complete the care based on a ‘reasonable doctor 
standard’ of care. 
ii. The HCP is also entitled to just remuneration, provided that the HCP acted with the 
intention of obtaining compensation for such action, he or she may claim 
compensation for the treatment administered to the patient. 
iii. The right to compensation: that if the HCP were to come to some harm while 
assisting the patient, then the HCP may claim compensation from the patient, if the 
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patient or individual assisted was negligent in creating the conditions that 
necessitated the assistance or unauthorized administration in the first place.794 
 
However, it must be observed that while South African law is derived in part from Roman 
Dutch Law,795 to which the concept of negotiorum gestio belongs, and English common 
law to which the doctrine of necessity belongs. One can argue that the NHA does not 
specify which derivative of South African law is applicable when providing treatment in an 
emergency as previously noted on pages 125-126 of this thesis. 
 
With regards to surrogate decision-making on behalf of incompetent patients. One can 
argue that, substituted judgment is only one aspect of the options that are applicable 
during surrogate decision-making. Generally, surrogate decision-making can be based 
on either: 
(a) Substituted judgment standard 
(b) Pure autonomy standard, or 
(c) Best interests standard 
It has been argued that the ‘substituted judgment standard’ would require that the 
surrogate decision-maker to ‘don the mantle of the incompetent’ as referred to in the 
American case of Superintendent of Belckerton State School v Sackewicz.796 The 
substituted judgment standard is generally viewed as autonomy based, however, it does 
not apply to never competent persons. In these cases, the types of types of evidence 
required for substituted judgment would be (i) written evidence, (ii) verbal evidence, or 
(iii) relational evidence.797 
The second basis on which decisions can be made on behalf of people lacking 
decisional capacity is the ‘pure autonomy standard’. It has been argued that this 
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standard generally eliminates the ‘ghost’ autonomy created by substituted judgment. 
However, it only applies to previously competent individuals and in such cases, the 
types and strength of evidence must be weighed to decide what the person would have 
wanted.798 
 
The third basis on which surrogates can make decisions on behalf of an individual 
lacking decisional capacity would be the ‘best interests standard’. In such cases, the 
surrogate determines what is in the patient’s best interests. Here, the goal is to 
maximize benefits to incompetent persons while minimizing risks. It is generally 
suggested that in such cases the surrogate should not consider his or her own interests 
or the interests of others besides the incompetent person. However, this standard is also 
complicated by the ‘myth of the disinterested other’, whereby, surrogates with ‘interests 
of their own’ could end up substituting their own objective with that of the incompetent 
person/s.799 
 
2.9.3 The doctrine of best interests 
 
Another legally acceptable reason for overriding patients’ autonomy or IC is based on the 
patient’s best interest.800 This will usually occur where the patient is incompetent either by 
being mentally incapacitated such as occurs in severe mental retardation in an adult 
patient, or during infancy or during states of unconsciousness. In such cases, the patient 
is lacking the necessary and required DMC to give IC. In such instances, according to the 
analogy of Lord Brandon in Re F:801 
 
[T]hey will normally be received into the casualty department of a hospital, which thereby 
undertakes the care of them. It will then be the duty of the doctors at that hospital to use their best 
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endeavours to do, by way of an operation or other treatment, that, which is in the best interests of 
such patients.802 
 
It has been argued that the legal concept of best interests is centred on respecting and 
promoting patients autonomy, and is therefore aligned with the desire-fulfilment theory 
which is related to a person’s well-being and  having one’s desires fulfilled, according to 
the concept of well-being and self-interest. In this case, a person’s well-being is what is 
good for them. Health could be considered a constituent of a person’s well-being, but it 
may not be all that matters to that individual’s well-being. “One correlate term worth noting 
here is ‘self-interest’: my self-interest is what is in the best interests of me, and not 
others.”803 In other words, to maximize an individual’s well-being, one ought to give them 
whatever they want. Opponents of this theory have argued that there could be a conflict 
between what an individual wants and what is actually good for them. Based on this 
conflict between wants and needs, the best interests’ argument can be divided into 
‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ categories.804 
 
A. Objective view of best interests- Advocates of the objective view argue that bests 
interests can be explained in terms of maximizing an individual’s welfare, well-
being or good. Based on this view, any action or omission that brings about the 
maximization of my well-being in a particular situation is that which is in that 
person’s best interests.805Others have argued that the decision would only 
considered the ‘best’ if such an action would bring about the most good for the 
individual concerned.806 
B. Subjective view of best interests- Advocates of the subjective view of best 
interests on the other hand argue that the best interests’ standard should be 
determined by what that particular individual would have chosen if they were 
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competent to do so. This would of course apply to only previously competent 
patients. Further, if those patients were incompetent, what they would have chosen 
if they were in a position to do so. In practical terms it could be argued that where 
knowledge is available of that person’s wishes e.g. by means of an advance 
directive, or living will, or arguably corroborative anecdotal evidence. Those 
individuals’ best interests would be determined based on this. The central idea in 
the subjective view of best interests would be that, if an individual values certain 
types of beliefs e.g. religious beliefs as exemplified by Jehovah’s witnesses. 
Actions that tend to take account of these views would be in my best interests and 
enhance my autonomy, while actions that ignore these beliefs would tend to 
compromise my best interests.807 
 
2.9.4  The doctrine of therapeutic privilege 
 
This is an exception to the IC doctrine, which allows a doctor under certain circumstances 
to withhold distressing information from a patient in his or her best interests. It is a 
controversial exception that could undermine the very essence of patient’s autonomy and 
self-determination.808 Generally, doctors or other HCPs are under a legal-ethical 
obligation to procure patients valid and fully informed consent before proceeding with 
treatment. At the same time, the HCP is bound by medical-ethical rules of the profession 
to heal or cure the patient if he or she can, based on the ethical principles of beneficence 
and non-maleficence, which bind the doctor to promote good and minimize harm.809  
Therefore, the doctrine of therapeutic privilege creates an ethical conflict and moral 
dilemma for the HCP. The doctrine of therapeutic privilege is a somewhat controversial 
formulation, which attempts to resolve this dilemma-albeit unsuccessfully in most cases. 
The doctrine of therapeutic privilege was recognized as an exception to the IC in 
Canterbury v Spence, 810 where the court held that: “Informed consent is a basic social 
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policy for which exceptions are permitted. These exceptions would include intellectual 
capability such as unconsciousness and extreme psychological threat […]”811  
 
The precise use of the therapeutic privilege exception to IC though recognized by most 
common law jurisdictions differs in application in various countries. While some 
jurisdictions would permit a physician to withhold information, where it would be contrary 
to the therapeutic intent and lead to a deterioration in the patient’s condition.  For example, 
when a patient with unstable cardiac arrhythmias would have his or her condition 
exacerbated by anxiety attendant on full disclosure of the risks of treatment.812 However, 
the exception in this case must be narrowly constructed so that it does not swallow up the 
general doctrine of IC and respect for patient’s autonomy.813  
 
Others appear to permit the withholding of information only if the patients knowledge of 
that information would have health-related effects, by impairing the patients DMC to give 
informed consent.814 In terms of psychological distress as a basis for therapeutic privilege, 
Robertson815 has suggested four possible scenarios where information could arguably be 
withheld from the patient: 
 
i. Where the information may be counterproductive in that the resulting 
psychological distress might prevent rational decision making; 
ii. Where the patient is being treated for emotional or psychological problems 
and the added distress caused by disclosure may compromise such 
treatment; 
iii. Where disclosure would be likely to cause serious distress or psychological 
harm. It would be in the best interests of the patient that the information 
should not be disclosed. 
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iv. Where a doctor or HCP believes that the treatment is in the patient’s best 
interests and the patient might refuse consent if told of the risks.816 
 
Further, some authorities have argued that the doctrine of therapeutic privilege can be 
legitimately invoked where the HCP has sufficient reasons to believe that disclosure would 
render the patient incompetent to give valid IC.817 To invoke the privilege under this 
condition, it is argued, does not conflict with the patients autonomy rights, because at this 
point the patient is incapable of making an autonomous decision.818 Other authorities 
contend that therapeutic privilege, as an exemption from IC is a frank exercise in 
paternalism.819 As outlined by Coetzee,820 the doctrine of therapeutic privilege may have 
the following negative impacts on the patient: 
 
a. It undermines the patients’ rights to freedom of choice and self-determination. 
b.  It may undermine patients trust in doctors/HCP and fiduciary duty inherent in the 
doctor-patient relationship. 
c. Applying the doctrine of therapeutic privilege may cause significant harm to the 
patient, where the patient eventually learns the truth despite efforts to shield him or 
her from it. 
d. Non-disclosure can affect the patient’s well-being. 
e. It may lead to dignity harm due to ‘loss of self-esteem’ when the true condition of 
the patient is later revealed, following initial non-disclosure. 
f.  The doctrine may afford an easy defence after the fact by a HCP of failure to obtain 
informed consent and thus may shield cases of medical negligence. 
g. The privilege may be used to legitimise the doctor’s Hippocratic aversion to 
delivering bad news. 
                                                          
816 Robertson 1981 Law Quarterly Review 102-121. 
817  Van den Heever P “Pleading the defence of therapeutic privilege” 2005 SAMJ 420-421. 
818   Van den Heever 2005 SAMJ 420-421. 
819  Mathew www.virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/204/02/msoc1-0402.html (Date of use: 29 January 
 2008). 
820  Coetzee LC “A critical evaluation of the therapeutic privilege in medical law: some 
 comparative perspectives” 2003 CILSA 268-288. 
134 
 
h. It may have cost implications in healthcare because the patients may not be given 
an opportunity to evaluate the cost/ benefit analysis of undergoing or refusing futile 
treatment, while on the hand , the HCP may proceed with such treatment based as 
it where on his own judgment of what would be in the patients best interests. 
i. Generally, physicians lack the ability or empirical evidence to conclude on whether 
disclosure would be harmful to a particular patient. It has been argued that the 
therapeutic privilege exception rests on a false assumption, that patients would 
automatically reject and refuse the recommended treatment once they are apprised 
of the truth.821 
 
It has been suggested that the doctrine of therapeutic privilege should be applied within 
very narrow boundaries because of its potential for abuse and overuse by HCPs. 
According to the Presidents’ Commission on Bioethics,822 the potential for abuse arises 
from its inherent inconsistency with the patient’s right to know in order to authorize or 
refuse the proposed treatment. Further, the privilege may sometimes allow doctors and 
other HCPs to unethically manipulate patients into giving consent to the proposed 
treatment.823 Van Oosten has argued that the wider the scope the doctrine of therapeutic 
privilege is defined, the narrower the scope of IC and information disclosure and the 
difficulty of obtaining a valid consent which respects the patient’s autonomy.824  
 
The American Medical association (AMA) Code of Medical Ethics suggests that 
physicians may withhold information about a patient’s diagnosis or treatment when 
disclosing it would pose such a serious psychological threat, as to be medically contra-
indicated. However, the code also warns that the doctrine of therapeutic privilege should 
not be used to prevent patients from exercising their free choice.825 Berg and others 
maintain that it is likely the therapeutic privilege exception lends false legitimacy to the 
natural aversion of doctors to giving information to patients. Therefore, if the scope of this 
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privilege is not circumscribed it has the potential to swallow the HCPs ethical-legal 
obligation of disclosure, which may in fact permit HCPs to substitute their own judgment 
for that of patients in any instance of healthcare decision-making. They further suggest 
that because of the overlap between the doctrine of therapeutic privilege and the 
allowances provided by waiver and incompetence, the doctrine of therapeutic privilege 
should be abolished.826  
 
In the context of South African jurisprudence, therapeutic privilege as an exception to 
information disclosure have been cited in cases such as the Castell case827 where 
Ackerman J recognized its existence as a defence against information disclosure in South 
African law, but did not provide a detailed analysis of its application in practice. According 
to Welz, the court in this case appeared to suggest that the existence of therapeutic 
privilege is incompatible with the current practice of enhancing patient’s autonomy and 
self-determination.828 Further, in SA Medical and Dental Council v McLouglin,829 
Watermeyer J observed, “it may sometimes even be advisable for a medical man to keep 
secret from his patients the form of treatment he is giving them”, whilst in Richter v Estate 
Hamman,830 the court opined that “a doctor whose advice is sought about an operation in 
which certain dangers are attached is in a dilemma because if he fails to disclose the risks 
he may render himself liable to an action for assault. On the other hand if he discloses all 
the possible risks, he might well frighten the patient into refusing treatment which the 
doctor knows would be in the patient’s best interest to accept.”831 The full extent of the 
doctrine of therapeutic privilege has never been litigated in South African courts. The more 
recent NHA 2003 codified this exception into law by providing that “every healthcare 
provider must inform a user of the user’s health status except in circumstances where 
there is substantial evidence that the disclosure of the users heath status would be 
contrary to the best interests of the user.”832 Therefore, while the exception of therapeutic 
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privilege is now legally recognized in South Africa, it is still advisable that HCPs use this 
exception with caution subject to the following recommendations: 
 
1. Non-disclosure or incomplete disclosure can only be justified in exceptional 
circumstances. 
2. There must be a real threat of detriment to a patient’s physical or mental health. 
3. Information could be withheld where the HCP judges the patients emotional state to 
be such that the patient is unable to use the information in arriving at a rational 
decision. 
4. The HCP must bear the onus of justifying that inadequate or non-disclosure was 
based a sound clinical judgment. 
5. The legal-ethical principles relating to the HCPs use of the therapeutic privilege 
exception must still protect the patient’s autonomy within the overall objective of 
achieving the goals of treatment and enhancing the patient’s dignity rights of self-
determination.833 
 
2.9.5 Waiver of information disclosure 
 
The final criterion and perhaps least controversial exception to information disclosure is 
based on the concept of waiver. In the case of Miranda v Arizona,834 the US Supreme 
Court defined waiver as the voluntary and intentional relinquishing of a known right. In 
exercising waiver, a patient voluntarily relinquishes the right to information disclosure and 
IC by delegating the decision-making to either the HCP or another surrogate decision 
maker.835 In making such a decision, some patients may express a decision to trust their 
doctor’s professional judgment, whereas others may feel unable or lack the confidence to 
analyse the risk disclosed.836 Sometimes a waiver may occur or apply where a patient 
who was previously competent initiates an ‘advance directive’ or ‘living will’, which 
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transfers the right to IC or healthcare decision-making to another person if, and when such 
a person is no longer competent to do so.  The law generally allows patients to waive their 
right to give IC, so long as it made after full information disclosure, or where a patient 
chooses not have negative information disclosed due to personal cultural beliefs. In other 
words, the patient makes a decision not to make an informed decision. The waiver 
exception may also be applicable based on religious or other cultural beliefs, for example 
amongst Navajo Indians of North America who abhor ‘bad news’- this exception may 
enable them to revoke their right to hear bad news by relieving the HCP from the duty of 
disclosure.837  
 
This exception has been legally accepted in some instances, in that courts have been of 
the opinion that doctors need not make disclosures of risks where the patient requests 
that he or she be not so informed.838 It has also been suggested by some ethicists that 
the bearer of rights can always waive that right.839 Others have argued that it is appropriate 
to recognize waivers of rights because an individual always enjoys a discretion when and 
whether to exercise those rights.840 It is possible that with regard to the issue of advance 
directives and living wills, that exercising these options allows the patient as the rights 
bearer to still be active in the decision-making process by choosing who will exercise those 
rights on his or her behalf, and that this enhances patient autonomy and right of self-
determination.  It has been said that patient consent can act as a waiver, for example, 
when a patient gives consent to a surgeon to operate. This does not actually give the 
surgeon the right to operate, since the patient retains the right to bodily integrity and 
sufficient control of his or her body to withdraw that permission at any time. In such 
situations, it may be argued that consent can operate as a waiver.841 Accordingly, the 
impact of the waiver exception is that if a waiver is properly obtained, the patient will 
remain the ultimate decision-maker. However, the content of this decision is shifted from 
the decisional level to the meta-decisional level, for example, the decision may change 
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from ‘I want this treatment or I do not want this treatment’ to ‘I do not want any information 
about the treatment I am about to receive.’842 However, the legal requirements for effective 
waiver during the informed consent process have never been clearly articulated by the 
courts. While it has been suggested that the court would generally approve of properly 
obtained and applied waivers, there is a concern that such waivers must be morally and 
legally acceptable. In the absence of clear judicial guidance, HCPs are advised to exercise 
this exception with appropriate caution.843 Further, it has been argued that a general 
acceptance of waivers of information disclosure and IC could lead to its abuse and 
overuse, because most patients have an inordinate trust in their doctors and a general 
acceptance of waivers could expose patient to exploitation and abuse.  
 
Therefore, it is generally accepted that a rule could be established whereby waivers would 
be overruled, except where it has been analysed an approved by an independent body, 
such as a research ethics committee or hospital ethics committee. This procedure could 
minimize or generally eliminate the potential abuse of the waiver exception by HCPs and 
others.844 
 
2.10 Understanding or comprehension of information disclosed 
 
Although information disclosure and knowledge of that information are necessary for the 
comprehension of information, plain knowledge is generally not sufficient. Real 
comprehension would involve the ability to use information rationally. Therefore, for a 
patient to understand the information imparted by a HCP, the patient must not only be 
able to listen attentively to the HCP. Doctors must also appreciate that for information to 
have been communicated successfully, it needs not only disclosure, but the patient must 
also pay attention to that information, understand it, accept, retain the information, and 
then put that information to use in a rational manner.845  Some commentators have argued 
that the true test for comprehension is the patient’s capacity to understand, and that the 
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HCP needs to ascertain that the patient actually has the capacity to understand the 
information conveyed in a non-technical language.846 Accordingly, in Re C,847 Thorpe J 
was of the opinion that there are three stages to a decision and understanding of 
information: 
 
(i) to take in and retain the information,  
(ii) to believe it, and  
(iii) to weigh that information balancing risks and needs.  
 
Based on these criteria, the court ruled that a schizophrenic patient, who had refused 
amputation of his infected leg, had the capacity to understand information disclosed.848 
Further, the British Medical Association (BMA)849 guidelines stipulate with regards to 
understanding that the patient must be shown to: 
 
 Understand in simple language what the medical treatment is, its purpose and 
nature and why it is being proposed 
 Understand its principal benefits, risks and alternatives 
 Understand in broad terms what will be the consequences of not receiving the 
proposed treatment 
 Retain the information for long enough to make and effective decision 
 Make a free choice (free from pressure or undue coercion) 
  
This was further explained by Morland J in Smith v Tunbridge Wells850 as follows: 
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When recommending a particular type of surgery or treatment, the doctor, when warning of the 
risks, must take reasonable care to ensure that his explanation of the risks is intelligible to this 
particular patient. The doctor should use language, simple but not misleading, which the doctor 
perceives from what knowledge and acquaintanceship that he may have of the patient (which may 
be slight), will be understood by the patient so that the patient can make an informed decision.851 
 
In finding a surgeon guilty of negligence in this case, the court held that surgeon had 
“failed to explain with sufficient clarity…the risk of impotence…and on this occasion was 
negligent.”852 In another English case Re L (Medical treatment: Gillick competency),853 the 
court ordered that a 14-year old Jehovah’s witness who was considered mature for her 
age, should be given blood transfusion against her will, because the court considered that 
she did not fully appreciate the consequences of her decision. According to Van Oosten, 
information as a sine qua non of informed consent entails both knowledge and 
appreciation by the consenter.854 Some have argued that the NHA855 is somewhat 
deficient in this respect, by emphasizing in section 6(1) “that users must have full 
knowledge”, without the corollary requirement that they must also appreciate such 
information, although this is implied in section 6(2) where the Act stipulates that HCPs 
must take into consideration the language and literacy level of the user. It has been 
suggested that the legislation may need to be remedied by including a requirement for not 
only understanding, but also appreciation by the consent giver.856 
 
The UK General Medical Council (GMC), in explaining this, states as follows:857  
 
Effective communication is the key to enabling participants to make informed decisions. When 
providing information you must do your best to find out participants individual needs and priorities 
e.g. the participants current understanding of their condition and treatment, beliefs, culture, 
occupation or other factors, may have a bearing on the information they require. You must not make 
                                                          
851  Smith v Tunbridge Wells Health Authority 1994 5 Med LR 334 [339]. 
852  Hocton The law of consent to medical treatment 46. 
853  Re L (Medical treatment: Gillick competency) (1998) 2 FLR 810 see also Khan et al Clinical 
 Negligence 68. 
854  Van Oosten The doctrine of informed consent in South African law 20. 
855  National Health 2003 s6. 
856  Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law 16-18. 
857 GMC Research: The role and responsibilities of doctors (General Medical Council London 
 2000). 
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assumptions about participant’s views but discuss matters with them and ask whether they have 
concern about the treatment or the risks involved in the research programme. 858 
 
From the above, one may argue that HCPs are required to actively seek to ensure that 
patients truly understand the information disclosed to them. In furtherance of the 
requirements for understanding and comprehension, some authorities such as the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission, USA (NBAC)859 have suggested that part of 
ensuring complete understanding of information may even include community 
participation.860 Such involvement may vary from providing written information sheets for 
potential participants to take home and discuss with family members, holding community 
meetings during which information is presented and community consensus is obtained,861 
in the context of research.862 It is suggested that when a patient wishes to involve family 
members in the consent discussion, the HCP should take appropriate steps to 
accommodate this desire by the patient, but the patient should be cautioned that such 
family member’s permission should not replace the requirement for a competent 
individual’s voluntary informed consent.863,864 Finally, it has been proposed that: 
 
 Improving people’s understanding of what is provided in the realm of medical services is seen 
 as a major factor that contributes to increased quality of care and adherence to expert advice. 
 Measurement of health literacy is needed to identify those patients that do not understand 
 medical information or the range of services offered. Only if we know about those patients or 
 subgroups with low degrees of health literacy, we can adjust our services respectively or  provide 
 specific teaching programs for patients.865 
                                                          
858 GMC Good medical practice 2013 https://www.gmc-uk.org/guidance/index.asp (Date of use: 
 12 November 2017). 
859  National Bioethics Advisory Commission Presidential bioethics commission issues report on 
 clinical  trials research in developing countries (NBAC Bethesda MD 2001) [recommendation 
 3.4]. 
860  NBAC Presidential bioethics commission issues report on clinical trials research in developing 
 countries (NBAC Bethesda MD 2001) [recommendation 3.5]. 
861  NBAC Presidential bioethics commission issues report on clinical trials research in developing 
 countries (NBAC Bethesda MD 2001) [recommendation 3.8]. 
862  Tindana et al 2006 IRB 1-6. 
863  NBAC Presidential bioethics commission issues report on clinical trials research in developing 
 countries (NBAC Bethesda MD 2001) [3.8].  
864  Chima Consent and patients’ rights 47.  
865         Abel T “Measuring health literacy: moving towards a health-promotion perspective” 2008 Int 
 J Public Health 169–170 see also Kanj and Mitic “Health Literacy” Paper presented at the 7th 
142 
 
2.10.1 Language and effective communication 
 
It is arguable that while the above requirements are generally applicable in medical 
treatment the magnitude of difficulty for understanding required in complex multicultural 
and multilingual developing African countries could be even higher,866 especially in a 
country like South Africa, which has 11 official languages.867 Further, the population using 
public healthcare services in South Africa are not highly educated868 and many do not 
speak the same language as the HCP providing treatment, especially doctors.869  In these 
types of settings it may be necessary to obtain the services of and interpreter or an 
intermediary, or to put the information in the patient’s local language in other words, ‘in 
language understandable to the patient’, in order to fulfil the obligation for understanding 
prior to IC. This would be consistent with the requirement in the NHA, which states that, 
“The health care provider concerned must, where possible, inform the user…in a 
language that the user understands and in a manner which takes into account the user’s 
level of literacy.”870  
 
Language barriers may have a negative impact on healthcare services, leading to errors 
such as misdiagnosis, failure of preventive healthcare and non-adherence by patients to 
prescribed medications.871 This could ultimately lead to accusations of negligence and 
claim of damages against doctors and other HCPs.872 Problems with language difficulties 
and IC or other healthcare services are not limited to South Africa,873 where previous 
reports indicate that the absence of appropriately trained interpreters is a major barrier to 
IC for doctors working in public hospitals.874 In another study in a South African district 
                                                          
 Global Conference on Health Promotion, "Promoting health and development: Closing the 
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866  Bhan A, Majd M and Adejumo A “Informed consent in international research: Perspectives 
 from India, Iran and Nigeria” 2006 MUMJ 36-41. 
867  Schlemmer A and Mash B “The effects of a language barrier in a South African district hospital” 
 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
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871  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
872  Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 229-331. 
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hospital, the authors concluded that language difficulties create significant problem for 
HCPs and could influence the patients’ rights to IC and confidentiality in the healthcare 
setting. 875,876  
 
In light of the above observations, the Council for International Organizations of Medical 
Sciences (CIOMS)877 has provided the following recommendations concerning language 
and comprehension of information, albeit with particular reference to biomedical research. 
However, these guidelines are equally applicable to medical treatment scenarios. 
 
Language – Informing the individual subject must not be simply a ritual recitation of the contents of 
a written document. Rather, the investigator must convey the information, whether orally or in 
writing, in language that suits the individual's level of understanding. The investigator must bear in 
mind that the prospective subject’s ability to understand the information necessary to give informed 
consent depends on that individual's maturity, intelligence, education, and belief system. It depends 
also on the investigator's [HCPs] ability and willingness to communicate with patience and 
sensitivity.878 
Comprehension – The investigator must then ensure that the prospective subject has adequately 
understood the information. The investigator should give each one full opportunity to ask questions 
and should answer them honestly, promptly and completely. In some instances, the investigator 
may administer an oral or a written test or otherwise determine whether the information has been 
adequately understood.879 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
875 Tate RC et al “Strategies used by prehospital providers to overcome language barriers” 2016 
 Prehosp Emerg Care 404-414. 
876  Schlemmer and Mash  2006 SAMJ 1084-1087 
877  The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) International ethical 
 guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects-Guideline 9 (CIOMS-WHO Geneva 
 2016) 33-36. 
878  CIOMS International ethical guidelines for biomedical research Involving human subjects  
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879  CIOMS International ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects  (WHO 
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2.10.2 Information overload 
 
Excessive information, which the patient barely understands, can also be a barrier to 
processing of disclosed information. In such cases, too much information as opposed to 
inadequate information can prevent understanding especially where unfamiliar 
terminology or medical jargon is used and the patient cannot make any sense of such 
information.880 This is of particular importance amongst less educated patients or low 
socio-economic classes as prevalent in developing countries like South Africa.881,882 
 
In another study from South Africa, it was reported that patients in a rural setting could not 
understand basic technological terminology because these are new technologies for 
which words do not exist in the local language. The authors concluded that this might 
affect the patients understanding and ability to render IC.883 In this situation, it has been 
argued that patients may come to rely on selective information processing within their own 
personal value systems or level of knowledge, making it increasingly difficult to determine 
whether patient preconceptions and beliefs distort the information disclosed or when other 
biases may intrude. 884,885 
 
2.10.3 Other factors that may impact on patient comprehension-false beliefs 
 
DMC can also be compromised where a patient’s ability to accept information which is 
factually true, even when they comprehend such information, could be impacted based 
on false beliefs, plain ignorance, or unexplained bias against the HCP. Such false beliefs 
can occur for example; (a) where a patient who is capable and understands information 
provided, but may still agree to participate in non-therapeutic research project under the 
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false belief that it is therapeutic, that is, the so-called therapeutic misconception.886 (b) A 
seriously ill-patient who has been presented with factual information that they have a 
serious medical diagnosis e.g. lung cancer, may falsely believe that he or she does not 
have lung cancer because he or she has not been a smoker and from her own personal 
knowledge only smokers can get lung cancer. In such a case, the patient’s perception is 
clouded by strongly held misinformation and belief, and where such a patient refuses the 
necessary treatment this will not be an informed refusal because it is based on a false 
belief. Finally, ignorance or bias can impact on a patient’s understanding and acceptance 
of information, for example, where a patient of a different racial background from the HCP 
refuses to accept factually accurate information simply because such a person has 
preconceived notions regarding the intellectual capacity or otherwise of the other race.887 
This is sometimes related to the inability to accept the otherness of the other,888 such as 
occurs in situations where xenophobia and other racial biases exist. Similarly, in a country 
like South Africa or Nigeria, ancestral beliefs systems including ancestor worship which is 
prevalent amongst Bantu speaking peoples.889 This may impact negatively on patients’ 
acceptance of factual medical or healthcare disclosures, if such individuals harbour the 
false or real belief that their illness are caused by the ancestors or evil spirits.890, 891,892 
 
As illustrated in the English case of Re MB,893 where the court opined that a misperception 
of reality, such as the blood is poisoned because it is red; could result in some impairment 
or disturbance of mental functioning, which renders the person unable to make a decision 
whether to consent to or refuse treatment.894 
                                                          
886  Sugarman J et al “Evaluating the quality of informed consent” 2005 Clinical Trials 34-41. 
887  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 91-92. 
888  Chima SC “Religion politics and ethics: Moral and ethical dilemmas facing faith-based 
 organizations and Africa in the 21st century-implications for Nigeria in a season of anomie” 
 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S1-S7. 
889  Dan-Fulani UHD “Religious conflict on the Jos Plateau: The interplay between Christianity 
 and traditional religion during the early missionary period” 2001 Swedish Missiological Themes 8-
 40. 
890  Irabor and Omonzejele 2009 Dev World Bioeth 34-42. 
891  Booysens JH “Traditional health care in South Africa- Diverse ideas and convergent practice” 
 1991 Koers 479-497. 
892         Bogopa D “Health and Ancestors: The case of South Africa and beyond” 2010 Indo-Pacific 
 Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) 1-7. 
893  Re MB (1997) 2 FLR 426. 
894  Re MB (1997) 2 FLR 426 [437]. 
146 
 
2.11 Consent, agreement or authorization of treatment 
 
Having evaluated all the key elements of informed IC as described above, a patient can 
legally authorize or give permission for the proposed treatment or otherwise refuse to 
authorize the proposed treatment. As previously defined, IC is an autonomous 
authorization by a patient to accept or refuse a medical intervention. Based on this 
definition, the US Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations require 
that consent should be sought “only under circumstances that provide the prospective 
patient or patients legally authorized representative, sufficient opportunity to consider 
whether or not to give permission, and that HCPs must minimize the possibility of coercion 
or undue influence.”895  
 
Similarly, the English Department of Health (DOH) has set out requirements for consent, 
which include the absence of coercion.896 Therefore, before a patient can give valid 
consent in the context of medical treatment, this requires that a patient’s decision must be 
made without any form of coercion or undue influence. Undue influence was classically 
demonstrated in Re T,897 where Lord Donaldson held that it was lawful to have transfused 
a Jehovah’s Witness patient in order to save her life, despite her refusal of consent. Here 
the court was of the opinion that the patient’s refusal to give consent was unduly 
influenced by her mother’s wishes, who was a staunch Jehovah’s Witness, in contrast to 
her ailing daughter, for whom evidence from close relatives were that, had she not been 
influenced by her mother, she would have given consent to save her life if she had the 
capacity to do so. In this case, the court overrode the patient’s refusal by stating that it 
was not a ‘valid or real refusal’ because the patient’s will was “overborne” by that of her 
mother.898   
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Further, the question of justifying or identifying whether consent is ‘real’ or valid also brings 
up the moral issue of consenting to illegal, immoral or ethically questionable activities. In 
analysing these issues, Cathell J in Grimes v KKI899 put it this way: 
  
One can say first, consent is justified whatever it consents to, so case closed, second, this        
particular consent is deficient-you did not really consent and so the result or action is not justified, 
or third, you consented, but your consent cannot justify the action or result […]”900 
 
Similarly, it has been argued that one can only consent to what is socially or morally 
acceptable or justifiable, based on public policy, law or custom. Real or valid consent can 
only apply to what is morally acceptable within a particular society’s “boni mores”.901,902 
Whatever is consented to generally has to be consistent with good morals, public good or 
accepted cultural values.903 
 
2.12 So, what is valid or true consent? 
 
Having analysed the various legal, ethical, and moral issues, which may affect the validity 
of consent. One may now attempt to define what constitutes valid IC: 
 
Valid, true or real consent to medical treatment may be described as a voluntary and 
autonomous authorization by a competent individual after disclosure of all material risks by 
the HCP, with full understanding by the patient, in the absence of any physical or moral 
pressure or undue influence. 
 
To put it another way, any form of undue influence, misrepresentation of facts, non-
disclosure of material risks, or lack of capacity to consent either by virtue of age, or mental 
incapacity due to any organic/inorganic/temporary/permanent incapacitation, fraud or lack 
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of time to fully consider the implications of consenting, may render consent invalid. Valid 
consent may also be given by a person with proxy responsibility under applicable laws, 
but is also subject to validity based on the above criteria being fulfilled. Similarly, a person 
with parental responsibility may give consent for minor under the age of consent although 
the minor’s assent should be obtained as well.  
 
However, where an individual is considered a ‘mature minor’, he or she may consent to 
his or her own treatment. Further, minors who are within the accepted age of consent 
(currently 12 years in South Africa);904 may consent on their own behalf to routine medical 
treatment, but may not necessarily be able to refuse all treatment since such refusal can 
be overridden by the parent, guardian, or a court of law as the case may be, because the 
court is considered the upper guardian for children.  Generally, where there is a dispute 
on the children’s consent or refusal, court opinion must be sought. This requirement was 
demonstrated in some American cases such as Strunk v Strunk905 where a mentally 
incompetent organ donor who was nominated to donate and organ to a sibling was 
granted permission to consent, through the parents, by the court to allow transplant of one 
kidney from mentally incompetent adult to 26-year old healthy sibling. Similarly, in Hart v 
Brown,906 court intercession and permission was sought to transplant one kidney from 7-
year old to an identical twin. In another case, Bonner v Moran,907 court permission was 
sought for a skin graft from a minor donor to a cousin. In all the above cases, consent was 
granted by the courts, based on humanitarian as well as other legal reasons. It is possible 
that these situations may be addressed by court jurisdiction in the ‘best interests’ of the 
minor as suggested by Lord Donaldson in Re W:908  
 
There can therefore be no doubt that [the court] has the power to override the refusal of a minor 
whether over the age of 16 or under that age but Gillick competent… such a refusal is a very 
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important consideration in making clinical judgments and for parents in deciding whether 
themselves to give consent. Its importance increases with the age and maturity of the minor.909 
 
Any such consent or refusal, which does not have the support of appropriate legal 
authority, may be considered invalid. For adults lacking the capacity to consent, UK law 
stipulates that no other individual can give consent except as established by the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005.910 To all intents and purposes, such individuals must be treated under 
the doctrine of ‘best interests’.911 Similar criteria are used in other jurisdictions such as the 
where a surrogate’s consent to treatment may be given by a legally responsible adult 
based on kin-ship relationships,912 or individuals with power of attorney or a similar person. 
Consent given while the patient is fully capable, in a ‘living will’ or ‘advance directives’, for 
example where a person consents to donate their body or remains for research or 
anatomical demonstration after death, may also be legally valid, though any limitations 
must be adhered to.913 These guidelines are also consistent with the law as outlined 
sections 6 to 9 of the NHA.914   
 
In addition and by way of comparison, the UK GMC has described valid consent as 
follows: “Patients consent is legally valid and professionally accepted only where patients 
are competent to give consent, have been properly informed, and have agreed without 
coercion.” 915 Finally, phrasing it in another way, informed consent may be described as 
the social rules of consent in institutions that must obtain legally valid consent, such as 
HCPs from patients. Any consent, which is not obtained within legally defined rules of 
obtaining consent, is therefore invalid.  
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2.13 Types of consent and the validity of consent forms 
 
Validity of consent is not dependent upon the form in which it is given. There is no 
requirement in law that consent should be in writing, except when this has been legally 
specified e.g. in the conduct of biomedical research in South Africa.916 The UK DOH917 
has recommended the use of consent forms as good practice where interventions, such 
as surgery, are planned. Similarly, the US Code of Federal regulations,918 as well as the 
CIOMS guidelines,919 and the Declaration of Helsinki,920 all consider this good practice in 
the research setting. Proplewell J, however, demonstrated the limits of written consent for 
surgical procedures in Taylor v Shropshire921 where he stated that:  
 
For my part I regard the consent form immediately before operation as pure window dressing in this 
case and simply designed to avoid the suggestion that a patient has not been told. I do not regard 
the failure to have specialized consent form at the time to be any indication of negligence.922 
 
Similarly, Bristow J stated in Chatterton v Gerson  as follows:923 “Getting the patient to 
sign a proforma expressing consent…would be no defence to an action based on 
trespass, if no explanation had in fact been given [and] consent obtained in ‘form only’ is 
no consent at all”.924   
 
Lord Donaldson MR in Re T explained with regard to consent forms authorizing or refusing 
blood transfusion as follows: “They will be wholly ineffective…if the patient is incapable of 
understanding them, they are not explained to him and there is no good evidence (apart 
from the patients signature) that he had that understanding and fully appreciated the 
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significance of signing it.”925 Therefore for the patients consent to amount to valid legal 
defence against trespass or negligence, the consent may be express, implied, oral or 
written, or part oral-part written, so long as the conditions described under valid consent 
above have been fulfilled. The signing of consent forms, however, is a legal requirement 
in accordance with certain statutory laws and regulations, such as the UK Mental Health 
Act 1983926 and the Human Fertilization and Embryology Act (HFEA) 1990.927 Where a 
patients’ capacity is in doubt, the patient’s DMC to validly sign a consent form must be 
ascertained in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.928  Furthermore, in South 
Africa, the HPCSA suggests that written consent should be obtained in the following 
circumstances: 
 
Except in an emergency, where the patient has the capacity to give consent HCPs should obtain 
written consent in the following cases, although this list is not exhaustive: (a)  Where the treatment 
or procedure is complex or involves significant risks and/or side effects; (b) Where providing clinical 
care is not the primary purpose of the investigation or examination; (c) where there may be 
significant consequences for the patient's employment, social or personal life; (d) where the 
treatment is part of a research programme.929 
One legal scholar asserts that hospital consent forms may impose contractual obligations 
between the doctor and the patient, which allow exclusion from any indemnities or failures 
that arise during medical treatment.930 However, one disagrees with this last observation, 
because as previously explained, consent agreements between doctors and patients 
creates a special relationship, which goes beyond the usual arm’s length contracts,931 in 
the sense that usually the HCP cannot unilaterally withdraw from a patients’ consented 
treatment while the patient still retains that right even after signing a consent form-the right 
to withdraw at any time from the proposed medical treatment.932 Interestingly, the United 
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States code of federal regulations933 has stipulated that any exculpatory statements 
contained in consent forms, especially with regard to biomedical research, would have the 
effect of rendering such an agreement or consent invalid. 
No informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any exculpatory language through which 
the subject or the representative is made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal 
rights, or releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institution or its agents 
from liability for negligence.934 
 
2.13.1  Implied or inferred consent 
 
Consent could be implied or inferred based on a patients conduct. For example, when a 
patient holds out his or her arm for the administration of an injection as demonstrated in 
the case of O’Brien v Cunard.935 In this classical case, a patient joined a queue on a ship 
and extended her arm to receive immunization from the ship’s doctor, but later sued the 
doctor based on trespass to the person. The court held that her actions implied consent 
whatever her unexpressed feelings might have been, although there were other 
corroborative evidence, such as wide advertisement of the place and time for the 
vaccination exercise on the ship in question. Other authorities have suggested that 
consent may have been inferred from her behaviour, as consent is a state of mind 
personal to a patient, whereby he or she agrees or gives permission to a HCP to interfere 
with his or her bodily integrity.936 However, since it is not possible to determine what the 
patient’s state of mind is, one can draw an inference from his or her behaviour or 
actions.937 Silence on the part of the patient however, does not necessarily imply consent, 
as argued in the case of Schweitzer v Central Hospital.938 Consent can also not be inferred 
where the patient is incompetent. In such cases the patient is treated based on the ‘best 
interests’ standards. According to the UK Mental Health Act 1983, “ the consent of a 
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patient shall not be required for any medical treatment given to him for the mental disorder 
from which he is suffering…if the treatment is given under the direction of the approved 
clinician in charge of the treatment.”939 According to Lord Goff in Re F, lawfulness of 
treatment under such circumstances is derived from the principle of necessity, “the doctor 
has to act in the best interests of the assisted person. In the case of routine treatment of 
mentally disordered persons, there should be little difficulty in applying this principle.”940  
 
The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), states as follows with regard to 
implied consent:  
 
Health care practitioners should be careful about relying on a patient's apparent compliance with a 
procedure as a form of consent. Submission in itself may not necessarily indicate consent. For 
example, the fact that a patient lies down on an examination couch does not indicate that the patient 
has understood what the health care practitioner proposes to do and why. Consent must at all times 
be expressed and not implied.941 
 
2.13.2 Express consent  
 
Express consent occurs where the consent is given once without limitations to its use. It 
extends through the entire transaction including all its consequences. In this case, the 
patient must:  
 
(a) Have had knowledge and been aware of the nature and extent of the harm or risk  
(b) Must have appreciated and understood the nature and extent of the harm or risk 
(c) Must have consented to the harm or assumed the risk, and  
(d) The consent must be comprehensive that it extends to the entire transaction inclusive 
of all its consequences.942 
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2.13.3 Presumed consent  
 
This occurs where the individual gives consent and it is assumed that this patient has 
given consent for all purposes, unless he or she chooses to ‘opt out’ if he or she does not 
consent to other uses or future activities. This type of consent has recently been applied 
in jurisdictions attempting to increase organ donations, where patients are presumed to 
have given consent, except where they ‘opt out’.943 However, it would be wrong to 
presume that simply when a patient shows up to the clinic or hospital or consulting rooms 
or is admitted to a hospital ward, that they have somehow impliedly consented to whatever 
a doctor or HCP decides to do, as observed by the HPCSA above,944 and neither can it 
be presumed that they have consented to all types of treatment or physical contact from 
the HCP. As noted by Watermeyer J in Stoffberg v Elliot:945 
 
A man by entering a hospital does not submit himself to such surgical operations as the doctors in 
attendance upon him might think necessary…by going into hospital he does not waive or give up 
his right of absolute security of the person…he retains his rights of control and disposal of his own 
body; he still has the right to say what operation he will submit to, and unless consent to an operation 
is expressly obtained, any operation performed on him without his consent is an unlawful 
interference with his right of security and control of his own body.946  
  
2.13.4 Open or Broad consent and other types of consent related to DNA biobanking 
 
Open consent refers to the situation where a person gives future consent to the use of his 
bodily fluids or tissues containing DNA, to a biobank or for personal genomic studies, 
pending the discovery of new ways of dealing with such material.947 This type of consent 
                                                          
840 A report of the presumed consent subcommittee on ethics. An evaluation of the ethics of 
 presumed consent (US Department of Health and Human Services). 
 https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/resources/ethics/an-evaluation-of-the-ethics-of-presumed-
 consent/ (Date of use: 16 April 2016). 
944  HPCSA Guidelines for good practice in the healthcare professions- Seeking patients 
 informed consent: The ethical considerations (HPCSA Pretoria 2008) Booklet 9. 
945  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148. 
946  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148-150. See also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational 
 principles [500].   
947 Liddell K and Skopek JM “ Informed consent for research using biospecimens, genetic 
 information and other personal Data”  University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Legal Studies 
155 
 
has acquired additional implications with the advent of new biotechnologies such as DNA 
storage and analysis and tissue bio-banking, especially with the advent of the Human 
Genome project, Personal Genome project, International Hap Map project and Genome-
wide association studies (GWAS).948 It has been asserted that ‘human subjects’ research 
no longer consists primarily of research on people, as advances in big data and 
biobanking have transformed the research landscape.949 Much research now focuses on 
personal data and bio-specimens, some of which is collected a long time ahead of the 
research and initially for other purposes. This shift has given rise to difficult questions 
about how to apply legal and ethical principles that were developed to govern biomedical 
research on people.950 The implications of this type of consent has created new 
controversies, ethical debate and moral dilemmas because of the on-going process of 
establishing human DNA databases in countries such as Iceland, Estonia, Tonga as well 
as the UK Biobank and others.951 It is also has implications for tissue bio banking 
generally, with future and current implications for regulations regarding individual 
confidentiality, privacy and the process of IC, especially in the context of human 
biomedical research.952 Some of the moral and ethical issues arising from these new 
developments include: 
 
a) Personal data and bio-specimens are increasingly at the centre of research, giving rise to difficult 
questions about whether and how to apply legal and ethical principles that were originally 
developed for a research model in which people were at the core.  
b) The requirement to obtain informed consent for research on personal data and bio-specimens can 
be grounded in many of the same considerations that justify requiring consent for research on 
people—e.g. autonomy, distributive justice and public policy, although there could be important 
differences in the application of these ethical principles.  
                                                          
 Research Paper Series Number 27/2017) http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ (Date of use: 24 
 September 2017). 
948  Lunshof JE et al “From genetic privacy to open consent” 2008 Nature Rev Genet 406-411.  
949  Lunshof et al 2008 Nature Rev Genet 406-411. See also Liddell and Skopek 
 http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ (Date of use: 24 September 2017). 
950  Liddell and Skopek http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ (Date of use: 24 September 2017). 
951  Hallinan D and Friedewald M “Open consent, biobanking and data protection law: Can open 
 consent be ‘informed’ under the forthcoming data protection regulation? 2015 Life Sci Soc 
 Policy doi.10.1186/s40504-014-0020-9. 
952  Chima SC and Mamdoo F “Ethical and regulatory issues surrounding umbilical cord blood 
 banking in South Africa” 2011 SAJBL 79-84. 
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c) The requirement of “specific consent” appears to be a poor fit for long-term research on personal 
data and bio-specimen; since the future research uses will often be inconceivable at the time of 
obtaining IC, thereby raising questions about whether alternative models, such as broad or 
dynamic consent, would be preferable options.  
d) The fact that research using genetic material and information will often reveal information about 
both the individual donor and a broader group of related individuals,953 has generated controversial 
proposals for requiring “community consent” in addition to individual consent.  
e) While the anonymization of personal data and bio-specimens may eliminate the requirement to 
obtain IC based on regulatory requirements, this approach has been criticized potentially infringing 
the informational autonomy of the sources and undervaluing the potential harms of re-identification, 
which could reduce the public’s trust in biomedical research.  
f) Stating that they did not consent to commercialization or patent protection is one of several ways 
individuals have sought to limit how their bio-specimens are used and commercialized; another 
approach has been to claim residual property rights in their bio-specimens. 954 
 
The moral dilemmas arising from these new biotechnologies have arisen because current 
IC regulations require that the nature, purpose and methods to be used be disclosed to 
any potential research subjects prior to IC.955 However in the case of human DNA and 
genome studies, it is possible and generally acknowledged that the potential 
consequences of future use of such materials cannot be fully anticipated during and prior 
to the collection of tissues containing human DNA.956 Therefore, all the potential future 
uses cannot be anticipated or disclosed, creating conflicts with current IC regulations and 
the potential for abuse of personal information, confidentiality and privacy.957 Due to these 
moral and ethical dilemmas, new types of consent have been suggested such as:   
 
(a) Presumed consent - also called democratic community consent; whereby the 
individual is not usually asked to give consent, but has the option to ‘opt-out’ in the 
future if they do not want to participate in the project. This type of consent has been 
                                                          
953 Chima and Mamdoo 2011 SAJBL 82. 
954 Liddell and Skopek http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ (Date of use: 24 September 2017). 
955   US Code of federal regulations 45 CFR 46.116 General requirements for informed consent 
 https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/45/46.116 (Date of use: 23 April 2016). 
956  Grady C et al “Broad consent for research with biological samples: Workshop conclusions” 
 2015 AJOB 34–42. 
957 Hallinan and Friedewald Life Sci Soc Policy doi.10.1186/s40504-014-0020-9. 
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used to increase general participation in organ donation, or to collect nationwide 
genomic information and DNA samples, as was done in Iceland. 958,959  
(b) Dynamic consent - refers to a ‘personalised, digital communication interface’ 
which allows biobank or researchers to establish continuous communication with 
human research subjects whereby research participants can be presented with 
specific project information and then, be able to continuously tailor their consent 
preferences according to their desires and needs.960 Dynamic consent has 
however been criticized for being inefficient, with the potential to burden human 
research subjects, exacerbate therapeutic misconceptions, and over-individualize 
ethical reviews.961 
(c) Sectoral consent - This refers to a situation where human research subjects can 
give consent to a specific project or research area while refusing or denying use of 
their donated tissues or DNA for other projects outside of the specified area without 
additional IC.962  
(d) Open or Broad consent963 - Of all the proposed new forms of consent, ‘open 
consent’, also known as ‘broad consent’, ‘general consent’ or ‘blanket consent’ 
appears to differ significantly from the accepted model of IC.964 Multiple definitions 
of open consent have been proposed including one by Lunshof et al,965 who defined 
‘open consent’ in relation to the Personal Genome Project in the following way:  
 
Open consent means that volunteers consent to unrestricted [research] re-disclosure of 
data originating from a confidential relationship, namely their health records, and to 
                                                          
958  Árnason V and Árnason G “Informed democratic consent? The case of the Icelandic 
 database” 2004 Trames 164–177. 
959    Rithalia et al “Impact of presumed consent for organ donation on donation rates: Systematic 
 review” 2009 BMJ doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.a3162. 
960  Kaye et al “Dynamic consent: A patient interface for twenty-first century research networks” 
 2015 EJHG 141-146. 
961  Steinsbekk KS, Myskja BK and Solberg B “Broad consent versus dynamic consent in biobank 
 research: Is passive participation an ethical problem?” 2013 EJHG 21 897-902. 
962  American Society of Human Genetics “Statement on informed consent for genetic research” 
 1996 Am J Hum Genet 471-474. 
963 Grady et al 2015 AJOB 15 34-42. 
964  Hallinan and Friedewald 2015 Life Sci Soc Policy doi.10.1186/s40504-014-0020-9. 
965  Lunshof et al 2008 Nature Rev Genet doi: 10.1038/nrg2360 [5]. 
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unrestricted [research] disclosure of information that emerges from any future research on 
their genotype-phenotype data set, the information content of which cannot be predicted.966 
 
Further, in relation to population-based biobanks, Nomper has defined ‘open consent’ as 
“the research subject’s affirmative agreement to participate in a population genetic 
database and in research projects that use tissue and data from that database.” 967  
Similarly, the recently codified US federal regulations for protection of human subjects 
which comes into effect in January 2018,968 requires that research subjects be informed 
if their bio-specimens may be used for commercial profit and whether or not they are likely 
to share in this profit.969This inclusion in the new ‘Common Rule’ probably arose from the 
contrasting judgments by two United States High Courts in the Moore case,970 and 
Greenberg v Miami Children’s Research Hospital.971 In the former case, the California 
Supreme Court held that physician-researchers must inform patients about economic 
rights or interests prior to obtaining informed consent, while in the latter case a United 
States Federal Court sitting in Florida held that this did not apply in a purely research 
context.972 Whilst there may be certain differences between the different definitions of 
‘open consent’, there are certain core concepts, which are common across all definitions. 
These characteristics differentiate ‘open consent’ from other forms of consent. The salient 
features are as follows: 
i. The human research subject usually gives consent only once to the biobank or to 
the data or tissue collector. 
ii. The research participant is not usually required to give IC to a specific research 
project, or to a particular project or research area. The participant gives consent to 
the use of their tissue sample or DNA and data for all future research purposes; 
without knowing which research projects, research areas, or technologies, for 
which the sample will be used, because sometimes even the biobank or researcher 
                                                          
966  Lunshof et al 2008 Nature Rev Genet doi: 10.1038/nrg2360 [5]. 
967  Nomper A Open consent - A new form of informed consent for population genetic 
 databases (Doctor Juris dissertation University of Tartu 2005). 
 http://dspace.ut.ee/bitstream/handle/10062/818/nomper.pdf (Date of use: 23 April 2016). 
968  Federal policy for the protection of human subjects 2017 US Federal Register 82 7149-7274. 
969 Liddell and Skopek http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ (Date of use: 24 September 2017). 
970 Moore v Regents of the University of California 51 Cal 3d 120 (CA 1990). 
971  Greenberg v Miami Children’s Research Hospital 264 F sup 2d 1064 (SD Florida 2003). 
972  Liddell and Skopek http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/ssrn/ (Date of use: 24 September 2017). 
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may not be able to predict the potential future uses of the collected sample in the 
future. 
iii. In most biobanks operating based on ‘open consent’, researchers wishing to 
conduct research on samples generally have to apply to the biobank for the 
opportunity to use stored tissue and data. The biobank through its governance 
mechanisms will then decide whether a research project will be permitted to use 
the requested material. The research subject plays no role in this decision. 
 
Open consent has become the most widely used of the new forms of consent because of 
certain reasons, including the fact that it has the maximum research utility, by allowing the 
most possible amount of data to be extracted from the tissue or DNA sample since there 
are no restrictions. Further, the consent procedure demands minimal administrative effort, 
since based on a singular meeting with the research participant/human subject; 
permission can be sought and granted, and consent forms signed for all future usage. It 
has been reported that open consent has become popular with population biobank 
projects, such as the Estonian gene bank where the consent form simply states that:  “‘By 
signing this document, I give my free and informed consent to… have the tissue sample, 
description of my state of health and my genealogy entered in the Gene Bank in coded 
form. The use thereof for genetic, public health research, statistical and other purposes in 
accordance with the law.”973 Similarly, the donor consent form for the UK Biobank simply 
states, “I give permission for long-term storage and use of my blood and urine samples 
for health-related research purposes (even after my incapacity or death)”.974  
 
The ethical implications of open/presumed/ sectoral/dynamic consent which individuals 
are forced to comply with, either because of local laws and regulations, lack of 
understanding of giving such consent when the uses have not been clearly stated, have 
not been clearly established. Based on the IC guidelines described above, these types of 
consent may not fulfil the criteria for valid or true IC because the patients are not informed 
                                                          
973  TÜ Eesti Geenivaramu Gene Donor Consent Form (Gene Bank Estonia 2007) 
974  Biobank UK Consent Form: UK Biobank 2013 
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of any new changes in information derived from the patients tissues or DNA, which would 
ordinarily render such IC invalid. However, these types of consent are still being applied 
in certain jurisdictions, not only for research but for medical treatment as well. It has been 
rightfully argued that such types of consent may be inconsistent with current EU laws and 
directives regarding confidentiality, data protection, information disclosure and privacy, 
and that these laws and regulations may need to be modified, if the open consent model 
can be made compliant with current laws and regulations.975,976,977, 978 
 
Another area of debate is the right of individuals who may be diagnosed with rare 
disorders affecting other members of the community or other family members. The moral 
and ethical dilemma on how to balance the privacy and self-determination rights of the 
individual consenting against the rights of others, who might benefit from that information 
either now or in the future, arises.979 The implications of open consent for new 
biotechnologies have been discussed by commentators such as Kegley,980 who has 
argued that, “new scientific discoveries and new technologies will soon challenge our old 
ways of proceeding and thinking. It is no surprise then that new knowledge in molecular 
genetics and the ensuing developments in genetic technology bring with them new modes 
of thought, not just in science and medicine, but also in ethics, law and public policy.”981 
The above statement has implications not only for on-going discoveries in DNA 
biotechnology, but for medical treatment and forensic science such as paternity tests and 
criminal prosecutions, as well as for gene therapy and cloning, including DNA and tissue 
                                                          
975  Hallinan and Friedewald 2015 Life Sci Soc Policy doi.10.1186/s40504-014-0020-9. 
976  European Commission “Proposal for a regulation of the European parliament and of the  council 
 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
 movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation)” (European Commission 2012). 
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 regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data” (European 
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bio banking in South Africa and elsewhere.982,983 However it must be noted that under the 
UK Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority (HFEA) regulations, consent for 
storage and use of gametes must be in writing after requirements for consent and parental 
donors have been fulfilled.984 In addition, the UK Human Tissue Act (HTA) established a 
criminal offence for the crime of ‘DNA theft’.985 According to Lunshof et al: 
 
Open consent means that volunteers consent to unrestricted re-disclosure of data originating from 
a confidential relationship, namely their health records, and to unrestricted disclosure of information 
that emerges from any future research on their genotype–phenotype data set, the information 
content of which cannot be predicted. No promises of anonymity, privacy or confidentiality are 
made. 986 
 
Some authors have suggested that the leading moral principle in this case should be 
veracity or truth telling which ideally should precede autonomy. Although in medicine truth 
telling is the required moral and legal norm in many jurisdictions, doctors and other HCPs 
may try to justify the withholding of information by invoking the controversial ‘therapeutic 
privilege’ exception as previously discussed.987 Albeit, in biomedical research, there is no 
such privilege arguably allowed by law when seeking informed consent during biomedical 
research. Generally, distorted or incomplete information disclosure could undermine trust 
in researchers and in science. It has been argued that this leaves individuals consenting, 
open to breach of confidentiality and infringement of their right to privacy and dignity, 
which are all against international ethical codes and local regulations, and may require 
new or modified regulations to protect potential human research subjects and 
patients.988,989,990 
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2.14 Limits, duration, withdrawals, and refusal of consent 
 
For consent to be truly autonomous, then any patient giving consent must be free to 
withdraw such consent at will. When a subject gives IC for a medical intervention or 
research, until such a time as the patient/subject withdraws such consent; it remains valid. 
The UK GMC recommends that HCPs should inform a patient when there is a change 
surrounding the circumstances for which consent was given.991,992 The requirement for 
renewal of consent was demonstrated by a US court in the case of Mohr v Williams,993 
where the court found a surgeon negligent for operating on a patients left ear, when in 
fact permission was given only for operation on the right ear. Similarly, in Williamson v 
East London and City HA,994 Butterfield J found surgeons negligent in performing more 
extensive surgery than the patient had consented to. Therefore a patient’s consent to 
treatment is only limited to what has been consented to and no more can be done without 
additional consent even if the doctor considers it to be in the patients best interests to do 
so.   
 
According to the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) guidance 
document, “[w]ith the exception of an unanticipated emergency, the practitioner should 
not exceed the scope of the authority given by the patient.”995 This is of course subject to 
the exceptions, which have been described above, such as emergency, waiver, 
negotiorum gestio, amongst others. Therefore, a patient with DMC is entitled to withdraw 
consent at any time, including during the procedure without reprisal as demonstrated in 
the Canadian case of Ciarlariello v Schactr: 996  
 
An individual’s right to determine what medical procedures will be accepted must include the right 
to stop a procedure…It is not beyond the realm of possibility that the patient is better able to gauge 
the level of pain or discomfort that can be accepted or that the patient’s premonitions of tragedy or 
                                                          
991  UK General Medical Council Good medical practice 2013 https://www.gmc-
 uk.org/guidance/index.asp (Date of use: 12 November 2017). 
992  UK GMC Consent: patients and doctors making decisions together (GMC London 2008). 
993  Mohr v Williams (1905) 104 N.W. 12 (Sup Ct Minnesota). 
994  Williamson v East London and City HA and Others [1998] Lloyds Law Rep Medical 6. 
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 Obstetricians &  Gynaecologists London 2015). 
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mortality may have a basis in reality. In any event, the patient’s right to bodily integrity provides the 
basis for the withdrawal of consent to a medical procedure even while it is underway. Thus, if it is 
found that the consent is effectively withdrawn during the course of the procedure, then it must be 
terminated.997  
 
Generally, if an adult with capacity makes a voluntary and informed decision to refuse 
treatment, this decision must be respected except when there are legally acceptable 
reasons such as those contained in the UK Mental Health Act 1983 or the South African 
Mental Healthcare Act.998 However limitations have been placed on reliance on the UK 
Mental Health Act as a mechanism for the involuntary treatment of patients, based on the 
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in HL v UK (The Bournewood 
case).999 This case involved the detention of a 49-year old autistic man without DMC, in 
his own best interests. The ECtHR overturned the UK House of Lords decision by 
indicating the patient’s detention was at variance with the “right to liberty” as enshrined in 
the ECHR.1000 Further, it held that detention under the common law and the Mental Health 
Act1001 were incompatible with Article 5 of the ECHR, because it was too arbitrary and 
lacked sufficient safeguards. Article 5 of the ECHR guarantees everyone the right to liberty 
and security of the person,1002 similar to section 12 of the South African Constitution.1003 
The ECtHR held that judicial review (administrative); which was the only way the patient 
was able to challenge his detention, did not provide the kind of rigorous challenge that 
was required by ECHR.1004 A patient’s refusal may also be legally overridden where it 
could result in death of a temporarily incapacitated patient1005 or in injury to a minor.1006 
Such patients must be treated under the doctrine of ‘best interests’ and necessity as 
previously discussed.1007 However, as cautioned by the UK GMC: “[HCPs] must respect 
                                                          
997  Ciarlariello v Schactr (1993) 1000 DLR 4th 609 (SCC) 618. 
998  Mental Health Care Act no 17 of 2002. 
999 R (L) v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust (1998) UKHL 24. 
1000 European Union European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1950) Article 5. 
1001  Mental Health Act 1983. 
1002 European Union European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe 1950) Article 5. 
1003  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
1004 HL v UK 45508/99 (2004) ECHR 471. 
1005  National Health Act 61 of 2003 s7 (1) (e). 
1006   McQuoid-Mason D “The National Health Act and refusal of consent to health services by 
 children” 2006 SAMJ 530-532 [531]. 
1007  Chima Trans J Coll Med S Afr 40. 
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a patient’s decision to refuse an investigation or treatment, even if you think their decision 
is wrong or irrational.”1008 The only exceptions would be in an emergency and when the 
patient lacks DMC due to mental incapacity, in which case such patients can be 
involuntarily treated for their mental disorder only, based on the regulations in the Mental 
Health Act 2007.1009 
 
2.15 Summary of chapter 2 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of relevant laws and ethical guidelines pertaining to the 
legal and ethical doctrine of informed consent in medical practice, derived from the 
principle of respect for autonomy in comparable common law jurisdictions and South 
Africa. In this chapter, I have critically examined different understandings of consent; key 
elements of informed consent, including standards for information disclosure, decision-
making capacity, and an understanding of information disclosed, voluntariness, what 
constitutes valid IC and the criteria to establish it. I have also considered the ethical and 
legally accepted exceptions to the IC doctrine, and have explored some general problems 
associated with obtaining valid IC in clinical practice and the different forms of consent 
used during medical treatment, including new problems associated with IC practice due 
the development of new biotechnologies including DNA storage and analysis. This 
chapter sets the background and provides the context as a basis for this study and some 
relevant objectives to be determined via an empirical research study, which is described 
in detail, in part 2 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 - REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the literature review that was undertaken for this thesis. A review 
of the relevant literature will encompass an analysis of the doctrine of informed consent 
as applied in South Africa jurisprudence, followed by the socio-legal aspects of IC in South 
Africa and the potential impact of the cultural milieu and multiculturalism on IC practice in 
South Africa. This will be followed by an analysis of the Hippocratic tradition and the 
evolution of the IC doctrine, as well as a critical discussion of the philosophical concepts 
of autonomy from a Kantian (duty based),1010 and Millian or utilitarian1011 perspectives.1012 
This is followed by analysis of the concept of patients’ rights, shared healthcare decision-
making, and the rights of vulnerable population groups.  
 
According to Polit and Beck,1013 a literature review is usually done to assist the researcher 
to comprehend and extend his or her knowledge regarding the phenomenon under study. 
It also helps the researcher to determine whether the phenomenon is worth studying and 
assists in determining the scope of the study, so that research can be limited to a needed 
area of inquiry.1014 A review of the literature may also help the researcher to determine 
the extent to which the topic under study is covered in the existing body of knowledge.1015 
Moreover, the literature review shares with the reader the results of other studies that are 
closely related to the topic under study, it relates the current study to other larger and 
ongoing debates in the literature, in this case the medico-legal cases and analysis 
regarding the doctrine of IC, by filling in gaps and extending prior studies. Hence a 
literature review provides a framework for establishing the importance of the present study 
                                                          
1010  Kant I Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals (translated from the original by Wood AW) 
 (Yale University Press New Haven 2002) see also Hope et al Medical ethics and law-The 
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 ed (Sage Publications Thousand Oaks California 2009) 25-29.  
1015  Babbie E and Mouton J The practice of social research (Oxford University Press Cape Town 
 2001) 565. 
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and a basis for comparison of the results of the present study to findings by other 
researchers working on the same phenomenon or in the same area of inquiry.1016,1017 
 
3.2 The legal doctrine of informed consent in South Africa 
 
3.2.1 Constitutional rights to informed consent 
 
Informed consent before medical procedures is a constitutionally protected right in South 
Africa. These constitutionally protected rights to bodily integrity and security have been 
tested in South African courts in the cases of Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa1018 
and Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba (hereinafter the Xaba case).1019 In both cases, 
the police sought a court order to compel an accused person to undergo a surgical 
procedure in order to extract a bullet to be used as evidence in their prosecution. In the 
Xaba case,1020  the court ruled that granting such an order would violate the defendant’s 
constitutional rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity and privacy.1021 By contrast, such an 
order was granted by a judge in the case of Minister of Safety v Gaqa (hereinafter the 
Gaqa case),1022 where the judge felt that there were grounds within the Criminal 
Procedure Act,1023 which allowed use of reasonable force by the police in the public 
interest.1024 In both cases, the defendants sought protection under the constitutionally 
protected rights to bodily and psychological integrity as enshrined in section 12(2) of the 
Constitution.1025 In the Gaqa case, Desai J granted the order for the extraction of the 
bullets, basing his judgment on the fact that the rights enshrined in section12 were limited 
rights when read together with section 36 of the Constitution, which provides that rights in 
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1017  Mugisha E Delivery and utilization of voluntary HIV counselling and testing services among 
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the constitution could be limited by a law of general application in a democratic society.1026 
The court further held that this limitation was supported by the Criminal Procedure Act,1027 
which stipulates that the police could use any reasonable force to procure evidence from 
suspected criminals.1028 On the other hand, Southwood J denied the police the right in the 
Xaba case,1029 basing his decision on the rights to bodily and psychological integrity 
enshrined within the Constitution, arguing that the judgment in the former case was wrong 
in terms of section 12 of the Constitution.1030 Further, it was held that relief could not be 
provided by the Criminal Procedure Act since the Act did not allow forced surgical removal 
of an object from the body of a person.1031  
 
Some commentators argued that the limitation of rights applied in Gaqa case by Desai J 
refers only to the limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights and specifies that those limitations 
apply “only in terms of law of a general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom.”1032 The authors contend that court adjudication may not be 
considered a law of general application and such abrogation should probably be done via 
legislative mandate, as suggested by Southwood J in the Xaba case.1033  
 
One may conclude this section by noting what has been suggested by others, namely 
that: “The ease with which any jurisdiction is capable of upholding patient’s rights depends 
on its history and jurisprudence as it does on its willingness to make appropriate 
modifications or enthusiasm for change.”1034  In South Africa, the constitutionally protected 
rights to bodily integrity and security as well as the right to IC have been codified in the 
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NHA,1035 and further enshrined in the Constitution and disseminated in the Patients Right 
Charter.1036 These provisions and regulations are designed to assist in achieving the right 
of access to healthcare by all South African citizens. The Patients’ charter formally 
recognizes the patients’ right to IC during medical treatment. It has been advanced that 
the Charter provides an officially sanctioned baseline standard that can be referred to as 
tool for accountability to patients, HCPs and the broader civil society.1037 Under South 
African law, health related autonomy rights are constitutionally protected as outlined in 
section 12 of the Constitution, with section 12(1) stating that “everyone  has the right to 
freedom and security of the person,” whilst section12(2) stipulates that:  
 
Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right to: 
(a) To make decisions concerning reproduction 
(b) To security in control over their body; and 
(c) Not to be subjected to medical and scientific experiments without their informed consent.1038 
 
3.2.2  Historical origins of informed consent in South Africa 
 
According to Van Oosten, patient consent, as a requirement for all lawful medical 
interventions, is a well-established principle in South African common law.1039 The earliest 
leading cases in this area were the cases of Stoffberg v Elliot1040 and the Esterhuizen 
case.1041 In the former case, a patient whose penis was wrongfully amputated without his 
consent sued his doctors for damages in action for assault. The court agreed that any 
treatment done without the necessary consent is and interference with and individuals 
bodily integrity and can lead to charges of assault and award of damages.1042 In the 
Esterhuizen case a 10-year-old child who was diagnosed with Kaposi’s sarcoma, a form 
of skin cancer was initially treated with superficial radiation for the condition with both 
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parents’ consent. Later, however, because of recurrence of the tumour, she was subjected 
to extensive radiation therapy, which resulted in severe burns and tissue damage 
necessitating amputation of her limbs. This was done without the express consent of her 
guardians. In action for damages for assault against the treating physician, the court held 
that while the superficial radiation was duly performed with appropriate consent from the 
parents, the latter procedure was performed without full disclosure, knowledge and 
consent of the child’s mother although there was adequate time to obtain such consent. 
The court rejected the treating doctor and hospital’s argument that the fact that her 
grandfather and parents had brought the child to hospital and previously consented to a 
similar treatment implied consent for the more radical procedure. The court also rejected 
arguments that the treatment was in the best interests of the child. The court held rather, 
that because the radical treatment was vastly different from the former superficial radiation 
given to the child, it was necessary that the child’s mother should have been adequately 
informed of the dangers inherent in the radical treatment for such consent to be 
considered valid.1043  
 
More recently in the Castell case,1044 it has been argued that the judgment of the court in 
this case seems to have introduced the prudent patient standard of information disclosure 
and IC into South African medical jurisprudence.1045 Further, the SCA revisited this 
judgement in the case of Broude v McIntosh,1046 but did not overrule this decision despite 
some technical reservations, thereby reaffirming the prudent patient and material risks 
standards as the required standard for information disclosure in South Africa.1047 The 
consequences of the court’s decision in the Castell case1048 on South African medical 
jurisprudence were that the following principles were generally accepted, according to Van 
Oosten: 1049 
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- a shift from medical paternalism to patient autonomy 
- A shift from  the ‘reasonable doctor’ standard to the ‘prudent patient’ standard  
- A shift in disclosure to the ‘material risk’ standard, where the level of disclosure 
required is what a reasonable patient would consider pertinent before making a 
decision 
- The court appears to place the patients’ informed consent within the framework of 
volenti non fit injuria or voluntary assumption of risk rather than delict.  
 
In 2004, enactment of the NHA1050 codified the requirements for IC into South African 
healthcare law specifying the nature and aspects of information to be disclosed prior to IC 
as discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis.  In terms of South African common law, 
the issue of how much information should be disclosed to a patient has been the subject 
of debate starting from the case of Lymberg v Jeffries 1925,1051 where the court was of 
the opinion that a “doctor is not obliged to disclose all the conceivable complications that 
may arise during a medical procedure.” However the judgment of Ackerman J in Castell 
v De Greef, 1052 suggested that a doctor is obliged to warn the patient of all the ‘material 
risks’ inherent in the treatment, where the material risks are based on a ‘prudent patient 
standard’.1053 Therefore, the requirement for information disclosure in South Africa tends 
towards the practice in North America where libertarian rights-based autonomy is 
predominant. Furthermore, section 6 of the NHA requests that as part of IC, “every HCP 
should inform the user of the user's health status except where it would be contrary to the 
user’s best interests,” which would include “the range of diagnostic procedures and 
treatment options available, the benefits, risks, costs and consequences generally 
associated with each option. The user’s right to refuse health services and the implications 
thereof”.1054 It may be said that this appears to reaffirm the requirement for disclosure of 
all material risks with appropriate exceptions.  
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3.3 Developments in South African common law on informed consent since the judgment 
in the Castell v De Greef and enactment of the National Health Act 2003 
 
As outlined in chapter one, following the judgment of Ackerman J in the Castell case,1055 
legal scholars from South Africa have argued that South African courts have not 
endeavoured to develop the common law on informed consent as envisaged by the 
Constitution.1056 Such commentators have suggested that in several cases brought to 
South African courts after the NHA1057 was implemented, the courts have been reluctant 
to apply the regulations laid down in the NHA with regard to the legal application of the IC 
doctrine in medical practice.1058,1059 Some of the pertinent cases which have been tried by 
South African Courts following the Castell case, include Broude v McIntosh and 
Another.1060 In this case, a claimant brought an action against a surgeon for negligence 
following facial paralysis developing secondary to an operation, which the claimant 
alleged, had been wrongfully performed. The claimant also alleged that the defendant 
surgeon had also failed to obtain appropriate informed consent, and had failed to warn of 
the risk of facial paralysis prior to surgery. The provincial High Court dismissed the claim, 
based on the fact that the claimant had failed to prove any negligent conduct on the part 
of the surgeon.1061 The claimant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) 
based on two heads of argument: (a) That the respondent wrongfully failed to obtain the 
appellants real or informed consent for the surgical procedure and that the respondent 
therefore committed an assault on the claimant by performing the surgery; and (b) 
alternatively, that in carrying out the surgical procedure on the patient, the surgeon acted 
in a negligent and unskilful manner by failing to inform the clamant before performing the 
surgery regarding the risks and hazards involved in the procedure and the availability of 
alternative treatments.1062 In arriving at a decision, the SCA was of the view that while the 
sole interest of the surgeon or doctor was to alleviate the suffering of the patient, it was 
somewhat strange that the doctors’ actions in this case should be considered an assault 
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due to failure to disclose some risks, which if disclosed may have caused the patient to 
abandon the surgery by withholding consent. The Court suggested that this was unusual 
and concluded in part that such an approach might be unsound. However, on the facts of 
the case the SCA rightfully held that failure to obtain real informed consent would in fact 
be considered an assault. The SCA also considered in detail the judgment of Ackerman 
J in the Castell case, but did not overrule the judgment in that case. However, Marais J 
made an orbiter dictum remark regarding his reservations about the observation that 
failure to disclose material risks which were in the opinion of a doctor likely to lead to a 
patient withholding consent, could constitute assault.1063,1064 In a more recent South 
African case Louwrens v Oldwage 20061065 (hereinafter the Oldwage case), Yekiso J 
sitting in the High Court found that based on a preponderance of the evidence, there was 
a failure to obtain informed consent by a vascular surgeon in performing a procedure on 
a patient, based on several grounds including the fact that the said surgical procedure as 
noted on the informed consent document signed by the patient and submitted as evidence 
in court, was different from the procedure that was eventually performed on the patient. 
Secondly, that the surgeon could not recall when such consent was obtained from the 
patient, and thirdly that the doctor’s clinical notes regarding his consultations with the 
patient could not be found and could not be presented as evidence in court, and might 
have been shredded by the surgeon prior to expiry of the time legally required for the 
preservation of medical notes. Despite noting the obiter dictum of Marais J in Broude v 
McIntosh,1066 the trial Judge Yekiso J concluded that he was legally bound by the opinion 
of the full bench of the High Court in the Castell case which held that failure to disclose 
material risks to a patient and obtain valid informed consent prior to surgery amounted to 
assault.1067 In the subsequent appeal heard by the SCA, the higher court overruled the 
judgment of Yekiso J, arguing that on the issue of informed consent, the surgeon had duly 
informed the patient of the appropriate surgery based on the opinion of expert witnesses 
who stated that the difference between the surgical procedure stated on the informed 
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consent document as ‘femoro-femoro bypass” and the procedure subsequently performed 
by the surgeon described as an “illio-femoral bypass” was merely semantic in that the two 
expert witnesses for the defence and prosecution concurred that both procedures were 
generally referred to as “femoro-femoro bypass”.1068 Similarly on the issue of whether the 
illio-femoral bypass was the cause of the patients subsequent development of a “steal 
syndrome”, the SCA held that the patients expert witness’ argument based on 1976 
clinical evidence that the incidence of such complications occurred in 4% of cases, was 
not acceptable in the year 2000. Rather the court preferred the evidence of the appellants’ 
expert witness who contended that because of modern techniques now available, the 
incidence of such complications was more in the region of 2%.1069 The claimant had 
argued that based on the judgment reached by the court in the Castell case, the patient 
ought to have been warned based on the material risks as outlined Ackerman J, where 
he said that for consent to be used as a defence, certain conditions must be satisfied.1070 
In arriving at its decision in the Oldwage case, the SCA referred to the ‘reasonable doctor 
standard’ as elucidated in Richter v Estate Hamman (hereinafter the Richter case),1071 
rather than the subjective prudent patient’s standard of information disclosure as arrived 
at in the Castell case.1072   
 
South African legal scholars have since argued that the SCA erred in its judgment in the 
Oldwage case,1073 because it applied the discredited reasonable doctor standard of 
information disclosure rather than the more accepted and current prudent patient standard 
as established in Castell.1074 It can be further be advanced that in arriving at its decision 
in the Oldwage case, the SCA did not pay attention to the judgments from similar cases 
in other common law jurisdictions like England, where the English Court of Appeals (CA), 
held in cases such as Chester v Afshar,1075 that failure of a doctor to disclose serious risks 
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in the range of 1-2% amounted to negligence. Similarly, in the Canadian case of Reibl v 
Hughes,1076 the Canadian Supreme Court held that failure to disclose material risks in the 
range of 1% could also amount to actionable negligence. Therefore, the judgment of the 
SCA in the Oldwage case has been generally criticized by some legal scholars based on 
several grounds.1077,1078,1079  Firstly, it has been argued that though the SCA first set out 
to answer the question of whether “the claimant gave informed consent to the surgical 
procedure performed by the defendant, in the absence of that, whether such a surgical 
intervention would have amounted to assault.”1080 The court did not address this question, 
rather it concluded that the absence of informed consent was not proven, and failure to 
obtain consent did not amount to assault. Secondly, in Broude v McIntosh,1081 the Court 
had alluded to the need for the SCA to review the issue of whether failure by a doctor to 
obtain informed consent amounted to assault at a later date. When confronted with this 
argument, the SCA did not refer to this particular issue in its judgment; neither did it review 
the arguments from that case or answer the query from the lower court. Thirdly, while the 
SCA accepted and applied the principles elucidated by Ackerman J in the Castell case,1082 
on the prudent patient and material risks standards of information disclosure; it also 
accepted and eventually applied the discredited ‘reasonable doctor standard’ arrived at in 
the Richter case1083 in its judgment, thereby creating some confusion in the interpretation 
of cases regarding informed consent in South African Courts. It has been maintained that 
by doing so, the SCA did not provide further clarity as to whether the principle of respect 
for autonomy should take precedence over medical paternalism.1084 Further, it has been 
suggested that this failure to clarify issues does not appear to be consistent with 
constitutional provisions for respect for privacy and bodily integrity as elucidated in 
sections 12(2) of the Constitution.1085 Furthermore, the SCA judgment in the Oldwage 
case also appears inconsistent with the constitutional provisions to expand the common 
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law by reference to judgments from foreign legal jurisdictions, and the need to promote 
the values of human dignity, equality and freedom when interpreting the bill of rights or 
when interpreting any South African legislation.1086 
 
The SCA has also been criticized for not taking into consideration the current regulations 
and legislation regarding informed consent as elucidated in the National Health Act 
2003.1087 In a more recent judgment in the case of McDonald v Wroe 2006,1088 a Western 
Cape High Court judge found that failure by a dentist to warn the patient of the risk of 
permanent nerve damage subsequent to extraction of an infected wisdom tooth amounted 
to violation of the patients right to bodily integrity as enshrined in section 12(2) of the 
Constitution.1089 Further, the Court held that the patient was subjected to surgery without 
real informed consent due to incomplete disclosure of the material risks.1090 In arriving at 
its decision, the  judge applied the rule established by Ackerman J in the Castell case,1091 
while emphasizing that in South African law there is a duty upon a medical practitioner to 
disclose the material risks of a planned procedure to the particular patient. Further, that in 
order for consent to be used as a defence, the patient must have knowledge of the risks, 
understood the risks, and assumed the attendant risks and all its consequences. 
1092,1093,1094 Expert opinion in this case was that there was about a 1% risk of injury to the 
inferior alveolar nerve and facial palsy occurring especially where such a procedure is not 
performed by a maxillo-facial surgeon. The dentist appealed the decision of the judge to 
a full bench of the Cape High Court. The decision of the judge a quo was recently 
overturned by a full bench of the Cape High Court,1095 based on the question of causation. 
In its judgment the High Court agreed that appellants were wrong by not warning the 
patient of all the risks involved, which resulted in the plaintiff consenting to the dentist 
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performing the surgery. However, he performed the surgery correctly without 
negligence. The experts were unable to fault the manner in which he performed the 
surgery in any way.  The harm which the plaintiff suffered, is due to a risk which is inherent 
in the surgical procedure in question, and which could ensue without negligence on the 
part of the practitioner, be it a general practitioner or a specialist.  The harm, which the 
plaintiff suffered, is harm she might equally probably have suffered in any event if the 
surgery had been performed by a specialist surgeon. There was, therefore, no direct 
causal link between the defendant’s negligence (in failing to warn the plaintiff of the risk) 
and occurrence of the harm, unless it can be shown that the plaintiff, upon being warned 
of risk, would not have undergone the procedure at all. That was not the plaintiff’s case.1096 
Based on the above considerations the full bench of the High Court overturned the 
judgment of Fourie J by reaffirming causation as an element deeply entrenched in the 
South African law of delict. A patient who intends relying on lack of informed consent bears 
the onus to prove on a balance of probabilities that: (1) the medical practitioner was 
negligent in so far he failed to warn his patient of the particular risk or complication; and 
(2) the medical practitioner’s negligent omission as such caused the damages suffered by 
the patient.1097,1098 The implications of this judgment on South African medical 
jurisprudence are further discussed in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
 
3.3.1 Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 1099  
 
In a more recent reportable case of Sibisi NO v Maitin1100 of October 2014 (hereinafter the 
Sibisi case), the SCA held that where a plaintiff did not discharge the onus of proving 
negligence on the part of the doctor accused of failure to obtain valid informed consent; 
informed consent would not be an issue once negligence is not proved. Further, the SCA 
held that “that the question of informed consent goes to the wrongfulness element of the 
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Aquilian action. Negligent conduct on the part of the doctor will be wrongful if the patient 
has not given informed consent.  However, proof of negligence is still a requirement. The 
court argued that this concept was established in the Castell case,1101 that where there is 
no negligence proved, the test for wrongfulness does not even arise.1102 The SCA further 
refused to develop South African law regarding informed consent by establishing that the 
prudent patient standard ought to be the required standard for information disclosure, by 
following the example of other common law jurisdictions despite a request by the plaintiff 
to do so,1103 arguing that, “[I]n this matter Mrs Sibisi did not prove that Dr Maitin was 
negligent. In the circumstances there is no need for this court to determine which test 
should be adopted in relation to informed consent.”1104 To evaluate how South African 
Courts are faring with regard to the constitutional injunction to extend the common law,1105 
it would be helpful to further evaluate the SCA judgment in the Sibisi case.1106 
 
Facts of the case 
 
Mrs Sibisi brought the action for damages suffered by her daughter Yandiswa, as a result 
of the negligent conduct of the respondent, Dr Maitin, during the birth of Yandiswa. The 
negligent conduct alleged had resulted in injury to Yandiswa’s brachial plexus, which had 
in turn resulted in Erb’s palsy-defined as “a type of brachial birth palsy in which there is 
paralysis of the muscles of the upper arm and shoulder girdle…due to a lesion of the 
upper trunk of the brachial plexus or of the roots of the fifth and sixth cervical roots”.1107 
The brachial plexus is a network of nerve fibres that run from the spine through the 
shoulder and down the arm to the hand. The injury to the brachial plexus was considered 
to be a result of the baby being very big or macrosomic, and shoulder dystocia having 
occurred. Shoulder dystocia occurs when the anterior shoulder cannot pass below the 
pubic symphysis and requires manipulation to release the shoulder and allow the baby to 
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pass through the mother’s pelvis. Yandiswa was indeed very large at birth weighing 
4.68kg; it was probably her size that caused the shoulder dystocia experienced during 
labour and delivery of the baby. It was reported that Dr Maitin had to perform a special 
procedure, called a McRoberts’ manoeuvre, in order to enable delivery of the baby. In this 
case, the McRoberts’ manoeuvre was done in a modified format because the mother was 
given epidural anaesthesia during labour to relieve pain, therefore she did not have full 
control of her limbs, leading to the McRoberts’ manoeuvre being done in a lithotomy 
position. This manoeuvre together with an episiotomy, were used to deliver the baby as 
an emergency procedure. Mrs Sibisi argued that a combination of the doctors’ failure to 
accurately estimate the weight of the baby, or to perform a Caesarean section (C-section), 
instead of a vaginal delivery, and the incorrect use of the McRoberts’ manoeuvre 
amounted to negligent conduct that caused the injury to the brachial plexus and the 
resultant Erb’s palsy. After delivery, Yandiswa, the baby was referred to paediatricians for 
further care, but her condition did not improve and she is currently living with the physical 
disability, and an accompanying difficulty of vision due to drooping of her left eyelid. The 
consequences of the injury to the brachial plexus have been very serious indeed for both 
Mrs Sibisi and Yandiswa resulting in the baby’s right shoulder and arm being paralysed 
so that she has very little control and movement, despite ongoing therapy. In addition, the 
effect of the injury at the root of the damaged nerve is that her one eye is sunken, affecting 
her appearance.1108 
 
Legal arguments at the High Court 
 
Mrs Sibisi alleged (among other arguments) that Dr Maitin had a duty to inform her prior 
to inducing labour of the material risks and complications associated with vaginal delivery 
and of alternative procedures, such as the option of undergoing a C-section, which could 
have minimised the risks. She also alleged that Dr Maitin should have foreseen the risks 
of vaginal delivery given the size of the baby in utero. She therefore alleged that she had 
not provided Dr Maitin with valid informed consent, as he had not informed her of all the 
inherent ‘material’ risks associated with her delivery. It was pleaded further that as a result 
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of Dr Maitin’s negligent conduct, Yandiswa had suffered a right brachial plexus palsy that 
had led to her requiring continued medical treatment. Mrs Sibisi also asked the court to 
develop the common law in line with the constitutional rights to bodily integrity and 
autonomy, by establishing that the test for whether a doctor has obtained a patient’s 
informed consent is whether, a patient in the position of the plaintiff would have elected 
not to undergo the procedure and instead elect another one. The High Court found in 
favour of Dr Maitin in that his conduct was not negligent and therefore found no need to 
develop the common law with regard to informed consent.1109  
 
SCA Judgment 
 
On appeal, Mrs Sibisi relied on her rights to have been informed of the risks of vaginal 
delivery based on the estimated and actual weight of the baby. The Court adopted the 
approach that in order to found liability, the plaintiff would have to establish negligence on 
the part of the doctor. Judge Lewis commented in the opening line of his judgement that 
“giving birth is an inherently risky process” and in order to determine whether Dr Maitin 
was negligent, the Court focused their attention on the testimony of the relevant experts. 
The Court found that Dr Maitin’s misestimating of Yandiswa’s weight was not negligent, 
as it is difficult to correctly estimate a baby’s weight when they are over 4kg as averred by 
expert witnesses.1110 On the additional grounds advanced by the plaintiff, the Court found 
that shoulder dystocia was not foreseeable and that a C-section had not been a viable 
option in the circumstances, although it was alleged that in utilising the McRoberts’ 
manoeuvre, Dr Maitin might have used too much force to pull the baby from her mother. 
Counsel for the defendant advanced the argument that an obstetrician who is required to 
utilise the McRoberts’ manoeuvre only has minutes to do so and must “use as much force 
as necessary”, failing which this may result is serious brain damage to the baby or even 
death. Mrs Sibisi therefore did not discharge the onus of proving negligence on the part 
of Dr Maitin.1111 Mrs Sibisi also asked the court to extend the common law test for informed 
                                                          
1109 Hogan Lovells “The doctors duty to inform” http://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-
 doctors-duty-to-inform (Date of use: 28 September 2017). 
1110  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [34]. 
1111  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [39-44]. 
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consent, by arguing that a reasonable patient, who was informed of all the risks of a 
vaginal delivery, would have elected to undergo a C-section if given that option by the 
doctor. It was common cause that Dr Maitin did not, at any time, advise Mrs Sibisi of the 
possibility of shoulder dystocia occurring, which could lead to a brachial plexus injury. The 
Court referred to the test for informed consent as established in the Castell case.1112 The 
court in that instance found that: 
 
For a patient’s consent to constitute a justification that excludes the wrongfulness of medical 
treatment and its consequences, the doctor is obliged to warn a patient so consenting of a material 
risk inherent in the proposed treatment. A risk will be material where: (a) a reasonable person in the 
patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it; or (b) a medical 
practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk would 
be likely to attach significance to it. 
 
The SCA based its judgment on the reasonable doctor standard of information disclosure 
as adumbrated in the case of Van Wyk v Lewis1113 and later applied in the Richter case1114 
The Court in the Sibisi case found that the test for informed consent goes to the 
wrongfulness of the matter.  Since Mrs Sibisi had failed to prove any negligence on the 
part of Dr Maitin, the Court therefore found that there was no need to assess the 
wrongfulness of the matter. Mrs Sibisi did not place any argument before the Court that 
had she known of the risk; she would have opted for a C-section. The appeal was 
dismissed and the SCA again found in Dr Maitin’s favour. Perhaps the Court would have 
elaborated further, should argument have been advanced as to the fact that Mrs Sibisi 
would have decided on a C-section had she been informed of the risks associated with 
vaginal delivery. According to the Court: 
 
No evidence was led to show what the reasonable patient in Mrs Sibisi’s position would have done 
had she been warned of the risk of shoulder dystocia (a risk that was lower than one per cent), and 
advised about the choice between a vaginal delivery or a C-section. Would she have taken the far 
                                                          
1112  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA (408) C [425-426].  
1113  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 [444]. 
1114  Richter & another v Estate Hamman 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) [232]. 
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greater risks attendant on a C-section or the very minor risk of shoulder dystocia occurring? We do 
not know.1115  
 
Moreover, Mrs Sibisi herself said, when asked if she knew about delivery by C-section, 
and about the risks associated with it, that she did not know of such risks and knew nothing 
about shoulder dystocia, brachial plexus injury or Erb’s palsy. It was suggested to her that 
both Dr Maitin and she had to weigh up the respective risks. She responded: “I don’t 
believe that. I placed all my trust in him in the sense that it was he who was going to make 
a decision as to the correct procedure to adopt.”1116 The evidence placed before the Court 
was that shoulder dystocia, while a risk of vaginal delivery, couldn’t be reasonably 
foreseen based on the weight of a foetus. This was based on the evidence by two expert 
witnesses invited to assist the Court in this case. In addition, the Court relied on a guideline 
issued by the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) on the 
foreseeability of shoulder dystocia, which advised that while there is a relationship 
between foetal size and shoulder dystocia, it is not a good predictor. The large majority of 
infants with a birth weight of 4500g or more do not develop shoulder dystocia and, equally 
importantly, 48% of incidences of shoulder dystocia occur in infants who weigh less than 
4000g at birth. Further, the guideline also pointed out that clinical foetal weight estimation 
is unreliable, and even ultrasound scans have a ten per cent margin of error. The guideline 
further advised that “elective caesarean section is not recommended for suspected fetal 
macrosomia (estimated fetal weight over 4.5 kg) without diabetes”. 1117  
 
The SCA concluded that the question of informed consent goes to the wrongfulness 
element of the Aquilian action. Negligent conduct on the part of the doctor will be wrongful 
if the patient has not given informed consent.  However, negligence is still a requirement 
as established in the Castell case.1118 Where there is no negligence proved, however, the 
test for wrongfulness does not even arise.1119 It has been argued that the Courts have 
                                                          
1115  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [52]. 
1116  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [52]. 
1117  Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG) Shoulder dystocia-Green-top 
 guideline No. 42 (RCOG London 2012) https://www.rcog.org.uk/en/guidelines-research-
 services/guidelines/gtg42/ (Date of use: 14 November 2017). 
1118  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA (408) C [426].  
1119  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [49-50] 
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now conclusively demonstrated that informed consent falls within the element of 
wrongfulness relating to a claim based on delict. However, in order to found this element 
of wrongfulness on a doctors’ conduct, the conduct must be negligent. You cannot have 
one without the other, or else there would be no claim in delict.1120 It has also been averred 
that although Mrs Sibisi was not successful in her claim against Dr Maitin, the case has 
highlighted the importance of HCPs gaining their patient’s informed consent.1121 The 
implications of the Sibisi case and extension of the common law will be further discussed 
in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
 
3.3.2 Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 991122 
 
 
In another recent case by the High Court of the Free State sitting in Bloemfontein, the 
issue of lack of informed consent during medical treatment was again debated and argued 
by a South African court with the conclusion being that patients have the dual 
responsibility of proving negligence in addition to proving failure to obtain valid informed 
consent. 
 
Facts of the case 
 
The plaintiff Ms. Boniswa Pane instituted action against the Member of the Executive 
Council (MEC) responsible for the Department of Health, Free State; seeking damages in 
the sum of R3 000 000 (three million rand) and costs of the suit. In bringing her action, 
she alleged that “the employees of the defendant were negligent by cutting the plaintiff’s 
intestine and removing her womb.”1123 She later amended the particulars of her claim to 
state that on the 23rd of January 2010, she suffered an incomplete miscarriage of a 
pregnancy and was admitted to a regional hospital the same day where she was treated 
by evacuation of the contents of the womb by doctors on duty and discharged the next 
day, with a course of antibiotics and pain killers. However, a week later on the 1st of 
                                                          
1120 Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA (408) C [425-426].  
1121  Hogan Lovells http://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-doctors-duty-to-inform (Date 
 of use: 28 September 2017). 
1122  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
1123  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [2]. 
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February, she showed up at a local clinic with complaints of abdominal pain, nausea and 
vomiting and she was then referred back to the original treating hospital. On this occasion, 
she was admitted and tests were done to determine the cause of her illness, it was found 
that she had “suspicion of a perforated uterus”. The diagnosis on this occasion read: 
“perforated uterus + bowel obstruction or urinary retention.”1124 On the 4th of February, the 
plaintiff alleged that she was discharged by the hospital despite still feeling sick and 
experiencing the same symptoms.  She further testified that on the 10th of February she 
was re-admitted to the hospital with the same symptoms she displayed on the 2nd of 
February. She was then operated on the 11th of February. When she regained 
consciousness, she was informed that the doctors had removed her whole uterus and 
inserted a colostomy bag, in which she was to relieve herself; which was supposed to be 
a temporary arrangement until a specialist from Australia came to South Africa to 
investigate how this could be reversed. She also testified that the colostomy bag caused 
her a lot of discomfort and embarrassment as it leaked from time to time and left a foul 
smell in the process. Consequently, she lost her job and her children found the condition 
unbearable. She is currently subsisting on the usual state grant to make ends meet, as 
she could no longer work as a seamstress.1125  
 
Legal arguments at court 
 
Both the plaintiff and the defendant called expert witnesses to support their arguments. 
The plaintiffs witness was a qualified obstetrician and gynaecologist, and after evaluating 
the hospital records reported that, the defendant doctors were negligent in the manner 
that they treated the patient on 2 February. In that having diagnosed perforated uterus, 
she should have been admitted immediately for surgery, and that had this been done at 
that time, her womb might have been preserved. He concluded: “The standard of care 
was neglected during her second admission as she should have been operated on during 
that admission but instead she was discharged again.”1126 The points of disagreement 
arise from the fact that it could not be established whether or why the patient was 
                                                          
1124  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [5]. 
1125  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [7]. 
1126  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [9]. 
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discharged after readmission on the 2nd or 4th of February. The plaintiff’s expert witness 
contented that in the absence of discharge documents or clinical notes to the effect that 
the patient absconded, and then he had no option but to conclude that the doctors who 
treated the patient on the 4th of February were negligent for discharging her without proper 
treatment. The expert witness for the defendant argued that absence of the clinical records 
or discharge records meant that the patient had absconded. The hospital legal 
administrator then testified that the hospital records disappeared in 2013 and the only 
records available were those provided by the plaintiff. During cross-examination, the 
plaintiff maintained that she was not given any treatment on 2nd of February. She was 
challenged with the hospital report that had an inscription that on 2nd of February the 
doctor had taken her for a scan, put her on a drip, and gave her medication including 
voltaren™ as well as antibiotics to relieve the pain. She refused to admit the correctness 
of such entry but was forced to admit that she was treated on the 2nd of February. She 
denied that she consented to the operation of 11th February which led to her whole uterus 
being removed. She indicated that the only operation she agreed to was an explorative 
laparoscopy. However, she maintained that even in that respect, nothing was explained 
to her including the risks and consequences of such operation.1127 Concerning the 
patient’s readmission on February 10th, the doctors testified that when the patient was 
taken to the operating theatre, her condition was critical; and that the only option available 
to save her life was a total abdominal hysterectomy (complete removal of the womb).1128 
Since the patient was unconscious under anesthesia, they obtained the necessary 
consent for the procedure from the hospital superintendent as required by regulations and 
operated on the patient based on the doctrine of necessity and in her own best 
interests.1129, 
 
 
Judgment 
 
The Court in this case argued that the issue of medical negligence revolves in most 
instances around whether proper consent was obtained before any operation or medical 
                                                          
1127  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [5-8]. 
1128  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [4-20]. 
1129  Chima Trans J Coll Med S Afr 41-42 see also National Health Act 2003 (s7 and s8). 
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procedure could be embarked upon.1130 The expert witness in this case bemoaned the 
quality of the consent forms used across the country and complained that he has even 
had to develop his own, for his personal use, to address all the necessary issues including 
the risks, foreseen and not foreseen but likely, that are related to the medical procedure 
undertaken.1131 He argued that if a consent form is not properly explained before the 
operation is undertaken, no matter the good intentions and oath of the medical 
practitioners, if proper consent was not obtained prior to a procedure, the practitioner will 
be liable for whatever happened during that procedure adopted, consistent with the 
National Health Act.1132 Proper consent includes consent given after all the apparent risks 
and the obvious steps that the medical team will take in any emergency have been 
explained to the patient as established in the case of Sibisi v Maitin.1133 By appending his 
or her signature, the patient indicates that she or he understood what was explained to 
him or her and accepted the risks. In the event that the patient is in no condition or state 
of mind to do so, his or her next of kin must be consulted in accordance with the National 
Health Act.1134 In arriving at a judgment in this case the judge held that negligence is a 
requirement for delictual liability and the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant 
was negligent as established in the case of Oppelt v Department of Health.1135  According 
to the judge, it is not sufficient to allege negligence alone. The particular grounds of 
negligence must also be detailed as explained in the case of Honikman v Alexander 
Palace Hotels.1136 It is an implied term of the contract that the medical practitioner who 
undertakes the treatment of the patient will exercise the reasonable skill and care of a 
practitioner in her or his field as established in Mitchell v Dixon.1137 In deciding what is 
reasonable, the evidence of qualified physicians is of greatest assistance; however, what 
is reasonable under the circumstances is a matter for the court to decide as established 
the case of Oppelt v Department of Health Western Cape.1138 Should the practitioner fail 
                                                          
1130  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [21-23]. 
1131   Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [11-13, 21]. 
1132  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s6 and s7).  
1133  Sibisi NO v Maitin 2014 (6) SA 533 (SCA) [49-50].   
1134  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s6 and s7). 
1135  Oppelt v Department of Health Western Cape 2016 (1) SA 325 (CC) [17]. 
1136  Honikman v Alexander Palace Hotels (Pty) Ltd 1962 (2) SA 404 (C).   
1137  Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD [525].   
1138  Mukheiber v Raath1999 (3) SA1065 (SCA) See also Oppelt v Department of Health Western 
 Cape 2016 (1) SA 325 (CC) [36].   
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in his or her duty and the patient suffer damages in consequence thereof, the practitioner 
is bound to compensate the patient for the damages caused by the breach of contract. If 
a plaintiff relies on a breach of duty of care, she or he must set out the facts that could or 
should have been foreseen by the defendant. Therefore, the onus rests on the plaintiff to 
establish that a reasonable person (diligens paterfamilias) in the position of the defendant 
as established in Van Wyk v Lewis:1139 “(i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of the 
conduct (whether an actor omission) injuring another’s person or property, and causing 
that person patrimonial loss; (ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such 
occurrence; and (iii) that the defendant failed to take such reasonable steps.”1140 Whether 
a reasonable person would have taken steps to guard against foreseeable harm involves 
a value judgment.1141 Four useful considerations courts rely on are: “(i) the degree or 
extent of the risk created; (ii) the gravity of the possible consequences; (iii) the utility of 
the actor’s conduct; and (iv) the burden of eliminating the risk.” 1142 The Court accepted 
the opinion of the expert witnesses, but could not establish why there were no forms filled 
out for discharge or refusal of treatment as done on her previous admission on January 
24 or as required by law. The case then turned on the credibility of the plaintiff. The Court 
held that despite the fact that she had a remarkable memory regarding what transpired 
on other occasions or throughout her medical saga, she conveniently could not remember 
what happened on the 4th of February when she claimed to have been discharged by the 
hospital staff. The Court concluded that she was an unreliable witness in this instance 
having referred to the law on a dispute of facts as established by the SCA in the case of 
Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery Group Ltd v Martell et Cie.1143 The Court concluded that 
the decision on which version of the facts to accept would be based on an evaluation of 
the credibility of the witnesses, their reliability and probabilities, as established in the 
Oldwage case.1144 The Court then found that the plaintiff had been unable to prove her 
charge of negligence on a balance of probabilities and her action was thus dismissed.1145 
                                                          
1139  Van Wyk Appellant v Lewis 1924 AD 438 [444]. 
1140  Oppelt v Department of Health, Western Cape 2016 (1) SA 325 (CC) [107-108]. 
1141  Cape Metropolitan Council v Graham 2001 (1) SA 1197 (SCA) [7].  
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The implications of these new rulings by South African courts in the above two cases and 
other recent court judgments with regards to the development of the doctrine of informed 
consent in South African jurisprudence will be further discussed and elaborated in chapter 
8 of this thesis. 
 
3.4 Other legal issues pertaining to the doctrine of informed consent in the context of 
comparative international laws  
 
3.4.1 Rights to bodily integrity and individual autonomy  
 
The rights to bodily and psychological integrity enshrined in the South African Constitution 
appear relevant to the protection of the individual’s autonomy. It has been argued that the 
right to bodily integrity underlies the right to pursue lifestyle choices including freedom to 
obtain medical care when needed, as well as autonomy choices regarding reproduction 
consistent with section 12(a) of the Constitution “to make decisions concerning 
reproduction”.1146 This right to reproductive choices is reminiscent of articles 8 and 12 of 
the ECHR1147, which were adopted into UK law under the Human Rights Act 1998.1148 
These articles guarantee an individual’s “right to respect for private and family life” in 
article 8 and; right to marry and found a family in article 12.1149 The South African 
constitutional guarantee of “security in and control over their body” provides protection to 
individuals over all forms of non-consensual touching, which extends to bodily integrity 
and self-determination ,whereas section 12(2)(c) specifically protects the rights of the 
individual not be subjected to medical and scientific experiments without their informed 
consent. This later requirement would appear to include protection from many forms of 
medical treatment including where treatment and research are combined as in 
randomized clinical trials (RCTs) or clinical trials. Section 72(7) of the NHA defines “clinical 
trials” as “a systematic study, involving human subjects that aims to answer specific 
                                                          
1146  The Constitution s12 (a). 
1147 Council of Europe European Convention on Human Rights (European Union 1950). 
1148  UK Human Rights Act 1998. 
1149  Chima Consent and patients’ rights 2006 [60-62]. 
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questions about the safety or efficacy of a medicine or method of treatment”.1150 This is a 
form of therapeutic research in which medical treatment and research are conducted 
simultaneously in the same patient as previously discussed in section 2.8 of this thesis. It 
could be argued further that a combined reading of these subsections of the legislation as 
well as the common law interpretations would mean that individuals are also entitled to 
participate in any decision-making process pertaining to their healthcare.1151 Again, this is 
consistent with Article 5 of the ECHR, which guarantees a person’s “right to liberty and 
security”.1152 Further, an explanatory note in article 5 of the European Convention to 
Human Rights and Biomedicine (CHRB)1153 explains that: 
 
Human beings must therefore be able to give or refuse their consent to any intervention involving 
their person. This rule makes clear patients autonomy in their relationship with healthcare 
professionals and restrains the paternalistic approaches which might ignore the wish of the 
patient…An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has 
given free and informed consent to it. This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information 
as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.1154 
 
3.4.2 The legal doctrine of informed consent in the context of South African and 
international jurisprudence 
 
The Roman law maxim of volenti non fit injuria (no harm is done to someone who consents 
or agrees), is generally regarded as the ultimate justification of consent to treatment. This 
is subject to any legal or moral considerations and exceptions. For example, one can only 
consent to something that is consistent with public policy or good societal morals bone 
mores. 1155,1156 It has also been argued that what is good and moral in society may be 
controversial, because people sometimes have values that may diverge from traditional 
                                                          
1150  National Health Act 61 of 2003 s72 (7). 
1151  Piertese M “The interdependence of rights to health and autonomy in South Africa”2008 SALJ 
 553-572. 
1152  Council of Europe European Convention on Human Rights (European Union 1950) Article 5. 
1153   European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Oviedo 1997. 
1154  European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Explanatory notes (Strasbourg  1997). 
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norms.1157 Ideally, informed consent is a prerequisite for any medical intervention or 
treatment, but it has been suggested that the only justification for something that would 
otherwise be considered illegal is consent or agreement to it.1158 For example, the only 
mechanism that would allow a surgical incision on a patient, which would ordinarily be 
considered infringement of the guaranteed right to bodily integrity, and would ordinarily 
result in a charge of battery or assault, is the patient’s consent or agreement to such a 
procedure.1159 Legal and ethical guidelines in health care therefore provide qualifications 
of information disclosure and focus on procedures to obtain valid consent. 1160,1161 
According to Ackerman J in the Castell case,1162 for consent to operate as a defence for 
a medical procedure, the following criteria must be fulfilled by the consenting party, that 
is, he or she: 
 
(a)  Must have had knowledge and been aware of the nature and extent of the harm 
or risk; 
 (b) Must have appreciated and understood the nature and extent of the harm or risk;  
(c) Must have consented to the harm or assumed the risk, and  
(d) The consent must be comprehensive that it extends to the entire transaction 
inclusive of all its consequences. 1163 
 
The doctrine of informed consent comprises the key elements of information disclosure, 
capacity, comprehension and voluntariness followed by a decision to accept or refuse the 
proposed treatment as previously described in the foregoing chapters of this thesis.1164,1165 
                                                          
1157  Savulescu J “Autonomy, the good life, and controversial choices” in The Blackwell guide to 
 medical ethics Rhodes R, Francis LP and Silvers A (eds) (Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford 
 2007)17-37 see also Shandu A “Julian Savulescu and the issue of controversial choices”  2013 
 Procedia Soc Behav Sci 222-226 [223].  
1158 Earle MA “Informed consent: Is there room for the reasonable patient in South African 
 law?”1995 SALJ 629-631. 
1159  Thomas 2007 SALJ 188-215. 
1160  Verheggen FWS and Wijmen FCB "Myth and reality of informed consent in clinical trials”1997 
Med Law 53-67. 
1161  Van Oosten FFW Patients’ rights and the doctor’s duty of disclosure in South Africa”1989 
 Med Law 443-456. 
1162  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
1163  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425]. 
1164  Jones B “Legal aspects of consent” 2006 BJU International 275-279. 
1165 Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 80. 
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A decision may be described as choices between various options which are usually made 
based on a balance of probabilities.1166 In the case of medical treatment, patients with 
capacity can only make a valid decision after full information disclosure and understanding 
of the options available, in an atmosphere that is free of coercion or undue pressure. 
Ideally, the IC process begins when the initial contact is made with the patient and extends 
throughout the entire treatment process or clinical encounter.1167 Accordingly, the US 
NBAC has emphasised that the process of IC should ensure that information is fully 
disclosed, that competent participants fully understand the treatment in order to make 
informed choices, and that decisions to participate or are not made involuntarily.1168  
 
A few exceptions to IC exist and these would include; based on the best interests of the 
patient or unauthorized administration. Based on necessity-such as emergency cases 
where the patient is unconscious or incapable of giving consent, or based on public policy 
and therapeutic privilege as previously discussed in the preceding chapter.1169,1170 The 
duty on the HCP to disclose information prior to medical treatment arises from the principle 
that an individual’s right to self-determination and free choice entails a right to know the 
truth and to receive all information that would enable the individual to make an intelligent 
choice.1171,1172 The Kansas Supreme Court in Natanson v Kline pioneered the use of the 
legal charge of negligence in informed consent cases, rather than battery, requiring from 
HCPs a duty “to disclose and explain to the patient in language as simple as necessary 
the nature of the proposed treatment…chances of success, failure, and any 
alternatives.”1173 In the case of Salgo v Leland Stanford University,1174 the California 
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 1997 Med Law 17-27. 
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Supreme Court ruled that, “a physician violates his duty to the patient and subjects himself 
to liability if he withholds any facts that are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent 
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.” Generally, the standard of information 
disclosure must be based on that of a ‘reasonable patient’ rather than that of the 
‘reasonable doctor’1175 or based on a ‘prudent patient standard’ as suggested by Lord 
Scarman in the Sidaway case.1176 In this case a patient claimed damages against a doctor 
based on injuries sustained after a surgical procedure. While the patient did not allege 
negligence on the part of the doctor in performance of the operation, the patient’s case 
was that she was not informed of the inherent material risks, put at about 1-2% of 
likelihood of nerve damage to the spinal cord resulting in paralysis. According to Lord 
Scarman, this case raised important questions on medico-legal jurisprudence, which 
include the following question: 
 
Has the patient a legal right to know, and is the doctor under a legal duty to disclose, the risks 
 inherent in the treatment which the doctor recommends? If the law recognises the right and the 
 obligation, is it a right to full disclosure or has the doctor discretion as to the nature and extent of 
his disclosure. 1177 
 
Lord Scarman concluded that there was room in the law for a legal duty to warn a patient 
of risks inherent in a proposed treatment, especially in cases of surgery, and that this was 
part of the doctor’s duty of care to the patient. In arriving at this conclusion, he relied on 
the propositions in the American case of Canterbury v Spence1178 where the doctrine of 
informed consent was applied based on certain premises: 
(a) The root premise is that every human being of adult years and of sound mind has 
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. 
(b) That consent is an informed exercise of choice, and that entails an opportunity to 
evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each.   
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(c) The doctor must therefore disclose all ‘material risks’. What risks are ‘material’ is 
determined by the ‘prudent patient’ test formulated by the Court as follows: “[A] risk 
is...material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know 
to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster 
of risks in deciding whether or not to forgo the proposed therapy”.1179 
 
Lord Scarman in Sidaway1180 therefore suggested that there is an obligation on the part 
of a doctor or other healthcare professional to disclose all the necessary information to 
enable a patient make an informed choice. Putting it another way, due to the asymmetry 
of knowledge that exists between a physician and his patients, the former has an 
obligation to provide sufficient and accurate information so that the patient can make an 
intelligent and informed decision.1181 A doctor or other HCP must therefore fully explain 
the proposed procedure, the short-term risks and long-term consequences, the available 
alternatives, their risks and benefits, and the consequences of delaying or declining 
treatment.1182 The patient should also be made aware of both short term costs such as 
pain, recovery time, and length of confinement to the hospital. Long term costs such as 
loss of functioning and physical scarring or loss of function must also be divulged.1183 The 
HCP must disclose all information that would be regarded as ‘material’ by a reasonable 
person, with material defined as any information that would make a particular patient 
choose a different option.1184 Legally obtaining consent without providing adequate 
information may constitute redressable negligence or assault.1185,1186 Despite this stated 
reality, in developing countries such as South Africa, where the doctor-patient ratio is high, 
though it may be ethically desirable, and legally required for patients to be as fully informed 
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as stipulated by the NHA,1187 and the HPCSA guidelines,1188 doctors may not have the 
time to spend on unduly lengthy explanations of all the ramifications of treatment.1189 This 
presents a challenge in ensuring that patients are armed with sufficient, relevant, and 
accurate information before they consent to any medical procedure or treatment.  
 
Comprehension is another key element of IC that focuses on ensuring that a patient is not 
only informed, but that the patient understands the information provided. According to the 
Belmont Report,1190 information must be provided in a language that can be understood 
bearing in mind the level of intelligence, rationality, education and maturity of the patient. 
This refers to cognitive and communicative vulnerability of human subjects of research,1191 
or medical treatment. The ability to comprehend information may be determined by the 
language of communication and the literacy levels of the patient concerned as alluded to 
in section 6 of the NHA, where the Act requires HCPs to take into consideration patients’ 
language and literacy levels when obtaining consent.1192 Discussions on a clinical 
procedure therefore needs to be carried out in a non-technical language so that maximal 
interchange of information between the patient and a doctor or another HCP can occur.1193 
Even when dealing with regard to educated people, explanations of the details of the 
medical procedure are mandatory.1194 The requirement of comprehension imposes on a 
doctor the duty to assess whether a person is capable of making a rational decision based 
upon the information provided by evaluating whether the patient understands the 
information. While it may be easier to assess the adequacy of information disclosed and 
imparted, it is far more difficult to assess whether the information has been understood by 
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the patient or research subject.1195 The causes of misunderstanding among such patients 
include differences in language, culture, level of education,1196 and lack of a shared 
understanding between the HCP and the patient about health and disease.1197  
 
In an African study on the application of IC in Nigeria, it was reported that 18 patients 
(1.5%) out of 133 patients had difficulties understanding the information given to them. 
They complained that the doctors used technical terminology.1198 Nevertheless, the 
patients gave consent to prevent their operations or surgical procedures being cancelled. 
These findings make it clear that even where consent is given, it may not always be fully 
informed or valid based on the legal requirements for validity. Another important 
component of IC is voluntariness. Volition is concerned with having the capacity required 
to make conscious choices or decisions or desire to make a choice. It is designed to 
protect the patient’s right to make health care choices free of coercion or undue 
influence.1199 In medical law, consent obtained through threat or intimidation for a clinical 
procedure may not be valid and the doctor can be held liable for assault or trespass to the 
person.1200 The power imbalance between a patient and a doctor also creates a danger 
of undue influence,1201 since a patient cannot obtain treatment without an agreeable 
medical professional.1202 In such cases the patient can do little more than respond to 
treatment offered by the HCP lest they are labelled as rude and uncooperative.1203,1204 It 
has also been reported that in South Africa, patients may consent to treatment without 
asking questions where they are afraid to loose free treatment benefits.1205 Patients are 
also often anxious at the time consent is sought, thereby making them even more 
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vulnerable and subject to undue influence, easy coercion1206 and manipulation1207 by 
HCPs during the IC process. An example of this would occur when consent is sought from 
women in labour, leading the RCOG to caution HCPs about taking due consideration 
when obtaining IC from women in labour.1208 In the case of Diaz v Hillsborough County,1209 
doctors were charged with the offence of ‘dignity harm’ for infringing on patients’ rights to 
human dignity, where they obtained informed consent during labour from vulnerable, 
poorly educated immigrant women, for a clinical trial without full information disclosure.1210  
 
In African countries, unlike more developed countries of the West, the appropriateness of 
first person IC has been questioned in the cultural context, where individuals are seen a 
part of a community and not only as individuals.1211 In these traditional settings, consent 
may first be sought from community elders, and in the case of married women, permission 
is sought from their husbands. It is therefore doubtful whether such consent is truly 
autonomous and free from coercion or undue influence.1212,1213 The real question 
regarding volition then, is whether patients’ consent is freely given or whether their 
decision is influenced by their relationship to the HCP or surrogate/persuader, as 
demonstrated in Re T,1214 where a Jehovah’s witness mother was alleged to have unduly 
influenced her vulnerable daughter and ‘overbore’ her will.1215  In view of this, some legal 
authorities have argued that sometimes the influence of parents on their children, or of 
one spouse on another, or of an employer over a servant, may result in coercion or undue 
influence.1216  
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From the foregoing, it is clear that there are challenges that exist in the process of 
obtaining IC. In some instances the information given is insufficient and/or is inaccurate. 
In other instances the information may be so technical that it cannot be understood by an 
ordinary patient based on language barriers, low education levels, poverty or other cultural 
beliefs; or  even sickness which may make the patient feel vulnerable. In yet other 
instances, patients may feel intimidated by the power asymmetry between the patient and 
the HCP or become intimidated by the hospital environment so that they do not consent 
freely. Finally, it is debatable whether all individuals giving consent have the legal capacity 
to give consent. The empirical part of this thesis will endeavour to investigate and explain 
how these factors play themselves out in clinical practice in South Africa. Therefore, this 
thesis seeks to shed some light on these aspects of the IC process in an urban setting in 
South Africa. 
 
3.5 Informed consent, the socio-cultural milieu and patients’ rights in South Africa 
 
In developing countries such as South Africa, educational standards and literacy levels 
are low, knowledge and power asymmetry on healthcare issues usually exist between 
patients and HCPs.1217,1218 It has been suggested that in such settings “[…] it is critically 
important to recognize the historical backdrop of colonialism and racism, and ongoing 
challenges of poverty and exploitation. In this light, building and maintaining trust among 
researchers, communities, and participants can be a critical element of informed 
consent.”1219 However, despite such considerations, it has been observed that a doctor 
or other HCP still has a duty to explain a clinical procedure without turning the patient or 
their surrogate decision makers into students of medicine.1220 Debates continue on how 
much information a HCP should give to a patient before they feel informed enough to 
make a valid decision.1221 It is trite that the ability to use written information is important 
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to comprehension and understanding,1222,1223 and barriers to communication arising from 
illiteracy and language differences may prevent a common understanding of medical 
procedures, thereby putting a patient at risk of providing consent without 
comprehension.1224,1225 How can HCPs ensure that patients understands a proposed 
treatment or procedure prior to providing consent? Some authorities have suggested a 
verbal or written test to ascertain patient capacity, competence or understanding before 
considering IC valid.1226,1227 In South Africa, around 25% of the population is 
unemployed, with low labour force participation rate of 54% compared to a global 
average of 69%; 1228,1229,1230 compounded by historical inequities within population 
groups.1231,1232,1233 Basic health care is unaffordable and out of reach for a majority of 
the population.1234 Therefore, any offer of medical assistance maybe seen as better than 
nothing, thus encouraging undue influence, therapeutic misconception, and medical 
paternalism.1235,1236 Further, there is a dichotomy in the organization of the South African 
healthcare system, which is dual in nature, consisting of private hospitals/medical 
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practice which is patronized by more affluent patients (about 20%); representing those 
who have health insurance or the financial means to pay for private healthcare services, 
compared with the public health services which accounts for the majority (80%) of 
indigent patients and citizens.1237,1238,1239 This dual healthcare system is further 
characterized by better infrastructure in private hospitals because of commercial 
competition and better funding, and arguably better educated and more knowledgeable 
patients and consumers of healthcare services.  
 
In a recent Canadian case of Chaoulli v Attorney General Quebec,1240 the court, by a 
narrow majority, held that the prevention of the right of more affluent Canadians from 
accessing healthcare services from the private sector, and therefore ostensibly preventing 
the development of a two-tier healthcare system in Canada, which would have prejudiced 
the ability of poorer or less affluent Canadians from obtaining equal health care services, 
was an infringement on those affluent Canadians’ rights to life, liberty and security of the 
person as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1241 The author 
concluded that the judgment in the Chaoulli case shows that there may be circumstances 
in which lack of access to certain forms of medical treatment, could be a violation of an 
individual’s autonomy rights.1242 By contrast, the Constitutional Court of South Africa held 
in the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health KwaZulu-Natal,1243 that the right of 
access to healthcare as enshrined in the Constitution,1244 is a gradually attainable right 
subject to the availability of resources with regards to access to healthcare services.1245 
One can therefore conclude that the dual healthcare system in South Africa may influence 
indigent patients’ autonomy rights as well as their right to the best possible healthcare 
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services as enshrined in the UDHR1246 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).1247  
 
This evident dichotomy of healthcare service delivery may in some ways influence the 
practice of IC in South Africa, since the more affluent and arguably more knowledgeable 
patients, may have the means to purchase private healthcare services and therefore 
maybe more attuned to demanding their consumer rights when accessing healthcare,1248 
since the consumer protection also guarantees the rights fair dealing and full disclosure 
during healthcare, including disclosure of costs.1249 Furthermore, most African societies 
being culturally complex and paternalistic in nature may require that consent or approval 
be obtained from community elders/extended family members, or men as heads of 
households before the actual patients or research subjects can provide consent. 1250,1251 
The challenge here then is to ensure that IC is truly voluntary and that community or 
surrogate consent is not substituted for individuals’ consent, which ideally should be 
obtained in the absence of undue influence and coercion.1252,1253 
 
3.6 The relationship between multiculturalism, right to health, and individual autonomy  
 
It has been argued that the IC doctrine is primarily based on the Western notion of 
individualism over the rights of the community and communalism, which is practiced in 
some African communities as exemplified by the Ubuntu philosophy that emphasizes 
communal rights and brotherhood over individual rights.1254 It has been argued that 
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traditionally, the ontology of African culture is communitarian in nature,1255,1256  which was 
characterized by John Mbiti as follows: “[In African culture], only in terms of other people 
does the individual become conscious of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and 
responsibilities towards himself and towards other people”, summarized by the maxim 
 “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am”.1257  It has been argued that the 
doctrine of IC as currently formulated favours self-reliance over interdependence, action 
over passiveness, rationalism over spirituality, and uncertainty and forthrightness over 
collective harmony.1258,1259 This is in contrast to deep religious and ancestral belief 
systems prevalent in most African cultures, which points to an omnipotent, universalizing 
and fatalistic view of the world that cannot be easily controlled or influenced by mortal 
human beings.1260,1261 This Western notion of autonomy, as paraphrased in the maxim of 
Cardozo which states that “every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body […]”1262  is  further characterized by 
the Cartesian maxim of “I think, therefore I am.”1263 This view overlooks that fact that in 
some non-western cultures, including those in Africa, individuals may expect and even 
desire that others make decisions regarding their healthcare and that some individuals 
may not even want to receive any ‘negative’ information on which such decisions maybe 
based.1264,1265 According to Frimpong-Mansoh the question to be asked is “how can the 
requirement of voluntary informed consent be addressed in African community oriented 
culture”.1266 
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The tradition of rugged individualism prevalent in American culture reinforces the view that 
healthcare is a matter of private interests which is best left to determination by market 
forces within a free market economy.1267 Unfortunately, this state of affairs has led to a 
category of underprivileged healthcare recipients within the American system, leading to 
observations that levels of ill-health are comparatively higher amongst the disadvantaged 
minorities and other vulnerable population groups in modern American society.1268 
Individuals who do not identify with Western cultural values may be more spiritual and 
more family oriented and communal in their decision making processes.1269,1270 Therefore 
imposing western beliefs and practices with regards to the IC doctrine and respect for 
individual autonomy may in fact create deleterious and negative health consequences for 
such patients, and risks viewing them as oddities stripped of their cultural belief systems. 
This view ignores the fact that such individuals’ perception of health and illness and 
medical decision-making choices are part of who they are as individuals.1271 Therefore, 
imposing a singular Western view of autonomy and IC may not actually respect such 
people’s rights to autonomy and their rights to make decisions about their own personal 
welfare within the context of their traditional customs, morals and belief 
systems.1272,1273,1274 ,1275 
 
Individual autonomy has been generally recognized as a core value of legal and 
constitutional order.1276 Further, it has been suggested that human beings require a 
minimum level health and physical well-being amongst other rights, as enshrined in the 
UDHR1277 and ICESCR,1278 in order to be fully autonomous and fulfil their personal goals 
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consistent with their own personal values.1279 Therefore, good health may be described 
as a basic social good, which enhances human flourishing and individual autonomy.1280 
Thus, any society that denies individuals access to basic healthcare services or standards, 
disvalues personal autonomy and opens itself up to moral criticism and public opprobrium. 
In view of the above observations, good health and the right to health cannot simply be 
viewed as issues under an individual’s autonomous control, because a person’s health 
status is generally impacted on by other complex variables such as genetic inheritance, 
or good or bad genes, coupled with other factors such as individuals’ psychological 
makeup, cultural, environmental, economic, as well as available health care resources 
both at the individual and societal levels.1281 Hence it is important to recognize the linkages 
between social vulnerability and individual choices, not just whether the individual is an 
innocent or unfortunate victim of disease, and not based only on the view that the 
individual has brought a disease on him or herself because of so-called ‘bad choices’ or 
poor decision-making in life.1282,1283 It should also be recognized that the health-affirming 
personal choices are invariably linked to various factors as alluded to above. Hence, one 
may argue that empowering individuals to exercise their personal autonomy must 
generally acknowledge the underlying socio-cultural factors and structural 
violence,1284,1285 prevalent in that particular society, and this means that the state must 
sometimes play an active role in providing access to health and enabling individuals to 
exercise their right to autonomy.1286,1287,1288,1289 Finally, it must be acknowledged that 
socio-economic factors, as well as cultural belief systems, may play a big role in the 
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development of human capabilities including the ability to fulfil life plans and participate 
effectively in political economic and social life and exercise one’s choices in life including 
the right to autonomy. Respect for autonomy forms the cornerstone of IC and is seen to 
be derived from the Western liberal notions of dignity, integrity, individuality and 
independence. However, it must be remembered that other societies may have a different 
worldview in terms of their interpretation of the rights to autonomy, which may include 
communalism rather than rugged individualism.1290 In view of these observations; Schuck 
has suggested that IC “is impoverished by a lack of context within which patients can 
exercise meaningful choice about difficult options […] that the goal should be to further 
contextualize informed consent-both the process and the legal doctrine that regulates it” 
[emphasis added].1291 One can therefore conclude that IC should be considered “as a 
normative variable, not an empirical constant” because of its cultural plasticity.1292 Thus, 
the implementation of IC should; if it is to be effective, allow for changes in the way it is 
defined to attune to the local or prevailing medical culture.1293  
 
The issues and considerations outlined above present challenges to ensuring that IC 
provided in clinical practice in South Africa is informed, comprehensible, voluntary and 
autonomous. For the purposes of this thesis, the emphasis is on the investigation of the 
role of HCPs, specifically medical doctors and professional nurses in the ensuring that IC 
provided by patients during routine healthcare services in South Africa is valid, while 
taking into consideration the various key elements of  IC namely; information disclosure, 
competence, voluntariness and comprehension. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1290  Gordon E 1997 Fordham Urb L J 1321-1362. 
1291  Schuck P “Rethinking informed consent” 1994 Yale LJ 951. 
1292  Chima Consent and patients’ rights 2006 [56]. 
1293  Schuck P 1994 Yale LJ 951-959 see also Chima Consent and patients’ rights 56. 
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3.7 The Hippocratic tradition and the historical origins of IC in medical practice 
 
An ethical code of behaviour is central to the ‘Corpus Hippocraticum’ attributed to the 
ancient physician Hippocrates and other writers of the 5th-3rd century B.C.1294,1295 The 
Hippocratic tradition was predicated on benevolent paternalism based on the ethical 
principle of beneficence,1296 which opined, ‘Speak to the patient carefully and adroitly, 
concealing most things…comfort with solitude and attention, revealing nothing of the 
patients’ future or present condition.’1297,1298, Providing benefit to the patient by relieving 
suffering and avoiding harm were chief concerns.1299 Primum non nocere (above all do no 
harm), based on the ethical principle of non-maleficence, was of paramount importance; 
therefore full information disclosure, as required by modern IC doctrines was considered 
harmful.  
 
Medieval physicians in the West expanded Hippocratic texts, so that by the 15th century, 
rules of conduct had been established in medical schools of the time. In the 18th century, 
American physicians such as Benjamin Rush and Thomas Percival stressed the need for 
primary moral rules of medical practice and began to wrestle with questions of truth-telling 
in the doctor-patient relationship. However, these physicians still maintained a rigid 
paternalistic attitude as shown by this quote from Benjamin Rush in 1786, “Yield to 
patients in matters of little consequence, but maintain an inflexible authority…in matters 
essential to life”.1300 Rush wanted patients educated to the point where they could 
                                                          
1294  Hippocrates Hippocrates collected works I Jones WHS (ed) 
 http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0251%3Atext%3
 Dintro%3Achapter%3D2 (Date of use: 23 April 2016). 
1295  2 Hippocrates Decorum 297- 299 (translated from the original by Jones W 1967). 
1296  Cohen-Almagor “On the philosophical foundations of medical ethics: Aristotle, Kant, JS Mill 
 and Rawls 2017 Ethics Med Public Health 1-26. 
1297  Katz J The silent world of doctor and patient (Free Press New York 1984)1-29. 
1298 Olufowote JO “A structurational analysis of informed consent to treatment: Societal evolution, 
 contradiction, and reproductions in medical practice” 2008 Health Communication 292-303. 
1299  Katz J “Limping is no sin: Reflections on making health care decisions” 1984 Cardozo Law 
 Review  243-265.  
1300   Leitch A “Rush, Benjamin (1746-1813)” in A Princeton companion (Princeton University Press 
 Princeton NJ 1978) see also Haakonssen L “Benjamin Rush: Medical ethics for a new 
 Republic” in Medicine and morals in the enlightenment: John Gregory, Thomas Percival and 
 Benjamin Rush (Rodopi Amsterdam/Atlanta 1997) 187-199. 
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understand and comply with physicians’ recommendations, but no further. In 1803, 
Thomas Percival published a book called “Medical Ethic”1301 where he stated:  
 
To a patient who makes inquiries which if faithfully answered, might prove fatal to him, it would be 
a gross and unfeeling wrong to reveal the truth. His right to it is suspended and even 
annihilated…the balances of truthfulness yield to beneficence in critical situations.1302 
 
Percival felt that beneficent deception for the purpose of protecting the hope of the patient 
was a prior duty to the truth when he stated: 
 
  The only point at issue is whether the practitioner shall sacrifice that delicate sense of  veracity, 
which is so ornamental to, and indeed forms a characteristic of excellence of the  virtuous man, to this 
claim of justice and social duty.”1303  
 
Percival's writings became the basis for the first American Medical Association (AMA) 
code of ethics issued in 1847.1304 Despite Percival’s insistence on concealing the truth 
from patients, other writers such as Thomas Gisborne1305 championed the need for truth-
telling in medicine when he wrote in 1794: “The physician…is invariably bound never to 
represent the uncertainty or danger as less than he actually believes it to be,”1306 thereby 
encouraging full disclosure as required by current IC doctrines. Other 19th century 
physicians such as Worthington Hooker1307 of Connecticut and William Osler1308 
continued to refine a primarily beneficence based understanding of medical ethics. Osler 
argued that physicians should be broadly educated in the liberal arts, so as to practice 
medicine properly, while Hooker was more concerned about the effect of deception 
                                                          
1301  Percival T Medical Ethic or a code of institutes and precepts adapted to the professional  conduct 
 of physicians and surgeons (Printed by S Russell Manchester 1803).  
1302  Faden and Beauchamp A history and theory of informed consent 68. 
1303  Haakonssen L “Thomas Percival: The duty of public office” in Medicine and morals in the 
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 annotations (American Medical Association Chicago 2006-2007). 
1305 Porter R “Thomas Gisborne: Physicians, Christians and gentlemen” 1993 Clio Med 252-73. 
1306  Porter 1993 Clio Med 252-73. 
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 574. 
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generally, than on the importance of patient consent. In the 1950s, following the 
revelations of research abuse and the use of human patients as guinea pigs during the 
doctors’ trial at Nuremberg, Germany,1309 efforts to codify ethical principles increased and 
the Nuremberg Code were introduced in 1947-19481310 to prohibit experiments against 
humans without their consent. As such, the first principle of the Nuremberg code provides 
in part:  “The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.”1311  The 
code suggests that the consent of the research subject must have at least four 
characteristics; it must be voluntary, competent, informed, and comprehending.1312  
 
Following publication of the Nuremberg Code, medical ethics began to move away from 
being primarily self-regulating to increased public scrutiny based upon the views of non-
physicians such as Joseph Fletcher,1313 who began to examine the impact of medical 
technology on the moral fabric of society. The World Medical Association (WMA) 
Declaration of Helsinki 19641314 departed from the strictly legal focus of the Nuremberg 
code, as a guideline for physicians in the ethical practice of medical research. Despite the 
publication of these ethical codes, Beecher1315 and Katz1316 were able to document 
unethical research practices involving human subjects. Because of these controversies, 
a United States National Commission published the Belmont Report,1317 which proposed 
broad ethical principles to guide researchers in designing research studies. The primary 
ethical principles suggested by the Belmont report are the principles of respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice. In addition, various US federal 
                                                          
1309  Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg military tribunals under control council law No. 
 10 vol 2 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office 1949). 
1310  Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg military tribunals under control council law  
 (Washington DC US Government Printing Office 1949) 181-182. 
1311 Faden et al History and theory of informed consent (Oxford University Press New 
 York1986)192. 
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1314  World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki-Ethical principles for medical research 
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agencies published regulations guiding experimental research such as the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) in 1981 and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) 
in 1983.1318 These regulations required that Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), review 
research proposals and monitor execution of federally funded research projects.1319  
 
Similarly in England in 1967, the Royal College of Physicians committee on the 
supervision of the ethics of clinical investigation called for the formation of research ethics 
committees (RECs).1320 In the same year, Papworth published his book “Human Guinea 
Pigs” 1321 which documented hundreds of unethical research practices in the United 
Kingdom and USA. In the later part of the 20th century until present, biomedical research 
has been dominated by new technological advances, which are currently influencing the 
ethics of contemporary biomedical research and medical treatment. The 1960s and 70s 
brought an emphasis on patient autonomy to the consideration of biomedical ethics in the 
USA.1322 Medical paternalism gradually gave way to respect for autonomy. The 
ascendancy of  respect for autonomy paralleled the rise in technological advancement in 
medicine and pronounced affluence in the West. Institutions dedicated to the study of 
biomedical ethics were established in Washington DC1323 and New York,1324 leading to 
challenges of the medical establishment as the sole participant in medical decision-
making. With the 1980s and 1990s came the prospect of scarcity of healthcare resources, 
which led to dramatic ethical debates regarding distributive justice in the context of the 
HIV-AIDS pandemic. Such questions as healthcare rationing, post-trial benefits to HIV-
AIDS drugs and redistribution of the risk and burdens of biomedical research became 
more prominent.1325 The last few decades have been preoccupied with the moral, ethical 
                                                          
1318  National Bioethics Advisory Commission Ethical and policy issues in research involving human 
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and legal issues associated with new medical advances in cloning, stem-cell research, 
DNA analysis, the human genome and gene therapy.1326  
 
As discussed above, concerning information disclosure, from Hippocratic times, the 
medical profession has always been reluctant to disclose information to patients fearing 
that “for many patients through this cause have taken a turn for the worse” (Decorum, 
XVI).1327 Similarly, up until the judgment of the UK House of Lords in the case of Sidaway 
where Lord Templeman opined that “the provision of too much information may prejudice 
the attainment of the objective of restoring the patient’s health,”1328 this opinion has been 
maintained by many medical and legal authorities. However, in recent times there has 
been somewhat of a paradigm shift in the doctor-patient relationship, whereby patients 
have acquired more rights, and become imbued with the rights of the consumer of 
healthcare services, rather than passive recipients of benevolent healthcare service from 
doctors and other HCPs.1329 As patients have become more aware of their rights, they 
have become more knowledgeable and inquisitive,  making comments, such as: “ I want 
to know what the options are, and weigh them myself,” or “ I want to know what is going 
to happen or why; I also look up info on the internet.”1330 The law such as the Human 
Rights Act1331 in the UK and the Constitution in South Africa1332 have enshrined these 
rights of dignity, privacy, confidentiality, and bodily integrity within codified legal 
instruments, which doctors and other HCPs are obliged to adhere to. As summarized by 
the WMA:1333 
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Until recently, physicians generally considered themselves accountable only to themselves, to their 
colleagues in the medical profession and for religious believers, to God. Nowadays, they have 
additional accountabilities to their patients, to third parties such as hospitals and managed 
healthcare organizations, to medical licensing and regulatory authorities, and often to courts of law. 
These different accountabilities can conflict with one another.1334  
 
In view of the above, the professional practice of medicine has changed from its 
Hippocratic roots, with doctors and other HCPs being urged to involve patients in 
healthcare decision-making, as stated by the GMC guidance documents on good medical 
practice: 
 
Work in partnership with patients. Listen to, and respond to, their concerns and preferences. Give 
patients the information they want or need in a way they can understand. Respect patients’ right to 
reach decisions with you about their treatment and care.1335  
 
Similarly, the HPCSA has urged HCPs in South Africa to ensure voluntary healthcare 
decision-making by patients’ stating:   
 
 It is for the patient, not the health care practitioner, to determine what is in the patient's own 
 best interests. Nonetheless, practitioners may wish to recommend a treatment or a course of 
 action to patients, but they must not put pressure on patients to accept their advice. In 
 discussions with patients, health care practitioners should give a balanced view of the options 
 and explain the need for informed consent.1336 
 
The recent judgment of the UK Supreme Court (Scotland) in Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire,1337 including certain social and legal developments in medical practice, 
signal a departure from a doctor-patient relationship based on medical paternalism 
towards a relationship based on respect for the autonomy and rights of patients as 
intelligent individuals who are capable of being involved in the healthcare decision 
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making process The current law and jurisprudence regarding IC and negligence point 
towards a situation where, instead of patients being placed in the hands of doctors 
under the reasonable doctor standard of care, whereby the patients may turn around to 
sue the doctor or HCP when things go wrong.  A shift is noticeable to one where the 
patients are recognized as capable of assessing the risks involved in healthcare, and 
making a conscious decision to accept such risks which might impact on their individual 
lives. “In the law of negligence, this approach entails a duty on the part of doctors to take 
reasonable care to ensure that a patient is aware of material risks of injury that are 
inherent in treatment.”1338  
 
In light of the above considerations and new developments in human rights, medical law 
and ethics; full information disclosure based on the prudent patient and material risks 
standards has become the required standard of care for IC since the latter part of the 
20th century to the present.1339 However, other commentators have argued for a shift 
from informed decision-making to shared healthcare decision-making by distinguishing 
informed decision-making as “an individual’s overall process of gathering relevant 
information from both the clinician and other clinical and non-clinical sources with or 
without independent clarification of values.”1340 Whereas shared healthcare decision-
making can be characterized as a particular process of decision‑making by the patient 
and clinician in which the patient: 
 
a) Understands the risk or seriousness of the medical condition; 
b) Understands the medical procedure including the risks, benefits, 
alternatives, and uncertainties; 
c) Has weighed his or her personal values regarding the potential benefits and 
harms associated with the healthcare service; 
d) Has engaged in decision‑making at a level at which he or she feels 
comfortable; 
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e) Has come to a joint decision in association with the healthcare provider.1341  
 
Advocates of shared decision‑making have suggested that it promotes patient 
comprehension and autonomy, reduces unwanted medical procedures, and malpractice 
claims, improves patient compliance, and decreases overall costs of healthcare service 
delivery.1342,1343,1344, 1345 
 
3.8 Sociohistorical phases of informed consent based on structurational analysis  
 
Using the technique of structurational analysis, Olufowote has delineated the historical 
evolution of the IC doctrine into three overlapping phases or structures.1346 The first phase 
or structure, known as the “traditionalist phase or structure”, favoured physician control 
over the medical decision making process and information disclosure which accompanied 
the emergence of the IC doctrine in the 1950s. Laws prevalent during this phase include 
the doctrine of therapeutic privilege and the reasonable doctor standard of information 
disclosure.1347,1348 The second phase is described as the “liability structure”, which 
favoured the interests of states and administrative entities, which emerged in the 1970s 
to challenge the traditionalist structure. Informed consent laws prevalent during this period 
included the ‘objective’ reasonable patient standard of information disclosure, legal rules, 
standardized risk disclosure, and the presumptive effect of consent forms as reflecting 
true informed consent.1349 The third phase or structure is described as the “decision-
making structure”, which now emphasises patients’ rights and emerged in the 1980s. The 
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laws constituting this phase or structure are the ‘subjective’ patients standard of 
information disclosure, waiver of IC,  where written consent alone may not prove that valid 
IC was obtained, and the ‘material risks’ standard of information disclosure.1350 In the 
decision-making phase, which is currently prevalent in modern medical practice, IC 
emphasizes oral communication and an ongoing conversation between doctors or other 
HCPs and the patient, which enhances patients’ understanding and comprehension. 
Patients are now seen as idiosyncratic and unique participants in decisions regarding their 
healthcare, and decisions are seen as an intertwining of the technical knowledge and skills 
of the HCP, with the personal values of the patient concerned, thereby facilitating shared 
healthcare decision making.1351,1352,1353,1354 
 
3.9 Some philosophical arguments related to autonomy and the informed consent 
doctrine 
 
3.9.1 The concept of autonomy 
 
 
“I am autonomous if I rule me and no one else rules I”,1355 therefore “I act autonomously 
if I, as the agent, am the power that freely and competently achieves my own ends by 
choosing what I have good grounds to believe to be, the best means to my ends”.1356 
Autonomy, as a concept, was initially introduced to describe self-governing nation states. 
In medical law and ethics, it refers to self-determination or freedom of choice.1357 This 
ethical principle that each person has a right to decide what can be done to his or her own 
body during medical treatment has found expression in some legal statutes, such as the 
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NHA,1358 and international ethical codes such as the UNESCO code on bioethics.1359 The 
concept of autonomy has also been given some legal recognition via court decisions in 
common law jurisdictions through the legal doctrine of informed consent.1360,1361 In cases 
such as Canterbury v Spence,1362 Rogers v Whitaker,1363 Reibl v Hughes,1364 and Castell 
v De Greef,1365 common law courts from South Africa to the USA, Canada, and Australia, 
have come to enforce patients autonomy rights through landmark judgments, thereby 
reinforcing the doctrine of IC.  
 
It has been argued that autonomy by itself has never been fully recognized as a legally 
enforceable right.1366 Instead, two other rights, derived from the principle of respect for 
autonomy, have been universally accorded legal protection. 1367 The first is the right to 
bodily integrity, protected by legal rules against assault or battery. The second is the right 
to bodily wellbeing, protected by professional negligence laws.1368 According to Keith LJ 
in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland:1369 
 
The first point to make is that it is unlawful so as to constitute both the tort and crime of battery, to 
administer medical treatment to an adult, who is conscious and of sound mind, without his 
consent… such a patient is completely at liberty to decline to undergo treatment, even if the result 
of his doing so will be that he will die.1370 
 
As explained further by Watermeyer J in the South African case of Stoffberg v Elliot,1371 
any operation performed on a person without his consent is an unlawful interference with 
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his right of security to his person. Cardozo J classically summarized a patient’s right to 
autonomy during medical treatment in the Schloendorf case,1372  where he opined: “Every 
person being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done 
with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his patients consent 
commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”1373  Rehnquist CJ of the US 
Supreme Court later reaffirmed these sentiments in the Cruzan case1374 when he noted 
that “[n]o right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by the common law. Than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of another”.1375 Therefore, a physician who exceeds the consent 
given by a patient will generally be guilty of infringing the patients’ right to bodily integrity 
and well-being,1376 as summarized by Lord Donaldson in Re F:1377  
 
  Prima facie, therefore, in the absence of consent all, or almost all, medical treatment and all 
 surgical treatment of an adult is unlawful, however beneficial such treatment might be. This is 
 incontestable.1378  
 
Therefore respecting patient’s autonomy requires that HCPs recognize that: 
 
It is established that the principle of self-determination requires that respect must be given to the 
wishes of the patient, so that if a patient of sound mind refuses, however unreasonably to consent 
to treatment or care by which life might be prolonged, the doctors responsible for his care must give 
effect to his wishes, even though they do not consider it to be in his best interests to do so.1379  
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3.9.2 Kantian or principled autonomy  
 
The 18th century philosopher, Immanuel Kant, postulated the moral basis for the principle 
of respect for autonomy.1380 Kant argued that the ability of humans to consider the 
possible consequences of their actions, form intentions, and then act on them, rather than 
reacting to circumstances, are what distinguish humans from machines or lower animals. 
Therefore, unthinking choices do not represent autonomy. Kant argued that autonomous 
action can be theoretically harnessed for universal good. This is based on his identification 
of a “categorical imperative”, which he formulated into two major maxims. The first of these 
maxims asks us to, “act only on that maxim which you can at the same time will, that it 
becomes a universal law”. In the second maxim he urges us to, “act as to treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in that of any other, never solely as a means but always 
as an end.”1381,1382  
 
This idea that people should be treated as ‘ends in themselves’ has influenced liberal 
political philosophy by stressing the principle that people should not have their individual 
freedoms compromised for the sake of others or for the good of society in general. Kant 
believed that these “categorical imperatives”, which may be described as duties that 
should never be renounced, could be used to derive the specific moral duties that make 
up a complete ethical framework. To illustrate this, he derived the following argument for 
the duty of keeping promises: “Suppose one is considering breaking his promise. One 
could not will that breaking promises would become universal law because that would 
result in a total breakdown of the trust needed for promises to mean anything at all”.1383 
Therefore based on Kant’s theory, immoral actions such as telling lies, coercion, deception 
and control or enslavement of others, are not universalisable, because if everybody acted 
in this way, the end result would be a breakdown in societal morals. This Kantian form of 
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autonomy has been described as principled autonomy.1384,1385 By contrast to Kant, 
another philosophical school of thought based on consequentialism argues that right or 
wrong actions should balance on their good or bad consequences. The proponents of this 
moral philosophy postulate that the right act in any circumstance is that which produces 
the best overall good as determined by an impersonal perspective that gives equal weight 
to the interests of each affected party.1386 This moral philosophy, called utilitarianism, 
accepts a significant role for the principle of utility in formulating public policy and one it 
principal proponents John Stuart Mills1387 formulated a form of utilitarian philosophy called 
Millian autonomy.1388 
 
3.9.3  Millian autonomy 
 
There is another conception of autonomy, which, while it gives consideration to reason, 
like Kantian autonomy, it accords, however, more weight to the exercise of choice and 
liberty. According to JS Mill, “the only part of conduct of anyone for which he is amenable 
to society is that which concerns others; in the part which merely concerns himself, his 
independence of right is absolute…Over himself, his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.”1389 Further: 
 
That the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the 
interests of no person but himself. Advice, instruction, persuasion, and avoidance by other people 
if thought necessary by them for their own good, are the only measures by which society can 
justifiably express its dislike or disapprobation of his conduct….The reason for not interfering, unless 
for the sake of others, with a person’s voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary 
                                                          
1384  Stirrat GM and Gill R “Autonomy in medical ethics after O’Neill” 2005 J Med Ethics 127–130. 
1385 Furness PN “Ethical aspects of histopathology” 2003 Recent Advances in Histopathology 
 115-122. 
1386  Hope et al Medical ethics and law 22-24 see also Mill JS “Utilitarianism” in Ryan A (ed) 
 Utilitarianism and other essays: JS Mill and J Bentham (Penguin Hammondsworth London 
 1987) 278. 
1387  Mill JS Utilitarianism liberty and representative government (JM Dent & Sons Ltd London 1910). 
1388  Cohen-Almagor “On the philosophical foundations of medical ethics: Aristotle, Kant, JS Mill 
 and Rawls 2017 Ethics Med Public Health [10-13]. 
1389  Mill JS On Liberty 1859 (Batoche Books Kitchener Ontario Canada 2001) [chapter 5]. 
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choice is evidence that what he so chooses is desirable, or at least endurable, to him, and his good 
is on the whole best provided for by allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it...1390  
 
Mills was the most famous proponent of this notion of autonomy, or individuality as he 
called it. He was also a strong advocate of originality. According to Mills: 
 
 [...]he who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of 
any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He, who chooses his plan for himself, employs 
all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to 
gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and 
self-control to hold to his deliberate decision...It is possible that he might be guided in some good 
path, and kept out of harm's way, without any of these things. But what will be his comparative 
worth as a human being? It really is of importance, not only what men do, but what manner of 
men they are that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employ in perfecting  
and beautifying, the first in importance is surely man himself... individuality is the same thing with 
development, and ... it is only the cultivation of individuality which produces, or can produce, well-
developed humans ...1391  
 
3.9.4 Millian autonomy and controversial choices 
 
There is no agreement in the world on what is good and moral in society. Questions have 
been asked about how far people should be allowed to pursue choices which are not 
judged to be in their best interests.  Should people be allowed act in such controversial 
ways or make such controversial choices? Common examples are those who practice 
apotemnophilia and other body dysmorphisms such as limb amputations, body piercings, 
tattooing and other controversial choices. How should society respond to these 
controversial choices? The answer, it has been argued, turns on how these people arrive 
at such choices. People often have values, which diverge from the dominant social values. 
These values lead them to make choices that are judged by some to be imprudent or 
irrational.   
                                                          
1390  Mill JS On Liberty 1859 (Batoche Books Kitchener Ontario Canada 2001) 52-68. 
1391  Savulescu J “Autonomy, the good life, and controversial choices” in The Blackwell guide to 
 medical ethics Rhodes R, Francis LP and Silvers A (eds) (Blackwell Publishing Ltd Oxford  
 2007) see also Mill JS On liberty 1859 [chapter 3]. 
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According to Savulescu, controversial choices can be divided into three categories: (a) 
refusal of assistance to which one has a legitimate entitlement (b) requests for assistance 
for enhancement or for assistance to which one does not have a clear legitimate 
entitlement, and (c) requests for liberty to engage in activities which may result in future 
requests for assistance or demands on others or society.1392 According to JS Mill who 
championed the right to individual freedom and liberty: 
 
I have said that it is important to give the freest scope possible to uncustomary things, in order that 
it may appear in time which of these are fit to be converted into customs. But independence of 
action, and disregard of custom, are not solely deserving of encouragement for the chance they 
afford that better modes of action, and customs more worthy of general adoption, may be struck 
out; nor is it only persons of decided mental superiority who have a just claim to carry on their lives 
in their own way. There is no reason that all human existence should be constructed on someone 
or small number of patterns. If a person possesses any tolerable amount of common sense and 
experience, his own mode of laying out his existence is the best, not because it is the best in itself, 
but because it is his own mode.1393,1394  
 
3.9.5 Implications of respect for autonomy and liberty on the informed consent doctrine 
 
Current arguments on informed consent in healthcare are based on libertarian rights-
based autonomy, designed to safeguard individual freedoms and liberty, above 
considerations related to the rights of others and society. John Locke wrote as follows:: 
“The natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth and not to be 
under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for his 
                                                          
1392  Savulescu J “Autonomy, the good life and controversial choices” 
 http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/28168/controversial_choices.pdf.  
 (Date of use: 22 February 2016) 
1393  Savulescu  
 http://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/28168/controversial_choices.pdf.  
 (Date of use: 22 February 2016). 
1394  Mill JS On liberty 1859 (Batoche Books Kitchener Ontario Canada 2001) 63. 
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rule.”1395 This may be compared to a statement by Karin Morin concerning the rights of 
human subjects in biomedical research:  
 
It is essential to recognize that society’s interest in knowledge may not coincide with an individual 
subject’s interest; the individual subject stands to gain nothing and may lose everything, including 
his or her right of self-determination…1396  
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, the doctrine of informed consent is essentially derived 
from two moral principles, namely respect for autonomy and liberty, which some consider 
to be synonymous with autonomy. Some scholars distinguish between liberty as the 
condition of being independent from controlling influences; and autonomy as having both 
liberty and agency, that is, the capacity for intentional action.1397 The idea of liberty in 
healthcare decision-making can be surmised from this statement attributed to Isaiah Berlin 
where he said that:1398 
 
 Those who have ever valued liberty for its own sake believed that to be free to choose, and 
 not to be chosen for, is an inalienable ingredient, in what makes human beings human, and 
 that this underlies… the demand... to be accorded an area… in which one is one’s own master, 
 a ‘negative’ area in which man is not obliged to account for his activities to any man so far as 
 this is compatible with the existence of organized society.1399  
 
Mill’s arguments also defend liberty of the individual from being controlled by society 
except where it interferes with the rights of other members of society.1400 Therefore, the 
Western moral tradition of individualism, as exemplified by works of Locke, Mills, Berlin 
and others, has strongly dominated the modern concept of autonomy and healthcare 
                                                          
1395  Locke J Second treatise of government 2010-2015 
 http://ezeg.nationallibertyalliance.org/files/books/locke/Locke%20-
 %20Early%20Modern%20Philosophy.pdf (Date of use: 23 April 2016). 
1396  Morin K “The standard of disclosure in human subject experimentation” 1998 J of Leg Med 
 167 see also Grimes v KKI [51-52].   
1397  Hope et al Medical ethics and law 2008 [40-41]. 
1398  Berlin I “Two concepts of liberty” in Berlin I Four essays on liberty (Clarendon Press Oxford 
 1969). 
1399  Berlin I Four essays on liberty (Oxford University Press Oxford 1969) lix-lx. 
1400  Mill JS On liberty 1859 (Batoche Books Kitchener Ontario Canada 2001) 69-71. 
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decision-making.1401 This is reflected in the IC doctrine and respect for autonomy, which 
favor individualism over communalism, self-reliance over interdependence, and truth-
telling and forthrightness over group harmony.1402  Other justifications for IC may include 
increasing numbers of more inquisitive and knowledgeable patients, who in exercising 
their rights as healthcare consumers have demanded more involvement in medical 
decision-making.1403 To explain further, as medical care has become more industrialized 
and sophisticated, patients have become consumers rather than involuntary recipients of 
benevolent healthcare services. Patients have begun to ask questions and demand 
consumer rights, resulting in increasing ethical and legal analyses of healthcare decision-
making.1404,1405 As a consequence of these questions and demands by patients and 
analysts, modern medical practice is evolving from a practice based on beneficence, 
towards rights based autonomy and shared healthcare decision making.1406 Moreover as 
argued by Murray:1407 
 
In the development of bioethics, respect for autonomy emerged as powerful catalyst for protest 
against thoughtless researchers and paternalistic doctors. It found ideological resonance within 
American civil rights movements and popular legal and political culture. The celebration of the 
individual, anger at the infringement of others, constitutionalized protections of personal liberty and 
faith in the free market economy as a fair and efficient method for distributing social goods.’1408 
 
One may rightfully conclude that the practice of medicine has changed significantly from 
its Hippocratic roots. While the requirement of competence endures, the doctor–patient 
relationship has changed, with more knowledgeable and demanding patients, explaining 
the formal requirements of informed consent and respect for patients’ autonomy. Thus, 
the patient’s welfare has become complex and contested. Hence the obligation of HCPs 
                                                          
1401  Cohen-Almagor “On the philosophical foundations of medical ethics: Aristotle, Kant, JS Mill 
 and Rawls 2017 Ethics Med Public Health [1-26]. 
1402  Gordon 1997 Fordham Urb L J 1321-1362. 
1403  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11 [75]. 
1404  Bastian H “Gains and losses for rights of consumer and research participants” 2001BMJ 1417-
 1421. 
1405 Schuck 1994 Yale LJ 899-959. 
1406  Chima A primer on medical law 18-19. 
1407  Murray T “Communities need more than autonomy” 1994 Hastings Cent Rep 32-33. 
1408  Murray T 1994 Hastings Cent Rep 32-33. 
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to recommend interventions based on evidence of benefit, and the advent of harm which 
is challenged by patients who have the expectations of consumers of healthcare services, 
rather than the recipients of benevolent care.1409,1410, 1411,1412 
 
3.10 Patients’ Rights 
 
Patient’s rights may be defined as a combination of claims, liberties, powers and 
immunities that ensure the protection of the patient’s dignity and moral autonomy.1413 This 
definition forms the foundation for the claims that a patient might have in respect of a 
doctor or other HCP and it also assists in defining the duties of the HCP to the patient. It 
ensures accesses to data and information, protection from most kinds of unauthorized 
activities including involvement in medical procedures without consent, and suggests that 
the patient does no wrong by choosing to accept or refuse any medical intervention or 
participation in biomedical research.1414 Wear and others1415 have described patient’s 
rights and IC as enabling and empowering a patient population that has traditionally been 
largely powerless and mute in the face of medical expertise and authority. When put this 
way, the notion of patient’s rights while remaining based on the legal autonomy model 
also extends beyond the confines of a particular legal system. As described by 
Beauchamp and Childress,1416 rights per se are not absolute, but only assert prima facie 
claims that individuals can make upon other individuals or society. Therefore, the exercise 
of rights and making of claiming are governed by rules. These rules may be legal, moral, 
or institutional rules, and some rights will exist or fail to exist because the relevant system 
either allows or disallow the claims in question.1417 The challenge for medical practice and 
                                                          
1409  World Medical Association Manual on ethics (WMA Ferney-Voltaire France 2005) 22. 
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biomedical research has hence been the development of a set of justifiable rules which 
could protect patients and human subjects, and upon which they can base their claims of 
rights or violations of same. The issue of patient’s rights in medical practice and research 
has only come to the fore in the later part of the twentieth century, especially arising after 
the abuse of research subjects as described during the Nuremberg trials1418 and 
afterwards.1419  
 
Recent advances in biomedical technology have also led to a constant rethinking of the 
rights of individuals utilizing the beneficial aspects of modern science.1420  Prior these 
events and subsequent challenges to the status quo, the rights of patients have only been 
based on the beneficence or non-maleficence of the benevolent physician. In other words, 
a patient’s right was solely dependent on the goodwill of the medical doctor or HCP, with 
the presumption that ‘doctor knows best’ and would act in the best interests of patients. 
With the revelations of doctor/researcher abuses in biomedical research, and ethical 
violations during medical treatment culminating in negligence claims as shown in 
Canterbury v Spence,1421 Castell v De Greef 1422 and other common law cases; 
commentators, such as McLean,1423 began to question whether it was still appropriate for 
patients to rely solely on the judgment of doctors and other HCPs, and if not, how patients 
should be involved in the decision-making process regarding medical treatment or 
participation in research. In addition, as medical care became more industrialized and 
sophisticated, patients became consumers of healthcare services rather than involuntary 
participants in the healthcare process. Against this background, the issue of IC has 
consequently become more complex than ever before, intensified by the impact of  the 
rights of patients as consumers of healthcare, and their entitlements.1424  
                                                          
1418  Trials of war criminals before the Nuremberg Military tribunals under control council law (US 
 Government Printing Office Washington DC 1949). 
1419  Papworth MH Human guinea pigs: Experimentation in man (Beacon Press Boston 1967). 
1420  Hallinan and Friedewald 2015 Life Sci Soc Policy DOI 10.1186/s40504-014-0020-9. 
1421 Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772 (DC Cir 1972). 
1422 Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
1423   McLean SAM A patient's right to know: Information disclosure, the doctor and the law 
 (Dartmouth Aldershot 1995) . 
1424 Schuck 1994 Yale LJ 899-959 see also Bastian H 2001BMJ 1417-1421 and Rowe and Moodley 
 “Patients as consumers of health care in South Africa: the ethical and legal implications” 2013 
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The increased complexity of decision-making in contemporary medicine has stimulated 
an extensive literature on patients’ rights in medical practice and increasing debate on the 
ethics of research.1425 One aspect of the recognition of the moral autonomy of the patient 
has been the recognition of the need for adequate information disclosure, which would 
enable the patient to accept or reject therapy or medical interventions, or choose between 
therapies as first recognized in cases such as Canterbury v Spence,1426  or more recent 
cases,1427 or as debated by the  English House of Lords in the Sidaway case.1428 One 
aspect of this debate in the latter case has been whether to persist with the ‘reasonable 
doctor standard’ as established in Bolam1429 or to follow the ‘prudent patient standard’ as 
suggested by Lord Scarman in Sidaway1430 and Ackerman J in the Castell case.1431 
Information disclosure is an important aspect of enhancing the patient’s moral autonomy 
or ability to choose. As suggested by McLean, its potential invasiveness and its social and 
political potential make it an area ripe for rights discourse.1432 Debates in this area have 
therefore focused on several issues, including whether the doctors’ duty to disclose based 
on the patients right to receive information can be tested independently of patient 
understanding, however, if the patient is unable to understand, what then is the point of 
disclosure? Is there a duty on the doctor or HCP to ensure patient understanding? There 
are also problems with the rationality of a patient’s decision-making, leading to questions 
of competence especially about incapacitated patients, minors, and individuals in 
dependent positions such as prisoners, students and vulnerable people from developing 
                                                          
1425  Chima Consent and patients’ rights in human biomedical research 2006 see also Chima “The 
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countries with poor resources.1433 Therefore, the contemporary debate on patients’ rights 
in medicine has been dominated by issues of competence, information disclosure, 
understanding of that information, the rights of vulnerable populations and issues of 
distributive justice. 
 
3.10.1 The rights of patients during medical treatment 
 
The need to formulate internationally recognized standards of rights relevant to patients 
as championed by the UN ICCPR1434 led to the formulation of the “Rights of Patients” by 
the WMA in 1981,1435 where the following sets of defined rights were articulated as the 
core principles pertaining to the doctrine of IC in WMA patients’ rights charter:  
 
Core Principles: 
 
1. Right to medical care of good quality 
a) Every person is entitled without discrimination to appropriate medical care. 
b) Every patient has the right to be cared for by a physician whom he/she knows to be free to 
make clinical and ethical judgements without any outside interference. 
c) The patient shall always be treated in accordance with his/her best interests.  
d) The treatment applied shall be in accordance with generally approved medical principles.  
2. Right to freedom of choice 
a) The patient has the right to choose freely and change his/her physician and hospital or 
health service institution, regardless of whether they are based in the private or public 
sector. 
b) The patient has the right to ask for the opinion of another physician at any stage 
 3 Right to self-determination 
a) The patient has the right to self-determination, to make free decisions regarding 
himself/herself. The physician will inform the patient of the consequences of his/her 
decisions. 
b) A mentally competent adult patient has the right to give or withhold consent to any 
diagnostic procedure or therapy. The patient has the right to the information necessary to 
make his/her decisions. The patient should understand clearly what is the purpose of any 
                                                          
1433  Chima 2006 BMJ 848-851. 
1434  United Nations International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (United Nations1966). 
1435   WMA Declaration of Lisbon on the Rights of the Patient (WMA Lisbon 1998 Reaffirmed Oslo 
 2015). 
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test or treatment is, what the results would imply, and what would be the implications of 
withholding consent. 
c) The patient has the right to refuse to participate in research or the teaching of medicine.  
4. The unconscious patient  
a) If the patient is unconscious or otherwise unable to express his/her will, informed consent 
must be obtained whenever possible, from a legally entitled representative.  
b) If a legally entitled representative is not available, but a medical intervention is urgently 
needed, consent of the patient may be presumed, unless it is obvious and beyond any 
doubt on the basis of the patient's previous firm expression or conviction that he/she would 
refuse consent to the intervention in that situation. 
5. The legally incompetent patient  
a) If a patient is a minor or otherwise legally incompetent, the consent of a legally entitled 
representative is required in some jurisdictions. Nevertheless the patient must be involved 
in the decision-making to the fullest extent allowed by his/her capacity. 
b) If the legally incompetent patient can make rational decisions, his/her decisions must be 
respected, and he/she has the right to forbid the disclosure of information to his/her legally 
entitled representative.  
6. Right to information 
a) The patient has the right to receive information about himself/herself recorded in any of 
his/her medical records, and to be fully informed about his/her health status including the 
medical facts about his/her condition. However, confidential information in the patient's 
records about a third party should not be given to the patient without the consent of that 
third party. 
b) Exceptionally, information may be withheld from the patient when there is good reason to 
believe that this information would create a serious hazard to his/her life or health. 
c) Information should be given in a way appropriate to the patient’s culture and in such a way 
that the patient can understand. d. The patient has the right not to be informed on his/her 
explicit request, unless required for the protection of another person's life. e.g. The patient 
has the right to choose who, if anyone should be informed on his/her behalf.  
7. Right to confidentiality 
a) All identifiable information about a patient's health status, medical condition, diagnosis, 
prognosis and treatment and all other information of a personal kind must be kept 
confidential, even after death. Exceptionally, descendants may have a right of access to 
information that would inform them of their health risks.  
b) Confidential information can only be disclosed if the patient gives explicit consent or if 
expressly provided for in the law. Information can be disclosed to other health care 
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providers only on a strictly "need to know" basis unless the patient has given explicit 
consent.  
c) All identifiable patient data must be protected. The protection of the data must be 
appropriate to the manner of its storage. Human substances from which identifiable data 
can be derived must be likewise protected.  
8. Right to dignity  
a) The patient's dignity and right to privacy shall be respected at all times in medical care and 
teaching, as shall his/her culture and values. 
b) The patient is entitled to relief of his/her suffering according to the current state of 
knowledge.  
c) The patient is entitled to humane terminal care and to be provided with all available 
assistance in making dying as dignified and comfortable as possible.1436 
 
The above principles led to the formulation of a patient’s charter of rights in other countries 
such as the UK1437 by the American Hospital Association (AHA) 1992,1438 and later in 
South Africa.1439 While these principles were originally proposed in the context of medical 
treatment rather than research, such principles as freedom of choice, information 
disclosure, and right to privacy and confidentiality are universal and applicable in all 
aspects of healthcare. Similarly, the American Medical Association (AMA) Code of 
Ethics1440 recognized the doctor’s obligation to respect patient’s rights and later 
recognized IC as a basic social policy necessary to enable patients to make their own 
choices even if the physician disagrees. 
 
3.10.2 The rights of vulnerable population groups  
 
The CIOMS guidelines describes vulnerable persons are those who are relatively (or 
absolutely) incapable of protecting their own interests. More formally, they may have 
insufficient power, intelligence, education, resources, strength, or other needed attributes 
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 charter (HPCSA Pretoria 2008).  
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to protect their own interests.1441 In this context, the UNAIDS criteria for vulnerability refers 
to:  
Limited economic development, inadequate protection of human rights and discrimination on the 
basis of health status, inadequate community and cultural experience with the understanding of 
scientific research, limited availability of healthcare and treatment options and limited ability of 
individuals in the community to provide informed consent.”1442  
Based on the previous reports, including a publication relating  to the research study 
reported here, it may be argued that a majority of patients attending public hospitals in 
South Africa would satisfy these criteria for vulnerability and may be considered 
vulnerable.1443,1444 In general, vulnerable population groups include children, mentally 
incapacitated or incompetent adults, prisoners, populations of developing or resource 
poor countries, students, soldiers and others in dependent relationships and may include 
women in certain cultural environments.1445 The central problem regarding the 
involvement of these population groups in research arises from the fact that their position 
in society may lead to an inequitable distribution of the benefits/burden of healthcare in 
such a way that they may be negatively impacted. Therefore, special care should be taken 
to protect the rights of such vulnerable populations groups in terms of distributive 
justice.1446 It has been observed that failures of the IC process lead to serious inequities 
in healthcare and biomedical research, especially for the poor and the less educated who 
bear most of the research burden and are also more impacted by medical malpractice and 
clinical negligence.1447,1448  
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3.11 The concept of shared healthcare decision-making 
 
It has been suggested that we may be living in an era where respect for patient’s 
autonomy, which was considered untenable based on the Hippocratic tradition of medical 
paternalism, may have become an unquestionable moral imperative.1449 Andrew 
Grubb1450 states as follows with regard to medical paternalism: 
 
  Paternalism was more appropriate to a by-gone age when the population were presumed 
 to be uneducated, and therefore incapable of playing an equal role in the doctor-patient 
 relationship. Such a view has no foundation in our present society and consequently does not 
 have any right to be reflected in our legal system.1451  
 
However, it has been argued that in the current legal systems, IC for medical treatment 
may be nothing more than a risk-management strategy, whereby the doctor or HCP 
believes that if he or she discloses every possible risk to the patient, and if anything goes 
wrong, then the patient cannot sue. The view has been proposed that this does not meet 
the moral standard for IC, which is derived from respect for the patient’s autonomy. 
Therefore the HCPs’ goal should not be to minimize liability, rather it should be focused 
on how to help the patient make the best possible decision. These two goals are not 
mutually exclusive, but they often lead to a divergent opinion regarding what IC is; and 
different ideas about what information needs to be shared with patients.1452 Ironically, if 
IC becomes focused on a disclosure of the ‘whole truth’, then IC disclosure or 
documentation may become excessively voluminous and encyclopedic, thereby 
becoming meaningless because of an information overload to the patient. This would 
generally not meet the ethical standard for information disclosure and the moral standard 
of IC and shared healthcare decision-making because very few patients would be able to 
evaluate such data.1453 ,1454 As explained by Lord Diplock in the Sidaway case: 
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[…] the only difference that a mention of risks can have on the patients mind, if it has any at all, can 
be in the direction of deterring the patient from undergoing the treatment which in the expert opinion 
of the doctor is in the patients interest to undergo. To decide what risks the existence of which a 
patient should be voluntarily warned and the terms in which such warning, if any, should be given, 
having regard to the effect the warning may have, is as much an exercise of professional skill and 
judgment as any other part of the doctors comprehensive duty of care to the individual patient.1455  
 
Therefore, determination of the doctor’s duty to disclose generally requires consideration 
of two values, which are sometimes in conflict, namely the duty of the doctor to act in what 
he conceives to be the best interests of the patient; and the right of the patient to control 
his own life and have the information necessary to do so.1456 For Lord Scarman in 
Sidaway, “the doctor’s duty arises from the patient’s rights”.1457  Further, the Canadian 
court in Allan v Mount Sinai1458 described a patients’ rights as follows: 
 
Without consent, either written or oral, no surgery may be performed. This is not a mere formality; 
it is an important individual right to have control over one's own body, even where medical treatment 
is involved. It is the patient, not the doctor, who decides whether surgery will be performed, where 
it will be done, when it will be done and by whom it will be done. 1459 
 
Unfortunately, this point of view is not generally accepted by the medical profession 
because traditional medical ethics and the Hippocratic tradition places emphasis on the 
patients welfare (salus aegroti) rather than his right of self-determination (voluntas 
aegroti),1460 thereby creating a conflict in the doctor patient relationship. It has been 
argued that proper information disclosure is a conditio sine qua non of a legally acceptable 
consent.1461,1462 Further, consent is unitary in nature, an essential prerequisite for any 
                                                          
1455  Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 [658]. 
1456  F v R (1984) 33 SASR 189. 
1457  Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 [651]. 
1458  Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634. 
1459  Allan v New Mount Sinai Hospital (1980) 109 DLR (3d) 634 [363]. 
1460  Giesen D “From paternalism to self-determination to shared decision-making in the field of 
 medical law and ethics” in Westerhall L and Phillips C (eds) Patient’s rights-Informed consent 
 access and inequality (Nerenius & Santerus Publishers Stockholm 1994)19-38. 
1461  Giesen Patient’s rights-Informed consent access and inequality 19-38. 
1462  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 883-894. 
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medical intervention, and for it to be valid, it must be given freely based on a sound 
understanding of what is at stake. Therefore, there is no room for a concept which leaves 
the HCP or the medical profession to decide how much information should be volunteered 
to the patient,1463,1464 because it is the patient who undergoes the risk of subjecting him or 
herself to a medical intervention and would-be any negative or positive consequences and 
therefore requires full information disclosure to make an informed decision.1465 In recent 
times, most legal systems appear to prefer the patient’s autonomy to medical paternalism, 
by recognizing the basic human right to self-determination which should not be denied to 
patients simply because they are sick and vulnerable. It has been suggested that the legal 
requirement of informed consent envisages a different type of doctor-patient relationship 
based on the equality of the patient and HCP and is built on a foundation of honesty, trust 
and mutual respect, thereby tending to support shared decision-making. 1466 Therefore, 
the issue is no longer about whether information should be disclosed by the HCP to the 
patient, but the standard and scope of such disclosure,1467 while tackling the conflict 
between the patients right to self-determination and the doctor’s beneficence.  
 
Lord Scarman pointed out in Sidaway that the question whether a doctor is under a duty 
to disclose, or whether such a duty has been discharged, is ultimately a legal not a medical 
question.1468 This approach has generally had the effect of reducing medical paternalism 
and preventing doctors from being the judge and jury in their own cases by determining 
the standard and scope of disclosure. Therefore a, patient-based standard of disclosure 
requires that a doctor or HCP should disclose information which the doctor or HCP knows 
or should know would enable the patient make his or her own decision based on the 
material risk standard.1469 Therefore, according to Kirby J “The days of paternalistic 
medicine are numbered. The days of unquestioning trust of the patient also appear 
numbered […] nowadays doctors, out of respect for themselves and for their patients; to 
                                                          
1463 Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 883-894. 
1464  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11 [87]. 
1465  Canterbury v Spence 464 F 2d 772 (DC Cir 1972). 
1466 Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 81.  
1467  Giesen Patient’s rights-Informed consent access and inequality 19-38. 
1468 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 [651]. 
1469  Hartman M and Liang BA “Exceptions to informed consent in emergency medicine” 1999  Hospital 
 Physician 53-59. 
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say nothing for deference to the law, must increasingly face the obligation of securing 
informed consent from the patient for the kind of therapeutic treatment proposed.”1470  The 
President’s commission has urged that “most fundamentally, the law could emphasize the 
process of continuing communication and decision-making, rather than pro forma 
disclosure of particular risks’” […] suggesting that, “ethically valid consent is a process of 
shared decision-making based upon mutual respect and participation, not a ritual to be 
equated with reciting the contents of a form that details the risks of particular 
treatments”1471 In view of the above observations and discussion, it is clear that IC has 
become the legal and ethical ‘standard of care’ for medical practice since the late 20th  
century. More recently, others have argued for shared healthcare decision-making as 
recommended above, rather than informed decision-making, where informed decision-
making has been described as “an individual’s overall process of gathering relevant 
information from both the clinician and other clinical and nonclinical sources with or without 
independent clarification of values.”1472 Shared decision-making, on the other hand, may 
be defined as a particular process of decision-making between the patient and clinician, 
in which the patient: 
 
i. Understands the risk or seriousness of the medical condition; 
ii. Understands the medical procedure including the risks, benefits, alternatives, and 
uncertainties; 
iii. Has weighed his or her personal values regarding the potential benefits and harms 
associated with the healthcare service; 
iv. Has engaged in decision‑making at a level at which he or she feels comfortable, 
and finally 
v. Has come to a joint decision in association with the healthcare provider.1473 
 
                                                          
1470 Sidaway v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 see also  
 Editorial “Adequately informed consent” 1985 J Med Ethics 115-116. 
1471   Summaries of the reports from the President’s commission for the study of ethical problem 
 in medicine and biomedical and behavioral research Appendix 2 (US Government Printing 
 Office Washington DC, 1982) 2-6. 
1472  Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 81. 
1473  Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 81 see also King and Moulton 2006 Am J Law Med 429‑501. 
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Advocates of shared decision‑making argue that it promotes patient 
comprehension and autonomy, reduces unwanted medical procedures and 
malpractice claims, improves patient compliance, and decreases overall costs of 
healthcare service delivery.1474,1475,1476,1477 
 
3.12 Summary of chapter 3 
 
Chapter three explored the doctrine of informed consent from a South African and 
comparative law perspective, by considering relevant laws and regulations, as well as 
case law, which have all contributed to the development of the doctrine of informed 
consent in South African law. The discussion has also turned to new developments in 
South African jurisprudence and some judgments by South African courts since the 
landmark judgment in Castell v De Greef,1478 and the introduction of the National Health 
Act in 2003.1479 In addition, some of the socio-cultural factors which may affect the practice 
of informed consent in South Africa were interrogated, as well as the interrelationship of 
multiculturalism, patients’ rights and cultural belief systems, including economic and 
unique social factors. Finally, the historical practice of medicine in accordance with the 
Hippocratic tradition with its emphasis on benevolent paternalism and the obligation on 
physicians to conceal information from patients ‘for their own good,’ rather than 
information disclosure, has been examined. This was followed by a critical discussion of 
the evolution of the philosophical concept of autonomy from the perspectives of 
philosophers, such as Immanuel Kant and his ideas of principled autonomy, as well as 
the ethical theory of utilitarianism and liberty as espoused by John Stuart Mills. Also 
considered were other philosophers, such as Isaiah Berlin, who have explored individual 
autonomy, liberty and libertarian rights as the basis for autonomous decision making. The 
chapter concluded with a brief discussion on patients’ rights during medical treatment, and 
                                                          
1474  King and Moulton 2006 Am J Law Med 429‑501. 
1475  Charles C, Gafni A and Whelan T “Shared decision‑making in the medical encounter: What 
 does it mean? (Or it takes at least two to tango)” 1997Soc Sci Med 681‑92. 
1476  Katz J The silent world of doctor and patient (Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore 2002). 
1477  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 46. 
1478  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
1479  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
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the concept of shared healthcare decision-making which has evolved with the recession 
of medical paternalism and the dominance of the doctrine of informed consent and respect 
for autonomy in modern medical practice. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter four of this thesis describes the research design and methods used to collect and 
analyse data in the empirical part of this study. This chapter will include a description of 
the methodological considerations and the underlying theoretical issues surrounding the 
empirical study. I will describe the study settings, such as hospitals included or excluded 
from the study, the study location, study population, sample size calculations, data 
collection methods and instruments used in collecting data. Methods used for storage and 
analysis of collected data, including statistical methods, and methods undertaken to 
ensure validity of data and ethical considerations including approvals from regulatory 
authorities, gate keepers and study participants will also be described..  
 
4.2 Methodological considerations 
 
Before I proceed with a full description of the research methods used in this study, it is 
necessary to provide a brief theoretical justification for using a particular research design 
approach, strategies, and techniques for sample collection and analysis of data applied in 
the empirical aspects of this research study consistent with the social science methods 
applied in ‘empirical bioethics’. A broad and detailed overview of this theoretical 
considerations and justifications for using empirical methods to study bioethical issues is 
provided in chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. A brief overview of research design and 
methods, including justifications, is included in the sections below.  
 
4.3 Research design 
 
Research can be described as the process of making claims, then refining or abandoning 
some of those claims for other claims more warranted based on empirical or objective 
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evidence or results derived from a particular study.1480 A research design is a plan or 
procedure for a research study that spans decisions taken by the researcher, ranging from 
broad assumptions to detailed methods used in data collection and analysis. It involves 
and intersection of philosophy, strategies of inquiry and specific methods.1481 According 
to Schutt,1482 research design refers to how to measure empirical phenomena, identify 
causal relationships and generalize findings.1483 Salazar1484 also describes research 
design as the strategies an investigator chooses to answer a research question. Its 
ultimate goal is to guide data collection and analysis. Mouton1485 further describes 
research design as the procedural plan or blueprint for conducting research in a particular 
setting. Therefore, one can conclude that a research design refers to the conceptual and 
procedural plans to conduct a research study, which emphasizes the importance of 
quality, validity and reliability of the design and methods used. 1486,1487  
 
Traditionally, there are three generally recognized styles and approaches of using 
different methods to collect and analyse data. However, none of these methods are 
considered superior to the other and are generally interlinked with a particular approach 
used in different situations, based on the theory or inferences that need to be drawn from 
the data.1488,1489 In recent times, researchers in the human and social sciences have used 
three generally recognized research design methods, which are the quantitative, 
qualitative or mixed methods research approaches. Quantitative research, which is 
                                                          
1480  Creswell JW Research design- qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches 3rd ed 
 (Sage Publications Thousand Oaks California 2009) 7. 
1481  Creswell Research design 5. 
1482  Schutt KR Investigating the social world: The process and practice of research (Sage 
 Publications Thousand Oaks California 2001) 396. 
1483  Schutt Investigating the social world 396. 
1484  Salazar LF Crosby RA and Dicamente RJ Research methods in health promotion (Wiley San 
 Francisco 2006) 75. 
1485  Mouton J How to succeed in your masters and doctoral studies: A South African sourcebook 
 4th ed (Van Schaik Pretoria 2003) 24. 
1486  Kumar R Research methodology: A step-by-step guide for beginners (Sage New Delhi 1999) 
 74. 
1487  Mugisha E Delivery and utilization of voluntary HIV counselling and testing services among 
 fishing communities in Uganda (D Litt et Phil thesis UNISA Pretoria 2008) 51. 
1488  Creswell Research design [4-5].  
1489  Marshall JE Informed consent during the intrapartum period: An observational study of the 
 interactions between health professionals and women in labour involving consent to 
 procedures (PhD Thesis University of Nottingham 2005) 51. 
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arguably one of the oldest methods of scientific enquiry, is a means of testing objective 
theories by examining the relationship amongst variables (dependent and independent 
variables). 1490 These variables are measured using various survey instruments e.g. 
survey questionnaires, so that numbered data can be derived, which are then analysed 
using statistical procedures.1491 In qualitative research on the other hand, the researcher 
tries to explore and understand the meaning individuals or groups ascribe to social and 
human problems or an individual’s perceptions of the world. Using this method of inquiry, 
the researcher seeks insight rather than a statistical analysis of data and questions 
whether a scientific approach can be used when dealing with human beings.1492 In the 
case of mixed methods research, the researcher combines elements of both the 
quantitative and qualitative research methods in a single study.1493 In this thesis, I have 
chosen to use a quantitative research design with data triangulation to study the process 
of IC in public hospitals as further described below. 
 
4.3.1 Quantitative research  
 
Generally, in quantitative research an investigator uses postpositivist claims for 
developing knowledge based on cause and effect thinking. These are then reduced to 
specific variables and hypotheses and questions, as well as use of measurement, 
observation, and the test of theories. This design method employs strategies of inquiry 
such as experiments and surveys, and collects data on predetermined instruments that 
yield statistical variables.1494 Putting it another way, “quantitative researchers collect facts 
and study the relationship of one set of facts with another, which are then measured by 
using scientific techniques to produce objective, verifiable, quantifiable, and generalized 
conclusions.”1495 A survey design method provides a quantitative or numeric description 
                                                          
1490  Creswell Research design 4.   
1491  Creswell Research design [3-15]. 
1492  Creswell Research design 4. 
1493  Ivankova NV, Creswell JW and Stick SL “Using mixed-methods sequential explanatory design: 
 From theory to practice” 2006 Field Methods 3-20. 
1494  Creswell Research design [145-171]. 
1495  Marshall JE Informed consent during the intrapartum period: An observational study of the 
 interactions between health professionals and women in labour involving consent to 
 procedures (PhD Thesis University of Nottingham 2005) 51. 
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of trends, attitudes or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that population. 
Based on the results obtained, the researcher can then generalize or make claims about 
that particular population.1496 Accordingly, Cargan1497 describes quantitative research as 
a system of counting using standardized measuring instruments while Burns and 
Grove1498 emphasize that quantitative research uses structured tools to generate 
numerical data, and then these are organized and analyzed using statistical methods. In 
this research study, I have used a quantitative research design, with structured 
instruments (questionnaires) to collect data which were stored and analyzed using a 
computer based statistical software package as further described below. 
 
4.3.2 Cross-sectional studies and survey design  
 
According to Creswell,1499 survey design provides a quantitative or numeric description of 
trends opinions or attitudes of a particular population by studying a sample of that 
population. From the sample results, the researcher then draws conclusions, generalizes 
or makes claims about that particular population.1500 In addition, cross-sectional studies 
are commonly used in social science research to measure a particular phenomenon at 
one point in time in that particular population, these are sometimes called one-shot 
studies.1501 Kumar has described a cross-sectional study as a study that defines a 
phenomenon by taking a section of it at any one time.1502 In this study, I have used a 
cross-sectional study methodology to survey the practice of IC (the phenomenon) in public 
hospitals in EThekwini metropolitan municipality, Kwazulu-Natal province (the population 
under study). 
 
                                                          
1496  Creswell Research design [145-147]. 
1497  Cargan L Doing social research (Rowman & Littlefield New York 2007) 47. 
1498  Burns N and Grove SK The practice of nursing research: Conduct critique and utilization 4th 
 ed (Saunders Philadelphia 2001) 20. 
1499  Creswell Research design [145-149]. 
1500  Creswell Research design 145. 
1501  Hakim C Research design: Successful designs for social and economic research 2nd ed 
 (Routledge London 2000)178. 
1502 Kumar Research methodology 81. 
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4.3.3 Post positivist approach to research  
 
A post positivist philosophical worldview, defined as a “basic set of beliefs that guide 
action,”1503 is usually applicable in quantitative research design, and reflects the need to 
identify and asses the causes that influence outcomes. This approach is generally 
reductionist in nature, in that it tends to reduce general or big ideas into a small discreet 
set of ideas for testing, such as the dependent and independent variables that comprise 
the hypothesis and research questions. The knowledge that is derived through the post 
positivist method is based on a careful observation and measurement of the objective 
reality that exists in the world.1504 Creswell1505 argues that in using this method, general 
laws and theories can be tested and verified so that we can better understand the world. 
The postpositivist approach represents the traditional form of research and is sometimes 
called the scientific method. Using this method, post-positivist researchers begin with a 
theory or hypothesis, and then collect data, which either supports or refutes the theory or 
hypothesis in question. The researcher may then make necessary revisions before 
conducting additional tests or draw conclusions from the data generated.1506 According to 
Walsh,1507 when using the postpositivist approach, the researcher tends to maintain a 
distance between himself, the participants, and the research setting. Russell1508 further 
suggests that the postpositivist approach helps the researcher maintain objectivity, and 
prevents him or her being influenced by the participants.  
 
In this study, I adopted a postpositivist approach by constructing research instruments 
which were completed by the respondents/participants voluntarily and in their own time 
without any input from the researcher. Further, in the case of patients included in this 
study, the questionnaires and face-face interviews were conducted by research 
                                                          
1503  Guba EG “The alternative paradigm dialog” in Guba EG (ed) The paradigm dialog (Sage New 
 Bury Park 1990) 17-30. 
1504  Guba The alternative paradigm [17-30]. 
1505  Creswell Research design [6-7]. 
1506  Creswell Research design [6-7]. 
1507  Walsh M Research made real: A guide for students (Nelson Thrones London 2001) 12. 
1508  Russell B Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches (Sage 
 Publications Thousand Oaks 2000)15. 
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assistants. This approach assisted me as researcher to maintain objectivity and guarantee 
a measure of validity. 
 
4.4 Triangulation 
 
Triangulation refers to the use of multiple references to draw conclusions about what 
constitutes the truth. According to Denzin,1509 triangulation refers to “the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon,” or it can be used metaphorically 
to refer to the use of multiple measures to converge on a single, discreet construct or 
point.1510 The original purpose of triangulation in research was to seek confirmation of 
apparent findings or consistency.1511 More recently, triangulation has also been used for 
completeness purposes,1512 for corroborating findings, and as a test of validity, although 
its use for these purposes is the subject of ongoing debate.1513,1514 Denzin1515 and 
Patton1516 have identified four generally accepted methods of triangulation; although a fifth 
method has been suggested by Kimchi,1517 called “analysis triangulation”.1518 Generally, 
the different types of triangulation are classified as follows: 
 
I. Data triangulation: This involves the use of multiple data sources in a study in order 
to get diverse views to aid in validating the conclusions.  
a.  Time triangulation may include collection of same data at different time periods;  
                                                          
1509  Denzin NK (ed) Sociological methods: A sourcebook (Routledge New York 2017) 31. 
1510 Denzin N The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods to 3rd ed 
 (McGraw-Hill New York 1989) 297. 
1511  Bekhet A and Zauszniewski J “Methodological triangulation: An approach to understanding 
 data” 2012 Nurse Res 40-43. 
1512  Adami MF and Kiger A “The use of triangulation for completeness purposes” 2005 Nurse Res 
 19-29. 
1513  Adami and Kiger 2005 Nurse Res 19-29. 
1514  Robert Wood Johnson Foundation “Triangulation” Qualitative research guidelines project 
 www.qualres.org/HomeTria-3692.html (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
1515  Denzin NK Sociological methods (McGraw-Hill New York 1978) see also Robert Wood Johnson 
 Foundation “Triangulation” Qualitative research guidelines project www.qualres.org/HomeTria-
 3692.html (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
1516  Patton MQ “Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis” 1999 HSR 1189-1208. 
1517  Kimchi J, Polivka B and Stevenson JS “Triangulation: operational definitions” 1991 Nurs Res 
 364-366. 
1518  Adami and Kiger 2005 Nurse Res 19-29. 
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b. Space triangulation may involve collection of the same data from different 
locations, e.g. public versus private settings; 
c. Person triangulation may involve collection of the same set of data from different 
persons or groups of persons. 
II. Investigator triangulation refers to the use of two or more trained researchers to 
analyze and interpret a set of data. This can provide a check on selective 
perception or bias and illuminate blind spots in interpretation.1519 
III. Theory triangulation refers to the use of competing theories or hypotheses in the 
analysis and interpretation of a single set of data. 
IV. Method triangulation involves the use of multiple methods in collecting data about 
the same phenomenon. For example, quantitative and qualitative data can be used 
in the same study to elucidate different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
V. Analysis triangulation involves the use of two or more approaches to analyze the 
same set of data for the purpose of validation. 
 
Therefore, triangulation can involve the use of different data collection tools with the same 
sample of participants; or, different qualitative methodologies to answer the same 
research question; as well as a combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies to answer the same research question; or the same data collection tools 
with different samples.   
 
In the empirical research study included in this thesis, I have used what can be described 
as a form of ‘multiple triangulation’, which is defined as the combination of two or more 
types of triangulation in the same study.1520,1521 Denzin describes the three basic types of 
data triangulation as time, space and person triangulations.1522  In this thesis, I have used 
both space triangulation (collecting data from different types of hospitals and clinical 
practice settings); and more specifically, person triangulation; whereby I have collected 
                                                          
1519  Robert Wood Johnson Foundation “Triangulation” Qualitative research guidelines project 
 www.qualres.org/HomeTria-3692.html (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
1520  Begley C “Using triangulation in nursing research” 1996 J Adv Nurs 122-128. 
1521  Adami and Kiger 2005 Nurse Res 19-29. 
1522  Denzin N The research act 297 see also Robert Wood Johnson Foundation “Triangulation” 
 www.qualres.org/HomeTria-3692.html (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
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data from medical doctors, nurses and patients, attending randomly selected public 
hospitals in eThekwini metropolitan municipality, Kwazulu-Natal province; in other test for 
consistency, validity and completeness of data with regards to questions raised about the 
process of obtaining IC during clinical practice in South African public hospitals. 
 
4.5 The value of using empirical research methods to study informed consent 
 
In recent times, applied ethicists have started to combine established social scientific 
methods of inquiry with normative ethical reflection and analysis. 1523,1524 This is based on 
the criticism that philosophical bioethics is too abstract and insensitive to social realities 
and context. According to Emmanuel,1525 “the two most common criticisms of bioethics is 
that it is divorced from reality and the actual issues that arise in medical practice, research, 
and health policy debates; and secondly that bioethicists are willing to layout arguments 
but skittish about actually deciding anything.”1526  It has been suggested that one symbol 
of this divorce from reality is the lack of engagement of philosophical ethics with empirical 
data.1527 Because of these observations, some authors have proposed a definition of 
‘empirical ethics’ or ‘empirical bioethics’ as “normatively oriented medical ethical research 
that directly integrates empirical research”.1528 Putting it another way, empirical ethics 
encompasses both empirical research with normative arguments and analysis, and tries 
to integrate both elements in such a way that new knowledge is produced, which might 
not have been possible without combining both methods.1529 According to Emmanuel,1530 
the issue is not whether bioethics should focus on conceptual analysis or empirical 
research but that it must focus on both.  
 
In terms of practical applications of empirical bioethics, it has been argued that empirical 
bioethics may serve three valuable purposes in healthcare or contemporary medical 
                                                          
1523 Sulmasy and Sugarman Methods of medical ethics [3-18]. 
1524  De Vries and Gordijn 2009 Bioethics 193-201. 
1525  Emanuel The relevance of empirical research for bioethics [99-110]. 
1526  Emanuel The relevance of empirical research for bioethics 99. 
1527 Ives J 2008 Health Care Ana 1-6. 
1528  Mertz et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics 17. 
1529  Mertz et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics 17. 
1530  Emanuel The relevance of empirical research for bioethics 99. 
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practice and that it enriches the field of bioethics. In this context, empirical bioethics can 
assist with (1) debunking widely held but erroneous views; (2) assessing the importance 
of ethical concerns; and (3) facilitating the realization of certain ethical values.1531 This 
view was substantiated by citing contemporary empirical studies, which have been able 
to show that instead of the popular belief that pain is the most difficult or predominant 
issue in euthanasia and end-of-life care issues, empirical data was able to demonstrate 
that depression, hopelessness, and general psychological distress are consistently 
associated with interest in physician-assisted-suicide and euthanasia.1532 Other areas in 
which empirical bioethics and data analysis could play a role would include helping to 
resolve the conflict in IC regarding the comprehensiveness of information disclosure and 
understanding of information disclosed, as well as determining the methodological or the 
ethical concerns surrounding the storage and use of human biological specimens.  
 
Empirical bioethics can also assist with the realization of ethical values such as respect 
for autonomy, and in some cases just allocation of scarce healthcare resources based on 
the ethical principle distributive justice.1533 Other empirical studies have also shown that 
people generally have problems in understanding the risks and benefits of medical 
treatment and decision making, and this could impact on the actual application of existing 
laws.1534 For example, a questionnaire based study by on Dutch nurses charged with 
taking care of nursing home residents while respecting the patient’s autonomy and liberty, 
revealed that those nurses did not comply with the existing regulations on patient care in 
Dutch nursing homes.1535 Others have advised that empirical ethics should be used to 
defend or criticize concrete moral principles or practices rather than make general claims 
about moral concepts.1536  Therefore, De Vries and Gordijn1537 have grouped some of 
these uses of empirical ethics into a five-fold typology of potential usage as described in 
detail in chapter one of this thesis. 
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In many countries including South Africa, the current law requires that doctors and other 
HCPs must obtain IC from patients’ before involving them in medical treatment or 
biomedical research as stipulated in the National Health Act.1538 Consequently, in recent 
times, applied ethicists have shifted their focus towards combining empirical research 
studies, especially social scientific research with normative ethical analysis. Proponents 
of this approach, the latter termed ‘empirical ethics', have argued that the study of people’s 
actual moral beliefs, behaviour and reasoning should be the starting point of ethics. It has 
also been acknowledged that the methodologies of the social sciences, especially 
quantitative and qualitative research, using surveys, interviews and questionnaires is 
probably the best way to map the reality of peoples actual moral norms.1539  
 
In view of these pertinent observations, I decided to use the methodology of empirical 
bioethics and data analysis to study the contemporary practice of IC amongst doctors, 
nurses and patients using public hospitals in KZN province, South Africa. 
 
4.6 Statement of the problem  
 
From a review of the literature, recent evidence from empirical research, case law, 
medico-legal and bioethical analyses, suggest that many medical therapeutic procedures 
are often conducted in violation of the ethical principle of respect for autonomy and the 
legal requirements for valid IC in most parts of the world. This is most evident in developing 
countries such as South Africa, with its dual healthcare system,1540 where the public 
hospitals have a patient overload, with about 80% of the population patronizing public 
hospitals. In this setting, the doctor to patient ratio is generally high1541 with long queues 
outside doctors’ clinics and public hospitals.1542   
 
                                                          
1538  National Health Act 2003. 
1539  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 1–3. 
1540  KZN Department of Health KwaZulu-Natal Strategic Plan 2015-2019 (DOH KZN 2015) 20-21.  
1541   Chima 2015 Nig J Clin Pract 49. 
1542   Mhlongo and Mdingi 1997 BMJ 252. 
244 
 
This makes it difficult for doctors and other HCPs to spend enough time with patients in 
order to provide adequate information and ensure that all the other elements of IC are 
complied with. Further, low education standards, high illiteracy levels, poverty, language 
difficulties, and the power asymmetry that exists in the doctor-relationship, may also make 
it difficult for a large proportion of the South African patients, not only to comprehend the 
medical information disclosed, but also to insist on their right to IC.1543 Further, consent 
forms and information sheets for treatment procedures are often written in a language that 
cannot be clearly understood by the majority of patients.1544 In addition, verbal translation 
by informal interpreters may also not provide an accurate picture of what is at stake.1545 
Therefore, valid and voluntary IC may sometimes be problematic and difficult to obtain  for 
vulnerable patients, since any offer of medical assistance or other assistance incidental 
thereto will be accepted because patients have limited choices, due to poverty and 
indigence of the local population which encourages undue influence, and sometimes 
therapeutic misconception.1546,1547 Finally, since the end of the apartheid era in South 
Africa, new laws have been introduced to safeguard the fundamental human rights of 
South Africans.1548 One of such laws is the NHA,1549 which codified the legal requirements 
for IC and outlined regulations for obtaining same. Other relevant laws include the Choice 
on termination of Pregnancy Act, 1550 which stipulates the age and conditions under which 
a woman can obtain a safe abortion; and the Children’s Act,1551 which stipulates the age 
of consent to medical treatment for minors.  
 
It is arguable whether all HCPS and healthcare users are fully aware of the current laws 
applicable with regards to IC and medical treatment in South Africa. In the light of the 
                                                          
1543   Summaries of the reports from the President’s commission for the study of ethical problems 
 in medicine and biomedical and behavioral research Appendix 2 (US Government Printing 
 Office Washington DC 1982) 2-6. 
1544 Krosin MT et al “Problems in comprehension of informed consent in rural and per-urban Mali, 
 West Africa” 2006 Clin Trials 306-313. 
1545  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
1546   Sugarman J et al 2005 Clinical Trials 34-41. 
1547  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [96-97]. 
1548  Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report. Institutional hearings: The health sector (CTP 
 Book Printers Cape Town 1998)109-164. 
1549  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
1550  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
1551  Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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foregoing, this study was designed to establish whether IC obtained from patients 
attending public hospitals in South Africa is fully informed, comprehensible, voluntary, and 
is obtained within the context of applicable local laws and regulations, when compared to 
the internationally acceptable standards of care. 
 
4.6.1 Research questions 
 
Based on a comprehensive review of literature, especially the ethical and legal and socio-
cultural issues likely to impact on the IC process as described in chapters two and three 
above (background and literature review), the following research questions were 
generated for this study:  
 
I. Is sufficient and comprehensive information provided to patients involved in 
medical treatment by HCPs before consent is obtained from patients 
attending public hospitals in South Africa? 
II. Do patients understand the information provided including, diagnosis, 
medical procedures, treatments risks and benefits, treatment options, and 
right of refusal, before they give consent to treatment? 
III. Are patients undergoing medical procedures in South Africa generally 
competent to consent to medical treatment? 
IV. Do patients involved in medical procedures or treatment in South Africa give 
consent voluntarily, in the absence of coercion or undue influence?  
V. Overall, is the informed consent given by patients undergoing medical 
treatment in South Africa truly valid and consistent with applicable local laws 
and regulatory standards? 
 
4.6.2 Aims, objectives, hypothesis and assumptions of the study 
 
The general objective of this study was to establish whether informed consent is obtained 
from patients prior to involvement in medical treatment or procedures in South Africa. The 
specific study objectives as well as the hypothetical assumptions have been described in 
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detail in chapter one. For a detailed description please refer to sections 1.5.1 to 1.5.4 of 
this thesis. 
 
4.7 Significance of anticipated outputs 
 
The results of the study will assist in enhancing patients and HCPs education and 
awareness in the areas of medical law, ethics and human rights with particular reference 
to IC and communication between HCPs and patients, as well as improving all practices 
related to other areas of concern in the WMA Patients’ Bill of Rights1552 and the South 
African Patients’ Rights Charter.1553 It will also be beneficial to lawmakers in the 
implementation and revision of current legislation, and drafting of new regulations to 
promote public health and healthcare practice in general. Finally, this study may also 
assist in the design of new consent documents and information sheets, used in obtaining 
valid IC from patients undergoing medical procedures in public hospitals, as well as 
highlighting new areas for training to improve the skills of HCPs and edification of patients. 
This study will also produce generalizable knowledge which will be disseminated by 
means of published academic papers, presentation of results at international conferences 
to further knowledge in the field of medical law and ethics of particular relevance to South 
Africa and other developing countries. 
 
4.8 Validity and reliability of the study 
 
4.8.1 Validity of the study 
 
According to Creswell, validity in quantitative research refers to the fact that one can draw 
meaningful and useful inferences from scores in particular instruments, while in the case 
of qualitative research, it refers to use of  procedures such as member checking and 
triangulating data sources to ensure readers of its accuracy.1554 In this study, due to the 
                                                          
1552  WMA Declaration of Lisbon on the Rights of the Patient (World Medical Association Lisbon 
 1981). 
1553   HPCSA National Patients’ Rights Charter (HPCSA Pretoria 2008). 
1554  Creswell Research design [162-165]. 
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fact that research design methods are not mutually exclusive, I have also used methods 
of data triangulation such as person triangulation, as described above, by collecting data 
from doctors, nurses and patients to ensure consistency, accuracy, and validity of the data 
and study results.1555 Further, I have ensured construct validity by using adequate 
definitions and measures of variables as shown in the next section, to enhance validity of 
data in this study. I have also minimized threats to internal validity by drawing from a wide 
variety of participants/respondents in different clinical departments and settings, such as 
randomizing the participating public hospitals; in order to be able to draw correct 
inferences and conclusions from the data generated, thereby minimizing participant bias 
or negative experiences. According to Pollitt and Beck, external validity refers to the 
“generalizability of the research findings to other settings.” 1556 Usually, studies are only 
generalizable if they are based on random sampling and conducted using quantitative 
methods. 1557,1558  
 
In this study I have used stratified random sampling in the identification and selection of 
participating hospitals as described below. Moreover, the selection of participants/ 
respondents were completely random in that any eligible participant whether, doctor, 
nurse or patient, at any of the randomly selected hospitals who was available and willing 
to participate was allowed to complete the questionnaire voluntarily and without coercion.  
This means that this study was based on random sampling and as such is generalizable, 
consistent with external validity. 
 
4.8.2 Reliability of the study 
 
Creswell describes reliability, as “whether scores ascribed to items on an instrument are 
internally consistent”.1559 This raises questions whether the items’ responses are 
consistent across constructs and over time and whether there is consistency in test 
                                                          
1555  Adami and Kiger 2005 Nurse Res 19-29. 
1556  Polit D and Beck C Nursing research: Principles and methods 7th ed (Lippincott Williams & 
 Wilkins Philadelphia 2004) 217. 
1557  Creswell Research design [191-193]. 
1558  Polit and Beck Nursing research 217. 
1559  Creswell Research design 233. 
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administration and scoring.1560 In this study, the main study instruments were 
questionnaires. A single questionnaire with the same items was administered to all HCPs 
(doctors and nurses), at all locations within the same time period. This shows consistency 
in items and administration. Further, the questionnaire for patients was a different 
questionnaire further translated into the predominant local language, IsiZulu. Patients 
were free to respond in their chosen language and the interviews were administered with 
by same set of three research assistants over the research time period. This suggests 
that the study was reliable in accordance with the definition of reliability in research 
studies. According to Pollitt and Beck,1561 reliability refers to repeatability of one’s study. 
Based on the study instruments used and methods of administration described further 
below, this study is reliable and repeatable. 
 
4.9 Materials and Methods 
 
4.9.1 Study rationale 
 
The methodological considerations underpinning the chosen study design have been 
described in detail above and in preceding chapters of this thesis. Briefly, the empirical 
aspect of this thesis entails a descriptive cross-sectional study in contemporary clinical 
practice settings at public hospitals within an urban metropolitan municipality in KwaZulu-
Natal province South Africa. The study was conducted in this setting using the methods 
further described below, because the time between procuring IC and treatment is very 
short and patients are normally in hospital for a limited time period. The descriptive 
approach allowed the participants/respondents including doctors, nurses and patients, to 
describe their experience with the IC process as it was happening, thereby bringing out 
the required information which is evaluated ad reported in this empirical study. 
 
 
                                                          
1560  Creswell Research design 233. 
1561   Polit and Beck Nursing research 416. 
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4.9.2 Study variables 
 
The independent variables in the study included age, sex, marital status, occupation, 
languages spoken, educational level, and income of participants. The dependent 
variables included decision-making capacity (DMC), information disclosure, 
comprehension and volition of the participants. Other variables included the extent of 
information disclosure, diagnosis, risks and  benefits of treatment, treatment costs, rights 
of refusal of treatment, consequences of refusal, methods of obtaining consent (verbal, 
written or both). I also evaluated the methods employed in obtaining consent during 
emergency situations, as well as knowledge and practice of presumed or implied consent 
amongst HCPS,  as well any evidence of coercion or undue pressure on patients giving 
informed consent during clinical encounters in public hospitals. Definition of the major 
variables studied are described in chapter one above. For a detailed description of these 
variables please refer to the ‘definition of terms’ in chapter one, section 1.16 of this 
thesis. 
 
4.9.3 Study location and setting 
 
The study was carried out at selected public hospitals within eThekwini metropolitan 
municipality in KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa. EThekwini municipality comprises 
a major urban city (Durban) and semi-urban areas (townships). EThekwini municipality 
has a population of about 3.5 million people (2011 census).1562 According to statistics from 
KZN department of Health, there are 18 public hospitals 1563 within this municipality 
ranging from tertiary, regional, district and specialized hospitals for chronic diseases. The 
list of public hospitals in EThekwini municipality which were stratified alphabetically and 
randomly sampled as shown in Appendix 4 of this thesis. The hospitals in EThekwini 
municipality are relatively well staffed since Durban is a major metropolitan city in South 
Africa. Also many hospitals within this district serve as teaching hospitals for the practical 
                                                          
1433  Statistics South Africa http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=ethekwini-municipality 
 (Date of use: 26 April 2016). 
1563  KZN Department of Health http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/district1.htm (Date of use: 26 April 
 2016). 
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training of doctors, nurses and allied health professionals up to specialist level. Therefore, 
all categories of HCPs are well represented in this population of healthcare workers 
(HCWs). In this study, all HCPs who were willing to participate in the study were eligible 
for inclusion.  
 
In this setting which included the teaching and tertiary hospitals, it was hypothesized that 
the IC doctrine should not only be taught and known by the participants/respondents, but 
also be applied in the teaching and training of the various categories of HCPS. The study 
also sought to establish to what extent the ethical and legal doctrine of IC  was practiced 
or applied, and the level of knowledge of the various categories of participants regarding 
IC, and  the basic laws guiding the clinical practice of medicine at the randomly selected 
public hospitals within this metropolitan municipality, in KZN province, South Africa. 
 
4.9.4 Target population groups 
 
Patients, medical doctors and professional nurses at selected provincial hospitals within 
EThekwini municipality were randomly selected to participate in the study. Randomization 
occurred at the level of the health care facility, while the individual participants at the 
selected institutions had an equal chance to participate voluntarily in the study. 
a) Inclusion criteria: Patients in the selected hospitals in the surgical, internal medicine, 
paediatric, obstetrics and gynaecology, wards and clinics had an equal chance of 
participating in the study if available and willing to participate during the site visits to the 
hospital. Similarly, all medical doctors, professional and enrolled nurses within the 
selected hospitals units were also equally eligible to participate in the study 
b) Exclusion criteria: Patients with severe mental incapacity due to mental health or 
behavioural disorders such as unconsciousness, and those who are unable to provide 
valid IC, were excluded from the study. Similarly, minors below the legal age of consent 
whose guardians or parents were absent during the study to provide the necessary IC on 
their behalf, were excluded from the study. In the case of nurses, nursing staff in the 
categories of auxiliary nurse, nursing students, and nursing assistants, were all excluded 
from this study. 
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4.10 Sampling procedures 
 
4.10.1 Selection of study site 
 
It has been argued that based on logistic considerations it is usually difficult if not 
impossible to include every individual in a target study population. For this reason, a 
representative sample of the target population is usually selected for a particular study. 
Sampling may be defined as “a means used to draw a representative number of elements 
from a larger population”.1564 Further, Kumar emphasizes that during sampling, it is 
essential to avoid bias in the selection of a sample, and also important to achieve 
maximum precision for a given outlay of resources.1565 Thus, a small but representative 
number of units are usually scientifically selected to provide a fair and true reflection of 
the population under study. Therefore, the general rule is to use the largest sample size 
possible because it has been suggested that the larger the sample size, the more 
representative it is of the population and the more likely results will be acceptable.1566 
Nonetheless, it is usually advisable to make an extra effort to obtain a representative 
rather than a very large sample size, in this way; the eventual sample size chosen is 
usually a compromise between what is desirable and what is feasible. The main aspects 
considered in determining sample size from a population include the objectives of the 
study, the need for variations in the sample, and the ease of handling the data 
collected.1567 According to Terre-Blanche and others,1568 thirty percent (30%), of any 
population is generally adequate when conducting a cross-sectional descriptive study. 
Since this study was limited to public hospitals, out of the 18 public hospitals, six were 
randomly selected as study sites for this research study. Multi-stage stratified random 
sampling was used to select eligible hospital sites. The hospitals were first stratified by 
authority (provincial or private); and then selected using systematic random sampling. 
This was done by arranging the public hospitals alphabetically by name. Then every third 
                                                          
1564  Cargan Doing social research 235. 
1565   Kumar Research methodology 19. 
1566  Cargan Doing social research 237. 
1567  Mugisha Delivery and utilization of voluntary HIV counselling 55. 
1568  Terre-Blanche et al Research in practice 50. 
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hospital from the list was selected. Probability sampling is used to ensure an unbiased 
sample population, whereby each individual in the population has an equal chance of 
being selected or included in the study population.1569,1570 Stratification of the available 
samples also helps to ensure that a representative sample is selected from each stratum. 
In this study, purposive sampling was also used to include the two major tertiary/teaching 
hospitals within EThekwini municipality, because they were most likely to yield the largest 
number of eligible study participants. That is, professional nurses and doctors at all levels 
of specialization, including newly qualified doctors serving their internship, as well as a 
variety of patients and HCPs in various clinical departments, to assist with a more robust 
sample population. It has been suggested that for non-probability sampling, participants’ 
selection is based on specific predetermined criteria in order to cover a wider range of 
constituencies, in which case, selection of participants is considered purposive.  
Generally, purposive sampling targets and prescribes specific criteria for recruiting a 
sample. In this case recruitment of participants is therefore based on the characteristics 
they exhibit in relation to the research question.1571 In this study, purposive sampling was 
used to include the two major tertiary hospitals within the study setting, because they were 
most likely to yield the largest number of eligible study participants. The rest of the 
hospitals within the municipality district were randomly sampled as described above.  
Random selection of the public health institutions for the study ensured that patients from 
all socio-economic strata were covered and eligible for inclusion, further HCPs with 
different types of practice experience with regard to informed consent were also included 
in the study.  
 
4.10.2 Sample size estimations 
 
Preliminary sample size for each group of study participants was calculated using a web-
based sample size calculator by Raosoft®,1572 based on this formula for sample size and 
5% margin of error: 
                                                          
1569  Babbie E The basics of social research 4th ed (Wadsworth Belmont California 2008) 238. 
1570 Russell Social research methods [144-147]. 
1571  Salazar et al Research methods in health promotion 303. 
1572  Raosoft® http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html (Date of use: 26 April 2016). 
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x = Z(c/100)2r (100-r)   
n = N x/ ((N-1) E2 + x)   
E = Sqrt [(N - n) x/n (N-1)]   
Where N is the population size,  
r is the fraction of responses that we are interested in, and Z(c/100) 
is the critical value for the confidence level c. 
 
Based on results obtained from Raosoft™ via computerized application of the above 
sample size calculation equation, the estimated sample size for each category of 
participants to be recruited for the study was: 
 
A. 360 Medical Practitioners (all categories of medical doctors including 
consultant/specialists) 
B. 373 Nurses (professional and enrolled nurses) 
C. 385 Patients 
 
The above figures gave an estimated total sample size for the study of 1118 study 
participants. This number served as a baseline for the number of participants to be 
recruited in each participant category for the entire study. Participant recruitment was then 
planned for a 3-month period from March to June 2012. Multiple visits were made to the 
selected hospitals/study sites during this time-period, after obtaining ethical approval from 
the various regulatory authorities and gatekeepers at each institution.  The actual 
distribution of the questionnaires/ patient interviews was conducted by three trained 
research assistants who were at the minimum bilingual in (English/Zulu/Xhosa/Sotho). 
The research assistants distributed the questionnaires to willing participants (HCPs), and 
made arrangements to collect same at the respondents’ convenience. Multiple visits were 
made to the various study sites to aid participant recruitment until the maximum number 
willing to participate was reached, in case of HCPs; and when the estimated sample size 
for patients was exceeded by 5% for patient respondents to compensate for incomplete 
forms or ineligibility. 
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4.11  Work Units  
 
The wards and clinics in each selected hospital/ study site, were also randomly sampled; 
again the aim was to sample about 30% of the wards.1573 Thereafter eligible HCPs and 
patients in the wards and outpatient clinics who were willing to participate in the study 
were all given a chance to participate in the study by completing the questionnaires. 
Generally, the outpatient departments (OPDs) and clinics were randomly targeted on the 
day of visit by the researcher and research assistants. Patients and HCPs were then 
approached by the research assistants, and those who were willing to participate were 
given the informed consent documents to read and sign. Then the study instrument 
(questionnaire) was handed over to the participant to complete in the case of HCPs. With 
regard to patient respondents, those who expressed a preference and were literate; were 
given the questionnaires to complete by themselves, after reading and signing the 
informed consent documents; while for those who wanted the questions to be read out, 
the research assistant would read out the questions and record the answers given by the 
patients verbatim onto the questionnaire for patients.  
 
4.12 Research instruments 
 
Data was collected using separate questionnaires (study instruments) for HCPS and 
patients. Two different semi-structured questionnaires with open and close-ended 
questions were applied to patients and healthcare professionals.1574 The questionnaires 
were distributed manually to medical practitioners and professional nurses working in the 
selected hospitals under study. The questionnaires for patients was further translated into 
IsiZulu, the predominant language in KZN province. The translation from English to IsiZulu 
was done by qualified translators at the Department of IsiZulu Studies, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. Patients had the opportunity to respond using either in 
                                                          
1573  Terre-Blanche et al Research in practice 50. 
1574   See Appendices 1-3. 
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IsiZulu or English based on their personal choice. The questionnaires for HCPs were in 
English language only.  
 
4.12.1 Description of questionnaire for HCPs  
 
The questionnaire for HCPs (doctors and nurses) was designed in 4 sections as shown 
in Appendix 1, but a brief description is provided here. The first section of the 
questionnaire was used to obtain information about respondent demographics or 
dependent variables, such as age, sex, job title, position, department in the hospital, years 
of professional experience, clinical speciality, amongst others. The second part of the 
questionnaire contained questions about informed consent practices such as: time spent 
on obtaining informed consent, patient workload, information disclosed to patients, 
language and methods used to obtain IC and communicate with patients; understanding 
of information by patients and challenges faced by HCPs when obtaining IC from patients. 
The third section of the questionnaire asked general knowledge questions about local 
healthcare laws such as ‘age of consent to medical treatment’ and ‘age of consent for 
termination of pregnancy’ and standards of information disclosure. The fourth section 
solicited questions about HCPs knowledge and practices regarding implied or presumed 
consent in clinical practice. The questionnaire for HCPs was first circulated for comment 
by a small sample of doctors and nurses, and then modified based on comments from 
potential participants prior to distribution to all eligible and agreeable participants. The 
questionnaires were distributed by hand at all selected sites by research assistants and 
retrieved by hand after completion by respondents at their own convenience. Participation 
in the study and completion of the questionnaire were entirely voluntary. 
 
4.12.2 Description of questionnaire for patients 
 
The study instrument for patients was a semi‑structured questionnaire in English 
language, which was also translated into IsiZulu, the dominant language spoken by about 
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81% of the population of KZN. 1575 Questionnaires consisted of three sections. The first 
section collected sociodemographic data; including age, sex, marital status, employment 
status, educational level, income and living situation of patient participants. These were 
mostly dependent variables. The second part of the patient questionnaire was used to 
gather information on independent variables such as details of patient experiences of IC 
when interacting or when receiving treatment from HCPs. This section also contained 
questions about time spent on the clinical encounter, information disclosed by HCPs to 
patients before obtaining consent, methods and language used to communicate with 
patients, satisfaction level with information disclosure and completeness of information 
disclosure, understanding of information disclosed, and the absence of coercion or undue 
influence by healthcare providers during clinical encounters. The third part of the patient 
questionnaire asked questions about a patient’s general knowledge, understanding, and 
opinions on IC, such as the legal age of consent to treatment, surrogate involvement in 
patients’ healthcare decision-making or informed consent processes; as well open ended 
questions regarding patients level of satisfaction with their encounter and communication 
with local HCPs. Participants were interviewed by three trained bilingual research 
assistants. Those patients who were able to read and write and preferred to, were allowed 
to complete the questionnaire by themselves and return to research assistant at the same 
clinical site during the site visit. Patient respondents had the option of completing 
questionnaires either in English or IsiZulu based on their preferred language. The study 
was conducted at various hospital departments at selected sites as described previously 
and further below. Participation by patients was entirely voluntary, and questionnaires 
were completed by parents or guardians in the case of children or individuals not capable 
of giving informed consent. 
 
4.12.3 Validity and reliability of the research instruments 
 
Pre-testing of the research instrument (questionnaires), with regards to HCPs, this was 
done by distributing to a few doctors and nurses in a single hospital ward for comments 
                                                          
1575 EThekwini Municipality EThekwini language policy 
 http://www.Durban.gov.za.eThekwiniLanguagepolicy.pdf (Date of use: 19 August 2014). 
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and validation, the comments and suggestions were then incorporated into the final 
questionnaire before distribution to all potential HCP participants. With regard to the 
patients’ questionnaire after initial design and compilation in English based on the 
literature review, the questionnaire was then submitted to professional language experts 
in IsiZulu studies for translation into the local language. Questionnaires which were 
completed in the local language IsiZulu was back translated to English by native language 
speakers, before capturing of data in the research data base as described below. All of 
the above strategies were used to ensure validity and reliability of data collected. Further, 
the research instruments (questionnaires) were vetted and approved by a qualified 
biostatistician for reliability to collect the intended data suitable for analysis and drawing 
of valid conclusions. Validity of a research study may be defined as the “accuracy and 
trustworthiness of instruments, data, and findings in research”.1576 It has been argued that 
ensuring validity helps to make the researcher’s evaluations more credible and provides 
defensible data, inferences and conclusions.1577 In this study, validity was ensured by 
using several techniques such as multiple triangulation as discussed in section 4.3 of this 
thesis. In addition, there was extensive literature review prior to preparation of the study 
instruments. Furthermore, the study instruments were evaluated by a qualified 
biostatistician and pre-tested amongst a select sample of HCPs before use. Face validity 
refers to subjective judgments on whether the research instrument appears to measure 
what it ought to measure.1578 In this study, face validity was maintained by constructing 
questions relevant to the study’s aims and objectives as derived from an extensive review 
of relevant literature and case law. Content validity relates to knowing whether the entire 
interview items reflect the entire range of potential meanings in a study.1579In this study, 
the researcher (myself), tried as much as possible to ensure that all potentially relevant 
questions and items were included in the study instruments used; based on an extensive 
literature review prior to the construction of the study questionnaires. 
 
                                                          
1576  Russell Social research methods [46-47]. 
1577  Guion LA Triangulation: establishing the validity of qualitative studies (University of Florida 
 IFAS 2002) 2. 
1578 Burns N and Grove SK The practice of nursing research: conduct, critique and utilisation 4th   
 ed (Saunders Philadelphia 2007) 400 see also Cargan Doing social research 232. 
1579   Cargan Doing social research 232. 
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4.13 Data collection 
 
Primary data was collected using questionnaires and interview schedules as described 
above. Further, relevant case law and statutory instruments were accessed from data 
available in the public domain, as well as applicable regulatory instruments based on a 
review of literature. In addition currently used standard consent documents or consent 
forms were collected where available from the various selected hospitals for comparative 
analysis. 
 
4.13.1 Data storage and analysis  
 
Data from the questionnaires which were completed manually were stored in a locked 
cabinet to maintain participant confidentiality and security. Then at the end of each 
collection date or site visit, the questionnaires were entered into a single laptop computer 
by one of the trained research assistants who also doubled up as a data capturer. The 
entered raw data was then evaluated for completeness and accuracy by the researcher 
(myself), and also cross-checked prior to analysis by a qualified biostatistician.  
 
The software used for data capturing storage and analysis was the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS versions 18 to 22 IBM Corporation).1580  It has been argued that 
that numbers and statistics by themselves are of little interest and are difficult to make any 
sense of. Thus, data analysis is a critical step during research.1581 Therefore, data analysis 
is “the search for patterns in the data and for ideas that help explain why those patterns 
maybe there in the first place”.1582 
 
4.14 Statistical methods 
 
Descriptive statistics such as proportions, median, mode and interquartile range were 
used to summarize the data from this study. Bar charts, pie chart and graphs were used 
                                                          
1580  IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp Armonk NY 2012). 
1581  Black TR Understanding social sciences research 2nd ed (Sage Publications London 2002) 21. 
1582  Russell Social research methods 419.  
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to present the results, using Microsoft Excel.1583 The scores for comprehension of 
informed consent were worked out from the responses. The Mann-Whitney U-test was 
used to examine the difference in scores between doctors and nurses and other applicable 
variables. The Kruskal-Wallis test was used to examine the relationship between (1) 
education level and the scores, (2) clinical department and scores and (3) profession and 
the scores, income level and scores etc., as will be further described in the findings in the 
following  chapters of this thesis. Chi-squared tests or Fisher’s exact test were used to 
test association between categorical variables in the study, as well as analysing and 
comparing the informed consent aggregate scores (ICAS); calculated between various 
cadres of HCPs, as will be  described in detail below in the results section. Both descriptive 
and inferential statistics were calculated. Finally, the reliability of the questions used for 
ICAS was calculated using Cronbach’s alpha. The data is displayed using graphs, tables 
and pie charts, with calculated proportions or percentages. Chi-square values were also 
calculated to obtain probability values (p-value) in order to evaluate the relationship 
between key variables, in accordance with suggestions by expert authorities.1584,1585  
 
4.14.1 Validity and reliability of statistical methods used 
 
The study design and statistical methodology proposed used this study was reviewed and 
validated by a consultant biostatistician at College of Health Sciences, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal. Further, the statistical methodology of the study was further evaluated 
and approved by the Knowledge management and strategic services division of the KZN 
Department of Health, before approval of the proposed study and research proposal. 
Validity relates to the strength of the conclusions, inferences or propositions of a research 
study. Construct validity includes the definition of variables in line with existing literature 
and differentiates between respondents who possess the trait and those without the 
trait.1586 Internal validity examines causal relationships,1587 while external validity refers to 
                                                          
1583  Microsoft Corporation Microsoft Excel for Windows ((Microsoft Office 2013). 
1584  Polit and Beck Nursing research [451-510] see also Wysocki DK Readings in social research 
 methods (Wadsworth Belmont California 2001) 281. 
1585  Russell Social research methods 526 see also Schutt KR Investigating the social world 347. 
1586  Burns and Grove The practice of nursing research 232. 
1587  Polit and Beck Nursing research 214. 
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the “generalisability of the research findings to other setting or samples”,1588 in other 
words, it tells us how well the results from one study, can be extrapolated to other similar 
or related settings. Generally, research findings can only be generalised to other 
populations if the sampling method was random. In the empirical study reported in this 
thesis, I employed random sampling techniques to select the sample sites and participants 
thereby enhancing external validity of this study. I also applied other measures to 
overcome threats to external validity, including sampling techniques used, such as cluster 
sampling or stratified random sampling which ensured random selection of the samples 
within each cluster as well as equal chances of each sample being included into the study 
cohort.  Finally, reliability of a study refers to the consistency of one’s measurement, or 
the degree to which an instrument measures something the same way each time it is used 
under the same condition with the same subjects,1589 otherwise known as the repeatability 
of one’s measurement. The strategies used to improve face, construct, and content 
validity in this study as described above, also helped reduce threats to reliability in this 
study. 
 
4.15 Ethical considerations and approvals 
 
Ethical approval was initially obtained from a subcommittee of UNISA Research Ethics 
Committee. In addition, ethical approval was obtained from the KZN Department of Health 
Knowledge and Strategic Management division (an accredited REC) as well as the 
EThekwini municipality department of health after review of the research proposal, 
including the biostatistical methodology. Further approvals were contained from each 
selected local hospital administration after evaluation of research proposals and ethical 
approvals. Finally, written informed consent was obtained from every participant in the 
research study, after full information disclosure and signing of the consent form prior to 
participation in the study. Sample informed consent documents used to obtain IC from 
participants are shown in appendices 4-6 of this thesis.1590 Participant confidentiality was 
                                                          
1588 Polit and Beck Nursing research 217. 
1589  Polit and Beck Nursing Research 416. 
1590  See Appendix 4-5 for copies of the informed consent documents used in this study. 
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maintained by safe storage and anonymization of data, and further, research results will 
also be reported anonymously. 
 
4.16 Summary of chapter 4 
 
This chapter describes the research methodology used to conduct the empirical research 
study, reported in part two of this thesis. In this chapter, I described the methodological 
considerations, including the post-positivist worldview, which underlies the scientific 
method of enquiry as well as the use of a cross-sectional quantitative research design in 
this study. Further, I have justified the importance of using empirical research methods to 
study social phenomena such as the doctrine of informed consent, as well as the use of 
data triangulation, in this case person and space triangulation to improve the reliability 
and consistency of the findings and results from this study. In addition, I have described 
the study location and populations under study, methods for calculating the sample size, 
as well as the research instruments which were used in this study. This involved the 
designing of two separate questionnaires for HCPs (doctors and nurses) and another for 
patients participating in the study. I have also described the methods used in the field 
studies and gathering of data, the selection of study sites using stratified random sampling 
and the calculation of sample size,1591  as well as the storage and analysis of data by 
means of a computer based software programme SPSS.1592 Finally, I have described the 
ethical considerations and permissions obtained, including mechanisms for obtaining 
statutory approval and informed consent from respondents and gatekeepers, as well as 
mechanisms for ensuring the validity and reliability of the statistical methods based on 
overview and input from a qualified biostatistician. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1591  Raosoft® http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html (Date of use: 26 April 2016). 
1592  IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows (IBM Corp Armonk NY 2012). 
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PART TWO 
 
RESULTS AND FINDINGS FROM THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STUDY AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Introduction 
 
In part one of this thesis, I provided an introduction, background, literature review and 
research methodology applicable to this thesis. I reviewed and analysed the ethical, legal, 
and socio-cultural issues likely to impact on the practice of IC and respect for autonomy, 
with particular reference to the South African setting. In addition, I provided an analysis of 
the methodological considerations and justification for using empirical methods including 
a quantitative research methodology to study ethical and legal issues relating to IC in 
South African clinical practice.  
 
In Part two of this thesis, I will present and discuss the results from the empirical study 
amongst doctors, professional nurses and patients working in, and utilizing  public 
hospitals in EThekwini metropolitan municipality, KZN, in chapters five to seven. This will 
be followed by a synthesis and discussion of the implications of the findings from the 
empirical study and review of relevant South African case law and commentaries by legal 
authorities, as well as a comparative analysis of relevant foreign case law from other 
common law jurisdictions. I will then draw some inferences and conclusions and make 
some recommendations based on the overall findings from this thesis. Parts of the results 
from the empirical research study have already been published as three separate peer-
reviewed research articles in accredited journals. These research articles are submitted 
as part of this thesis in the journal article format and appear in Annexures 1-3 of this thesis. 
Therefore, chapter five will present the results pertaining to the medical doctors,1593 
chapter six will present the results from professional nurses,1594 while chapter seven will 
                                                          
1593  Chima SC “Evaluating the quality of informed consent and contemporary clinical practices by 
 medical doctors in South Africa: An empirical study” 2013 (14 Suppl 1) BMC Med Ethics S3 1-
 17 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3878312/pdf/1472-6939-14-S1-S3.pdf (Date 
 of use: 23 April 2016). 
1594   Chima SC “Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South 
 Africa: An empirical study-brief report” The Asian Conference on Ethics, Religion & 
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provide patient perspectives,1595 with regard to the practice of IC at selected public 
hospitals in EThekwini municipality, KZN, as found from this cross-sectional empirical 
study. This chapter will also present a summary of the findings from the empirical study 
as surmised from the empirical study. Finally, in chapters eight and nine, I will discuss the 
implications of the empirical research study in the context of the entire thesis and I will 
present the conclusions and recommendations arising from the study in the final chapter 
(nine). As I previously mentioned in the summary to chapter one, since we have applied 
the postpositivist scientific method in the empirical aspects of this thesis. I have also 
endeavoured to report the results using the IMRAD method, which is a scientific method 
for reporting studies in the biomedical sciences as opposed to the social sciences.1596 The 
term  IMRAD represents the first letters of the words Introduction, Materials and Methods, 
Results, and, Discussion. It indicates a pattern or format rather than a full listing of all 
sections of a research paper.1597 The results of the empirical studies described in chapter 
five to seven of this thesis have been reported using the IMRaD method which may explain 
the possible duplication or repetition of theoretical arguments in each chapter. I crave your 
indulgence in applying this method of reporting, but as has already been noted, this is an 
interdisciplinary thesis necessitating the use of both biomedical and social sciences 
methods. 
 
 
 
                                                          
 Philosophy 2017 March 22-27 Kobe Japan (ACERP Official Conference Proceedings 2017) 
 89-102. 
1595  Chima SC "Because I want to be informed, to be part of the decision-making": Patients' insights 
 on informed consent practices by healthcare professionals in South Africa” 2015 Nig J Clin Pract 
 S46-S56 http://www.njcponline.com/temp/NigerJClinPract18746- 378318_103031.pdf (Date of 
 use: 27 April 2016). 
1596  Sollaci LB and Pereira MG “The introduction, methods, results, and discussion (IMRAD) 
 structure: a fifty-year survey” 2004 J Med Libr Assoc 364–371. 
1597  Nair PKR and Nair VD “Organization of a research paper: The IMRAD format” in Scientific 
 writing and communication in agriculture and the natural resources (Springer International 
 Publishing Switzerland 2014) https: // file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/9783319031002-c2.pdf 
 (Date of use: 24 January 2017). 
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CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS ON QUALITY OF INFORMED CONSENT AS PRACTISED BY 
MEDICAL DOCTORS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Informed consent is a legal and ethical doctrine derived from the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Generally two rights derived from autonomy are accorded legal protection, 
firstly the constitutional rights1598 to bodily integrity and well-being protected by laws 
against trespass, assault and battery;1599 and the rights against bodily well-being and 
privacy protected by professional negligence rules.1600 Informed consent has been 
codified by the National Health Act, 1601 requiring healthcare professionals (HCPs) to 
inform patients about diagnosis, treatment risks, benefits, options, and the right of refusal, 
while taking into consideration patients’ language and literacy levels. Therefore, HCPs 
treating patients without valid informed consent may be guilty of infringing patients’ rights 
to bodily integrity, privacy and well-being. However, many challenges are experienced by 
doctors trying to obtain valid informed consent among vulnerable population groups in 
resource poor settings globally. One can argue that complex multicultural societies like 
South Africa are most often challenged by problems of socio-cultural issues, 
multilingualism, poverty, education, unfamiliarity with libertarian rights based autonomy, 
and the power asymmetry between doctors and patients, all of which could influence the 
quality of informed consent obtained by medical doctors during clinical practice.  
 
5.1.1 Aims and objectives of the study 
 
The general objective of this aspect of the study was to evaluate the quality of informed 
consent obtained by doctors from patients attending public hospitals in South Africa. I 
specifically wished to establish whether sufficient information was provided to patients 
before consent is obtained. Further, I wanted to establish whether patients involved in 
                                                          
1598  The Constitution s12 (2). 
1599  Jennings S “Medical Law and Individual Autonomy- Competing Perspectives” 2003 
 http://www.nuigalway.ie/law/ GSLR/2003/MedicalNegligence.pdf (Date of use: 20 February 
 2008). 
1600  Schultz 1985 Yale L J 219-299. 
1601  National Health Act 61 of 2003 [s6-9]. 
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clinical procedures understand the information given to them, and also whether consent 
is obtained from patients voluntarily, and whether the informed consent provided by 
patients attending public hospitals in South Africa, is truly and legally valid. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
This study was a descriptive cross-sectional study in contemporary clinical practice 
settings, aimed at obtaining data from practising medical doctors using a semi-structured 
questionnaire. Questionnaires were distributed to participants in hospital clinics and wards 
in real-time during clinic hours. The real-time approach within the hospital environment 
allowed doctors to describe their experience with the informed consent process as it is, 
thereby bringing out the required information. Three trained research assistants 
distributed and collected the questionnaires from healthcare professionals over a 3-month 
period from April to June 2012. To increase the response rate, repeated visits was 
sometimes necessary to collect completed questionnaires from doctors.            
 
5.2.1 Research instrument  
 
Data was collected using a self-administered semi-structured questionnaire. The 
questionnaire for healthcare professionals consisted of 4 sections. The first section 
collected information on participant demographics. The second section was used to 
gather information on informed consent practices, such as time spent on obtaining 
informed consent, patient workload, information disclosed to patients, language and 
methods used to communicate with patients, understanding of information by patients, 
and challenges faced by HCPs when obtaining informed consent. The third section dealt 
with generic questions on local laws and regulations on informed consent such as ‘the 
legal age of consent to treatment’ and standards of information disclosure. The fourth 
section dealt with understanding and use of implied and presumed consent by doctors 
and nurses.1602 Questionnaires were distributed and collected by hand to all participants. 
                                                          
1602  See Appendix 1 for sample questionnaire. 
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The study design and research instruments were evaluated and approved by a qualified 
biostatistician. 
 
5.2.2 Study location and sampling procedures  
 
The study was conducted in the outpatient clinics and wards at randomly selected public 
hospitals within EThekwini metropolitan municipality, KZN. EThekwini municipality 
comprises a major urban city (Durban), surrounded by semi-urban areas (townships). The 
population of this area is approximately 3.2 million (2010 estimate).1603 According to 
information from KZN department of health, there are 18 public hospitals within this 
municipality ranging from tertiary to district hospitals.1604  Multi-stage stratified random 
sampling was used to select participating hospitals. The 16 hospitals identified as eligible 
for inclusion were arranged alphabetically for stratified sampling, and every third hospital 
on the list was then selected.1605 It has been statistically estimated that 30% of any 
population is adequate when conducting a descriptive study.1606 Purposive sampling was 
also used to include the two tertiary teaching hospitals within the municipality because 
they contain the largest number of medical doctors, including specialists. The rest of the 
public hospitals within the municipality were randomly sampled. A total of five hospitals 
from Durban and one outlying hospital in nearby Pietermaritzburg with rotating surgical 
registrars from Durban were included in the study. Therefore a, total of six provincial public 
hospitals were included in this study.  
 
5.2.3 Target population and inclusion criteria 
 
Medical doctors at the selected public hospitals were randomly targeted to participate in 
this study. All medical doctors within the selected hospitals clinical units and departments 
                                                          
1603  Statistics South Africa http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=ethekwini-municipality 
 (Date of use: 26 April 2016). 
1604  KZN Department of Health http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/district1.htm  (Date of use: 12 April 
 2016). 
1605   See Appendix 6. 
1606  Terre-Blanche et al Research in practice 50. 
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who were available duration the times when the study was conducted at the hospitals, 
and were willing to participate, were eligible for inclusion in the study. 
 
5.2.4 Sample size  
 
Preliminary sample size for each group of study participants was calculated using a web 
based freely accessible sample size calculator, Raosoft®.1607 Based on the formula for 
sample size and 5% margin of error, the estimated sample size for this category of 
participants was for the recruitment of 360 medical practitioners. Available data on 
healthcare personnel statistics indicated that that there were about 5670 medical doctors 
registered in KZN in 2010, although there are disagreements on the total number of 
doctors practicing within South Africa and its provinces with high mobility and vacancy 
rates.1608,1609 Due to the fact that hospitals within the municipality serve as institutions for 
training of doctors and nurses, there is a constant rotation of medical personnel throughout 
the district and the province, and since the results were to be extrapolated to the practice 
of doctors generally in South Africa, I based my initial estimates on the total number of 
doctors and nurses practicing within KZN province as obtained from health personnel 
statistics.1610 Overall, because of the low numbers of health personnel, there was minimal 
difference in estimated sample size regardless of whether sample calculations were 
based on healthcare professionals within the municipality, practicing in the public sector, 
or within the province.1611 
5.2.5 Data analysis and statistical methods  
 
Data from the questionnaires were captured directly into statistical package for social 
sciences (SPSS) by a research assistant. The captured data was then checked for 
                                                          
1607  Raosoft® Sample size calculator http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html (Date of use: 19 
 August  2014). 
1608  KZN Department of Health: KwaZulu-Natal Strategic Plan 2010-2014 (Department of Health 
 KZN 2010). 
1609 Econex Updated GP and specialist numbers for SA health reform note 7 2010 
 http://www.econex.co.za (Date of use: 14 September 2013). 
1610  Health Systems Trust: Health Personnel 2013 http://indicators.hst.org.za/healthstats/281/data 
 (Date of use: 14 September 2013). 
1611  Raosoft® Sample size calculator http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html (Date of use: 19 
 August  2014). 
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completeness and accuracy by the researcher (myself), and a consultant biostatistician. 
Data was later analysed using SPSS (version 21).1612 Descriptive statistics such as 
proportions, median, mode and interquartile range were used to summarize the data. 
Scores for comprehension, understanding, information disclosure, voluntariness and 
informed consent aggregate scores were worked out from the responses. The Mann-
Whitney test was used to examine the difference in scores between different categories 
of healthcare professionals in public hospitals. Kruskal-Wallis test was used to examine 
the relationship between area of specialization and scores, and occupational rank and 
scores. Chi-square or Fisher’s exact tests were used to test for association between 
categorical variables in the study. 
 
5.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from a sub-committee of University of South Africa (UNISA) 
Research Ethics Committee. The research protocol including the biostatistics 
methodology was also reviewed and approved by the health research and knowledge 
management sub-component (a local research ethics committee) of the KZN Department 
of Health. Approval was also obtained from the CEOs or medical managers at each of the 
randomly selected hospitals included in the study. Finally, written informed consent was 
obtained from each participant after full information disclosure prior to participation in the 
study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1612  IBM: SPSS Statistics for Windows Version 21.0 (IBM Corp Armonk NY 2012). 
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5.4 RESULTS: FINDINGS FROM THE DOCTORS’ STUDY  
 
5.4.1 Demographic characteristics of doctors 
 
Demographic characteristics of participating doctors are as shown in Table 5.1. The 
response rate for this arm of the study was study was about 47% (46.66%) of the initial 
estimates with 168 doctors completing the questionnaires out of an initial estimate of 360. 
However, this low response rate is not unusual when compared to previous studies from 
doctors in South Africa.1613 There was a broad representation of all clinical specialties with 
participating doctors from all major clinical specialties as shown in Table 5.2. The 
occupational ranks of participating doctors is also shown in Figure 5.1. The cohort of 
participating doctors was then regrouped into 8 major clinical disciplines or specialities for 
further analysis as shown in Figure 5.2 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Participating doctors by occupational rank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1613  Henley L et al “Informed consent-a survey of doctors’ practices in South Africa” 1995 SAMJ 
 1273-1278. 
28%
16%
26%
30%
Interns
Medical Officers
Registrars
Consultants /Specialists
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Table 5.1: Demographic characteristics of participating doctors 
Doctor characteristics Age 
(years) 
  
(%) 
 
Age 
Median                                                                                            
  
  30  
  
Range   22-77    
Gender                                             
 
 
Male   78              49.1       
Female 81  50.1        
Missing data 9 
 
       -       
 
Occupational Ranks    
Interns 47 28  
Registrars 44 26.2  
Medical Officers (MO) 26 15.5  
Consultant/Specialists 
Total 
51 
  168 
30.4 
  100 
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Table 5.2: Clinical disciplines of medical doctors participating in the study 
 
 
Clinical disciplines/ sub-disciplines 
 
Paediatrics 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
Internal Medicine 
General Surgery      
Urology   
General Practice (GP) 
Orthopaedic s 
Dermatology 
Radiology 
Anaesthetics 
Cardiology 
Gastroenterology 
HIV Medicine 
Emergency Medicine 
Maxillofacial Surgery 
Neurology 
Neonatology 
Oncology 
Medical management 
 
 
Practice location 
Public 
Private 
Missing data 
Total 
No of Doctors 
 
42 
18 
23 
13 
11 
11 
8 
5 
5 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
 
 
166 
1 
1 
168 
% 
 
25 
10.7 
13.7 
7.7 
6.5 
6.5 
4.8 
3 
3 
2.4 
1.2 
1.2 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
0.6 
 
 
        
99.4 
    0.6 
    - 
100 
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Figure 5.2: Participating doctors by clinical sub-discipline or specialty 
 
 
5.4.2 Workload and time spent by doctors on a clinical encounter and informed consent 
 
The average number of patients seen by doctors in this cohort ranged from 1 to 120 
patients/day (median = 20 patients/day) as reported by medical practitioners. The majority 
of doctors spent about 5 to 10 minutes providing information to patients prior to treatment 
decision (Figure 5.3). When asked whether the amount of time was sufficient, 55.4% of 
doctors answered ‘yes’ (Table 5.3). Those who thought the time spent was inadequate 
gave various reasons including language barriers and uneducated patients requiring more 
time for explanations. Others complained of time constraints, administrative 
responsibilities, and large patient workloads as being factors militating against spending 
more time explaining procedures in order to obtain valid informed consent from patients.  
While others explained that, the time spent depends on the procedure. Some stated that 
the time spent was “definitely inadequate” with comments such as “in an ideal world, 
patients [should be] counselled for at least 30 minutes with enough time for questions and 
clarifications”. 
4
12
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36
18
43
5
38
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Figure 5.3: Time spent by doctors on IC and clinical encounter with patients 
 
5.4.3 Information given to patients before obtaining consent 
 
When asked about what types of information was generally disclosed to patients prior to 
obtaining consent. The majority of doctors said they provided information on ‘diagnosis 
(96.4%); 89.3% provided information on the ‘benefits of treatment’, 81% provided 
information on ‘treatment options’, while 88.7% recommended a specific treatment. 
Another 83.3% gave information on ‘risk of refusing treatment’, while 64.9% reported 
advising patients on ‘the right of refusal’. Only 11.9% of doctors said they gave information 
on the ‘cost of treatment’ to patients because treatment at public hospitals in South Africa 
are provided free of charge. When asked specifically whether they explained the benefits 
of the procedure to a patient, 97% of doctors answered affirmatively, while 95% said they 
explained the risk of the procedure to patients. A summary of information provided to 
<5 minutes 
(40 doctors) 
23.8%
5-10 minutes 
(89 doctors) 
53%
10-20 minutes
(33 doctors) 
19.6%
20-30 minutes 
(6 doctors), 3.6%
Total 
(168 doctors) 
100%
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patients prior to obtaining informed consent is shown in Table 5.3.  When doctors were 
asked whether they thought the amount of information provided to patients was sufficient 
for valid informed consent, 72.5% answered affirmatively, 16.1% answered ‘no’; while 
11.4% answered that they ‘don’t know’ (Table 5.3) 
 
Table 5.3: Information given to patients by doctors prior to obtaining consent  
Information disclosed to patients Yes (%) No (%) Don’t know        
(%) 
    
Diagnosis 162 (96.4) 6 (3.6) - 
Treatment options 136 (81) 32 (19)                                         -
Recommended treatment 149 (88.7) 19 (11.3)                -
Risk of refusing recommended treatment 140 (88.3) 28 (16.7) - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Cost of medical treatment 
Information on general risks                       
Information on benefits 
Information on right of refusal 
20 (11.9) 
147 (87.5)  
150 (89.3) 
109 (64.9)  
148 (88.1) 
21 (12.5) 
18 (10.7) 
59 (35.1) 
Probing Questions 
Do you think the information you provide is sufficient? 
Do you think this amount of time spent is sufficient? 
Do you think the hospital consent form is adequate 
 
121 (72) 
93 (55.4) 
105 (62.5) 
 
27 (16.1) 
66 (39.3) 
51 (30.4) 
 
19 (11.4) 
9 (5.4) 
12 (7.1) 
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5.4.4 Nature of risks disclosed to patients  
 
 
Information about specific risks of each procedure was provided to patients by about 95% 
of doctors. When asked what types of risks were generally disclosed to patients, around 
92% of doctors said they disclosed the ‘most common risks’, 86% disclosed ‘the most 
serious risks’, while only 21% disclosed ‘all material risks’ to patients (Table 5.4). The 
nature of risks disclosed is important because disclosure of ‘materials risks’ is the current 
standard required based on the ‘prudent-patient standard’ of information disclosure as 
required by both South African and also expressed in international case law. This has 
been established in landmark court judgments such as the case of Castell v De 
Greef,1614,1615 the American case of Canterbury v Spence,1616  the Australian high court 
judgment in Rogers v Whitaker, 1617  and the recent judgment of the UK Supreme Court, 
Scotland in Montgomery v Lanarkshire.1618  
 
Chi-squared tests were used to test for statistical significance on the types and nature of 
information disclosed to patients across different clinical specialties. Information on 
disclosure of ‘clinical diagnosis’ was statistically significant (ρ ≤ 0.001), with radiologists 
least likely to give patients information on diagnosis. Similarly there was statistical 
difference in disclosure of information on ‘recommended treatment’ (ρ = 0.002), with 
anaesthetists and radiologists least likely to recommend treatment to patients. Finally 
information disclosure on ‘treatment options” was also statistically significant across 
different specialities (ρ = 0.004), with 60% of radiologists, 50% of anaesthetists, and 
32.6% of paediatricians least likely to discuss treatment options with their patients. All 
other categories of information disclosed were not statistically significant across different 
clinical specialties. The specialities such as radiology, anaesthesiology and paediatrics 
which did not give information regarding ‘clinical diagnosis’, ‘recommended treatment’ and 
treatment options, is consistent with the fact that the first two specialties are generally 
                                                          
1614  Castell v De Greef (1993) 3 SA 501 [425-426]. 
1615  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 164-179 [178]. 
1616  Canterbury v Spence [1972] 464 2d 772 (DC) [41-46]. 
1617  Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58 (1992) 175 CLR 479 [83]. 
1618  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board Scotland [2015] UKSC 11[87]. 
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ancillary specialists whose role is to support of the work of surgeons and physicians rather 
than rendering primary diagnosis. In the case of paediatrics, since most of the patients 
would be children below the age of consent to treatment, such information would be 
generally discussed with the consenting parents or guardians of such children, rather than 
the patients themselves. 
 
Table 5.4: Nature of risks disclosed to patients  
 
 
 
5.4.5 The current hospital consent forms  
 
 
When asked whether the current consent form used to obtain informed consent from 
patients was satisfactory, 62.5% (105/168) doctors thought it was adequate, while 30.4% 
(51/168) doctors answered ‘no’ and 7.1% (12/168) answered ‘don’t know’. When asked to 
explain why the current universal consent forms used in public hospitals was inadequate, 
many doctors complained that the current form does not give opportunity to detail specific 
complications because different clinical conditions may require different mandatory 
disclosures. Some suggested that the consent forms should contain tick-boxes for more 
detailed information disclosure. Others complained that the current form does not take 
into account “privacy, language and cultural values”. For example, one respondent stated 
that the form is “done briefly in a language not the patients first language (sometimes 
cannot get an interpreter), so we take for granted the patients understands when he/she 
says yes to everything”. Other doctors complained that the form contains “no binding 
space that consent was given or alternatives discussed” while some said that it was “not 
Types of risks disclosed 
to patients by doctors 
    Yes (%)      No (%) Don’t   
know  (% ) 
  
Most serious risks 144 (85.7)   18 (10.7) 2 (1.2)  
Most  common risks 152 (92.1) 13 (7.9) -  
All material risks 35 (21.2) 117 (70.9) 13 (7.9)   
Do you explain risks of the 
procedure to patients? 
  158 (94.6) 8 (4.8) 1 (0.6)   
 
Do you explain benefits of 
the procedure to patients? 
 
162 ( 97) 
 
4 (2.4) 
 
1 (0.6) 
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specific to minors; when guardian details must be recorded”. Others suggested that the 
current form has, “not kept up with current progress in medico-legal teaching”. 
 
5.4.6 Methods used to obtain consent from patients  
 
When asked how patients would normally provide consent for clinical procedures, around 
6.7% of doctors said ‘verbally’, another 50.9% answered ‘written’, while 34.5% said both 
verbally and written, while some 7.9% of doctors answered ‘it depends’. Doctors who 
answered ‘it depends’ gave various reasons for obtaining consent using different formats. 
Most stated that it depends on the type of procedure. Others said it depends if there is an 
‘emergency’ or if the patient is unconscious, or a minor. Some doctors said they would 
obtain telephonic consent when parent/guardian was not available, while others said 
sometimes the hospital superintendent would give the necessary consent in an 
emergency. Some doctors said it depends if law requires written consent. There was no 
statistical difference across specialities or occupational ranks in methods of obtaining 
informed consent (ρ = 0.587). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
                   Figure 5.4: Methods used to obtain consent from patients by doctors 
 
Verbally 6.7%
Written 50.9%
Both (Written 
and Verbal) 
34.5%
It depends 
7.9%
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5.4.7 Methods used to enhance comprehension or understanding of information 
disclosed 
 
To evaluate whether patients usually understand the information disclosed by doctors in 
the context of the language in which the information is provided, I asked questions about 
the language and methods used to obtain informed consent from patients. When 
communicating with patients, 64.3% (108/168) doctors said they used the ‘English 
language’. Another 44.6% (75/168) said they used the ‘patients’ local language’, while 
69% (116/168) of doctors said they used ‘both English and the patients’ local language’. 
To enhance or facilitate understanding of information disclosed to patients, 96.4% 
(162/168) doctors said they used ‘words’ or communicated verbally. Another 20.2% 
(34/168) used ‘pictures’; 41.7% (70/168) used ‘diagrams’, while 72% (121/168) used 
‘Interpreters’ to communicate with patients. When doctors were asked if they think patients 
understood the information given to them; 76.4% (126/168) answered affirmatively. 
Another 3.6% (6/168) answered ‘no’; 12.7% (21/168) doctors answered ‘don’t know’, while 
7.3% (12) said they ‘didn’t think so’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Figure 5.5: Language used by doctors to communicate with patients 
 
 
English language 64.3%
Patients local language 44.6%
Both English and Patients local language 69%
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5.4.8  Competence or capacity to give informed consent  
 
When doctors were asked whether they generally presumed that patients had the capacity 
to consent to treatment; 67.3% (113/168) of doctors answered affirmatively. Another 31% 
(52/168) answered ‘no’, while 1.8% (3/168) answered ‘don’t know’. When asked whether 
they routinely assessed a patient’s capacity to give consent to treatment, 58.9% (99/168) 
doctors answered ‘yes’, 37.5% (63/168) answered ‘no’; while 3.6% (6/168) said they ‘don’t 
know’. When asked to rank the most important factors in assessing patients’ decision 
making capacity (DMC), 73% (123/168) of doctors ranked ‘level of consciousness’ first, 
74% (125/168) ranked ‘age’ second; 72.6% (122/168) ranked ‘educational level’ third, 
65.5% (110/168) ranked ‘appearance, fourth while 66.67% (112/168) ranked ‘sex’ of the 
patient last in terms of importance. These rankings by doctors appeared somewhat 
consistent with the recommendations by the UK Mental Capacity Act 2005,1619 which 
suggested that “a lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to  a  
person’s  age,  appearance,  intelligence,  level  of  education,  or  any condition or aspect 
of behaviour, which might lead others to make unjustified  assumptions  about  
capacity.1620,1621 
 
5.4.9 Methods used to assess capacity 
 
When asked to rank methods used in assessing patients’ capacity when confronted with 
difficult cases during clinical practice, 72.6% (122/168) of doctors ranked ‘mental status 
examination’ first; 70.8% (119/168) ranked ‘psychiatric consultation’ second; 66.1% 
(111/168) and 58.9% (99/168) doctors ranked ‘ethics consultation’ and ‘use of surrogates’ 
third. While ‘court adjudication’ was ranked fourth by 62.5% (105/168) doctors. About 
28.6% (48/168) of doctors said they would use ‘none of the above’ methods.  When asked 
to specify what method they routinely used in assessing patients mental capacity when 
                                                          
1619  UK Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
1620 Annandale et al “Mental capacity and best interests-Annual Review 2006” 
 www.bevanbrittan.com (Date of use: 27 March 2008). 
1621  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr [42-43]. 
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dealing with difficult cases during clinical practice, the majority of doctors said they used 
the mini-mental status exam (MMSE), followed by level of consciousness, or orientation 
in time place and person, and the Glasgow coma scale (GCS). Others said they would 
involve parents/guardians especially in paediatric cases, while some said they would use 
other surrogates such as a social worker/psychologist, family members or the hospital 
superintendent. There was no significant difference across clinical specialties in terms of 
‘presumption of capacity’ (ρ= 0. 110) or routine assessment of capacity (ρ= 0.698).  
 
5.4.10 Consent in emergencies 
 
When doctors were asked whether they usually obtained informed consent in emergency 
cases; 54.2% (90/168) of doctors answered affirmatively, while 19.9% (33/168) answered 
‘no’. Another 24.1% (40/168) doctors said ‘it depends’, while 1.8% (3/168) said they ‘don’t 
know’. Doctors who answered ‘it depends’ gave various reasons for not obtaining consent 
in emergency cases, including level of consciousness or mental status of the patient; 
availability of a parent or guardian to serve as surrogate decision maker. Other doctors 
said that if the patient was in a stable condition and able to comprehend, then they would 
obtain consent. Others said if patients were incapacitated, then proxy consent would be 
obtained from the consultant in charge, or medical superintendent of the hospital, 
consistent with current regulations as contained in the National Health Act 2003.1622 Other 
doctors indicated that it depends on the procedure and whether it was a life-threatening 
situation. 
5.4.11 Voluntariness of consent during medical treatment  
 
When doctors were asked whether they would ‘allow patients to choose a medical 
procedure or treatment by themselves’; 53% (88/168) of doctors answered affirmatively. 
Another 44.6% (74/168) said ‘no’, while 2.4% (4/168) answered ‘don’t know’. To further 
explore whether doctors allowed their patients to exercise choice or act on their own free 
will during clinical encounters, doctors were asked about their understanding and use of 
                                                          
1622  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s8). 
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implied and presumed consent in practice. Their responses to that question is reported 
below. 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Use of implied or presumed consent by doctors 
 
5.4.12 Understanding and use of implied/presumed consent by doctors 
 
When doctors were asked whether they ever used implied or presumed consent when 
treating patients; 53% (80/168) of doctors answered affirmatively, while 47% (71/168) 
answered ‘no’. More doctors said they used implied consent in an emergency rather than 
in the than in the hospital wards or clinics (table 5.5). When asked how often they used 
implied or presumed consent in practice, about 39% of doctors said they used implied or 
presumed consent sometimes or occasionally, while 26% used it on rare occasions. Only 
about 11% said they used it all of the time, while another 24% said they never used it at 
all as shown in figure 5.6 below. Another 66% (95/168) of doctors also said they obtained 
specific consent for certain procedures, while 34% (49/168) said they did not (Table 5.5). 
Those doctors who said that they would obtain specific consent for certain procedures, 
generally indicated that they would obtain specific consent for minor and major surgical 
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procedures or blood transfusions. The issues surrounding voluntariness and consent to 
treatment will be evaluated further from the point of view of patients, when patients’ data 
are analysed and discussed in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
 
5.4.13 Major challenges to obtaining informed consent  
 
In this study, doctors were also required to rank a series of potential challenges 
experienced while obtaining informed consent in practice, on a seven point scale of 1-7, 
with 1 being most difficult and 7 as least difficult (Table 5.6). The major challenges 
identified by doctors in this setting included ‘language difficulties’, ranked highest by 
87.5% (147/168) of doctors, ‘time constraints’ ranked second by 86.9% (146/168) doctors, 
followed by ‘work load’ 85% (143/168) doctors. Then ‘lack of education’ by 84.5% 
(142/168), ‘lack of administrative support e.g. interpreters’ by 82% (138/168) of doctors. 
The least important constraints identified were ‘cultural barriers’ generally, ranked by 
79.8% (134/168) of doctors, while medical paternalism (doctor knows best) was ranked 
last by 78% (131/168) of doctors as shown in Figure 5.7. Cultural barriers identified by 
doctors included religious beliefs, such as Jehovah’s witnesses, or traditional abhorrence 
of organ transplantation, amputations, and blood transfusions by some South African 
tribes. Other cultural factors noted by respondents include the need to obtain approval 
from husbands, other family members or elders prior to giving consent, preference for 
traditional healers, cultural taboos, and ‘disempowered caregivers’ according to one 
respondent. A test of statistical significance using the Kruskal-Wallis test for independent 
variables, showed that the ‘lack of administrative support e.g. interpreters’ was statistically 
significant across all clinical specialities (ρ = 0.013) as shown in table 5.6. 
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Table 5.5: Use of implied or presumed consent in clinical practice 
 
Implied/presumed consent Yes (%) No (%) Don’t 
know (%) 
    
Do you ever use implied/presumed consent in 
practice? 
80/168 (53) 71/168(47%)  
 
When do you use implied/presumed consent: 
1. When patients’ present at the clinic?  
2. When patients are admitted to the ward?  
3. In an emergency?                      
 
 
49/168 (34) 
45/168 (31) 
69/168 (48)          
 
 
95/168 (66) 
98/168 (68) 
73/168 (50)         
 
 
1/168(1) 
1/168 (1) 
3/168 (2) 
How often do you use implied/presumed consent?    
Some of the time or occasionally 
 
Seldom or rarely 
53/168 (38.7) 
36/168(26.3) 
  
All of the time 15/168(10.9)   
Never 
 
 
 
Do you obtain consent for other specific procedures?             
33/168(24.1) 
 
95/168 (66)      
 
  
49/168 (34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
284 
 
 
Table 5.6: Major challenges to obtaining informed consent by doctors 
 
Challenges                   Median score             P-value 
Lack of admin. support e.g. interpreters                    4                         0.013 
Time constraints                    2                         0.226 
Work load                    3                         0.110  
Lack of education                    4                         0.915 
Cultural barriers                    5                         0.551 
Language barriers                    2                         0.453 
Medical paternalism (doctor knows best)                    7                         0.300 
 
Notes: (a) Challenges were ranked from 1-7, with 1 being most difficult and 7 being least difficult, median 
scores are reported here. (b) Tests of statistical significance across all clinical disciplines were done using 
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent samples, significance level is P ≤ 0.05 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Challenges to obtaining informed consent reported by doctors 
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5.4.14 Understanding of standards for information disclosure  
 
When doctors were asked whether the current standards for information disclosure was 
based on a ‘reasonable doctor’ or ‘prudent patient standard’, most doctors, 60.2% 
(97/168) answered that it was based on a ‘reasonable doctor standard’, while 47.8% 
(76/168) correctly answered that it was based on a ‘prudent patient standard’. When asked 
whose duty it was to obtain consent from patients during routine clinical practice, 66.3% 
(110/168) of doctors correctly answered that it was responsibility of the ‘doctor performing 
the procedure or treating the patient’. About 6.1% (10/168) doctors answered that ‘nurses’, 
were responsible. Another 44.6% (74/168) said that ‘junior doctors’ were responsible, 
while 10.8% (18/168) doctors thought it was the responsibility of ‘any available healthcare 
professional’, while 3.6% (6/168) doctors did not know who was responsible. 
 
5.4.15 Responsibility for obtaining informed consent  
 
When asked whose responsibility it was to assure that adequate information was provided 
before obtaining informed consent from patients, only 61.7% (100/168) of doctors thought 
that it was the ‘doctor or healthcare professional’s responsibility’. About, 41% (66/168) of 
doctors answered that ‘both the doctor and patient were jointly responsible’, while 5% 
(8/168) doctors thought it was ‘the patient’s responsibility’.  
 
5.4.16 General knowledge of basic local laws and regulations relating to informed 
consent   
 
To test for basic knowledge of informed consent laws and regulations in South Africa, 
doctors were asked some specific questions. When asked to select the ‘current age of 
consent’ to routine treatment in South Africa, as recommended by the Children’s’ Act1623 
only 70.7% of doctors were able to correctly select ‘12 years’. This question was answered 
incorrectly by many doctors with 10.8% choosing ‘15 years’; while 15.3% chose 18 years’; 
1.9% of doctors selected ‘21 years’, while another 1.3% of doctors did not know the correct 
                                                          
1623  Children’s Act 38 of 2005 as amended. 
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answer. Further, when asked to select the correct age when women can consent to 
termination of pregnancy (TOP) in accordance with the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act,1624 only 29.6% of doctors correctly answered ‘any age’ as stipulated by 
law. Majority of doctors gave the wrong response  with 50.9% of doctors choosing ‘12 
years’; 13.2% chose ‘15 years’, 3.8%  chose ‘18 years’, while about 2.5% did not know 
the correct age. Chi-squared tests were used to test for statistical significance in terms of 
general knowledge of informed consent laws and regulations across all specialities. There 
was no statistical significance detected in terms of age of consent, age for women to 
request for TOP, or standards of information disclosure. 
 
5.4.17 Informed consent aggregate scores (ICAS)  
 
To compare informed consent practices across occupational ranks of doctors and nurses, 
as well as between clinical specialties, I developed an aggregate score using a modified 
version of the method described by Sugarman and others.1625 Previous authors used a 
series of seven questions derived from a brief informed consent evaluation protocol 
(BICEP) during research studies.1626 I selected a series of questions from the 
questionnaire which relate to information disclosure, voluntariness, assessment of 
capacity and understanding or comprehension as shown in table 5.7. The questions 
included in calculating the ICAS were derived from the list of items included in the NHA1627 
and from a review of the relevant literature regarding information disclosure during 
informed consent. A total of twelve questions from the questionnaire for healthcare 
professionals1628 were adjudged to satisfy these criteria. Each of the selected questions 
was given a rank score of one (1) and the aggregate score is the sum of the scores (12) 
as shown in table 5.7.  ICAS aggregate scores for all doctors by occupational rank ranged 
from 1 to 12, with a median score of 10 (SD = 2.28).  The lowest scores in this cohort were 
recorded by interns and registrars with a median score of 9; while medical officers and 
                                                          
1624  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
1625  Sugarman J et al “Evaluating the quality of informed consent” 2005 Clinical Trials 34-41. 
1626  Sugarman et al 2005 Clinical Trials 35-37. 
1627  National Health Act (section 6). 
1628  See Appendix 1. 
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consultants/specialists recorded a median score of 10 respectively as shown figure 5.8. 
Tests of statistical significance for ICAS by occupational rank of doctors was not 
statistically significant (ρ = 0.174). However, comparison of ICAS scores by clinical 
speciality using the Kruskal-Wallis test was statistically significant (ρ = 0.005). In this case 
anaesthetists and radiologists had the lowest ICAS scores with a median score of 7 and 
8, respectively, while the highest scores were obtained by OBGYN, Internal medicine and 
GP doctors with a median score of 10.50 as shown figure 5.9 below. Finally, when the 
ICAS scores of doctors were compared with that of professional nurses, scores by 
professional nurses was lower than that of doctors with a median score of 8, while the 
median score for doctors was 10. The difference in scores between doctors and nurses 
was highly statistically significant (ρ ≤ 0.001), using the Mann-Whitney U test for 
independent samples at a significance level of 0.05. The comparative score of doctors 
versus nurses ICAS is further discussed in chapter six of this thesis. 
 
 
Note: MO = Medical Officers 
Figure 5.8: Doctors ICAS by occupational rank 
 
8,4
8,6
8,8
9
9,2
9,4
9,6
9,8
10
INTERNS REGISTRARS MO SPECIALIST
288 
 
 
Table 5.7: Questions used to calculate ICAS 
 
Note: The question about cost of medical treatment is excluded from this ICAS calculation in this 
cohort because the cost of healthcare services in SA public hospitals is generally free. 
 
 
 
 
A. Information disclosure: 
 
What information do you routinely provide to your patients? 
 
 
Diagnosis 
 ICAS Score 
 
 
 
Yes          No 
 
1               0 
 
Treatment options 
 
1               0 
 
Recommended treatment 
 
1               0 
 
Risks of refusing recommended treatment 
 
1               0 
 
General risks 
 
1               0 
 
Benefits 1               0 
 
 
Right of refusal 
 
1               0 
       
B. Capacity/Competence 
 
 
Do you routinely assess the competence of your patients to 
consent to treatment? 
 
1               0 
Do you generally presume that your patients have the 
capacity to consent to treatment? 
 
1               0 
 
 C. Voluntariness 
 
Do you allow your patients to choose a procedure or 
particular treatment? 
 
1               0 
      D. Understanding 
 
 
Do you think your patients understand the explanations 
given to them? 
 
1               0 
   E. Consent or agreement 
 
 
Do you think the information you provide is sufficient to 
procure valid informed consent? 
 
1               0 
Total: Informed consent aggregate score (ICAS)  12             0 
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Note: GP = General Practitioners; OBGYN = Obstetricians and Gynaecologists 
Figure 5.9: ICAS scores of doctors by clinical specialty 
 
 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
 
5.5.1 The quality of informed consent 
 
Most studies which evaluated the quality of informed consent especially in developing 
countries have focused on informed consent practices in clinical research. These include 
previous studies from Nigeria,1629 Uganda,1630 South Africa,1631 and Mali.1632 Most of these 
                                                          
1629  Taiwo O and Kass N “Post-consent assessment of dental subjects understanding of informed 
 consent in oral health research in Nigeria” 2009 BMC Med Ethics 10 [11]. 
1630 Kiguba K et al “Assessing the quality of informed consent in a resource-limited setting: A cross-
 sectional study” 2012 BMC Med Ethics 13 [21]. 
1631  Minnies D et al “Evaluation of the quality of informed consent in a vaccine field trial in a 
 developing country setting” 2008 BMC Med Ethics 9 [15]. 
1632  Krosin MT et al “Problems in comprehension of informed consent in rural and peri-urban Mali 
 West Africa” 2006 Clin Trials 306-313. 
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studies reported problems with comprehension and understanding of the informed 
consent process by patients including the right of withdrawal. Other studies from 
developed countries have contended with problems of the human subject’s therapeutic 
misconception, voluntariness and measurement of capacity to consent during biomedical 
research including clinical trials.1633,1634,1635 While many studies on informed consent have 
focused on clinical trials and biomedical research, very few studies have actually focused 
on the quality of informed consent in clinical practice, especially in Africa.1636,1637,1638 The 
paucity of studies in the area of clinical practice of IC is rather surprising, considering that 
patients or healthcare users are far more likely to seek treatment for routine medical 
treatment, than to participate in clinical trials or biomedical research. Nonetheless, most 
of the studies from developing country settings have highlighted the need for more 
education on medical ethics for biomedical researchers, HCPs, as well as patients or 
human subjects of biomedical research.1639,1640,1641,1642 Some studies have also identified 
the need to improve the quality of informed consent documents, including the need for 
simplified language to enhance participant understanding.1643 Others have highlighted the 
different notions of informed consent such as the moral and legal dimensions of consent 
which have the potential to impact on the quality and practice of informed consent, 
including information disclosure, understanding and shared decision making.1644,1645 
 
 
                                                          
1633 Sugarman et al 2005 Clinical Trials 34-41.  
1634  Sturman ED “The capacity to consent to treatment and research: A review of standardized 
 assessment tools” 2005 Clin Psych Rev 954–974. 
1635  Appelbaum PS, Lidz CW and Klitzman R “Voluntariness of consent to research: A preliminary 
 empirical investigation” 2009 IRB: Ethics & Human Research 10-14. 
1636  Ezeome and Marshall 2009 Dev World  Bioeth 138-148. 
1637  Ogundiran and Adebamowo 2010 J Med Ethics 741-745. 
1638  Henley et al 1995 SAMJ 1273-1278. 
1639  Taiwo and Kass 2009 BMC Med Ethics 11. 
1640  Kiguba K et al 2012 BMC Med Ethics 21. 
1641  Minnies et al 2008 BMC Med Ethics 15. 
1642  Krosin et al 2006 Clin Trials 2006 306-313. 
1643  Jefford M and Moore R “Improvement of informed consent and the quality of consent 
 documents” 2008 The Lancet Oncology 485-493.  
1644  Lindegger and Richter 2000 S Afr J Sci 313-317. 
1645        Mandava A et al “The quality of informed consent: mapping the landscape. A review of 
 empirical data from developing and developed countries” 2012 J Med Ethics [361-363]. 
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5.5.2 Standards of information disclosure  
 
One of the more controversial areas of informed consent in practice surrounds the amount 
of information disclosure required before consent can be considered valid. On this 
consideration, there are two contesting schools of thought. On one hand is ‘reasonable 
doctor standard’ derived from the English common law judgment by McNair J in Bolam v 
Friern HMC 1646commonly known as the Bolam test, which states that, “A doctor is not 
guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with the practice accepted as proper by 
a responsible body of men skilled in that particular art…”.1647 It has been argued that 
English courts have opted for a paternalistic approach by following the reasonable doctor 
standard, which bases disclosure on the clinical judgement or accepted practice or 
substantial risk/normal/usual risk principles as established in Bolam.1648,1649 This judgment 
was later reaffirmed by the English House of Lords in the Sidaway case1650 where Lord 
Templeman argued that: 
  
 At the end of the day, the doctor bearing in mind the best interests of the patient and bearing 
 in mind the patients right to information which will enable the patient to make a balanced 
 judgement, must decide what information should be given to the patient, and what terms that 
 information should be couched.1651 
However, Lord Scarman in the same case suggested the use of a ‘prudent patient 
standard’ of information disclosure, arguing that: “It was a strange conclusion if our courts 
should be led to conclude that our law…should permit doctors to determine in what 
circumstances...a duty arose to warn.”1652 The courts in North America, have maintained 
in cases such as the American case of Canterbury v Spence1653 and the Canadian case 
of Reibl v Hughes1654 that a patient must be informed of all material risks, where those 
‘material risks’ would consist of what a reasonable person, in such a patients position, 
                                                          
1646  Bolam v Friern Health Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
1647 Bolam v Friern Health Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 [587]. 
1648  Van Oosten 1991 [395-461]. 
1649  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 679. 
1650  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 
1651  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 [903]. 
1652  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 [932] 
1653  Canterbury v Spence [1972] 464 2d 772 (DC) [41-46]. 
1654  Reibl v Hughes [1980] 114 DLR (3d) 15. 
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would be likely to attach significance to, in deciding whether to accept or forego a 
proposed treatment. Similarly, in the Australian case of Rogers v Whitaker1655 the High 
Court of Australia reaffirmed the ‘material risk’ standard of information disclosure as the 
acceptable standard and this prudent patient standard of information disclosure was finally 
adopted into English law by a recent judgment of the UK Supreme court sitting in Scotland 
in the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire.1656 Comparatively,  in South African case law, 
the issue of how much information should be disclosed to patients has been the subject 
of debate since  the case of Lymberg v Jefferies1657 where the Court was of the opinion 
that a “doctor is not obliged to disclose all the conceivable complications that may arise 
during a medical procedure.” However in the landmark South African case of Castell v De 
Greef1658 the full bench of the High Court concluded, that a doctor is obliged to warn the 
patient of all the ‘material risks’ inherent in the proposed treatment,  where material risks 
is based on a ‘prudent patient standard’.1659 However in recent South African court 
judgments like the Oldwage case,1660 the SCA seems to have abandoned, even if partially, 
the material risks standard as established in the Castell case1661 and reverted to the 
discredited ‘reasonable doctor’ standard as applied in the case of Richter and Another v 
Estate Hamman.1662 This recent judgment in the Oldwage case has been criticized by 
legal commentators and academic writers1663,1664 as being retrogressive and inconsistent 
with the regulations in the National Health Act.1665 While the current requirements for 
information disclosure as codified in the NHA,1666 are consistent with the prudent patient 
and material risks standards as practiced in North America and other common law 
jurisdictions, recent judgments by South African Courts in the Oldwage case and Sibisi  
NO v Maitin1667 have brought this requirements into question since they are not being 
                                                          
1655  Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479 (Aust High Ct) [83]. 
1656  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11 [87]. 
1657  Lymberg v Jeffries 1925 AD 236. 
1658  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
1659  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425-426]. 
1660  Louwrens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 SCA [14] 
1661  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
1662  Richter and Another v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) [232]. 
1663  Thomas R 2007 SALJ 188-215 see also Britz and Roux-Kemp SAMJ 2012 [189-192].  
1664  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational principles [685-687]. 
1665  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
1666  National Health Act of 2003 (s6). 
1667  Sibisi NO v Maitin 2014 (6) SA 533 (SCA). 
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actively applied by South African law courts. In addition the courts have shown a 
reluctance to expand the common law based on comparative application of international 
legal jurisprudence as required by the Constitution.1668  
Section 6 of the NHA outlines the requirements for information during informed consent. 
One can argue that these requirements reaffirm the need for full disclosure of all material 
risks with few exceptions, as specified in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act.1669  
In the current study, the results show that while the majority of South African doctors 
complied substantially with the requirements of the NHA in terms of information disclosure 
as shown in Table 5.3, only about 21% of doctors complied with or understood the 
‘material risks’ standard of risk disclosure as seen in Table 5.4. Further, a majority of 
doctors (60%) chose the ‘reasonable doctor’ rather than the ‘prudent patient’ standard as 
the required standard for information disclosure in clinical practice. Therefore, the current 
practice by doctors in terms of information disclosure is only partially compliant with ethical 
guidelines from the HPCSA1670 or as codified in the National Health Act,1671 however, they 
may be supported by the inconsistent judgments of South African courts.1672 
 
5.5.3 Comprehension of information disclosed  
 
It has been suggested that in developing countries such as South Africa, where education 
standards and literacy levels are low, knowledge and power asymmetry usually exist 
between patients and health care professionals.1673,1674 It is also important to recognize 
the historical backdrop of colonialism and racism, and ongoing challenges of poverty and 
inequality.1675,1676 In spite of such considerations however, it has been argued that doctors 
                                                          
1668   The Constitution s39 (b) and (c). 
1669  National Health Act 2003 (sections 7 and 8). 
1670  HPCSA Seeking patients informed consent (HPCSA Pretoria 2008). 
1671  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (S6-S9). 
1672  Thomas R 2007 SALJ 188-215 see also Britz and Roux-Kemp SAMJ 2012 [189-192].  
1673 Irabor and Omonzejele 2009 Dev World Bioeth 34-42. 
1674  Ijsselmuiden and Faden 1992 NEJM 830-834. 
1675  Maphai 1989 [1-24] see also Mhlongo and Mdingi 1997 BMJ 252. 
1676  Annas and Grodin Health and Human Rights 1999 [373-380]. 
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still have an obligation to adequately explain clinical procedures to patients without turning 
them or surrogates into students of medicine.1677 It is therefore important that healthcare 
providers ensure that patients understand the proposed treatment or procedure prior to 
providing consent. Some authorities have suggested a verbal or written test to ascertain 
patient capacity, competence or understanding before considering informed consent 
valid.1678 To further improve understanding and comprehension during the informed 
consent process in developing countries and traditional communities, the United States 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) has suggested that community 
participation is acceptable. This may include providing written information sheets for 
discussions with family members and holding community meetings, but cautions that 
family permission should not replace the requirement for individual informed 
consent.1679,1680  
 
5.5.4 Language as a barrier to informed consent 
 
The ability to use written information is important to comprehension and 
understanding,1681 as such; barriers to communication arising from illiteracy and language 
differences may prevent a common understanding of medical procedures, thereby putting 
patients at risk of providing consent without comprehension.1682  In the current study, one 
of the major barriers towards obtaining valid consent by doctors was ‘language difficulties’, 
ranked highest by 88% of doctors in this cohort. This was supported by complaints about 
‘lack of education’ (85%) and lack of administrative support such as interpreters by 82% 
of doctors (Figure 5.7). Therefore, it cannot be overemphasized that one of the major 
barriers to obtaining valid informed consent in this environment is the issue of language. 
It has been argued that language barriers can have a deleterious effect on healthcare 
service delivery, leading to such errors as misdiagnosis, failure of preventive therapy or 
                                                          
1677  Lore 1993 Medicus 227-229. 
1678  Appelbaum 2007 N Engl J Med 1834-1840. 
1679  National Bioethics Advisory Commission Presidential bioethics commission issues report on 
 clinical trials research in developing countries (Bethesda USA NBAC 2001). 
1680  Tindana et al 2006 IRB 1-6. 
1681  Green et al 2003 J Paediatric Child Health 700-703. 
1682  Richter L et al “Guidelines for the development of culturally sensitive approaches to obtaining 
 informed consent for participation in HIV vaccine-related trials” (UNAIDS Geneva1999). 
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non-adherence to prescribed medication, which could ultimately lead to charges of 
medical negligence and award of damages against doctors.1683 The issues of language 
difficulties and the necessity for appropriately trained interpreters, is not limited to 
developing countries, but is also a barrier to proper healthcare service delivery in 
developed countries such as the USA or any multicultural/multilingual setting.1684,1685 
Currently South Africa has eleven official languages; therefore language barriers, 
especially the absence of adequately trained interpreters to assist HCPs professionals in 
providing care to patients is a major problem. In another study at a South African district 
hospital, the authors concluded that language barriers in the hospital created significant 
problems for healthcare professionals and impacted negatively on patients’ rights to 
confidentiality, informed consent and the quality of healthcare service delivery.1686  
 
5.5.5 Decision making capacity  
 
In the common law, there is a presumption that every adult person has the capacity to 
consent or refuse medical treatment unless proven otherwise by acceptable evidence. A 
lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to a person’s age, appearance, 
and intelligence, or level of education, or any condition or aspect of behavior, which might 
lead others to make unjustified assumptions about capacity.1687 According to an opinion 
from an English court in the case of Richmond v Richmond:1688 
 
Capacity is ultimately a legal not a medical decision… it is for the court to decide the question of 
capacity, although the court must pay attention to the evidence of experts in the medical profession 
who can indicate the meaning of symptoms and give some idea of the mental deterioration which 
takes place in cases of this kind….  
 
                                                          
1683  Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 229-331. 
1684  Schenker et al 2016 J Gen Intern Med 294–299.  
1685  Tate et al 2016 Prehospital Emergency Care 1-11.  
1686  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
1687  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr 42. 
1688  Richmond v Richmond [1914] 111 LT 273 2 [148]. 
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Thorpe J summarized the common law test for capacity in Re C1689 where he said that: 
the patient must be able to (a) comprehend and retain the information (b) believe it (c) 
weight it in the balance so as to arrive at a choice. However, the UK Mental Capacity 
Act1690 further simplified this test, which now states that a person is deemed incapable of 
making a decision and exercising autonomy rights where that person is unable: 
a) To understand the information relevant to the decision, b) To retain that information 
c) To use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
d) To communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means).1691  
 
In the study reported here, about 67% of doctors said that they would presume that 
patients have the capacity to consent to treatment, although this low percentage may 
have been influenced by the large number of pediatricians within our study cohort, who 
would normally assume that their patients could not provide the necessary consent 
based on their age. Similarly, only 59% of doctors in this cohort claimed that they 
routinely tested their patients for capacity to prior to treatment. On the other hand, the 
majority of doctors accurately ranked factors such as level of consciousness, age, 
educational level, appearance and sex, in descending order, as being factors used in 
the assessment of capacity. When assessing capacity in difficult cases, majority of 
doctors responding said they would use a MMSE, GCS or orientation in time place and 
person, to ascertain patient’s capacity to give consent to treatment. This is contrary to 
previous studies on capacity assessment tools for medical treatment, which concluded 
that both the MMSE and GCS should be viewed as blunt instruments when determining 
patients’ capacity.1692 Perhaps more sensitive capacity assessment tools, such as the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Treatment (MacCAT-T) should be evaluated 
for use in this setting.1693,1694  
                                                          
1689 Re C: Adult Refusal of Medical Treatment [1994] 1 All ER 683.  
1690   UK Mental Capacity Act 2005. 
1691  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr  43 see also Annandale et al www.bevanbrittan.com  
 (Date of use: 27 March 2008). 
1692  Sturman ED “The capacity to consent to treatment and research: A review of standardized 
 assessment tools” 2005 Clin Psych Rev 954-974. 
1693  Sturman 2005 Clin Psych Rev 954-974. 
1694  Appelbaum PS  2007 N Engl J Med 1834-40. 
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5.5.6 Voluntariness and consent or agreement to treatment 
 
Voluntariness of consent has been one of the more difficult areas to assess by empirical 
methods due to variations in patients’ clinical condition and cultural norms associated with 
the concept of voluntariness.1695,1696 In traditional African societies the influence and 
respect for family, friends and elders is very important in accordance with cultural 
norms.1697 Therefore, it is not unusual for individuals to seek the advice of family, friends 
and relatives before making important decisions regarding healthcare.1698,1699  While these 
types of interference may be considered undue influence in western cultures, with their 
history of libertarian autonomy and individual rights. African societies are more accepting 
of collective decision making, based on a different concept of autonomy derived from 
Ubuntu or “sumus, ergo sum, (we are, therefore I am)”.1700,1701 It is generally recognized 
that voluntariness in informed consent means that the patients’ consent must be given 
voluntarily, devoid of any undue influence or coercion either by fraudulent 
misrepresentation or trickery from the physician or family or friends.1702 According to Lord 
Donaldson in Re T:1703  
If…his will was overborne, the refusal will not have represented a true decision. In this context the 
relationship of the persuader to the patient-for example, spouse, parents or religious adviser-will be 
important, because some relationships more readily lend themselves to overbearing the patient’s 
independent will than others. 
In the current study, I have tried to study voluntariness by asking some indirect questions 
from doctors such as whether doctors would allow patients to choose a particular 
procedure or treatment, of which only 53% of doctors answered affirmatively. Similarly, 
                                                          
1695  Nelson RM et al “The concept of voluntary consent” 2011 AJOB 6-16. 
1696  Appelbaum PS, Lidz CW and Klitzman R “Voluntariness of consent to research: A preliminary 
 empirical investigation” 2009 IRB: Ethics & Research 10-14. 
1697  Frimpong-Mansoh 2008 Dev World Bioeth 104-114. 
1698  Irabor and Omonzejele 2009 Dev World Bioeth 34-42 see also Ezeome and Marshall 2009 
 Dev World Bioeth 138-148. 
1699  Tindana et al 2006 IRB 1-6. 
1700  Cullinan T “Other societies have different concepts of autonomy” 1997 BMJ 248. 
1701  Metz and Gaie 2010 J Moral Educ 273‑9 see also Chima 2015 Nig J Clin Pract s1-S7 and 
 Frimpong-Mansoh 2008 Dev World Bioeth 104-114. 
1702  Nelson et al 2011 AJOB 6-16 see also Beauchamp and  Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 
 94-98. 
1703  Re T (An adult): Consent to Medical Treatment [1992] 2 FLR 458 [799]. 
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when asked whether doctors ever used implied or presumed consent in practice, 53% 
answered affirmatively. When further asked how often they used implied or presumed 
consent in practice, 39% said they used it occasionally, 26% said rarely, while 11% said 
‘all of the time’. Only 24% of doctors said they ‘never’ used implied or presumed consent 
in practice (table 5.5). This suggests some forms of medical paternalism are still prevalent 
in clinical practice in this setting. It appears that many doctors resort to implied/presumed 
consent in lieu of obtaining legally valid consent, contrary to ethical guidelines from the 
HPCSA, which advices doctors not to simply presume that patients have given consent 
when they lay down on the examination table.1704 The advice from the HPCSA is 
consistent with the injunction of a South African court in the case of Stoffberg v Elliot1705 
where the court said that: 
 
A man by entering a hospital does not submit himself to such surgical operations as the doctors in 
attendance upon him might think necessary…he retains his rights of control and disposal of his own 
body; he still has the right to say what operation he will submit to, and unless consent to an operation 
is expressly obtained, any operation performed on him without his consent is an unlawful 
interference with his right of security and control of his own body… 
Perhaps this unquestioned practice of using inferred consent could be explained by the 
power asymmetry that exists between doctors and patients in the African setting, or the 
special respect shown to doctors by patients in this environment as described by other 
studies from Nigeria.1706 It may also be associated with the many challenges experienced 
by doctors practicing in this South Africa public hospitals who reported factors such as 
heavy workload and lack of administrative support as barriers to informed consent as 
shown in figure 5.7.  
5.5.7 Comparative analysis of ICAS scores  
 
Analysis of ICAS scores showed that interns and registrars scored lower than medical 
officers and consultant/specialists. This could be explained by the fact that interns and 
registrars are still trainees and it should be expected that their knowledge of informed 
                                                          
1704  HPCSA Seeking patients informed consent (HPCSA 2008) 11. 
1705  Stoffberg v Elliot [1923] CPD 148 [150]. 
1706  Ezeome and Marshall 2009 Dev World Bioeth 142. 
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requirements would be lower than that of their trainers and supervisors. Across the clinical 
subspecialties, radiologists and anaesthetists scored lower than internists, surgeons, and 
GPs. This is somewhat consistent with findings from another study in Croatia where 
anaesthetists scored lower than internists and surgeons on informed consent.1707 A 
plausible explanation for this observation is that due to the fact that radiologists and 
anaesthesiologists are ancillary subspecialties, they may not be required to provide 
information to patients such as diagnosis and treatment options etc., and may also depend 
on primary care physicians to obtain prior informed consent, before referral for 
supplementary services in terms of scope of practice.1708 In the case of comparison 
between nurses and doctors, it should be expected that doctors are more knowledgeable 
about informed consent regulations, because doctors are generally better trained in the 
areas of medical law and ethics and are required to make final decisions regarding patient 
care, therefore the requisite knowledge about regulations and practice maybe more 
rigorously enforced by the regulatory authorities. However it must be noted that the NHA 
stipulates that ‘every healthcare provider’1709 must obtain informed consent from 
healthcare users’ (patients), before any medical procedure. This clearly requires 
professional nurses and other HCPs to be equally knowledgeable about IC when 
compared to medical doctors. 
 
5.6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
Previous studies on informed consent during clinical practice in African hospitals have 
shown that while doctors are generally knowledgeable about the ethical doctrine of 
informed consent, the application and adherence to the standard ethical requirements of 
informed consent is usually lacking in practice. Analysis of data from this study confirm 
these observations by showing that doctors practicing in public hospitals in South Africa 
are relatively knowledgeable about the ethical requirements of informed consent, such as 
                                                          
1707  Jukic M et al “Knowledge and practices of obtaining informed consent for medical 
 procedures among specialist physicians: Questionnaire study in 6 Croatian hospitals” 2009 
 Croat Med J 567-574. 
1708  HPCSA Seeking patients informed consent: the ethical considerations 2nd ed (HPCSA Pretoria 
 2007). 
1709  National Health Act of 2003 (s6). 
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information disclosure, and decision making capacity. However not all doctors in this 
cohort adhered to the critical elements of IC as specified in the National Health Act 2003, 
or the requirements based on international standards of care or local ethical guidelines. 
The major challenges militating against the proper practice of informed consent as 
identified in this study were related to issues of language barriers, lack of administrative 
support in the form of interpreters to assist with communicating with patients. Others 
factors identified include large patient numbers with associated time constraints and 
heavy workload. These results show that while the majority of doctors spent an average 
of 5-10 minutes on obtaining informed consent, this amount of time was considered 
inadequate by other doctors. Knowledge of essential local laws such as the age of consent 
to routine medical treatment or age of consent for TOP in South Africa was not universally 
known by doctors. Similarly, the majority of doctors still believed in the paternalistic 
concept of a ‘reasonable doctor standard’ rather than more currently accepted ‘prudent 
patient’ and ‘material risks’ standards of information disclosure. This study suggests that 
doctors were statistically more knowledgeable about informed consent than professional 
nurses, however it remains to be seen whether this translates directly into clinical practice. 
Finally, there was evidence of overuse of implied and presumed consent or inferred 
consent by doctors with poor implications for medical paternalism, respect for autonomy 
and lack of patient volition to provide valid informed consent.  Some limitations of this 
study include the fact that this study was limited to public hospitals in an urban setting and 
the study period was restricted to 3 months. It is possible that other studies in private 
hospitals or in a more rural setting in South Africa may yield some different results. Based 
on the findings in this study, one can recommended the recruitment and training of a 
‘corps’ of interpreters as part of  the medical team in South African public hospitals, to 
assist in improving the quality of doctor-patient communications, informed consent, patient 
confidentiality and healthcare service delivery in public hospitals. It would also be useful 
to modify the current universal hospital consent form to better reflect current teaching in 
medico-legal practice, by including translations in local languages, or options for specific 
consent for certain procedures or mandatory disclosures as required by law. It would also 
be useful for patient information leaflets to be produced in local languages to enhance 
patient education, information disclosure, and understanding by patients, prior to providing 
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consent. Finally, continuing education for doctors and other healthcare professionals in 
ethics and medical law will go a long way towards improving the overall quality of 
healthcare service delivery in South African hospitals. 
 
5.7 Summary of chapter 5 
 
This chapter reports the findings from doctors who participated in the cross-sectional 
empirical research study conducted at randomly selected public hospitals in EThekwini 
metropolitan municipality (Durban), KZN province, South Africa. One hundred and sixty-
eight (168) doctors, ranging from interns to specialist consultants completed the 
questionnaire-based study. Almost all major clinical disciplines were represented in the 
study. The major findings from this aspect of the thesis is that doctors practising in this 
setting are fairly knowledgeable regarding the IC regulations in South Africa and 
international ethical guidelines, however implementation in practice was deficient. Doctors 
generally disclosed many of the items as stipulated in the National Health Act 2003, prior 
to obtaining IC from patients. However, doctors knowledge of basic local laws pertaining 
to IC and medical treatment was deficient with only 70% of doctors  able to identify the 
correct age of consent to treatment as ‘12’ years of age. Further, only 30% of doctors were 
able to correctly identify the age of consent to termination of pregnancy as stipulated in 
the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 1996. To compare knowledge about IC 
between different categories of doctors and nurses, a 12-item informed consent aggregate 
score (ICAS) was designed. Using the ICAS, I was able to show that practising medical 
officers (MOs) and consultant/specialists were more knowledgeable regarding IC 
regulations when compared to interns and registrars in training. ICAS aggregate scores 
for all doctors by occupational rank ranged from 1 to 12, with a median score of 10 (SD = 
2.28). The lowest scores were recorded by interns and registrars with a median score of 
9, while medical officers and consultants/specialists recorded a median score of 10 out of 
12. Tests of statistical significance for ICAS by occupational rank of doctors was not 
significant (p ≤ 0.174). However, comparison of ICAS by clinical speciality using the 
Kruskal-Wallis test was statistically significant (p ≤ 0.005). In this case, anaesthetists and 
radiologists had the lowest ICAS scores with a median score of 7 and 8, respectively, 
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while the highest scores were obtained by Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, Internists 
and General Practitioners with a median score of 10.50 out of 12. Finally, when the ICAS 
scores of doctors was compared with that of professional nurses; nurses scored 
significantly lower than doctors with a median score of 8, while the median score for 
doctors was 10. The difference in scores between doctors and professional nurses was 
statistically significant (ρ ≤ 0.001), using the Mann-Whitney U test for independent 
samples at a significance level of p ≤ 0.05. The findings for nurses from this study are 
further elaborated in chapter 6 below. The major barriers to IC identified by doctors were 
‘language barriers’ followed by ‘time constraints,’ ‘workload’, and lack of education by 
patients’ as well as ‘lack of administrative support e.g. interpreters’. Based on the findings 
in this part of the study, I am able to conclude that doctors would benefit from continuing 
professional education in the area of medical law and ethics. Further, due the language 
barriers, workload and lack of interpreters, it may be prudent public health policy to 
introduce a corps of trained interpreters to assist HCPs in their work especially in the 
public hospital setting. This will generally improve the process of the IC and the overall 
quality of healthcare service delivery in public hospitals in South Africa.  Finally, this aspect 
of the empirical research study forming part of this doctoral thesis has been published as 
a peer-reviewed research article in an international biomedical journal. 
A hard copy of the published journal article is shown in annexure one of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS ON THE KNOWLEDGE AND PRACTICE OF INFORMED CONSENT 
BY PROFESSIONAL NURSES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Informed consent (IC) is a legal and ethical doctrine derived from the principle of respect 
for autonomy. The rights to bodily and psychological integrity and the right to security in 
and control of their own body are constitutionally protected rights in South Africa.1710 It has 
been argued that a South African court decision in the Castell case 1711 led to a shift in 
South African medical jurisprudence from the ‘reasonable doctor’ to the ‘prudent patient’ 
standard of information disclosure.1712 The National Health Act codified the requirements 
for informed consent in South African law and medical practice by stipulating that 
healthcare professionals (HCPs) must inform healthcare users (patients) about; 
diagnosis, risks, benefits, treatment options, and the right of refusal, in a language that 
patients understand.1713 However, it must be noted that complex multicultural societies 
like South Africa, may be inherently challenged by problems of poverty, education, 
language, and the power asymmetry that exists between doctors and patients. All of which 
could impact on the practice of IC in this setting.1714, 1715, 1716   
 
This chapter reports on the findings of an empirical study designed to evaluate the 
knowledge and practice of IC by professional nurses in South African public hospitals.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1710  The Constitution s12 (2) (a-c). 
1711  Castell v De Greef [1993] (3) SA 501. 
1712  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 171-175. 
1713  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s6 and s7). 
1714  Ezeome and Marshall 2009 Dev World Bioeth 142 see also Irabor and Omonzejele 2009  Dev 
 World Bioeth 34-42. 
1715       Gordon E 1997 Fordham Urb L J 1321-1362. 
1716  Richter et al Guidelines for the development of culturally sensitive approaches to obtaining 
 informed consent for participation in HIV vaccine-related trials (UNAIDS Geneva 1999).  
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6.2 Knowledge of ethics, human rights and medical law among South African nurses 
 
Despite the adoption of the international Code of Nursing Ethics,1717 and the Code of 
Ethics for nursing practice in South Africa;1718 both of which emphasize the importance of 
IC and human rights, professionalism, and advocacy for healthcare users, in the practice 
of nursing. Recent studies from South Africa have shown that nurses are not fully aware 
or well indoctrinated on the ethical practice of nursing or knowledgeable about the basic 
ethical principles and legal doctrines applicable in modern healthcare practice. 1719,1720,1721 
It has been suggested that overcoming this deficiency may require better training in 
medical law, ethics, human rights.1722 In addition, training on the cross-cultural issues 
underlying nursing practice and contemporary healthcare service delivery is also 
required.1723,1724 One area where there is an identifiable gap in knowledge of professional 
nurses, especially in resource-poor settings and developing countries, may be with 
regards to ethical and legal rules surrounding IC and nursing care.1725,1726,1727 Other areas 
where there is a knowledge gap or deficiency amongst South African nurses, as reported 
by a recent study include; “inadequate social skills, lack of initiative, inability to apply 
theoretical knowledge to patient care, lack of basic nursing skills, and lack of 
understanding of professional practice”.1728 However, this knowledge gap amongst nurses 
                                                          
1717 International Council of Nurses ICN Code of Ethics for Nurses (ICN Geneva 2012). 
1718   South African Nursing Council Code of ethics for nursing practitioners in South Africa (SANC 
 Pretoria 2013).  
1719  White J, Phakoe M and Rispel LC “Practice what you preach: Nurses’ perspectives on the 
 code of  ethics and service pledge in five South African hospitals” 2015 Glob Health Action 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/gha.v8.26341 (Date of use: 28 July 2017). 
1720  Stellenberg EL and Dorse AJ “Ethical issues that confront nurses in private hospitals in the 
 Western Cape metropolitan area” 2014 Curationis 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 (Date of use: 28 July 2017). 
1721 London L and Baldwin-Ragaven L “Human rights and health: Challenges for training nurses in 
 South Africa” 2008 Curationis 5-18. 
1722  London and Baldwin-Ragaven 2008 Curationis 5-18. 
1723  Barnes DM, Davis AJ and Moran T et al “Informed consent in multicultural cancer patient 
 population: Implications for nursing practice 1998 Nurs Ethics 412-423.  
1724  Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 503-509. 
1725  Stellenberg and Dorse 2014 Curationis http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 (Date f use: 
 28 July 2017). 
1726  Rosse PA and Krebs LU “The nurse’s role in the informed consent process” 1999 Semin Oncol 
 Nurs 116-123. 
1727  Bristol ST and Hicks RW “Protecting boundaries of consent in clinical research: implications 
 for improvement” 2014 Nurs Ethics 16-27. 
1728  Armstrong SJ and Rispel LC “Social accountability and nursing education in South Africa” 
 2015 Glob Health Action http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/gha.v8.27879 (Date of use: 28 July 2017).  
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is not limited to South Africa or only developing countries.1729 It is equally evident in nurses 
trained in other parts of the world, including developed countries due to cross-cultural 
issues and other ethical and moral conflicts as reported in studies from Indonesia,1730 
Iran,1731 Korea,1732 Japan,1733 and Greece.1734  
 
6.3 The doctrine of Informed consent and respect for autonomy 
 
The ethical and legal doctrine of IC is derived from the principle of respect for autonomy. 
Although there are many theories regarding the concept of autonomy, there is no 
universally accepted definition,1735 leading to a situation where there are various 
interpretations of this concept by nurses, including diverse interpretations such as “self-
governance, liberty, rights, privacy, individual choice, freedom of will, governing one’s 
behaviour and being one’s own person”.1736 Based on this lack of clarity on the meaning 
of respect for autonomy, some have suggested alternative interpretations of autonomy 
such as: 
  (a) A liberal view based on an individual’s freedom of choice and self-determination;  
 (b) The Kantian idea of moral autonomy, which emphasizes self-determination as well 
 rationality of choice;  
                                                          
1729  Butts JB, “Ethics in professional nursing practice” in Nursing ethics: Across the curriculum and 
 into practice Butts JB and Rich KL (eds) (Jones and Bartlett Publishers Burlington MA 2008) 
 71-122. 
1730  Susilo AP et al “Nurses role in informed consent in a hierarchical  and communal context”  2013 
 Nurs Ethics 413-425. 
1731  Rouhangiz M and Rutledge DN “Perceptions of informed consent for care practices: 
 Hospitalized patients and nurses” 2011 Applied Nurs Res 276-280. 
1732  Lee S et al “Nurses perceptions of informed consent and their related roles in Korea: An 
 exploratory study” 2009 Int J Nursing Stud 1580-1584 
1733  Masaki S, Ishimoto H and Asai A “Contemporary issues concerning informed consent in  Japan 
 based on a review of court decisions and characteristics of Japanese culture”  2014 BMC Med  
 Ethics 8. 
1734  Lemonidou C et al “A comparison of surgical patients’ and nurses perceptions of patients' 
 autonomy, privacy and informed consent in nursing interventions” 2003 Clin Eff Nurs 73-83. 
1735  Aveyard H “The requirements for informed consent prior to nursing care procedures” 2002 J 
 Adv Nurs 243-249 [244]. 
1736 Lemonidou et al 2003 Clin Eff Nurs 74 see also Hertz JE Conceptualization of perceived 
 enactment of autonomy in the elderly 1996 Issues Ment Health Nurs 261–273. 
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 (c) A narrative interpretation which emphasizes an individual’s life plan based on their own 
 historical and cultural context; and  
 (d) Respect for autonomy is an ethic of care, which emphasizes a caring attitude towards 
 others.1737  
The above interpretations appear not to have provided the necessary clarity because the 
authors concluded that caregivers seemed to value different notions of autonomy based 
on the circumstance, therefore a multidimensional interpretation of the ethical principle of 
respect for autonomy would best fit nursing home care.1738 This misunderstanding of the 
concept of autonomy and IC may have led to incomplete or wrong definitions by some 
professional nurses, such as “autonomy within ethics means that individuals have the right 
to information, and, on the basis of this, the right to agree or refuse to participate in 
research” as suggested by one author.1739 Such an incomplete definition leaves out 
important aspects of the IC doctrine, including capacity, comprehension of information 
disclosed, and voluntariness of action in agreeing or refusing recommended treatment. 
Further, valid IC decisions must occur in the absence of coercion and undue influence.1740 
Misconceptions about respect for autonomy and the key elements of IC may also lead to 
misapplication of this doctrine during nursing care and clinical practice. In medical law and 
ethics, respect for autonomy could be simply defined as “the right to self-determination or 
freedom of choice”.1741 The ethical doctrine of IC as derived from the principle of respect 
for autonomy was illustrated by Faden and Beauchamp,1742 as follows:  
 X is an informed consent by person P to intervention I if and only if: 
i. P receives a thorough disclosure regarding I 
ii. P comprehends the disclosure 
iii. P acts voluntarily in performing X 
                                                          
1737  Van Theil GJMW and Van Delden JJM “The principle of respect for autonomy in the care of 
 nursing  home residents” 2001 Nurs Ethics 419-431.  
1738  Van Theil and Van Delden 2001 Nurs Ethics 419. 
1739  Shaibu S 2007 Nurs Ethics 504. 
1740  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 94-98. 
1741  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr 38.  
1742  Faden and Beauchamp The history and theory of informed consent 275. 
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iv. P is competent to perform X 
v. P consents to I  
It has been argued that the principle of respect for autonomy has never been considered 
a legally enforceable right in law; rather two rights derived from this principle have been 
generally accorded legal protection.1743 These are the rights to bodily integrity protected 
by the legal rules against assault and battery, and the right to bodily welfare protected 
under professional negligence rules.1744,1745 The legal doctrine of IC during medical 
treatment was famously summarized by Cardozo J in the Schloendorf case1746 where the 
judge opined that, “every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body […]” This legal opinion has been 
reaffirmed in other legal cases including the US Supreme Court in the Cruzan case1747 
where the Court stated that “[n]o right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by 
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his 
own person, free from all restraint or interference of another.”1748 Therefore, any HCP who 
treats any patient without IC or exceeds the consent given by a patient, maybe guilty of 
infringing the patients’ right to bodily integrity and bodily well-being as shown in the South 
African case of Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba.1749 This observation was succinctly 
summarized by Lord Donaldson in the case of Re F1750 when he held that “prima facie, 
therefore, in the absence of consent all, or almost all, medical treatment and all surgical 
treatment of an adult is unlawful, however beneficial such treatment might be. This is 
incontestable.”1751 
 
                                                          
1743  Shultz 1985 Yale LJ 219-299. 
1744  Jennings http://www.nuigalway.ie/law/ GSLR/2003/MedicalNegligence.pdf (Date of use: 20 
 February 2008). 
1745  Shultz 1985 Yale LJ 219-299. 
1746  Schloendorf v Society of New York Hospital (1914) 211 NY 105 NE 92. 
1747  Cruzan v Director Missouri Department of Health (1990)  Supreme Court of the United States 497 
 US 261 see also Union Pacific Railway Co v Botsford 141 US 250 (1891) [251]. 
1748  Union Pacific Railway Co v Botsford 141 US 250 (1891). 
1749  Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D) see also Carstens and Pearmain 
 Foundational Principles [543-544]. 
1750  Re F (1992) AC 1 [12D] see also Hocton Law of consent to medical treatment 18. 
1751  Re F (1992) AC 1 [12D]. 
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6.4 The legal doctrine of IC in South Africa and other common law jurisdictions 
  
Informed consent is an established principle in South African medical jurisprudence.1752 
This was demonstrated in cases such as Stoffberg v Elliot1923,1753 and the Esterhuizen 
case.1754 In the former case, Watermeyer J argued that: 
 
In the eyes of the law, every person has certain absolute rights, which the law protects. They are 
not dependent upon a statute or upon a contract, but they are rights to be respected, and one of 
those rights is the right of absolute security of the person….Any bodily interference with or restraint 
of a man’s person which is not justified in law or excused by law, or consented to, is a wrong, and 
for that wrong the person whose body has been interfered with has a right to claim such damages 
as he can prove he has suffered owing to that interference.1755 
  
In more recent South African cases, such as Minister of Security v Xaba1756 and the Castell 
case,1757 local courts have defended the patients fundamental right to bodily integrity and 
privacy, as shown in the Xaba case where a high court judge rejected police request to 
conduct a surgical procedure on a patient in order to retrieve a bullet which was to be 
used as evidence in criminal proceedings against the accused. It was held that this would 
be an infringement on the accused person’s constitutionally guaranteed rights to bodily 
integrity and privacy.1758 By contrast, in the case of Minister of Safety and Security v 
Gaqa,1759 another high court judge allowed such a request by the Police based on 
regulations within the Criminal Procedure Act,1760 public necessity, and statutory 
authority.1761 It has been suggested that the court in the Castell case1762  appears to have 
adopted the principle of respect for autonomy based on a ‘prudent patient’ and ‘material 
risks’ standards, whereby the level of information disclosure required for IC should be  
                                                          
1752  Van Oosten The doctrine of informed consent in medical law (LLD Thesis UNISA1989). 
1753  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148-150. 
1754  Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T). 
1755  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148. 
1756  Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D) 
1757  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501. 
1758  Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D) see also Carstens and Pearmain 
 Foundational Principles [543-544]. 
1759  Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (1) SACR 654. 
1760  Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 section 37(2). 
1761  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles [907, 917]. 
1762  Castell v De Greef 1993 (3) SA 501. 
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based on what a reasonable patient would consider important before making a healthcare 
decision.1763 This is consistent with the practice in North America as shown in the 
Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes1764 and the landmark judgment of an American court in 
Canterbury v Spence1765 where the District of Columbia Appeals Court held that: “[…] a 
risk is material when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to 
be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks 
in deciding whether or not to forgo the proposed therapy”.1766  Similarly, Australian High 
Court decisions have generally adopted the ‘prudent patient standard’ since the 
judgments in F v R, 1767 and Rogers v Whitaker.1768 It has been argued that the court in 
the Castell case appears to have adopted the subjective ‘prudent patient standard’ into 
South African jurisprudence,1769 while rejecting the professional practice or ‘reasonable 
doctor’ standard  of IC previously accepted and practised in common law jurisdictions 
since the judgment of Ackerman J in Bolam v Friern HMC.1770 It has been further 
suggested that the court in Castell also seems to have moved South African medical 
jurisprudence from paternalism to patient autonomy, by placing patients’ informed consent 
within the framework of volenti non fit injuria or voluntary assumption of risk rather than 
delict.1771,1772  
 
The current situation in English law is that the ‘prudent patients standard’ is becoming 
more acceptable as shown in Pearce v United Bristol,1773 where Lord Woolf  urged doctors 
to inform patients of any significant risks which would affect the judgement of a reasonable 
person. Further, in Bolitho v City and Hackney1774 the English House of Lords held that 
the opinion of any expert witnesses ought to be assessed by the courts for its logicality 
                                                          
1763  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 164-179. 
1764  Reibl v Hughes [1980] 114 DLR (3d) 1. 
1765  Canterbury v. Spence [1972] 464 2d 772 (DC). 
1766  Canterbury v Spence [1972] 464 2d 772 (DC) [41-46]. 
1767  F v R [1983] (39) 33 SASR. 
1768  Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; 175 CLR 479 [489-490].  
1769  Van Oosten FFW1995 De Jure 178. 
1770  Bolam v Friern Health Management Committee (1957) 1 WLR 582. 
1771  Van Oosten FFW1995 De Jure 164-179. 
1772  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational principles [875]. 
1773  Pearce v United Bristol NHS Healthcare Trust (1998) 48 BMLR 18 [21]. 
1774  Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority (1998) AC 232[HL] see also Bolitho (1993) 4 Med 
 LR 381 [386]. 
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and reasonableness. More recently in the case of Chester v Afshar1775 the English CA 
held that it could be considered negligent if omission to disclose risks fell below the 
required professional standard, thereby finding a doctor negligent for failing to disclose a 
1-2% risk of nerve damage even when enquires were made by the patient. One can 
therefore conclude that the ‘prudent patient standard’ is becoming the accepted 
professional standard of care in most common law jurisdictions with regard to information 
disclosure and IC, reminiscent of the dissenting judgment of Lord Scarman in the Sidaway 
case.1776 This dissenting opinion of Lord Scarman and the recent judgments regarding 
informed consent, information disclosure and the reasonable doctor standard were 
recently re-examined by a UK Supreme  Court (Scotland), in the case of Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire HA,1777 resulting in an unanimous judgment by the UK Supreme Court, that 
the expected standard of care based on all current considerations including the 
introduction of the human rights regime into European and international medical law 
jurisprudence should be based on the ‘prudent patients’ standard’.1778 The Court further 
held that this standard of information disclosure would extend mutatis mutandis to all 
categories of healthcare professionals.1779 
 
6.5 IC regulations in South Africa since enactment of the National Health Act 
 
As previously discussed, the NHA 1780 codified the legal requirements for IC in medical 
practice in South Africa. Section 7 of this act specifies that healthcare services cannot be 
provided to patients, without the patients’ IC, unless the patient is unable to provide IC, 
and such consent is given by another person, mandated by the patient in writing to grant 
consent on their behalf; or another person authorized to give such consent in terms of any 
law or court order; or where the patient is unable to give IC and no person is mandated or 
authorized to give such consent.1781 The law further requires that every health care 
                                                          
1775  Chester v Afshar (2002) EWCA Civ 724 [5]. 
1776  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital and Wisbech AHA (1985)1 All ER 
 643 [889-890]. 
1777  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) UKSC 11 [87]. 
1778  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) UKSC 11 [76]. 
1779  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (2015) UKSC 11 [75]. 
1780  National Health Act 61 of 2003.  
1781  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s7).  
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provider must inform the healthcare user or patient of his or her health status except in 
circumstances where there is substantial evidence that the disclosure of such information 
would be contrary to the best interests of the patient, thereby making provision for the 
exception of therapeutic privilege.1782  More specifically, section 6 of the NHA summarizes 
the requirements for information disclosure during IC to include: 
(a) The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the 
user.  
(b) The benefits, risks, and consequences generally associated with each option; and  
(c) The user’s right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, and 
obligations of such refusal.1783 
 
The NHA also requires that the health care providers must inform the patient ‘in a 
language that the patient understands while taking into account the patient’s literacy 
level’.1784 One can argue that in general terms, the NHA  appears to encompass most of 
the key elements of  IC as described by most international ethical guidelines and 
authoritative texts.1785,1786 Albeit, while also allowing for the controversial doctrine of 
therapeutic privilege,1787,1788 where the law states that “every health care provider must 
inform the patient of his or her health status except in circumstances where there is 
substantial evidence that the disclosure of such information would be contrary to the best 
interests of the healthcare user”.1789  IC has been defined as an autonomous authorization 
by individuals of a medical intervention, whereby in order to give a binding authorization, 
the patient must be fully informed, have the capacity to comprehend the information, then 
voluntarily consent or agree to the procedure. 1790,1791 Others have proposed that IC 
involves more than a mere signing of a consent form; describing it as “process of mutual 
                                                          
1782  National Health Act (s8) (2).  
1783  National Health Act s6 (1). 
1784  National Health Act s6 (2). 
1785 Van Oosten The doctrine of informed consent in medical law (LLD thesis UNISA 1989) see also 
 Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles [871-941]. 
1786  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [57-112]. 
1787 Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr 42.  
1788 Van Oosten 1991 Med Law 31-41. 
1789  National Health Act 61 of 2003 s8 (2). 
1790  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3. 
1791  Faden and Beauchamp History and theory of informed consent [277-280] see also 
 Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [57-112]. 
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exchange of information, understanding, trust, voluntariness, competence, willingness, a 
lack of coercion, and consent between the patient and the staff”.1792 IC has also been 
described as a conversation that follows specific rules In which case such conversations 
should ideally be initiated by the HCP, and should involve transparency, engagement by 
both parties, and continues throughout the period of medical intervention. This 
conversation may require evidence of its occurrence such as an eyewitness, a co-signed 
document or annotation in the patients’ clinical notes.1793  
 
As a general rule, medical treatment should not proceed unless the HCP has first obtained 
the patient’s consent which may be express or implied, written or verbal.1794,1795 The 
consent given by a patient may be withdrawn at any time during the clinical encounter, 
and could be vitiated by any change in circumstances which are not communicated to, or 
approved by the patient.1796,1797  Some authorities have indicated that IC documentation, 
especially in biomedical research, should not include any exculpatory language which 
would prima facie absolve the person obtaining the consent from any accusations of 
negligence or malpractice.1798 Therefore, for IC to be considered true or valid in clinical 
practice, there must be evidence that five key elements have been adhered to; vis-à-vis 
information disclosure, capacity, comprehension, voluntariness followed by consent or 
agreement to the medical procedure or research intervention. Otherwise, such consent 
maybe considered invalid.1799 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1792  Lemonidou et al 2003 Clin Eff Nurs 74. 
1793  McCormick http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/ (Date of Use: 31 August 2013). 
1794  Aveyard 2002 J Adv Nurs 245. 
1795  Chima A primer on medical law 68-104. 
1796  Ciarlariello v Schactr (1993) 100 DLR (4th) 609 SCC. 
1797  Chima A primer on medical law 68-104. 
1798  US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR 46.116). 
1799  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [57-112] see also Chima A primer on 
 medical law [56-104]. 
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6.6 Socio-cultural factors potentially influencing nursing practice in South Africa 
 
South Africa is a complex multicultural society with a recent history of racial segregation, 
healthcare and human rights challenges. 1800,1801 Currently, there is a high unemployment 
rate of around 25%,1802,1803 with a reportedly low labour participation rate.1804 Further, the 
healthcare system is dichotomous with privately funded healthcare services used by about 
20% of the population who can afford private healthcare insurance, compared with public 
health services patronized by the majority of indigent citizens.1805,1806 Furthermore, South 
Africa has 11 official languages,1807 which impacts on the ability of HCPs to effectively 
communicate with patients, leading to reported deficiencies in the quality of healthcare 
service delivery.1808 Previous studies amongst doctors practising in local hospitals in 
South Africa have identified language barriers as one of the challenges faced by HCPs 
working in setting.1809,1810 Under such circumstances it has been suggested that nurses 
practicing in this environment have sometimes become involved in the process of ‘cultural 
brokerage’, defined as “the act of bridging, linking or mediating between groups or persons 
for the purpose of reducing conflict or producing change”.1811,1812  
The problem of language difficulties may require nurses to undertake the additional role 
of acting as interpreters as a form of cultural brokerage to enhance patients’ 
                                                          
1800  London and Baldwin-Ragaven 2008 Curationis 5-18. 
1801  Benatar SR “Health care reform and the crisis of HIV and AIDS in South Africa” 2004 N Engl J 
 Med 81-92 see also Mhlongo and Mdingi 1997 BMJ 252. 
1802  Trading Economics South Africa unemployment rate 2017 
 https://www.tradingeconomics.com/south‑africa/ unemployment‑rate (Date of use: 27 June 
 2017). 
1803  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S46-S56. 
1804  Vollgraaff R “Little hope of hitting job-creation target” 2011-02-20 Sunday Times South Africa.  
1805  Zelnick J and O’Donnell M “The impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in KwaZulu-Natal, South 
 Africa: Nurses perspectives and implications for health policy” 2005 J Public Health Policy 
 163-185. 
1806  KwaZulu‑Natal Strategic Plan 2010‑2014 (KZN DOH 2010) see also Chima 2015 Niger J Clin 
 Pract S46-S56. 
1807  EThekwini language policy http://www.Durban.gov.za.eThekwiniLanguagepolicy.pdf (Date of use: 
 19 August 2014). 
1808 Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
1809  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3. 
1810  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
1811  Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 507 see also Degazon EC “Cultural diversity and community-oriented 
 nursing practice” in Stanhope M and Lancaster J (eds) Community and public health nursing: 
 promoting health of aggregates, families and Individuals 5th ed (Mosby St Louis 2000) 138-156. 
1812  Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497‑513. 
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understanding of the IC process during healthcare service delivery.1813,1814 Unfortunately, 
this additional role imposed on nurses may impact on workload, leading inefficiencies in 
the IC process,1815 with the potential to lead to other ethical and moral dilemmas, 1816 
which could negatively impact on nurse-patient relationships, and the overall quality of 
healthcare services.1817,1818 This increased workload occasioned by cultural brokerage, 
and requirements to work in unfamiliar roles or outside of the job description for nurses, 
coupled with the moral distress and healthcare burden associated with the impact of 
HIV/AIDS pandemic in South Africa, may equally be associated with poor job satisfaction 
and job attrition frequency reported amongst nurses working in South 
Africa.1819,1820,1821,1822  Other factors which may impact on IC process in this setting include 
the power asymmetry between HCPs and patients, hierarchical cultural system, and the 
practice of communality, such as the involvement of family members and elders in 
healthcare decision-making.1823,1824,1825,1826 African culture is communal in nature as 
exemplified by the Ubuntu philosophy prevalent in South Africa.1827,1828,1829 Similar to 
some Asian communities where families and elders also have an important role in life 
                                                          
1813  Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 507. 
1814  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1085-1087 see also Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3. 
1815  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084. 
1816  Stellenberg and Dorse 2014 Curationis http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 (Date of 
 use 28 July 2017). 
1817  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1085-1087 see also Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S46-
 S56. 
1818 Stellenberg and Dorse 2014 Curationis Art 38. 
1819  Zelnick and O’Donnell 2005 J Public Health Policy 163-185. 
1820  Mmamma ML, Mothiba TM and Nancy MR “Turnover of professional nurses at Mokopane 
 hospital in the Limpopo province, South Africa: Experiences of nursing unit managers” 2015 
 Curationis 38(2) http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/curationis.v38i2.1566 (Date of use: 28 July 2017). 
1821  Khunou SH and Davhana- Maselesele M “Level of job satisfaction amongst nurses in the  North-
 West Province, South Africa: Post occupational specific dispensation” 2016 Curationis 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/ curationis.v39i1.1438 (Date of use: 28 July 2017). 
1822  Pillay R “Work satisfaction of professional nurses in South Africa: A comparative analysis of the 
 public and private sectors” 2009 Hum Resour Health 7-15.  
1823  Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 505-506.  
1824  Tindana et al 2006 IRB 1-6. 
1825  Irabor and Omonzejele 2009 Dev World Bioeth 34‑42. 
1826  Matthew DB “Race religion and informed consent-lessons from social science” 2008 J Law 
 Med Ethics149-173. 
1827  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S1-S7. 
1828  Metz and Gaie 2010 J Moral Educ 273‑90. 
1829  Frimpong-Mansoh 2008 Dev World Bioeth 104-114. 
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events and healthcare decision-making.1830,1831 Previous studies from South Africa,1832 
and other reports and analysis have shown the impact of lack of education, illiteracy, 
poverty, religious beliefs as confounding factors when obtaining IC in African and other 
complex multicultural societies.1833,1834,1835,1836 
 
6.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
6.7.1 Aims and of this study 
 
This aspect of the empirical study was designed to evaluate the quality of IC as practised 
by professional nurses at South African public hospitals. This was a cross-sectional 
questionnaire based quantitative study amongst nurses practicing in public hospitals 
within EThekwini municipality, KwaZulu-Natal province (KZN).  The objective here was to 
establish whether nurses are actually complying with the current regulations guiding IC in 
clinical practice as required by the NHA,1837 relevant case law, other healthcare 
regulations and ethical guidelines. This chapter reports observations amongst nurses at 
public hospitals in Durban, KZN, South Africa. 
 
6.7.2 Study objectives  
 
The general objectives of this study was to establish whether valid IC is obtained from 
patients prior to involvement in medical treatment at public hospitals in South Africa. 
Specific aims were, with regards to professional nurses were: 
                                                          
1830  Susilo AP et al “Nurses role in informed consent in a hierarchical  and communal context”  2013 
 Nurs Ethics 413-425. 
1831  Lee et 2009 Int J Nursing Stud 1580-1584 see also Masaki et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics 15 [8]. 
1832  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087 see also Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S46-
 S56. 
1833  Barnes DM et al “Informed consent in multicultural cancer patient population: Implications for 
 nursing practice”1998 Nurs Ethics 412-423 see also Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 503-509. 
1834  Lee et al 2009 Int J Nursing Stud 1580-1584 See also Masaki et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics 15. 
1835  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S1-S7 see also Irabor and Omonzejele 2009 Dev World Bioeth 
 34‑42. 
1836  Matthew 2008 J Law Med Ethics 149-173 see also Tindana et al 2006 IRB 1-6. 
1837 National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
316 
 
a. To find out whether sufficient information was provided to patients before IC. 
b. To establish whether patients involved in medical treatment actually understand 
the information provided. 
c. To establish whether IC is voluntarily obtained from patient without coercion or 
undue influence. 
d. To establish whether IC provided by patients during medical practice in is truly valid 
e. The study also sought to establish to what extent the ethical and legal doctrines of 
IC were actually being applied in practice, and the level of knowledge of various 
categories of nurses regarding IC and some basic laws guiding medical practice in 
South Africa.  
 
6.7.3 Research design 
 
This study was a quantitative study using semi-structured, self-administered 
questionnaires to collect quantitative and qualitative data, in contemporary clinical practice 
settings. The descriptive approach allowed all participants to describe their experience 
with the IC process as it happened, thereby bringing out the required information. Further, 
the techniques of person and data triangulation were used1838,1839 to compare the findings 
from the nurses with other HCPs (doctors), as well patients simultaneously surveyed 
during this study. The technique of multiple triangulation was also used to ensure 
consistency and reliability of the study.1840 
 
6.7.4 Study location and setting  
 
The study was carried out at selected public hospitals within eThekwini metropolitan 
municipality, located on the east coast of South Africa in KZN province. The municipality 
                                                          
1838  Denzin NK Sociological methods (McGraw-Hill New York 1978) see also Denzin N The 
 research act 297 and Robert Wood Johnson Foundation “Triangulation” Qualitative research 
 guidelines project www.qualres.org/HomeTria-3692.html (Date of use: 7 November 2017). 
1839 Kimchi J, Polivka B and Stevenson JS “Triangulation: operational definitions” 1991 Nurs Res 
 364-366. 
1771  Begley C “Using triangulation in nursing research” 1996 J Adv Nurs 122-128 see also Adami and 
 Kiger 2005 Nurse Res 19-29. 
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comprises a major urban city (Durban), and semi-urban areas (townships), with an 
estimated population of 3.5 million people (2011 census).1841 The area consists of a 
diverse population of about 80% black Africans, with various social, economic, 
environmental, and governance challenges.1842 According to statistics from KZN 
department of health, there are 18 public hospitals within this municipality ranging from 
tertiary, regional, district and specialized hospitals for chronic diseases such as 
tuberculosis (TB) and psychiatry.1843 The hospitals within EThekwini municipality are 
relatively well staffed, since many hospitals within the municipality serve as teaching 
hospitals for medical students, postgraduate doctors, nurses and allied health 
professionals up to specialist level.1844 
 
6.7.5 Target population   
 
All professional and enrolled (staff) nurses at the selected public hospitals were eligible 
for participation in the study. Randomization occurred at the health care facility level, while 
the individual participants at the selected institutions had an equal chance to participate 
voluntarily in the study. See sampling procedure below and as previously described.1845  
 
6.7.6 Inclusion criteria  
 
According to the South African Nursing Council (SANC)1846 and other sources, there are 
three categories of registered nurses in South Africa, professional nurses, staff nurses, 
and nursing auxiliaries.1847,1848 A professional nurse, sometimes called a nursing sister, is 
                                                          
1841  Statistics South Africa http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=ethekwini-municipality 
 (Date of use: 26 April 2016). 
1842  Statistics South Africa http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=1021&id=ethekwini-municipality 
 (Date of use: 12 April 2016). 
1843  KZN Department of Health http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/district1.htm (Date of use: 12 April 
 2016). 
1844  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3. 
1845  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [6-7]. 
1846  South African Nursing Council Strategic plan for nurse education, training and practice 2012/13 – 
 2016/17 (SANC Pretoria 2012).  
1847  KZN Department of Health KwaZulu‑Natal Strategic Plan 2010‑2014. 
1779 Rispel LC “Transforming nursing policy, practice and management in South Africa” 2015 Glob 
 Health Action http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/gha.v8.2800 (Date of use: 28 July 2017). 
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an individual who has completed a minimum 4-year programme at university or tertiary 
institution such as nursing college, and is certified competent to practice comprehensive 
nursing and midwifery.1849 An enrolled or staff nurse is a registered nurse with a minimum 
of 2-years tertiary nursing education, 1850  while an auxiliary nurse has one year of nursing 
education. 1851  In this study, only nurses in the categories of professional nurse and 
enrolled/staff nurse were included. Nurses working in the surgical, internal medicine, 
paediatric, obstetrics and gynaecology, wards and clinics that were available and willing 
to participate during the site visit and study period, were given an equal opportunity to 
participate in the study. 
 
6.7.7 Exclusion criteria  
 
Apart from the three categories of registered nurses in South Africa, there are also nursing 
assistants and student nurses.1852 All other categories of nurses, including student nurses 
studying for bachelor degrees, were excluded from this study. The objective was to 
ascertain the level of knowledge of practising professional nurses within the field. 
 
6.7.8 Sampling procedures  
 
According to Terre-Blanche and others, 30% of any population is generally adequate 
when conducting a cross-sectional descriptive study.1853 Since this study was limited to 
public hospitals, out of the 18 public hospitals in EThekwini municipality, six were 
randomly selected as study sites. Multi-stage stratified random sampling was used to 
select eligible hospitals (see list of hospitals in appendix 6). The hospitals were first 
stratified by authority (provincial or private), then selected using random sampling. In this 
                                                          
1849   SANC Bachelor’s degree in nursing and midwifery qualification framework- Purpose and 
 rationale of the qualification www.sanc.co.za (Date of use: 22 November 2017). 
1850   SANC Diploma in nursing: Staff nurse qualification framework- Purpose and rationale of the 
 qualification www.sanc.co.za (Date of use: 22 November 2017). 
1851   SANC Higher certificate: Auxiliary nursing qualification framework- Purpose and rationale of 
 the qualification www.sanc.co.za (Date of use: 22 November 2017). 
1852  Stellenberg and Dorse 2014 Curationis http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 (Date of 
 use: 28 July 2017) See also SANC Strategic plan for nurse education, training and practice 
 2012/13-2016/17 (SANC Pretoria 2012). 
1853  Terre-Blanche et al Research in practice 50. 
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case, public hospitals were listed alphabetically; then every third hospital on the list was 
chosen. Purposive sampling was also used to include the two tertiary teaching hospitals 
within this municipality because they were likely to yield the largest number of study 
participants, i.e. professional nurses at all levels of specialization to assist with a more 
robust sample population. In this way, HCPs with different types of practice experience 
with regard to IC were included in the study, similar to a previously reported study amongst 
doctors.1854  
 
6.7.9 Work units  
 
The wards and clinics at each participating hospital were also randomly sampled; again, 
the aim was to sample about 30% of the wards and clinics. Thereafter, eligible 
professional nurses working in the wards and outpatient clinics (OPDs) who were willing 
to participate in the study, were given an equal chance to participate by completing the 
study instrument (questionnaires). OPDs and wards were randomly selected on the day 
of site visit by the researcher and research assistants. Nurses were generally approached 
by three trained research assistants, and those who were willing participants were given 
the IC documents to read and sign. The study questionnaires were then handed over to 
the participant for completion. Occasionally, in order not to disrupt the work environment, 
the matron-in-charge of the ward or clinics was approached for permission, the study was 
explained to her and then the matron undertook to collect and distribute the questionnaires 
and IC documents, to nurses during a convenient time. Research assistants were then 
informed when questionnaires were ready for collection. Repeated visits were sometimes 
made to study sites during the study period to increase the number of respondents. All 
participants who completed questionnaires were also required to provide written informed 
consent. The study was conducted during a 3-month period from March to June 2012. 
Manual distribution and retrieval of questionnaires was done by three trained research 
assistants who were also bilingual in (English/Zulu/Xhosa/Sotho).  
 
                                                          
1854  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3. 
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6.7.10 Sample size calculations 
 
Preliminary sample size for this study was calculated using a web-based sample size 
calculator by Raosoft®.1855 Based on the formula for sample size calculations from this 
computer programme, the number of nurses required using a 95% confidence limit and 
5% margin of error, was estimated at 373 nurses (as shown in chapter four, section 
4.10.2). This served as a baseline for the number of nurses to be recruited.  
 
6.7.11 Research instruments  
 
Data was collected using the same questionnaire for all HCPs (doctors and professional 
nurses). The questionnaire for HCPs was divided into in 4 sections, as previously 
reported, 1856 and described (see chapter five, section 5.2.1). The first section was 
designed to obtain demographic information about respondents including dependent 
variables, such as age, sex, job title, department in the hospital, years of professional 
experience, clinical specialization. The second part of the questionnaire contained 
questions about IC practices such as; time spent on obtaining IC, patient workload, 
information disclosed to patients, language and methods used to communicate with 
patients; and challenges faced by nurses when obtaining IC from patients. The third 
section asked general knowledge questions about local healthcare laws such as age of 
consent to medical treatment and age of consent to termination of pregnancy and 
standards of information disclosure. The fourth section solicited questions about nurses’ 
knowledge and practices regarding implied or presumed consent in clinical practice. The 
questionnaire for HCPs was first circulated for comment by a small sample of doctors and 
nurses in a single hospital ward. It was then modified, based on comments from potential 
participants prior to distribution to all eligible participants. Participation in the study and 
completion of the questionnaire was voluntary. A sample questionnaire is attached to this 
thesis in Appendix 1. 
 
                                                          
1855  Raosoft Sample size calculator http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html (Date of Use: 12 
 February 2016). 
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6.7.12 Statistical methods  
 
Descriptive statistics such as proportions, median, mode and interquartile range were 
used to summarize the data. Bar charts, pie chart and graphs are used to present the 
results, using Microsoft Excel.1857 The scores for comprehension of informed consent 
were worked out from the responses. The Mann-Whitney U test was used to examine the 
difference in scores between doctors and nurses and other applicable variables. Kruskal-
Wallis test was used to examine the relationship between (1) education level and the 
scores, (2) clinical department and scores and (3) professional category and the scores. 
Chi-squared tests or Fisher’s exact test were used to test association between any 
categorical variables, as well as analysing and comparing the informed consent aggregate 
scores (ICAS) scores between various cadres of HCPs. Cronbach’s alpha was used to 
evaluate the internal consistency and reliability of the questions used to calculate ICAS. 
 
6.7.13 Data storage and analysis  
 
The computer software used for data storage and analysis was the Statistical Package for 
Social Sciences (SPSS) versions 18-22.1858 Primary data was collected using 
questionnaires. I also collected information on local laws, statutes and regulations, from 
information available in the public domain via literature review. Standard consent forms 
were also collected from the selected hospitals for comparative analysis. Questionnaires 
were filled out manually by respondents, then collected and stored in a locked cabinet to 
maintain security and confidentiality. At the end of each site visit, data from questionnaires 
was entered into a single laptop computer by a trained research assistant/data capturer. 
The raw data was evaluated for completeness by the principal investigator (myself) and 
also cross-checked for completeness and accuracy by a qualified biostatistician.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1857   Microsoft Excel (Part of Microsoft Office Professional Edition) (Microsoft Corp Seattle WA 2003). 
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6.7.14 Validity and reliability of statistical methods  
 
The study design and statistical methodology for this was reviewed and validated by a 
consultant biostatistician at College of Health Sciences, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa. The statistical methodology was further evaluated by the knowledge 
management and strategic services division of the KZN Department of Health (a local 
research ethics committee), before approval of the study proposal. According to Creswell, 
“validity in quantitative research refers to whether one can draw meaningful and useful 
inferences from scores on particular instruments”. 1859 Methods used to ensure internal 
and external validity as well as construct validity and reliability have been described in 
detail above in Chapter four of this thesis. 
 
6.8 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
 
Ethical approval was obtained from a subcommittee of University of South Africa (UNISA) 
Research Ethics Committee. Local approvals were obtained from the KZN department of 
health knowledge and strategic management ethics committee, as well as the EThekwini 
municipality department of health, after review of the research protocol. Further approvals 
were obtained from each participating hospital administration after evaluation of research 
proposals and other ethical approvals. Finally, written IC was obtained from every 
participant in the study after full information disclosure. Participant confidentiality was 
maintained by safe storage and anonymization of data, research results are also being 
reported anonymously. 
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6.9 RESULTS 
 
6.9.1 General demographic characteristics of nurses  
 
The overall response rate for nurses who participated in this study was 95% (355/373) of 
initial estimates. Majority of participating nurses were female (92%) with a median age of 
39 years, and range of 22-62 years. The age distribution of the participating nurses 
showed a normal distribution using the one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test (mean = 
39.25; SD= 9.912). Majority of participants were professional nurses representing 85% 
(330/355) of participants, while 15% (54/355) were enrolled or staff nurses as shown in 
figure 6.1. Nurse respondents had from 1 to 41 years of professional experience (median 
= 9 years) as shown in figure 6.2. In addition, almost all participating nurses worked in the 
public hospitals (99.7%) as shown in Table 6.1. All major nursing domains were 
represented in this study including internal medicine, surgery, obstetrics and gynaecology 
and paediatrics. There were also nurses with specialized training practising in units such 
as trauma/casualty, theatre/perioperative care, burns/critical care, as well as neonatal 
intensive care as shown in Table 6.2 and figure 6.3.  General demographic characteristics 
of participating nurses are shown in Table 6.1. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Nurses by occupational category 
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Figure 6.2: Nurses categorized by years of professional experience 
 
6.9.2 Information disclosure by nurses 
 
Information given to patients by nurses during medical treatment included; diagnosis as 
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nurses. Recommended treatment was disclosed by 65% (223/346) of nurses according 
to nurse respondents. Risks of refusing recommended treatment was disclosed by 80% 
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(81/346) nurses said they also disclosed the cost of treatment. Overall 78.9 % of nurses 
felt that the amount of information disclosed to patients was adequate, while 85% of 
nurses felt that patients understood the information disclosed. Details of information 
disclosure by nurses are shown in Table 6.3 below. 
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Table 6.1: Demographic characteristics of participating nurses 
Item Number Valid Percent (%)  
Gender    
Male 26 8.4  
Female 283  91.6  
Missing data 46   
Professional category 
 
Professional nurse (Nursing sister)§ 
 
300 
 
    84.7 
 
Enrolled nurse ( Staff nurse)* 
 
Missing data 
54 
1 
15.3 
 
 
Age of respondents (years) 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Mean 
 
Standard deviation 
 
22 
62 
39.25 
9.912 
  
 
Professional experience (years)  
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
 
Median 
 
1 
41 
9 
  
Area of Practice (Public or private hospital) 
Public hospitals 
 
Private hospital 
 
354 
1 
 
99.7 
0.3 
 
Note: §Professional nurse (minimum 4-year Nursing diploma or Degree); *Enrolled nurse (minimum 2-year 
nursing diploma) 
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Table 6.2: Hospital departments and nursing domains involved in the study 
 
Clinical domain Hospital units Number of nurses % 
Surgical Domain Surgery; including,  surgical 
outpatients (SOPD), Male and female 
surgical wards, Plastic & reconstructive 
Surgery, Urology 
 83  23.4 
Medical Domain Medicine; including Neurology, 
medical outpatients ( MOPD), male 
and female medical wards,  
TB/infectious diseases, psychiatry, 
dermatology, GI & respiratory clinic, 
endocrine &diabetes clinic 
 
123 
34.6 
Obstetrics & 
Gynaecology 
(OBGYN) domain 
OBGYN; including Maternity and 
labour wards, antenatal and postnatal 
clinics and matrons office 
36 10.1 
Paediatrics and 
child nursing 
domain 
Paediatrics clinics and wards including 
(neonatal intensive care (NICU), and 
mother and child clinics 
39 11 
Theatre and 
Perioperative 
nursing domain 
Theatre including critical care, peri-
operative and peri-anaesthetic nursing 
18 5.1 
Trauma, Casualty  
Emergency 
Nursing 
domain 
Trauma, casualty, Acute Medical Unit, 
Resuscitation and Emergency Nursing 
16 4.5 
Orthopaedic 
nursing 
Orthopaedics clinics and wards 17 4.8 
Surgical Burns 
nursing domain  
Burns including adult paediatric burns 
units and wards 
19 5.4 
Unknown not specified 4 1.1 
    
TOTAL  355 100 
 
 
6.9.3 Time spent on informed consent 
 
Most nurses reported spending about 5-10 minutes on the IC process. This amount of 
time was reported by 41% (144/350) of nurses, while 24% (85/350) reported spending 
about 10-20 minutes. Another 16% (57/350) of nurses reported spending less than 5 
minutes, while 11% (39/350) of nurses reported spending 20-30 minutes, and 7% (23/350) 
said they spent over 30 minutes on IC. Responses of nurses regarding time spent on 
informed consent are shown in figure 6.4. When asked if this amount of time was 
sufficient, majority of nurses 52% (185/353) answered ‘yes’, while 41% said ‘no’. Those 
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who said the time was insufficient gave various reasons for the negative response 
including; time constraints, large patient workload and language barriers.   
 
 
Figure 6.3: Nursing domains/hospital departments where this study was conducted 
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Table 6.3: Information provided to patients by nurses prior to obtaining consent  
Information disclosed to patients  
Nurses 
(No.) 
 
 
 
 
Valid% 
 Yes No              (%) 
    
Diagnosis 265  81  76.6 
Treatment options 233  112                                         67.5
Recommended treatment 223 123 64.5 
Risk of refusing recommended treatment  
 
277 69 80.1 
Costs of medical treatment ** 81 265 23.4 
Information on risks of treatment 
 
238 108  68.8 
Information on benefits of treatment 246 100  71.1 
Information on right of refusal 232 
 
114 
             
67.1 
 
Probing Questions 
Do you think the information you provide is sufficient? 
Do you think patients understand the information given? 
Do you presume that patients have the capacity to consent? 
 
270 
294 
183 
 
46 
8 
119 
 
78.9 
85 
54.8 
Note: ** Costs of treatment in public hospitals in South Africa are generally free 
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6.9.4 Nature of risks disclosed by nurses 
 
The majority of nurses in this study reported disclosing the most common and serious 
risks to patients; with 80% (256/320) of nurses disclosing the ‘most common risks’, while 
42% (134/319) of nurses said they disclosed the ‘most serious risks’. However, only 36% 
(114/318) nurses reported disclosing ‘all material risks’ to patients. When compared to 
preference of patients regarding risk disclosure, the majority of patients preferred 
disclosure of ‘all-risks’ according to 304/391(77.4%) of patients.1860 A minority of patients 
22/391 (5.63%) preferred only ‘some risks’ being disclosed; while 5.63% (22/391) wanted 
‘none’ of the risks disclosed.1861 The nature of risks disclosure by nurses when compared 
to preferences by patients is shown in Table 6.4 below. 
 
Table 6.4: Nature of risks disclosed by nurses compared to preferred disclosure by patients 
Risks Disclosed Nurses  Nurses               Patients   
 No. (Yes) % Preferred Risk 
Disclosure 
No. (Yes) % 
Most common Risks 256/320 80 All of the risks 304 78 
Most Serious Risks 134/319 42 Some of the risks 22 6 
All Material Risks 114/318 36 None of the risks 22 6 
   Don’t know 43 11 
    
6.9.5 Methods used to obtain informed consent from patients  
 
The majority of nurses reported obtaining’ written’ IC from patients 49% (167/343) of 
nurses, while 8% (26/343) nurses reported obtaining ‘verbal’ consent. Another 39% 
(135/343) of nurses said they used both methods ‘verbal’ and ‘written’ to obtain IC from 
patients, while 5% (17/343) of nurses answered ‘it depends’. On the other hand, patients 
from another aspect of this study reported that HCPs obtained consent verbally in most 
                                                          
1860  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S46-S56. 
1861  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S51. 
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cases as reported by 73% (274/374) patients, while written consent was only obtained in 
19% (71/374) cases, with both methods being reported by 5% (19/374) patients. This 
observation will be further discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Methods used to obtain informed consent from patients by nurses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Language used to facilitate communication with patients by nurses 
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6.9.6 Methods of communicating with patients 
 
Most nurses reported communicating with patients verbally using their local language as 
reported by 59% (206/350) of nurses. Another 39% (135/350) of nurses said they used 
English language, while 56% (195/350) of nurses reported using both English and the 
local language. Other methods used to enhance patient communication include use of 
diagrams and pictures as reported by 20% (69/349) of nurses. The use of interpreters was 
reported by 56% (197/349) of nurses; but was only corroborated by 3.5% (14/404) of 
patients. The implications of this finding will be discussed further below in chapter seven 
of this thesis.  
 
6.9.7 Capacity of patients to provide consent to treatment  
 
With regard to presumption of capacity, 55% (183/334) of nurses said they would 
generally presume that patients have the capacity to consent to treatment, whilst 36% 
(119/334) said they would not. Another 9.6% (32/334) of nurses said they did not know. 
In addition, a majority of nurses 76% (257/337) said they would routinely assess the 
patient capacity to consent to treatment, 19% (64/337) said they would not, while 4.7% 
(16/337) said they did not know. When asked to rank a series of 5 items consisting of age, 
sex, educational level, appearance, and level of consciousness; in terms of importance in 
assessing capacity, most nurses correctly ranked ‘level of consciousness’ first, followed 
by age, and educational level, in order of importance. Sex and appearance were correctly 
ranked as least important when determining a patient’s decision-making capacity (DMC). 
When asked to rank 5 criteria consisting of mental status examination, psychiatric consult, 
ethics consult, court adjudication, surrogates, plus ‘none of the above’, by virtue of 
importance in difficult cases. Most nurses correctly ranked ‘mental status examination’ 
and ‘psychiatric consult’ as being most important in assessing mental capacity in difficult 
cases. When asked to specify which methods they would use to assess capacity in difficult 
cases, most nurses listed the Glasgow coma scale (GCS), mini-mental status exam 
(MMSE), orientation in time place and person, and level of consciousness. When deciding 
about difficult cases, a few nurses stated they would obtain “Superintendent’s consent” 
when confronted with difficult cases. This refers to the legal requirement which requires 
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that when HCPs are unable to obtain consent from a patient in emergency situations, or 
when the appropriate guardian or next-of-kin is unavailable to give consent, then such 
consent can be provided by the Minister of Health, represented by the hospital 
superintendent for such emergency treatment or overriding of the requirement healthcare 
users informed consent.1862 
 
 
Note:  Results from the top column represents responses from ‘professional nurses’, the middle column represents 
responses from ‘enrolled nurses’, while the lower column represents the combined responses from both categories of 
nurses. There was no statistically significant difference between ‘professional’ and ‘enrolled/staff’ nurses. 
 
6.9.8 Barriers to informed consent identified by nurses   
 
Nurses were asked to rank a series of potential barriers to IC on a 7 point scale , where 1 
was considered the most difficult challenge, while 7 was the least difficult. The major 
challenges identified by nurses are illustrated in figure 6.7 below. Overall, majority of 
                                                          
1862  National Health Act 61 of 2003 s7 (1) (e). 
Table 6.5: Barriers to obtaining IC reported by different categories of nurses 
Occupational rank 
Time 
constraint 
Work 
load 
Language 
difficulties 
Lack of 
administrative 
support e.g. 
interpreters 
Cultural 
barriers 
Lack of  
education 
Medical 
paternalism 
Prof nurse N 194 190 228 181 186 197 163 
Median 
3.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maxim’m 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Enrolled 
nurse 
N 22 26 31 22 21 23 20 
Median 4.00 1.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 2.00 4.50 
Minim’m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maxim’m 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 
Total N 216 216 259 203 207 220 183 
Median 3.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 6.00 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maxim’m 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
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nurses ranked ‘language difficulties’ as being their most challenge. This was followed by 
lack of education, work load and time constraints. Further followed by cultural barriers and 
lack of administrative support e.g. interpreters. The least difficult challenge experienced 
by nurses was due to medical paternalism.  The results are also shown in tabular form 
above in table 6.5 above, which categorizes responses from professional and enrolled 
nurses separately. There was no statistically significant difference in barriers identified 
between ‘professional’ and ‘enrolled/staff’ nurses. However language difficulties, cultural 
barriers, lack of education and medical paternalism showed statistically significant 
differences  when compared between doctors and nurses, with a range of ρ ≤ 0.001 to ρ 
= 0.002.  
 
 
 
Fig 6.7: Barriers to informed consent reported by nurses. 
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rarely’ used it. Another 40% (88/218) of nurses said they ‘never’ used implied or presumed 
consent during clinical practice, while 16% (35/218) of nurses said they used it ‘all of the 
time’ as shown in figure 6.8 and table 6.6 below. However, when asked to define or 
describe what they understood by “implied or presumed consent”, the majority of nurses 
did not appear to fully comprehend the meaning of implied or presumed consent. Many 
nurses indicated that when patients showed up at a clinic or healthcare facility to seek 
help or treatment, this automatically implies that such a person or patient had consented 
to receive medical treatment. Verbatim responses from nurses when asked to explain 
what they understood by ‘implied or presumed consent’ included statements such as: “By 
routine of the patient coming to the healthcare facility- he is consenting to treatment.” Or 
“by virtue of the fact that you have sought my help” and “patient presents themselves 
requesting treatment.” In terms of when they actually or were most likely to use 
implied/presumed consent during medical treatment; 26% (73/280) of nurses said they 
used it ‘when patients present at the clinic’. Another 31% (87/281) of nurses said they 
would use it ‘when patients are admitted to the ward’, while most nurses, 41% (117/284) 
said they used implied or presumed consent during ‘emergencies’. A further 57% 
(142/248) of nurses said they usually obtained specific consent for certain clinical 
procedures. Examples of procedures enumerated by nurses where specific consent was 
required included blood transfusions, lumbar punctures, surgical operations e.g. tubal 
ligation, bone marrow aspiration. Others were HIV testing, CT scans and ‘anything 
invasive’ according to some nurse respondents. 
335 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6.8: Use of implied and presumed consent by nurses 
 
 
Table 6.6: Use of implied/ presumed consent by nurses in practice 
Implied/presumed consent Nurses 
No. 
Nurses 
Yes (%) 
When do you use implied/presumed consent: 
1. When patients’ present at the clinic?  
2. When patients are admitted to the ward? 
3. In an emergency?                      
 
73/280 
 
87/281 
117/284 
 
26.1 
 
31 
41.2 
How often do you use implied or presumed 
consent in practice? 
Some of the time or occasionally 
Seldom or rarely 
All of the time 
Never        
 
 
44/218 
51/218 
35/218 
88/218 
 
 
20.2 
23.4 
16.1 
40.4 
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6.9.10 Nurses’ general knowledge regarding the IC doctrine 
 
When nurses were asked who should normally obtain IC from patients, the majority of 
nurses 79% (270/342), correctly answered that the HCP performing a medical procedure 
should ideally obtain consent from the patient. When asked what standard should be used 
for information disclosure, 56% (165/295) of nurses chose the ‘reasonable doctor 
standard’, while 47% (138/291) chose the ‘prudent patient standard’. When asked whose 
responsibility it was to ensure that adequate information was disclosed during IC, most 
nurses, 60% (196/325), said that that it was the responsibility of HCPs. Another 37% 
(121/325) of nurses felt that HCPs and patients were jointly responsible; while 12% 
(40/326) of nurses felt that it was the responsibility of patients. When asked whether the 
amount of time spent on information disclosure is adequate; 52% (185/353) of nurses 
answered ‘yes’. Similarly when asked if the current consent form used in public hospitals 
was adequate, 81% (281/345) of nurses felt it was adequate. Nurses who felt that the 
current consent form was inadequate complained about lack of space to detail 
complications for patients since different clinical conditions may require different 
mandatory disclosures. With regards to voluntariness, when asked if they would allow 
patients to choose a particular procedure or treatment by themselves; 40% (137/337) of 
nurses answered ‘yes’, while 50% (170/337) said ‘no’. 
 
6.9.11 Knowledge of local healthcare laws by nurses  
 
To test the general knowledge of HCPs with regards to local laws pertaining to IC; two 
sets of general knowledge questions were included on the questionnaire. On the first 
question relating to ‘age of consent’ to routine medical treatment in South Africa, only 30% 
(99/331) nurses chose ’12 years’ as the correct answer. Another 10% of nurses chose 
‘15years’, 55% (183/331) selected ’18 years’; 3.6% chose ’21 years’, while 1.2% nurses 
did not know the correct answer. Concerning age of consent for termination of pregnancy 
in South Africa in terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,1863 the majority 
                                                          
1863  Choice on termination of pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
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of nurses 58% (190/327) chose ’12 years’ as the correct answer, while only 8% (25/327) 
nurses correctly chose ‘any age’. The difference in knowledge of the age of consent for 
medical treatment and for TOP when compared between doctors and nurses showed 
statistical significance (ρ ≤ 0.001).  
 
6.9.12 Comparison of IC aggregate scores (ICAS) between nurses and other HCPs 
 
To compare knowledge and practice of IC across occupational and professional ranks of 
doctors and nurses, I developed an aggregate score using a modified version of the 
criteria described by Sugarman et al,1864 which was previously used to evaluate the quality 
of informed consent and therapeutic misconception among patients involved in clinical 
trials. To this end, I selected a series of 12 questions from the questionnaire for HCPs as 
previously described.1865 The questions included for this scoring represent selected 
questions, which reflect the key elements of informed consent as recognized by 
independent legal and academic authorities.1866,1867 The questions selected for the ICAS 
calculation are also consistent with the elements of information disclosure as stipulated in 
the NHA.1868 Each of the selected questions was given a score of 1 (one) and the 
aggregate score represents the overall ICAS score. The questions used for the ICAS was 
evaluated for reliability by calculating the Cronbach’s alpha, described as a test of internal 
consistency which shows how closely related a set of items are as a group.1869  
Comparison of the ICAS scores between ‘professional nurses’ and ‘enrolled nurses’ 
showed that professional nurses scored 9 on average, while enrolled nurses scored 7. 
However this difference was not statically significant ρ = 0.090. Further analysis showed 
that there was no significant differences between nurses working in different nursing 
domains, even though nurses working in trauma and casualty departments had the 
                                                          
1864  Sugarman et al 2005 Clinical Trials 36-37. 
1865  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3:1-17 
1866  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 80. 
1867  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 883-918. 
1868  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (section 6). 
1800       Statistical Consulting Group UCLA “Introduction to SAS”  
            www.https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/sas/modules/sas-learning-module-introduction-to-the-features-of- 
 sas (Date of use: 13 February 2018). 
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highest ICAS score of 10. The difference in scores between nursing domains was also 
not statistically significant when compared using the Kruskal-Wallis test (ρ = 0.293). On 
the other hand, comparison of ICAS scores between doctors and nurses was significantly 
different with doctors having an aggregate score of 10, compared to nurses with an 
aggregate score of 8. The difference between doctors and nurses was statistically 
significant when compared using the Mann-Whitney U test (ρ ≤ 0.001). The Cronbach’s 
alpha score for the 12 items included in the ICAS was calculated as 0.646.  Although the 
interpretation of alpha is somewhat controversial, this score is within the magnitude of 
reliability scale of ‘high’ with regards to Cronbach’s alpha, where a high score for 
Cronbach’s alpha is classified as scores of between 0.61-0.80.1870 This score suggests 
that the items used for calculating ICAS have internal consistency and are at least 
moderately closely related.1871 
 
6.10 DISCUSSION 
 
6.10.1 Overview of findings from nurses in relation to other studies on IC practice 
 
This aspect of the empirical study discussed in this chapter focuses on practising 
professional nurses at public hospitals in South Africa. The overall objective for this study 
was to establish whether HCPs are actually knowledgeable and practising within the 
regulatory framework for IC as codified in the NHA,1872 and other national and international 
ethical codes for nursing,1873 ethical guidelines for HCPs,1874 and other relevant South 
African legislation.1875,1876 I also wanted to establish whether the quality of IC practised by 
HCPs in South Africa is consistent with international ethical guidelines and standards of 
                                                          
1870 Flores JWC https://www.researchgate.net/post/How_do_i_interpret_my_Alpha_value (Date of 
 use: 30  January 2018). 
1871  Tavakol M and Dennick R “Making sense of Cronbach’s alpha” 2011 IJME 53-55. 
1872  National Health Act 61 of 2003 
1873  International Council of Nurses ICN Code of Ethics for Nurses (ICN Geneva 2012) see also 
 SANC Code of ethics for nursing practitioners in South Africa (SANC Pretoria 2013).  
1874  HPCSA Guidelines for good practice in the healthcare professions (HPCSA Pretoria 2008). 
1875  Children’s Act 38 of 2005 as amended. 
1876  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
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care.1877, 1878 The quality of informed consent may be described as completeness of 
information disclosure, comprehension of the information disclosed, and voluntary 
agreement or disagreement with the proposed treatment in the absence of coercion or 
undue influence.1879,1880,1881 In this case, IC would be considered true or valid consent, if 
consisting of the five key elements of IC as stipulated by law, international ethical 
guidelines and academic and legal authorities.1882,1883,1884 As previously reported by other 
authors and discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis, medical doctors practising in South 
Africa are generally knowledgeable about IC regulations, but not consistent or effective in 
actual implementation of IC guidelines as stipulated by local laws and professional ethical 
codes. 1885,1886 This observation was also supported by analysis of responses from the 
patients who were simultaneously evaluated during this study,1887 and will be discussed 
in chapter 7 below. Not many empirical studies have previously evaluated the knowledge 
and practice of IC by HCPs in Africa.1888 There are also few studies which have evaluated 
nurses’ understanding of IC in clinical practice in an African setting. The few reported 
studies from other African countries have generally focused on the performance of doctors  
with some nurse participation .1889,1890,1891 Previous reports from African countries have 
generally highlighted deficiencies in the clinical implementation of IC by doctors, especially 
in the context of surgical practice, a clinical area where many of these studies were 
                                                          
1877 ICN Code of Ethics for Nurses (ICN Geneva 2012). 
1878  US Code of Federal Regulations 45 CFR 46.116 General requirements for informed consent 
 http//:www.law.cornell.edu/cfr (Date of use: 29 June 2017). 
1879  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics [12] see also Minnies et al 2008 BMC Med Ethics 15 [2]. 
1880  Sugarman J et al 2005 Clinical Trials 35. 
1881  Kiguba et al 2012 BMC Med Ethics 13 [6-7]. 
1882  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [80] see also Carstens and 
 Pearmain Foundational Principles 875-941. 
1883  Van Oosten LLD thesis 1989. 
1884  Beauchamp TL and Faden RR “Informed consent: Meaning and elements of informed consent” 
 in Encyclopaedia of Bioethics Reich WT (ed) (Simon & Schuster Macmillan New York 1995) 
 1240- 1245. 
1885  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics Suppl1 S3 [1-17]. 
1886  Henley et al 1995 SAMJ [1273 &1277]. 
1887  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S46-S56. 
1888  Henley et al 1995 SAMJ 1273-1278. 
1889  Dairo MD, Oyetunde MO and Olaitan PB “Informed consent in a tertiary hospital in Nigeria: how 
 involved is the nurse?”  2007 Niger Postgrad Med J 209-212. 
1890  Kajja I, Bimenya GS and Sibinga CTS “Informed consent in blood transfusion: Knowledge and 
 administrative issues in Uganda hospitals” 2011 Transfus Apher Sci 33-39. 
1891  Sippel D et al “Clinical ethics in Gabon: The spectrum of clinical ethical issues based on findings 
 from in-depth interviews at three public hospitals”2015 PLoS One 10. 
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conducted.1892,1893 With regard to knowledge and practice of IC by nurses during nursing 
care, even fewer empirical studies have been conducted and most of these have either 
been in association with doctors,1894,1895 or usually in the context of biomedical 
research.1896,1897 In previously reported studies from Africa, nurses have generally played 
a secondary or passive role, both in their knowledge and application of IC in clinical 
practice.1898,1899 However, recent studies on the knowledge of ethics and ethical dilemmas 
confronting nurses in South Africa appear to focus on issues such as nurses’ appreciation 
of the nurses pledge,1900,1901 which suggests a superficial understanding of  medical ethics 
by nurses. In these studies, the most frequent ethical dilemmas in nursing practice were 
limited to patient abuse, job satisfaction, and the unprofessional attitudes of caregivers 
who are not registered nurses. These studies also emphasise that the general knowledge 
of professional ethics and healthcare law amongst different categories of nurses in South 
Africa may be somewhat deficient, with nurses in the auxiliary and junior cadres 
complaining and implying that ethical nursing care practice appeared to be limited to or 
valued only by professional and enrolled nurses with college or university 
education.1902,1903 These reported deficiencies in nurses’ education and knowledge of 
ethical issues in healthcare still appear consistent with a twenty-year-old report by the 
Democratic Nurses of South Africa (DENOSA) to the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in 1996, which stated that:  
 
                                                          
1892  Ogundiran and Adebamowo 2010 J Med Ethics 741-745. 
1893  Ochieng J et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics 15.  
1894  Kajja et al 2011 Transfus Apher Sci 33-39. 
1895  Dairo et al  2007 Niger Postgrad Med J 209-212 
1896  Taiwo and Kass 2009 BMC Med Ethics 10: 11 
1897  Minnies et al 2008 BMC Med Ethics 9. 
1898  Dairo et al 2007 Niger Postgrad Med J 209-212 
1899  Sippel et al 2015 PLoS One 10.   
1900  White J, Phakoe M and Rispel LC “Practice what you preach: Nurses’ perspectives on the 
 code of  ethics and service pledge in five South African hospitals” 2015 Glob Health Action 8 
 http://dx.doi.org/ 10.3402/gha.v8.26341 (Date of use: 28 July 2017). 
1901  Stellenberg and Dorse 2014 Curationis 38: http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 (Date of 
 use: 28 July 2017). 
1902  White J et al 2015 Glob Health Action 8: 2634 http://dx.doi.org/ 10.3402/gha.v8.26341 (Date 
 of use: 28 July 2017). 
1903  Stellenberg and Dorse Curationis 38: http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 (Date of 
 use: 28 July 2017). 
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Ethics content has always been included in nursing curricula. However, it seems that educators 
largely did not succeed in teaching this subject so that it had everyday application. While provision 
is made for the teaching of ethics in the curriculum, nurses do not seem to identify it as significant 
to their professional role. In one particular study, it was found that 87% of the research sample 
indicated that they did not regard the subject Ethos as necessary to their work as registered nurses. 
It also appeared from interviews that, in teaching the subject, more attention was given to the history 
of nursing and etiquette than to ethics and professional conduct, and that students perceived the 
subject as a list of ‘do’s and don’ts.1904,1905   
 
Therefore, reports from the present and previous studies suggest that training in the area 
of medical law and ethics needs to be enhanced amongst all categories of nurses in South 
Africa. The study reported here was limited to professional and enrolled nurses with 
nursing college diplomas and some with university education. This report shows that while 
many of these nurses are somewhat knowledgeable about some theoretical aspects of 
IC, majority of nurses were generally deficient in their specific knowledge of legal 
requirements of IC as stipulated by current laws and regulations, especially the NHA.1906 
Secondly, with regard to the age of consent for medical treatment in South Africa, only 
about 28% of responding nurses could correctly identify the current age of consent for 
minors as 12 years as specified in the Children’s Act.1907 This observation is important 
because the ‘age of consent’ plays an important role in determining the capacity of 
individuals to consent to treatment. Furthermore, in the specific case of South Africa, the 
age of consent to treatment was reduced from 14 years to 12 years in recent times, due 
to the large number of self-sustaining AIDS orphans whose parents or guardians 
previously died due to the AIDS epidemic in South Africa, leaving in essence a large 
number of child-headed households in South Africa. Failure to recognize this special 
category could lead to discrimination and stigmatization1908 of such children, including the 
potential for denial of rights to consent to treatment for themselves or to obtain testing and 
                                                          
1904  London and Baldwin-Ragaven 2008 Curationis 5-18 [6]. 
1905  Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report Institutional hearings: The health sector (CTP 
 Book Printers Cape Town 1998)109-164 [110]. 
1906  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
1907  Children’s Act 38 of 2005 as amended (s129-142). 
1908  Famoroti TO, Fernandes L and Chima SC “Stigmatization of people living with HIV/AIDS by 
 healthcare workers at a tertiary hospital in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa: A cross-sectional 
 descriptive study” 2013 BMC Med Ethics S6. 
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treatment for HIV/AIDS in the absence of a surrogate parent or guardian.1909 Similarly, on 
the question regarding the age of consent for termination of pregnancy as stipulated in 
the Choice Act,1910 only 8% of nurses could identify the correct response as ‘any woman 
of any age’.  This knowledge is important for HCPs, including nurses, to be able to 
correctly advice women including children on their rights to information regarding 
contraception and TOP, because this Act was designed to mitigate the issue of illegal 
abortions, and poor access to contraception which was prevalent under the former 
discredited Abortion and Sterilization Act,1911  used during the apartheid era. The new law 
was designed to enhance “reproductive rights and extend freedom of choice by affording 
‘any woman of any age’ the right to choose whether to have an early safe and legal 
termination of pregnancy according to her individual beliefs”.1912 The lack of knowledge by 
nurses regarding this legal requirement was quite surprising, considering that over 90% 
nurses who participated in this study were female, and in the geopolitical context of South 
Africa, nurses should be expected to provide accurate health advice and information to 
their local communities, considering that nurses represent major category of HCPs 
practising in sub-Saharan African countries, including South Africa.1913,1914,1915 Further, 
such ‘information giving’ roles could also be considered part of the nurses’ role of ‘cultural 
brokerage’ in resource-poor settings.1916,1917 Studies amongst nurses in other medium 
income developing countries similar South Africa like Indonesia,1918 have suggested that 
nurses may have up to four separate roles to play in the IC process in communities with 
strong communality, such as the Ubuntu philosophy as practiced in some African 
                                                          
1909   Brand South Africa “Government explains new Children’s Act” 03 July 2007 
 https://brandsouthafrica.com/governance/services/government-explains-newchildrens-act 03 
 July 2007 (Date of use: 13 October 2017) see also Children’s Act 2005 s130. 
1910  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
1911  Abortion and Sterilization Act 2 of 1975. 
1912  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 [para1]. 
1913  Crisp N and Chen L “Global supply of health professionals” 2014 N Engl J Med 2014 950-
 957. 
1914  Anyangwe SCE and Mtonga C “Inequities in the global health workforce: The greatest 
 impediment to health in Sub-Saharan Africa” 2007 Int J Enviro Res Public Health 93-100. 
1915  World Health Organisation Strategic directions for strengthening nursing and midwifery services 
 2011-2015 (WHO Geneva 2011) www.who.int/hrh/resources/nmsd/en/index.html  (Date of use: 28 
 July 2017). 
1916  Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 503-509. 
1917  Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497‑513. 
1918  Susilo et al 2013 Nurs Ethics 413-425. 
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communities.1919,1920 This is similar to the familial and hierarchical structure prevalent in 
Asian cultures.1921,1922,1923 According to the study reported by Susilo and others, the 
nurses’ role in the  IC process may include:1924 
 
(a) Manager - in this role nurses ensure that the IC is conducted properly including 
taking responsibility for preparing consent forms, making sure that both doctors 
and patients accurately sign the forms, and ensuring that the completed forms are 
placed in patients’ records.  
(b) Witness - this role requires nurses to attend meetings between patients, doctors 
and family members or surrogates, witness the IC conversation between doctor 
and patient, and should sign the IC document as witness. 
(c) Patient advocate-in this role nurses can mediate between different parties in the IC 
process, such as encouraging patients to ask questions or express any wish to the 
doctors and other HCPs, thereby enhancing the IC process and patient 
understanding. This is similar to the ‘cultural brokerage’ role sometimes played by 
nurses in other settings.1925   
(d) Information giver - in this role nurses could expand on the brief information provided 
by doctors, assist with patient understanding and compliance with instructions for 
clinical procedures e.g. fasting before anaesthesia, or the proper way to take 
medications, etc. 
 
Based on the study reported here, the deficiency of knowledge regarding IC regulations 
by nurses was no different between professional and enrolled nurses. Neither did the 
observed deficiency in knowledge differ based on the years of professional experience. 
Further, there was a statistically significant difference between the levels of knowledge of 
doctors generally, when compared to nurses in this study using ICAS comparison.1926 This 
                                                          
1919  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S1-S7. 
1920  Metz and Gaie 2010 J Moral Educ 273‑90 
1921  Barnes et al 1998 Nurs Ethics 412-423. 
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1923  Masaki et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics15:8 
1924  Susilo et al 2013 Nurs Ethics 413-425. 
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observation indicates that training in the area of medical law and ethics and professional 
practice readiness may not be properly catered for in local nursing schools. This finding 
is also consistent by studies of newly graduated nurses from a local nursing college, where 
their competence to practice at graduation was found to be unsatisfactory.1927 One may 
argue that nurses are not generally required to obtain IC from patients; therefore they 
need not bother about specific details of the IC regulations. However, the current law as 
specified by the NHA1928 requires that ‘users must have full knowledge’ prior to 
involvement in medical procedures. Section 6 of the Act also states that: “[e] very health 
care provider must inform a user of – 
 
1) the user’s health status except in circumstances where there is substantial 
evidence that the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the 
best interests of the user;  
2) The health care provider concerned must, where possible, inform the user as 
contemplated in subsection (1) in a language that the user understands and in a 
manner which takes into account the user’s level of literacy.1929 
 
Section 7 of the Act states further that “subject to section 8, a health service may not be 
provided to a user without the user’s informed consent”, unless with defined 
exceptions.1930 These injunctions ultimately include all registered HCPs, including 
nurses. These requirements also indicate that knowledge of IC regulations by nurses is 
not expected to be lower than that of any other HCPs, including doctors. The above 
observation is further supported by the recent judgment of the UK Supreme court in the 
case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire,1931 where the Court held that: 
   
In addition, a wider range of healthcare professionals now provide treatment and advice  of 
 one kind or another to members of the public, either as individuals, or as members of a team 
                                                          
1927  Morolong BG and Chabeli MM “Competence of newly qualified registered nurses from a nursing 
 college” 2005 Curationis 38. 
1928  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
1929        National Health Act (s6). 
1930  National Health Act 2003 (s7). 
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 drawn from different professional backgrounds (with the consequence that, although this 
 judgment is concerned particularly with doctors, it is also relevant, mutatis mutandis, 
 to other healthcare providers)”.1932 
 
 
On the other hand, one can argue that such criticism of nurses’ factual knowledge should 
not be limited to South African nurses, because studies from other developing countries 
such as Iran, Indonesia, and some East African countries, seem to indicate a deficiency 
in knowledge and implementation of IC by practicing nurses, either due to inadequate 
knowledge or other socio-cultural factors.1933,1934,1935,1936,1937 Similarly, studies regarding 
nurse performance in developed countries such as Netherlands, Greece, Korea, Japan 
and elsewhere have also indicated that nurses do not generally implement all the 
elements of IC in clinical practice, either due to a confusion about the role of nurses in the 
IC process or incomplete appreciation of the ethical principle of respect for autonomy and 
the doctrine of IC in nursing care practice.1938,1939, 1940,1941,1942 It has been suggested that 
nurses’ role in the IC process may also be multidimensional because of the current 
emphasis on the respect for autonomy over professional beneficence in healthcare, and 
the evolution of consumer, human and cultural rights in modern society, coupled with 
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1940  Lee et al 2009 Int J Nursing Stud 1580-1584 see also Masaki et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics 15. 
1941  Aveyard 2003 Int J Nurs Stud 697-705 
1942  Lemonidou et al 2003 Clin Eff Nurs 73-83 see also Van Theil and Van Delden 2001 Nurs  Ethics 
 419-431.  
346 
 
greater awareness of patients generally regarding human dignity and consumer  
rights.1943,1944,1945,1946,1947 
 
6.10.2 Barriers and challenges to IC identified by nurses  
 
In the current study, the primary barrier identified by nurses against the practice of IC in 
this setting was the issue of ‘language barriers’, which was identified by 73% of 
professional nurses in this study, as well as 88% of doctors as previously reported.1948  
Other barriers identified by nurses include the issues of ‘lack of education’, 'workload’, 
‘time constraints’, and ‘lack of administrative support in the form of interpreters’. The three 
combined barriers of language, lack of interpreters, and poor education of patients, point 
to the importance of language in the understanding and practice of IC in a multilingual and 
multicultural country like South Africa. It has been suggested previously that problems of 
language may have a deleterious impact on healthcare practice, leading to such 
unforeseen outcomes like misdiagnosis, failure of preventive advice, or non-compliance 
with prescribed medications by patients, which could ultimately result on charges of 
medical negligence and misconduct against HCPs.1949,1950,1951  The issue of language 
barriers to IC and clinical practice is not limited to South Africa;1952 it has also been 
reported amongst multicultural communities in developed countries such as the 
USA.1953,1954,1955 According to another study by Schenker and others, “language barriers 
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have been found to complicate many aspects of patient care, including receipt of medical 
services, patient satisfaction, interpersonal processes of care, comprehension, adherence 
to prescribed medication regimens, and length of hospital stay”.1956 In this study, it was  
reported that even where interpreter services are readily available; such availability did 
not prevent failure to document IC in patients’ clinical notes among patients with low 
English proficiency. Further, in another international comparative study between USA and 
South Africa, in a prehospital ambulatory care setting, emergency medical services (EMS) 
telecommunicators identified telephonic interpreter services as the single most effective 
strategy for overcoming language barriers.1957 However, it was also reported that while 
interpreter services did improve the efficiency of patient-provider communication, other 
unorthodox methods were used to enhance communication between patients and HCPs 
due to frustration with the interpreter services.1958  
 
Another study from a South African district hospital found evidence that language barriers 
impacted negatively on patients’ rights to confidentiality, IC and the overall quality of 
healthcare services.1959 Therefore, the impact of language barriers on the IC process and 
potential impact on healthcare service delivery cannot be overemphasized. One may 
further suggest that the problem of lack of trained interpreters in local hospitals not only 
detracts from clinical practice, but also increases the workload of nurses who are usually 
called upon to act as interpreters in this setting, in the practice of cultural brokerage.1960  
The inappropriate use of interpreter services by doctors has also been identified as 
contributing to language barriers during IC in the hospital setting. In this study, the authors 
suggested four factors that should inform the decision to call an interpreter or not. That is, 
“the clinical situation, degree of language gap, available resources, and patients’ 
preference.”1961  One may conclude that the incidences of work overload occasioned  by 
the use of nurses in lieu of trained interpreters in the study reported here, may also 
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contribute to the increased patient workload reported by nurses, which may be associated 
with the high turnover of nurses due job attrition and lack of job satisfaction reported in 
South African hospitals.1962,1963,1964 
 
6.10.3 Similarities and inconsistencies between professional nurses, doctors and 
patients  
 
The overall knowledge of legal aspects relating to IC was higher amongst doctors than 
nurses when compared using ICAS as previously reported,1965 and discussed in chapter 
5 of this thesis.  Furthermore, doctors were more knowledgeable concerning basic local 
laws such as age of consent treatment, which was correctly identified by 70% of doctors 
but only 30% of nurses, as discussed above. There was no significant difference in 
knowledge and practice of IC between professional nurses with 4-years or more of 
university or nursing college education, compared to enrolled/staff nurses with a minimum 
of 2 years nursing college diploma. Both doctors and nurses were equally deficient in their 
interpretation of implied and presumed consent and its usage in clinical practice. There 
were some inconsistencies between nurses’ understanding, when compared to patients, 
with fewer nurses disclosing elements of IC such as ‘recommended treatment,’ ‘risks of 
refusing recommended treatment’ and ‘right of refusal’, whereby nurses claimed 
comparatively higher percentages of disclosure when compared to patients as previously 
reported.1966 With regard to the method of obtaining informed consent from patients, while 
most nurses (48%) claimed that they obtained written informed consent from patients 
rather than by verbal means as shown in figure 6.5 above, the majority of patients 
otherwise reported that informed consent was obtained verbally by HCPs in most cases, 
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with only 19% of patients reporting that written informed consent was obtained by nurses 
and doctors respectively.1967 
 
6.11 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY  
 
Potential limitations of this study may include the fact that the study was carried out in 
selected public hospitals in an urban setting. It is possible that a similar study in a more 
rural setting in KZN province or elsewhere in South Africa could yield a different set of 
results based on the impact of socio-cultural factors prevalent in the rural setting. Further, 
similar studies carried out in private, for-profit hospitals, may yield a different set result, 
gleaned from IC studies in private hospitals in Greece, which indicate that doctors are 
generally more compliant with IC disclosures in such settings.1968 However, another study 
from the Western Cape Province, South Africa, on ethical issues in nursing practice 
conducted in private hospitals, suggested there were similar deficiencies in nurses’ 
knowledge regarding IC.1969 It is therefore unlikely that nurses practicing in private practice 
settings in South Africa are more knowledgeable than those practising in public hospitals 
because nurses are generally trained using the same curricula in South African nursing 
colleges. However, there may be stricter compliance by private practitioners because of 
the added fear of negligence litigation, lower patient workloads, better remuneration of 
HCPs, and more educated and knowledgeable patients. It is hence recommended that 
future studies should endeavour to compare IC as practised in public hospitals with that 
in private practice settings in South Africa.   
 
Finally, the data discussed in this study is based on the self-reporting of IC practises by 
nurses. I have therefore assumed that nurse respondents have provided an accurate 
report of their understanding of IC and current practice.  However, if data reported on the 
research instruments are not an accurate reflection of the IC in practice, this could also 
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be an additional limitation to the interpretation of results from this study. However, since 
the report comprises results from a large sample of over 300 nurses from randomly 
selected public hospitals with variable experience, it is unlikely that this limitation would 
have contributed significantly to any bias, because the large sample size, variety of 
participant nurses, and application of multiple triangulation, have contributed towards 
minimizing bias and improving the reliability of this study.  
 
6.12 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The findings from this study with regard to knowledge of IC regulations by professional 
nurses in South Africa suggest the need for increased training of all categories of nurses 
in medical law, ethics and human rights, with particular focus on knowledge of basic local 
laws and healthcare regulations, especially as specified in the National Health Act.1970 
Despite specific laws which require that all HCPs must provide the key elements of IC to 
patients prior to medical treatment, this study has revealed that many nurses are not fully 
conversant with the basic requirements of IC as stipulated by the law.  Further, the process 
of IC requires improved communication skills by nurses who may be hampered by multiple 
demands on their time, coupled with the excessive workload, in the public hospital setting. 
This study also demonstrated that the major barriers to IC practice in this setting include 
language difficulties, poorly educated patients, heavy workload and time constraints, as 
well as lack of administrative support in the form of interpreters. Therefore, it may be 
prudent public health policy for government as an employer to develop a ‘corps’ of trained 
interpreters to assist nurses in their work. This would ultimately result in better job 
satisfaction and less job attrition by professional nurses, leading to retention of nurses in 
public healthcare services. Moreover, training of nurses at nursing colleges and 
universities in South Africa may require modification of the nursing curricula to better 
reflect the job role of nurses which may include ‘cultural brokerage’ and also reflect the 
need for nurses to be proficient in the four roles identified for nurses in the IC process, 
i.e., manager, patient advocate, witness and information giver.1971 For patients who do not 
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speak English, additional time and effort may be required by nurses to provide the 
necessary information in the individual patient’s language of choice, as well obtaining IC 
using the patient’s chosen language, in order to ensure adequate understanding of 
information disclosed.  
 
Low educational level identified as a barrier to IC by nurses is common amongst users of 
public hospitals in South Africa, as previously reported1972 and further discussed in chapter 
7 below. It is important that nurses and other HCPs understand that they have a moral 
and legal obligation to obtain valid IC from all patients, regardless of how onerous the 
process maybe. Whereas it may present more challenges, IC among vulnerable patient 
groups is critical to ensure patient safety and the protection of human rights and dignity of 
patients compatible with a patient-centred healthcare services, and constitutional 
requirements.   
 
6.13 Summary of chapter 6 
 
This chapter summarises the findings from a cohort of professional nurses from EThekwini 
metropolitan municipality KZN who participated in the empirical part of this study. This 
was a cross-sectional quantitative descriptive study using semi-structured questionnaires 
for nurses, conducted simultaneously with the study by doctors, using the same 
questionnaire previously administered to doctors as described in chapter 5.   
 
In this case only registered nurses with minimum 4 years university or nursing college 
education (professional nurses);  or  those with a minimum of 2 years nursing college 
diploma (enrolled/ staff nurses), were included in this study. Overall, 355 registered nurses 
completed the study, of which 85% were categorized as professional nurses, while 15% 
were enrolled nurses. The majority of participants were female (92%), with a median age 
of 39-years, and 1-41 years of professional experience. Information reportedly disclosed 
by nurses included diagnosis (77%); treatment options (68%); recommended treatment 
(65%); treatment benefits (71%) and risks (69%).  
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Data triangulation revealed some inconsistencies between nurses and patients with 25-
41% of patients reporting non-disclosure regarding the ‘right of refusal’, ‘treatment options’ 
and ‘risks of refusing recommended treatment’ as required by the National Health Act. 
Nurses who completed this study appeared unfamiliar with basic legal provisions relating 
to the current age of consent to treatment, with only 30% nurses responded accurately. 
Similarly, with regard to the ‘age of consent for termination of pregnancy’ as stipulated by 
the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, only 8% of nurses accurately selecting the 
correct response of ‘any age’. Comparison of results obtained from nurses with those from 
doctors using an informed consent aggregate scores (ICAS) showed that nurses were 
significantly less knowledgeable about IC regulations, when compared to doctors and this 
difference was statistically significant (ρ<0.001). However, there was no significant 
difference in knowledge between professional and enrolled nurses. Barriers or challenges 
to IC identified by nurses were ‘language barriers’, ‘lack of education’, ‘workload’, and 
‘time constraints’, followed by ‘lack of administrative support in the form of interpreters’.   
 
From this study, one may conclude that professional nurses in South Africa may require 
continuing professional education in the areas of medical law, ethics human rights, and 
communication skills. Furthermore, nursing curricula at  nursing colleges and universities 
may require revision to re-emphasize training on medico-legal issues in healthcare and 
communication skills. Provision of trained interpreters in public hospitals will help minimise 
language barriers, lighten nurses’ workload, improve job satisfaction, minimize job attrition 
among nurses, and improve the overall quality of healthcare service delivery in South 
African public hospitals. 
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CHAPTER 7: PATIENTS’ PERCEPTIONS ON INFORMED CONSENT PRACTICES BY 
HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
7.1 A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THIS STUDY 
 
As discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, informed consent (IC) is a legally 
enforceable right in South Africa, based on constitutionally protected rights to bodily 
integrity and well-being. In terms of the law, specifically the National health Act,1973 
patients cannot be involved in medical treatment or research without IC. Healthcare 
providers must inform healthcare users or patients about diagnosis, risks, benefits, 
treatment options, and right of refusal in a language patients understand, based their 
literacy level.  
 
This chapter of the thesis reports an empirical study on patients’ perceptions of IC as 
practiced by doctors and nurses in South Africa. A cross-sectional descriptive study, using 
a semi-structured questionnaire was conducted among patients attending randomly 
selected public hospitals in EThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban), KwaZulu-Natal 
province (KZN). Competent patients or legal surrogates were eligible for inclusion. IC was 
obtained from all participants. Four-hundred and four (404) participants completed 
questionnaires of which 68% were female. The median age of participants was 35 years 
(range 11-91 years). Most respondents spoke IsiZulu (55%), were single (56%), 
unemployed (66%), with secondary school education (69%). Patients were generally 
informed about diagnosis (81%), risks (57%), and benefits of treatment (61%). Few were 
informed about treatment options (41%), recommended treatment (28%), and right of 
refusal (25%). IC was obtained verbally in 73% of cases. Patients favoured disclosure of 
all material risks (78%) and few consulted surrogates before decision-making (76%). 
There was association between participant’s age and knowledge of the age of consent  to 
routine  medical treatment (ρ = 0.005). Most patients were satisfied with information 
disclosed (91%), and did not feel coerced. Some were afraid to ask questions for fear of 
losing free treatment benefits (8%). This study revealed that patients using public 
hospitals are aware of the right to IC. However, many were vulnerable due to indigence. 
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Barriers to IC include poverty, language, and low educational level. South African patients 
prefer disclosure of all material risks, better communication skills by HCPs, and a shift 
towards informed or shared healthcare decision-making.  
 
7.2  INTRODUCTION 
 
7.2.1 The doctrine of informed consent in South Africa 
 
Informed consent before medical treatment is a constitutionally protected right in South 
Africa.1974 Section 12(2)(b) of the Constitution provides that “[e]veryone has the right to 
bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right (b) to security in and control 
over their body; and (c) not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without 
their informed consent”. Further, section 12(1)(c) of the Constitution states that  
“[e]veryone has the right to freedom and security of the person  which includes-the right 
to be free from all forms of violence from  public or private sources”.1975 These 
constitutional rights to bodily integrity and security have been demonstrated in landmark 
judgments by South African courts prior to the enactment of the final Constitution, in cases 
such as Stoffberg v Elliot,1976 Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal,1977 and more 
recently in Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba,1978 and Castell v De Greef.1979  
 
In most of these cases, South African courts have defended the patients’ right to bodily 
integrity and the need for information disclosure prior involvement in any medical 
treatment or surgical procedures. However, in some recent judgments in cases such 
Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa,1980 (hereinafter the Gaqa case), and the Oldwage 
case;1981 there have been some contradictory or conflicting judgments by some local 
courts. For example, in the Gaqa case, a South African High Court judge allowed a police 
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request to remove a bullet or bullets from the body of a suspected criminal, which was to 
be used in evidence against the accused. The judge based his judgment on sections of 
the Criminal Procedure Act,1982 as well section 36 of the Constitution, which provides for 
the limitation of rights.1983 In the Oldwage case, the SCA overturned a High Court 
judgment by applying the questionable ‘reasonable doctor standard’ of information 
disclosure as established in the case of Richter and another v Estate Hamman,1984 rather 
than the more recent ‘prudent patient standard’ based on the judgment of a full bench of 
the High Court in the Castell case.1985 Following the  High Court judgment in the Castell 
case,1986 it has been suggested that South African jurisprudence appears to have shifted 
from a ‘reasonable doctor standard’ to the ‘prudent patient standard’ of information 
disclosure.1987,1988 Further, it has been argued that there was a shift in risk disclosure to 
the objective ‘material risks’ standard which is based on what a reasonable patient would 
attach importance to, in arriving at a decision whether to accept or refuse a recommended 
treatment.1989,1990,1991 The National Health Act1992 codified the requirements for IC before 
treatment by requiring in section 6 that every healthcare provider before treating a patient 
must amongst other requirements disclose the following:  
 
(a) The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available 
to the user. 
(b) The benefits, risks, and consequences generally associated with each option;  
(c) The user’s right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, 
obligations of such refusal. 
                                                          
1982  Criminal Procedure Act 1978. 
1983  The Constitution s36. 
1984  Richter and another v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C). 
1985  Castell v De Greef [1993] (3) SA 501. 
1986  Castell v De Greef [1993] (3) SA 501. 
1987  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 164-179. 
1988  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 673-694. 
1989  King and Moulton 2006 A J Law Med 429-501. 
1990 Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [3-4].  
1991  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 174-176. 
1992 National Health 61 of 2003.  
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 (d) The health care providers must give the user this information in a language that 
the user understands and in a manner which takes into account the user’s level of 
literacy.1993   
 
According to Van Oosten1994 for consent to be used as a defence, the consenting 
individual must be fully aware of the following: 
 
a. what is consented to must be recognized by law, i.e. it must not be contra bono 
mores;1995 
b. it must be given by a person capable in law of consenting i.e. by someone who is 
capable of forming and intention or of understanding what he consents to; 
c. it must be free or voluntary i.e. not induced by fear or force or fraud; 
d. the consenting party must have had knowledge and been aware of the nature and 
extent of the harm or the risk; 
e. the consenting party must have appreciated and understood the nature of the harm 
or risk; 
f. the consenting party must have consented to the harm or assumed the risk 
g. it must be comprehensive i.e. extend to the entire transaction inclusive of its 
consequences; 
h. it must be clear and unequivocal; 
i. it must precede the conduct in question; 
j. it must be manifested externally to qualify as a legal act; 
k. it must as a rule be granted by the plaintiff or claimant himself; 
l. the conduct in question must fall within the limits of the consent given i.e. it must 
not exceed the bounds of the consent given. 1996,1997 
                                                          
1993  National Health 61 of 2003 S(6) 
1994  Van Oosten LLD Thesis 1989 [448-449] see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational 
 Principles [883-890]. 
1995  Slabbert MN “South Africa” in International encyclopedia of laws 2014 [113-115] see also 
 Carstens v Pearmain Foundational Principles 937. 
1996 Van Oosten LLD Thesis 1989 See also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles [883-
 890]. 
1997  Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law (LLM dissertation 
 University of Pretoria 2016) 8. 
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Failure to follow these guidelines may result in offending HCPs being found guilty of 
assault, battery or negligence. 1998,1999,2000 
 
7.2.2 Socio-cultural factors that may impact on informed consent in South Africa 
 
Other factors which may impact on the practice of IC in  South Africa and other African 
communities include socio-cultural issues such as language, education and literacy level,  
modern technology, economic factors and religion.2001,2002, 2003,2004,2005  South Africa is a 
multicultural middle-income country, with a population of around 54 million people,2006 with 
a high unemployment rate, and eleven official languages.2007,2008 The country has 
historical socio-cultural inequities resulting from an apartheid policy which left a section of 
the local population marginalized,2009 with a high unemployment rate currently estimated 
at around 27%.2010  Because of these historical inequities, there is an apparent dichotomy 
in the provision of healthcare services with the majority indigent population, of about 88% 
uninsured in KwaZulu-Natal province, using publicly funded healthcare services, while the 
minority affluent populace use privately funded healthcare services.2011  This has created 
a situation of work overload, whereby doctors and other HCPs may be unable to comply 
                                                          
1998  Stoffberg v Elliot [1923] CPD 148-150 see also Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal [1957] 
 (3) SA 710 (T). 
1999  Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba [2003] (2) SA 703 (D) see also Castell v De Greef  [1993] 
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2000  Slabbert International encyclopaedia of laws 109-155. 
2001  Ezeome and Marshall 2009 Dev World Bioeth 138–148.  
2002  Irabor and Omonzejele 2009 Dev World Bioeth 34-42. 
2003  Molyneux et al 2005 Soc Sci Med 443-454 
2004  Jack C et al “Language, cultural brokerage and informed consent-will technological terms 
 impede  telemedicine use?” 2014 S Afr J B L 14-18. 
2005  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S1-S7. 
2006 Statistics South Africa Mid-year population estimate 2014 http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/ (Date of 
 use: 20  July 2014). 
2007  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
2008  EThekwini Municipality EThekwini language policy 
 http://www.Durban.gov.za.eThekwiniLanguagepolicy.pdf (Date of use: 19 August 2014). 
2009  Maphai VT “Affirmative action in South Africa ‑a genuine option?”1989 Social Dynamics 1-24. 
2010  Trading Economics South Africa unemployment rate 2017 
 https://www.tradingeconomics.com/south‑africa/ unemployment‑rate (Date of use: 27 June 
 2017). 
2011  KZN Department of Health KwaZulu-Natal Strategic plan 2010-2014 (Department of Health, 
 KZN 2010) www.kznhealth.gov.za/stratplan2010-2014.pdf (Date of use: 29 June 2017). 
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with the legal requirements of IC, especially in public hospitals.2012,2013,2014 It has been 
suggested that there may be geographic and cultural barriers to the practice of IC even in 
developed countries such as the USA. 2015,2016,2017 This has led most international ethical 
guidelines to recommend that cultural factors and language must be taken into 
consideration when obtaining IC from patients especially those in developing countries 
during biomedical research or treatment.2018, 2019, 2020, 2021  
 
7.2.3 Informed consent and current medical practice 
 
The World Medical Association (WMA) aptly points out the dilemma that HCPs face in 
current times:2022 
 
Until recently, physicians generally considered themselves accountable only to themselves, to their 
colleagues in the medical profession and for religious believers, to God. Nowadays they have 
additional accountabilities to their patients, to third parties such as hospitals and managed 
healthcare organizations, to medical licensing and regulatory authorities, and often to courts of law. 
These different accountabilities can conflict with one another.2023  
 
                                                          
2012  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics Suppl1 S3. 
2013  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
2014        Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
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 health  information system can guide planning and regulatory decision-making”1973 Science 
 1102-1108. 
2016  King and Moulton 2006 A J Law Med 430. 
2017 Clark et al 2011 J of Surg Educ 143. 
2018  United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization Universal Declaration on 
 Bioethics and Human Rights (UNESCO Paris 2005). 
2019  National Bioethics Advisory Commission Presidential bioethics commission issues report on 
 clinical  trials research in developing countries (NBAC Bethesda USA 2001). 
2020  CIOMS International ethical guidelines for biomedical research involving human subjects 
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Due to recent controversies surrounding the ethics of healthcare decision-making, a 
central dilemma has arisen in modern medical practice, which can be summarized as 
‘whether the principle of respect for autonomy should have priority over professional 
beneficence?’2024 It has been argued by some scholars in bioethics that persistence with 
professional beneficence by doctors and other HCPs creates a culture of medical 
paternalism, which does not fully respect patients’ autonomy.2025 In these types of 
situation, the ethical principle of beneficence may come into conflict with the principle of 
respect for autonomy, thereby creating a tension in the doctor-patient relationship.2026 To 
promote patients’ autonomy it has been advocated by common law cases such as 
Canterbury v Spence2027 that: 
 
The patients’ right to self-determination can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses 
enough information to enable an intelligent choice...True consent to what happens to one’s self is 
the informed exercise of choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the 
options available and the risks attendant upon each...from these axiomatic considerations springs 
the need, and in turn the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by the physician to the patient to 
make such a decision possible.2028  
 
In view of the above, adequate information disclosure prior to IC has become the legal 
and ethical ‘standard of care’ for medical practice since late 20th century, demonstrated 
in the American cases of Salgo v Leland Stanford University,2029 where the term ‘informed 
consent’ was first applied in a case of trespass or assault, and Natanson v Kline,2030 where 
the charge of ‘negligence’ rather than assault was first applied to a case of lack of informed 
consent. Similarly the standard of information disclosure prior to consent have been 
debated in common law court cases such as the English case of Bolam v Friern HMC,2031 
where the Bolam principle or the ‘reasonable doctor standard’ was first applied in English 
                                                          
2024  Chima A primer on medical law 19. 
2025  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr 43. 
2026  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [176-194]. 
2027  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 F 2d 772 (DC Circuit). 
2028  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 F 2d 772 [29-32]. 
2029  Salgo v Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees 317 P 2d 170 CA (1957). 
2030  Natanson v Kline 186 Kan. 393 (1960) 350 P2d 1093. 
2031  Bolam v Friern Barnet Health Management Committee [1957] 2 All ER 118. 
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law, and the South African case of Stoffberg v Elliot.2032 More recently, some bioethicists 
have argued for ‘shared decision-making’ in healthcare rather than ‘informed decision 
making’. These authorities have distinguished informed decision-making as “an 
individual’s overall process of gathering relevant information from both the clinician and 
other clinical and non-clinical sources with or without independent clarification of 
values.”2033 Shared decision-making, on the other hand, may be defined as a particular 
process of decision making by the patient and clinician during which the patient:  
(i) understands the risk or seriousness of the medical condition; 
(ii) understands the medical procedure including the risks, benefits, alternatives, and 
uncertainties; 
(iii) has weighed his or her personal values regarding the potential benefits and harms 
associated with the healthcare service;   
(iv) has engaged in decision-making at a level at which he or she feels comfortable; and 
finally 
(v) has come to a joint decision in association with the healthcare provider.  
 
Advocates of shared healthcare decision-making argue that it promotes patient 
comprehension and autonomy, reduces unwanted medical procedures and malpractice 
claims, improves patient compliance, and decreases overall costs of healthcare service 
delivery. 2034,2035,2036 
 
7.2.4 Elements of informed consent to medical treatment  
 
In its ideal legal and ethical contexts, IC requires five key elements to establish validity. 
These key elements must include (i) competence, (ii) voluntariness (iii) information 
disclosure (iv) understanding of information disclosed, and (v) authorization or consent to 
                                                          
2032  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148-150. 
2033 Kaplan RM “Shared medical decision making: A new tool for preventive medicine” 2004 Am J 
 Prev Med 81-83. 
2034  King and Moulton 2006 A J Law Med 468-473. 
2035  Charles C, Gafni A and Whelan T 1997 Soc Sci Med 681-692. 
2036  Katz J The silent world of doctor and patient (Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore 2002) ix-
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the medical procedure or treatment. 2037,2038  In medical practice, IC should ideally involve 
a conversation between a doctor or other HCP and the patient, initiated by the healthcare 
professional. This conversation must involve complete transparency, engagement by both 
parties, continuity, and may require evidence that it occurred, such as an eyewitness, 
documentation in the clinical notes, or a signed consent form.2039,2040 Informed consent 
could be withdrawn at any time by the patient as demonstrated in the case of Ciarlariello 
v Schactr (1993)2041 where the Canadian Supreme Court held that “an individual’s right to 
determine what medical procedures will be accepted must include the right to stop a 
procedure”.2042  Furthermore, a patients consent maybe vitiated by any changes in 
material facts not previously communicated to, or approved by the patient.2043   Further, in 
accordance with some state laws, any exculpatory statements intended to deny any 
claims rights of the individual giving consent in order to protect responsible parties are 
expressly prohibited and may nullify consent.2044 Furthermore, valid consent in 
accordance with certain state regulations and case law requires the absence of coercion, 
undue influence or deception, as demonstrated in the English case of Re T.2045,2046 In this 
case, a patient refused blood transfusion because of coercion and undue influence by the 
mother, who was a Jehovah’s Witness. The court held that her refusal was not freely given 
because her will was overborne by undue influence from her mother. Therefore, her 
refusal did not represent an independent choice. The court therefore overruled her refusal 
and authorized blood transfusion in the patient’s best interests.2047  
 
                                                          
2037  Chima SC Consent and patients’ rights 34-36. 
2038  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [89-90]. 
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 use: 29 June 2017). 
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It is noticeable that US courts have become increasingly reluctant to dismiss personal 
injury claims on the ground that the victims consented to the injury causing risks. 
Therefore, these courts have disfavoured consent-based defences such as assumption 
of risk, and product warning, as a form of defence against negligence or battery.2048 
 
7.2.5 Informed consent and patients’ rights 
 
Patients’ rights may be defined as a combination of claims, liberties, powers and 
immunities that ensure the protection of the patient’s dignity and moral autonomy.2049 This 
definition forms the core claims which patients may have against clinicians and defines 
the duties of clinicians to patients. Patient rights ensure access to data and information, 
protection from most kinds of unconsented activities. It suggests that patients may do no 
wrong by choosing to accept or refuse any recommended medical intervention.2050 Wear 
and others have described patient’s rights and IC as enabling and empowering a patient 
population that has traditionally been largely powerless and mute in the face of medical 
expertise and authority. 2051 In this way, patients’ rights while remaining based on the legal 
autonomy model, also extend beyond the confines of any particular legal system.2052 
Patients’ rights during medical treatment and research have risen to prominence in the 
later part of the twentieth century, especially after the reported abuses of human subjects 
of biomedical research in the scientific literature,2053,2054,2055and the moral conflicts 
between respect for autonomy and professional beneficence.2056 Further, recent 
advances in biomedical technology have also led to a constant rethinking of the rights of 
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363 
 
individuals utilizing the beneficial aspects of modern science. 2057,2058 Prior to these recent 
evolutions in bioethics and medical practice, with subsequent challenges to the status 
quo, the rights of patients have previously been based on medical paternalism.2059 
Patients’ rights were solely dependent on the goodwill of doctors and the presumption that 
doctors would act in the best interests of the patients.2060 With revelations of 
physician/researcher abuses however, and ongoing unethical research, ethicists and legal 
scholars began to question whether it was still appropriate for a patient to rely entirely on 
the judgment of doctors, and if not, how patients should be involved in the healthcare 
decision-making process.2061 Further, as medical practice has become more industrialized 
and sophisticated, patients have become consumers of healthcare services rather than 
involuntary participants in the healthcare decision-making process, raising the questions 
about  consumer rights.2062,2063 One aspect of the recognition of the moral autonomy of 
the patient has been the recognition of the need for adequate information disclosure, 
which would enable the patient to accept, reject or choose between different medical 
therapies, as first recognized in cases such as Canterbury v Spence2064 or as debated by 
the English House of Lords in the case of Sidaway.2065 Another aspect of this debate has 
been whether to persist with the ‘reasonable doctor standard’ as established in the case 
of Bolam v Friern HMC2066 or to follow the “prudent patient standard” as suggested by Lord 
Scarman in the Sidaway case,2067  and adjudicated in the South African case of Castell v 
De Greef,2068 and also recently confirmed as the accepted standard of care in most 
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common law jurisdictions by the UK Supreme Court sitting in Scotland in the case of 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire.2069  
 
Information disclosure is an important aspect of enhancing the patient’s moral autonomy 
and ability to choose.2070 As suggested by Mclean, its potential invasiveness and its social 
and political potential make it an area ripe for rights discourse.2071 Debates in this area 
have therefore focused on several issues including whether the doctors’ duty to disclose 
based on the patients’ right to receive information can be tested independently of patient 
understanding.2072 However, if the patient is unable to understand, what is the point of 
disclosure?  Is there hence a duty imposed on clinicians to ensure patient understanding 
prior to providing informed consent? There may also be concerns regarding the rationality 
of patient’s decision-making, specifically with regard to the competence of incapacitated 
patients, minors, and other vulnerable members of society.2073,2074  
 
In light of the above, questions about competence, information disclosure, understanding, 
and the rights of vulnerable population groups have dominated contemporary debate on 
patients’ rights, respect for autonomy, and the informed consent doctrine. 2075,2076,2077  
Some have questioned whether providing information about risks, benefits and 
alternatives actually improve patients’ decision-making.2078 Schuck identified two 
obligations imposed on the doctors by these requirements. First, the fiduciary duty of care 
i.e. the duty imposed on doctors to put patients’ interests above their own. Secondly, the 
problems associated with cost and resource allocation since the obligation on full 
information disclosure, which may actually increase the burden on healthcare 
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resources.2079 Others have argued that shared healthcare decision-making may actually 
decrease healthcare costs for well-informed patients. 2080,2081,2082,2083 Such observations 
seem to suggest IC should also be viewed in terms of cost-effectiveness.2084 Therefore, 
there may be need to re-conceptualize IC to suit the particular geographical or socio-
cultural environment involved.2085 For example, it has been suggested that there may be 
need to reduce consent procedures in ‘minimal risk’ research or treatment while providing 
more information in ‘high-risk’ situations.2086 Further, not all patients require the same level 
of information disclosure, either due to personal choice or cultural belief systems. For 
example, it has been reported that among certain South Asian populations, the disclosure 
of negative information may be considered harmful,2087 while some Nigerian- African 
population groups are reportedly averse to negative information disclosure due to religious 
beliefs.2088 Consequently, one may argue that IC needs to be viewed as a normative 
variable, not an empirical constant, due to its cultural plasticity as suggested by 
Schuck.2089 Therefore effective implementation of IC should allow for different cultural 
belief systems and differences in regional or geographical medical practice.2090,2091,2092 
However, the protections enshrined in the UNESCO Convention on Bioethics,2093 the 
Nuremberg code2094 and the ICCPR, amongst other instruments, are emphatic about the 
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implementation of an acceptable informed consent regimen in biomedical research and 
healthcare.2095 
 
7.2.6 Rationale for the study 
 
From the foregoing introduction it is obvious that there may be geographic and cultural 
barriers to the practice of IC, even in very developed but multicultural countries such as 
the USA.2096,2097 This has led most international ethical guidelines to recommend that 
cultural factors such as language and belief systems must be taken into consideration 
when obtaining IC from patients especially those in developing countries during 
biomedical research or treatment. 2098,2099,2100 In chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis, I reported 
on the understanding and practice of informed consent by medical doctors2101 and 
professional nurses2102 in South African public hospitals.  
 
In this chapter, I report on patient’s actual experiences, perceptions and evaluation of the 
IC process at local public hospitals in EThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban), KZN 
province, South Africa. This study was conducted concurrently with the study on doctors 
and professional nurses practicing in KZN provincial hospitals as reported in chapters 5 
and 6.  
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7.2.7 Aims and objectives of the study 
 
The general objective of this study was to establish whether IC is obtained from patients 
prior to medical treatment in South African public hospitals. Specific objectives were to 
establish whether sufficient information was provided to patients; whether patients 
understand the information provided to them; whether patients providing IC to treatment 
are generally competent to consent to such treatment, and whether IC is obtained from 
patients voluntarily. Finally, the question asked was whether the IC provided by patients 
in this setting is truly valid, and consistent with the requirements of the National Health 
Act 20032103 and other pertinent local laws and regulations.  
 
7.3 MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
7.3.1 Study population and location 
 
The study location and stratified random sampling methodology used to select public 
hospitals and patient populations were previously described in detail in chapter 4 of this 
thesis. Briefly, this study was conducted at the outpatient clinics (OPD) and inpatient 
wards of selected public hospitals in EThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban). 
Inclusion criteria were such that any adult and competent patient attending the selected 
hospitals during the period of study (March to June 2012), who were willing to participate 
voluntarily, was eligible for inclusion in the study. Exclusion criteria were mental incapacity 
and absence of parent or guardian to provide consent for children below the age of 
consent (12 years) in South Africa as stipulated by the Children’s Act.2104 
 
7.3.2 Study instrument  
 
The main study instrument was a semi-structured questionnaire in the English language, 
which was also translated into the IsiZulu language, the dominant language spoken by 
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2104  Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
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about 81% of the population of KZN province.2105 Professional translation of the 
questionnaire from English language to IsiZulu was done by the department of IsiZulu 
studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal.  The questionnaire used for this study consisted of 
three sections. The first section collected socio-demographic data on the participants; the 
second part was designed to collect information on patient experiences of IC practices by 
healthcare providers during clinical encounters. The third section of the questionnaire 
asked questions about patient’s general knowledge about healthcare, understanding and 
opinions on IC generally. Participants were interviewed by three trained bilingual research 
assistants or alternatively those patients who preferred were allowed to complete the 
questionnaire by themselves. Respondents had the option of completing questionnaires 
either in English or IsiZulu according to their wishes. The study was conducted in various 
hospital departments as illustrated in Figure 7.1 below.  
 
7.3.3 Study design and statistical analysis  
 
The preliminary sample size for this study was calculated using a web based sample size 
calculator, Raosoft®.2106  Based on the formula for sample size and margin of error from 
Raosoft, a representative sample size of 385±20 patients was calculated (95% CI; P = 
0.05). Data from questionnaires was transcribed directly into a computer software named 
statistical package for social sciences (SPSS)2107 and analysed. The captured data was 
first checked for completeness and accuracy by both the PI (myself) and a qualified 
biostatistician. Descriptive statistics such as percentages, proportions, median, mode, and 
interquartile range were used to summarize the data. Scores for comprehension, 
understanding, information disclosure, voluntariness were worked out from the responses. 
Fisher’s exact test was used to test for association between categorical variables and 
groups of patients. Pearson’s chi-squared test was used to test for differences in 
responses between patients and HCPs (doctors and nurses). One sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnoff test was used to test for the normality of patients’ age distribution. 
                                                          
2105  EThekwini municipality EThekwini language policy 
 www.Durban.gov.za.eThekwiniLanguagepolicy.pdf (Date of use: 19 August 2014). 
2106  Raosoft® http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html (Date of use:  12 June 2012). 
2107  IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows version 21.0 (IBM Corp Armonk NY 2012). 
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7.3.4 Ethical considerations  
 
Initial ethical approval for this study was obtained from a subcommittee of the research 
ethics committee at the University of South Africa (UNISA). The study protocol and 
biostatistical methodology was also reviewed and approved by the health research and 
knowledge management research ethics committee of the KZN Department of Health, 
and the EThekwini municipality health department.  Ethical approvals were also obtained 
from the management of each of the hospitals included in the study. Finally, written IC 
was obtained from each respondent after full information disclosure prior to participation 
in the study. 
 
7.4 RESULTS 
 
7.4.1 Demographic characteristics of patient participants  
 
Four-hundred and four (404) valid questionnaires were completed by patient respondents 
with few missing data. The clinical disciplines and hospital departments from which patient 
participants were recruited is shown in figure 7.1 below. The socio-demographic 
characteristics of the participants are summarized in tables 7.1 and 7.2 below. The 
majority of the questionnaires were completed by the patients themselves (88.2%, 
351/398)), while the remainder were completed by surrogates including parents or 
guardians (8.2%, 33/398).  The majority of the participants in this study were female 68.2% 
(272/399); while 56% (225/403) were single and 37% (149/403) were married. The age of 
patient participants showed a normal distribution (ρ<0.001, median = 35.5 years), with a 
range of 11-91 years.  Most of the participants were bilingual, with 55% (222/403) IsiZulu 
speakers, about 49% also spoke the English language (195/403), 8% spoke IsiXhosa 
(32/403), and 2% (9/403) were Afrikaans speakers. Other minority languages spoken by 
this cohort of patients included Hindi, Tamil, Tswana and Sesotho. The majority of the 
patients reported having secondary school education (69%, 278/401); about 16% also 
had some tertiary education (65/401); 12% had primary education (49/401), whilst 2% 
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(9/401) reported having no formal education. The majority of the participants were 
unemployed 66% (262/398)), while 27% (106/398) were employed. The majority of the 
participants also reported having no monthly income 65% (262/404). The detailed 
earnings of participants are shown in figure7.2 below.  
  
Figure 7.1: Percentage of patient participants by clinical departments 
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Table 7.1: Demographic characteristics of patient respondents  
Characteristic Number  %  
Gender    
Male 127 31.4  
Female 272 67.3  
Missing  5 1.2  
Age (years) 
Range                                        
Mean                                        
Median                              
Standard deviation               
Age group (categorized  in years) 
1-20 
21-40 
41-60 
>61 
Missing 
 
11-91 
38.093 
35.50 
15.84 
 
42 
192 
90 
42 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.5 
52.5 
24.6 
11.5 
9.4 
 
Marital status 
Married 
Single 
Divorced 
Widowed 
Separated 
Missing 
 
149 
225 
8 
21 
0 
1 
 
36.9 
55.8 
2 
5.2 
0 
 
 
 
372 
 
Status of minors (<18years) 
Orphaned 
Living with parents 
Living on my own 
Total 
 
12 
75 
97 
184 
 
6.5 
40.8 
52.7 
100 
 
Languages spoken 
English 
IsiZulu 
IsiXhosa 
Afrikaans 
Other (Hindi, Tamil, Sesotho, Tswana) 
 
195 
222 
32 
9 
8 
 
48.3 
55.08 
7.9 
2.2 
2 
 
Educational Level 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
None 
Missing 
 
49 
278 
65 
9 
3 
 
12.2 
69.3 
16.2 
2.2 
0.7 
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Table 7.2: Secondary demographic and social stratification data of patients 
Characteristic Number     %  
Occupation    
Unemployed 
Employed 
Self-employed 
Other (housewife, student, pensioner) 
Missing 
262 
106 
15 
15 
6   
65.8 
26.6 
3.8 
3.8 
1.5 
 
Monthly Earnings (Rands) 
No earnings 
<1000 
1001-3000 
3001-5000 
5000-10000 
>10000 
Don’t know/refuse to disclose 
 
227 
18 
46 
42 
13 
3 
55 
 
56.2 
4.5 
11.4 
10.4 
3.2 
0.7 
13.6 
 
Educational Level 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
None 
Missing data 
 
49 
278 
65 
9 
3 
 
12.2 
69.3 
16.2 
2.2 
0.7 
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Figure 7.2: Monthly earnings of participants  
Note: Salaries are shown in South African Rands (ZAR); 1$ (USD) ≥ 13.5 ZAR (2015 rates). 
 
7.4.2 Information disclosure  
 
The majority of the respondents reported that a HCPs (doctors or nurses) explained the 
treatment or medical procedure to them 88% (355/403).  Information provided to the 
patients included diagnosis as reported by 81% (326/403) of the patients; treatment risks 
reported by 57% (229/403) patients, and treatment benefits reported by 61% (245/403) 
patients. Less than half of the respondents were informed about treatment options as 
reported by 41% (165/403)) patients; recommended treatment by 28% (113/403), and 
risks of refusing recommended treatment by 25% (99/403) of patients. Only 28% of 
No earnings
65%
<1000
5%
1001-3000
13%
3001-5000
12%
5001-10000
4%
>10000
1%
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patients (113/403) reported that they were given information about their right of refusal. 
Detailed information regarding information disclosure is shown in table 7.4 below.  
 
7.4.3 Patients preference on risk disclosure   
 
The majority of patients reported that they would prefer to receive information on “all the 
risks” associated with a treatment or medical procedures as reported by 78% (304/391) 
of patients. Another 6% (22/391) of patients said they preferred to be informed about 
“some of the risks”, while 6% (22/391) of patients preferred to know “none of the risks”. 
Around 11% (43/391) of patients responded “don’t know” to this question. Patients’ 
preference regarding risk disclosure when compared to risks disclosed by HCPs is shown 
in table 7.3.  Some reasons given by patients for requesting full disclosure of all material 
risks are reported verbatim in table 7.6 below. For example, some patients wanted to know 
about the side-effects of the drugs, because they were allergic to some medications. 
Others were more concerned about the impact of prescribed medications on their children, 
or on their pregnancy, or current health status. Those who preferred partial or none-
disclosure of risks gave varying reasons for their choices. Some patients preferred not 
knowing about risks to prevent excessive worrying, while others stated that some of the 
information was irrelevant, as summarized in table 7.6. 
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Table 7.3: Nature of risks disclosed by doctors and nurses vs. preferred disclosure by patients 
Risks Disclosed     Doctors 
   Yes (%) 
                                 
No (%) 
Nurses 
Yes (%) 
 
No (%) 
Ρ-value 
Pearson χ2 
 
Most common Risks 
 
15/165(92) 
 
13/165 (8) 
 
256/320(80) 
 
59/320 (18) 
   
ρ= 0.002 
 
Most Serious Risks 
 
144/164(88) 
 
18/164 (11) 
 
134/319(42) 
 
177/319(56) 
   
ρ = 0.000 
 
All Material Risks 
 
35/165 (21) 
 
117/165(71) 
 
114/318(36) 
 
183/318(58) 
  
 ρ= 0.004 
      
 
Patients                                               
     
           
Preferred risk 
disclosure 
 
Yes (%) 
    
 
All of the risks 
 
304 (78) 
    
 
Some of the risks 
    
 22  (6) 
 
    
None of the Risks 
 
Don’t Know 
 22  (6) 
43 (11) 
   
    
 
 
7.4.4 Time spent on information disclosure    
 
Time spent by patients with doctors or other nurses during a clinical encounter, including 
obtaining IC ranged from  less than 5 minutes as reported by 15% (58/399) of patients. 
Another 29% (115/399) of patients reported 5-10 minutes; while 10-20 minutes was 
reported by 23% (91/399) of patients; 20-30 minutes was reported by 13% (51/399) of 
patients, and more than 30 minutes reported by 15% (59/399) of patients. A breakdown 
of times spent on clinical encounters between HCPs and patients is shown in figure 7.3. 
However, it is unclear whether the amount of time reported here refers to the time spent 
on obtaining IC from patients or the entire clinical encounter. However, because most 
patients would not be able to distinguish between IC procedures and the entire clinical 
encounter between HCP and patient, one can assume that the time intervals reported by 
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patients’ most likely correlate with the entire clinical encounter for each visit between a 
HCP and the patient. 
 
  
 Figure 7.3: Time spent on IC/ clinical encounter by HCPs as reported by patients. 
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Table 7.4: Information disclosed by healthcare professionals to patient during IC 
 
Information disclosed to patients Yes (%) No (%) Don’t know/ 
remember 
    
Did the doctor/nurse explain treatment or procedure? 
Information provided:  
Diagnosis                                                                                   
355 (88.1) 
 
326 (80.9) 
48 (11.9) 
 
77 (19.1) 
 
Treatment options 165 (40.9) 238 (59.1)                                         
Recommended treatment 113 (28) 290 (72)                 
Risk of refusing recommended treatment 99 (24.6) 304 (75.4)  
Information on general risks                       
Information on benefits 
Information on right of refusal 
229 (56.8)  
245 (60.8) 
113 (28)  
                 
174 (43.2) 
158 (39.2) 
290(72) 
 
 
 
 
Probing questions    
In what language was information provided? 
English 
IsiZulu 
English and a local language 
 
257 (63.6)   
131 (32.4) 
13 (3.2) 
  
Methods used to explain treatment? 
Words (verbally) 
Pictures/photographs 
Diagram 
Interpreter 
Did you understand the information provided? 
Did you ask any questions about the treatment? 
 
358 (89.3) 
32 (8) 
21 (5.2) 
14 (3.5) 
355 (90.6) 
275 (70.3) 
 
43 (10.7) 
369 (92) 
380 (94.8) 
387 (96.5) 
31 (7.9) 
113 (28.9) 
 
 
 
 
 
6 (1.5) 
3(0.8) 
 
 
7.4.5 Methods used to obtain informed consent and enhance information disclosure 
 
The majority of patients in this cohort reported that informed consent was obtained 
‘verbally’ by HCPs as reported by 73% (274/374) of patients. Another 19% (71/374) of 
patients reported that IC was obtained in a ‘written’ format; while 5% (19/374) of patients 
said both methods were used. Information disclosure and communication with patients 
were rendered using ‘words’ in the majority of cases as reported by 89% (358/401) of 
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patients. Further, the English language was used while discussing with patients as 
reported by 66% (255/384) of patients, while the predominant local language IsiZulu was 
the language of communication reported by 32% (124/384) of patients. Methods used to 
enhance information disclosure included pictures as reported by 8% (32/401) patients; 
diagrams as reported by 5% (21/401), and use of  ‘interpreters’ as reported by 3.5% 
(14/401) of patients. The methods used to enhance communication or facilitate 
information disclosure to patients are summarized in tables 7.4 above, and 7.5 below. 
 
           Table 7.5: Methods used to communicate and enhance patient understanding 
 
 
7.4.6 Understanding of information disclosed  
 
The majority of patient respondents said they understood the information provided by 
HCPs as reported by 91% (355/392) of participants; while about 8% (31/392) answered 
“no” to this question.  When asked if they were able ask any questions about their 
treatment, about 70% (275/391) of patients answered ‘yes’, while 29% (113/391) 
answered ‘no’. When asked about reasons for not asking questions about treatment, 
Methods used in 
obtaining or 
enhancing IC 
disclosure 
 
Doctors 
 Yes (%) 
 
Nurses  
Yes (%) 
 
Patients  
Yes (%) 
 
P-value 
Pearson λ2 
 
Written 
Verbal 
Both 
It depends 
 
84/165 (50.9) 
11/165 (6.7) 
 57/165 (34.5) 
 13/165 (7.9) 
 
167/343 ( 48.7) 
26/343 (7.6) 
135/343 (39.4) 
15/343 (4.4) 
 
19/374 (19.0) 
 274/374 (73.3) 
19/374 (5) 
(2.7) 
 
 
ρ = 0.000 
Methods used 
To explain to 
patients 
 
 
  
 
 
Words (verbal) 
 
Pictures/photos 
 
Diagrams 
 
Interpreters 
162/168 (96.4) 
 
34/168 (20.2) 
 
70/168 (41.7) 
 
121/168 (72) 
 
 
 358/404 (89.3) 
 
32/404 (8) 
 
21/404 (5.2) 
 
14/404 (3.5) 
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responses by patients included statements such as “doctor knows best”, or “I didn’t know 
what to ask”. Others said they were already familiar with their medical diagnosis and 
treatment regimen. Some complained that they did not have time to ask questions 
because doctors were in a hurry or too busy. “The doctor was too fast he didn’t give me 
time to ask, he didn’t have time at all.” 
 
7.4.7 Voluntariness during informed consent 
 
When patients were asked if the amount of information provided by HCPs was enough, 
about 74% (290/391) answered ‘yes’, while 24% (92/391) said “no”. When asked whether 
they made decisions regarding their treatment of their own free will, without input from 
others; about 95% (348/366) of patient respondents answered affirmatively. However, 
some respondents said they usually only followed orders from the doctor, with one stating: 
“The doctors tell you what needs to be done and you do it.” When asked if they could 
change their minds if they did not like the recommended treatment by HCPs, about 87% 
(309/356) of respondents answered ‘yes’ while 12% (41/356) of patients answered ‘no’. 
Several patients who stated that they could not change their mind regarding their 
treatment and explained it was because they had no choice or could not afford any 
alternative treatments as summarized in table 7.6 below. Statistical analysis using chi-
squared tests showed that there was no significant association between patients’ age and 
knowledge of the right of refusal (ρ = 0.334); educational level and the right of refusal (ρ= 
0.404); or income level and right of refusal (ρ = 0.480). 
 
7.4.8 Potential impact of undue influence or coercion on patients’ informed consent 
 
When patients were asked whether they were advised that they could accept or reject any 
recommended treatment or procedure, only 42% (153/370) answered ‘yes”. When asked 
if they felt threatened or were afraid to say ‘no’ during the clinical encounter, 8% (30/379) 
of patients answered ‘yes” while the majority of patients, 91% (343/379) answered “no”. 
Patients’, who said they were afraid to say ‘no’, gave various reasons as detailed in table 
7.6 below. Reasons given by patients include those who complained that they were afraid 
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because the doctor or HCP was simply too rude or aggressive or that they would be asked 
why they were refusing help. When patients were asked if they were given any perverse 
incentive or persuaded to accept any particular treatment; 9 patients  or 2.4% (9/377) 
answered ‘yes’ while the majority of patients 97% (365/377) answered ‘no’. Some of the 
patients who responded affirmatively said they were given some pills and money for bus 
fare. “They gave me money and they said it was bus fare.” Another said; “There are pills 
that they say we must take for them to see if they are working and they gave us R120.” 
Another was persuaded by being told it would benefit her in the end.  
 
7.4.9 Involvement of surrogates by patients in healthcare decision-making   
 
When patients were asked whether they sought assistance from any other person before 
deciding to accept or reject the treatment recommended by HCPs, the majority of patients 
76% (274/363) answered ‘no’, while 24% (86/363) answered ‘yes’.  Regarding those who 
reportedly sought help from surrogates, about 11% (42/370) sought input from ‘parents’ 
while 6% (21/369) sought inputs from another family member. These included assistance 
or input from a husband reported by 3% (11/369) patients; about 2.4% (9/369) sought 
input from a ‘friend’; another 1% (4/369) of patients received input from a wife, and less 
than 1% obtained input from a ‘child’. A few patients also reported seeking input or 
assistance from a HCP (doctor or nurses). Others looked for information from the internet 
or in a few cases from another patient. Most of those seeking assistance or input from 
parents reported doing so because they were ‘minors’ currently dependent on their 
parents/guardians. Those seeking assistance from doctors or nurses felt that HCPs knew 
better about treatment options or they were seeking a second opinion from another HCP. 
 
7.4.10 Specific comments by patients regarding informed consent and clinical 
encounters with HCPs.  
 
Selected comments regarding various aspects of IC and the clinical encounter with HCPS are 
summarized in table 7.6 below. 
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Table 7.6: Selected verbatim responses from patient to questions on IC 
 
Patients choice on full risk disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Because I want to be informed. To be part of the decision 
making”   
“Because I want to know what the options are, and weigh 
them myself”. 
 “Because i want to know what is going to happen or why; I 
also look up info on the internet”.  
“I have a right to know about everything because I’m the 
one who is going to be taking medication”  
“People are not the same, so I have to know about my 
medication because I have asthma so I am allergic to some 
medication.” 
 
Patients choice on non-disclosure or reduced 
disclosure of risks 
 
 
“Because I worry unnecessarily”  
“I don’t want to know irrelevant information”; 
 It’s scary to know sometimes”  
“I think it’s a waste of time”. 
 “Will knowing really make a difference? 
 
 
Voluntariness of consent: Patients who were 
afraid to say ‘no’ 
 
 
 
 
“If we say no to the treatment, we will be rejected and 
told to leave (victimization)” 
“Sometimes we face difficult situation where we need 
to say yes to everything”.  
“If I say no I will get in trouble but if I listen to whatever 
the nurse or doctor say I’m going to get help”.  
“When you desperate for help you do whatever they 
say, because if you don’t they just leave you.” 
Patients who feel they have no choice 
or cannot refuse any recommended 
treatment because of poverty 
“Because I’m not working i cannot afford to purchase 
medication by myself” 
 
“If I’m poor I can’t change my mind i have to accept 
because I don’t have money to go expensive hospital” 
 
“If I leave whatever medication provided to me it will be 
like committing suicide” 
 
 
 
 
383 
 
7.4.11 General knowledge of relevant local laws by patients   
 
When asked about the ‘age of consent’ to treatment by children in South Africa, most 
patient respondents answered wrongly, with 26% (96/373) choosing, “15 years”. Another 
33% (122/373) of patients chose ’18 years’; while 11% (40/373) chose “21 years”, and 6% 
(21/373) did not know the correct response. Only about 25% (94/373) of patients correctly 
answered “12 years”. There was a statistically significant association between 
participants’ age and knowledge of the ‘age of consent’ to treatment in South Africa (ρ ≤ 
0.005). Older patient age groups were more likely to respond correctly. There was no 
significant association between patients’ educational level, or income level and knowledge 
of age of consent to treatment. Tests of statistical significance based on these criteria 
using chi-squared tests returned scores of (ρ = 0.080) for educational level, and (ρ = 
0.334) for income level respectively.  
 
7.5 DISCUSSION 
 
This study was designed to evaluate patients’ understanding and perceptions on the 
quality of IC as practiced by HCPs (doctors and nurses) in an urban public hospitals in 
South Africa. Patients reported being generally satisfied with the level of information 
disclosure during medical treatment with about 74% expressing satisfaction with 
information disclosed by HCPs. Patients also confirmed that doctors provided most of the 
information headings required by the National Health Act,2108 which included diagnosis, 
general risks and benefits of treatment. This was consistent with a previous study on 
doctors practicing in the same clinical setting as previously reported,2109 and discussed in 
chapter 5 of this thesis.  
 
However, about 25-41% of patients reported that they were not given information on the 
right of refusal, treatment options, recommended treatment, and risks of refusing 
recommended treatment as stipulated by section 6 of the National Health Act.2110 
                                                          
2108 National Health Act 61 of 2003.  
2109  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3.  
2110  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s6).  
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Concerning understanding of information disclosed, over 90% of patients stated that they 
understood the information provided by HCPs, and about 70% said they were able to ask 
questions about their treatment. However, about 30%of patients said that they were afraid 
to ask questions about their treatment for fear of losing the free treatment benefits 
provided in public hospitals. This was due to the fact that they were indigent and did not 
have any alternative means of obtaining healthcare services. This observation is 
consistent with a similar study in Kenya, where it was reported that patients appeared too 
timid or afraid to ask questions due to the fear of losing the benefits of free treatment 
provided during clinical trials or research.2111,2112 In terms of voluntariness of consent, the 
majority of patients in this study reported making  healthcare decisions of their own free 
will, while those who sought assistance from surrogates reported involvement of mostly 
family members, friends and occasionally other healthcare workers (HCWs).  
 
Most patients in this cohort also reported that there was absence of coercion or undue 
influence during the clinical encounter, with over 90% reporting that they were not afraid 
to say ‘no” if they felt uncomfortable with the recommended treatment. This is somewhat 
unusual for developing country especially in Africa, where cultural and family influences 
are thought to play a major role in healthcare decision-making, as reported from studies 
in Nigeria2113 and Kenya.2114 This observation may indirectly indicate that South African 
patients are more aware of patients’ rights and more sophisticated in terms of their 
understanding of IC when compared to patients from other developing countries in Africa. 
This may be a compliment to the passage and wide publication of the National Health 
Act,2115 and the patients’ rights charter,2116 both of which required to be displayed by law 
in all public hospitals in South Africa. This observation may provide a good example to 
                                                          
2111  Molyneux CS et al 2005 Soc Sci Med 443-454. 
2112  Molyneux C.S, Peshu N and Marsh K “Understanding informed consent in a low-income setting: 
 three case studies from the Kenyan coast” 2004 Soc Sci Med 2547-2559.  
2113  Ezeome and Marshall 2009 Dev World Bioethics 138-148 see also Irabor and Omonzejele 
 2009 Dev World Bioethics 34-42. 
2114 Molyneux CS et al  2005 Soc Sci Med 443-454 see also Molyneux et al 2004 Soc Sci Med 
 2547-2559. 
2115  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2116  HPCSA National patients’ right charter (HPCSA Pretoria 2008).  
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other countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, who are yet to legally enforce healthcare laws 
in their own jurisdictions.2117  
 
Most patients in this cohort also reported that there was no perverse influence on their 
healthcare decision-making such as financial inducement or threats, except few who 
reported being given money for ‘bus fare’. The latter were probably patients involved in 
ongoing clinical trials that were financially compensated for participation, although the 
amount of 120 ZAR reported here by these patients was less than the nationally 
recommended rate of 150 ZAR per day according the South African National Health 
Research Ethics Committee.2118 The majority of patients in this study reported that the 
amount of time spent on the IC process and clinical encounters between HCPs and 
patients was within the range of 5 to 20 minutes, consistent with the timeframe previously 
reported by doctors as discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. However, it is unclear from 
the patients’ account whether time spent with patients refers to time specifically spent on 
obtaining IC, or also includes the time spent on the entire clinical encounter with HCPs. 
One can assume that it is probably the latter, since most doctors in the public hospitals 
are very busy with a large caseload, thereby militating on time spent on IC as previously 
observed.2119 On the other hand, this timeframe of less than 20 minutes is consistent with 
the time spent on the entire clinical encounter during outpatient hospital visits as reported 
from other jurisdictions like USA, where the estimated duration of an average primary care 
visit is reported to be 15 minutes.2120  Some cultural factors impacting on IC in this 
population under study includes unemployment and poverty, with over 65% of patients in 
this cohort reportedly unemployed and another 56% reporting no monthly income 
whatsoever. Other cultural issues identified from this study include language difficulties, 
with majority of patients speaking IsiZulu or other African languages, while communication 
with HCPs on IC was predominantly in the English language. Language as a barrier to IC 
                                                          
2117 Akinloye A “Nigeria’s National Health Bill: Delayed, disputed and desperately needed” 
 www.Thinkafricapress.com (Date of use: 13 September 2014). 
2118  National Health Research Ethics Committee “Payment of trial participants in South Africa: 
 Ethical  considerations for research ethics committees South Africa” (NHREC Pretoria 2012). 
2119 Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [7-8].  
2120  Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 81. 
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was previously reported in other studies from South Africa,2121,2122 and the USA.2123,2124  
Language as a barrier to IC was also reported by doctors and professional nurses in this 
setting as previously discussed in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. However, this barrier or 
constraint did not seem to affect understanding of information in this cohort of patients, 
with over 90% of respondents claiming they understood the information provided by 
HCPs. Nonetheless, there were some inconsistencies with previous reports where doctors 
claimed that IC was obtained in writing in 51% of cases as reported in chapter 5 of this 
thesis, compared with patients in this study who reported that IC was obtained verbally in 
over 75% of cases. In addition, doctors reported giving patients information on right of 
refusal in 65% of cases, while patients reported only 28% disclosure. Further, doctors 
reported using interpreters in 72% of cases when obtaining IC as reported previously,2125 
and discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis. On the other hand, patients in this cohort 
reported that interpreters were involved in only 3.5% of clinical encounters. This 
inconsistency cannot be readily explained, although it could be due to the practice of 
“cultural brokerage”, whereby nurses may be used to “translate, mediate and negotiate 
on behalf of patients”.2126 In the clinical setting, patients may not readily recognize or relate 
the use of interpreters during clinical encounters, while a doctor or nurse may report 
otherwise, due to the fact that they are more aware that using nurses or other healthcare 
workers (HCW) as an ‘interpreter’ during a clinical practice, is not part of their job 
description, but rather an informal arrangement employed in the absence of suitable 
alternatives. 
 
Finally, patients showed a poor knowledge of the legal age for consent in South Africa, 
with only 25% identifying the current age of consent to routine treatment. Overall patients 
in this study were satisfied with their encounter with HCPs, although they preferred being 
involved in the healthcare decision-making process via informed or shared healthcare 
                                                          
2121  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
2122  Jack et al 2014 S Afr J B L 14-18. 
2123  Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 229-231. 
2124  Clark et al 2011 J of Surg Educ 143-147. 
2125  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [7]. 
2126  Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497-513 see also Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 507. 
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decision-making.2127;2128 The findings from this study appear consistent with reports from 
other parts of Africa such as Nigeria2129 and Kenya,2130 as well as from Greece.2131  In 
these cases, patients felt that while IC was important, they also wanted to be involved in 
decisions affecting their healthcare. It has been suggested by some American researchers 
that informed and shared decision-making represent important aspects of preventive 
medicine and public health. 2132,2133 
 
Recommendations by patients in this study regarding improvement IC practices in this 
setting include improved communication skills by HCPs, with many patients complaining 
that doctors were too busy, rude or aggressive. Patients’ responses to this question 
included comments such as:    
 
“Bit more time spent with each patient will help,” and “communicate better with patients”.  
Others said, “Doctors need to give all the important information without patients asking.”  
Another patient commented, “I think nurses must try to spend more  time  
explaining the treatment because sometimes they just right (write) in your card and you 
can hardly see what is written.”  
And another, “I think they must be more careful with our documents and they must also 
learn how to speak to patients.”  
Finally, “I think they need to manage their time better.” 
                                                          
2127  Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 81  see also “Rethinking informed consent: The case for shared 
 medical decision-making”2006 King and Moulton 2006 A J Law Med 429-501 and Whitney 
 SN et al A “Typology of shared decision making informed consent and simple consent” 2003 
 Ann Intern Med 54-59 [55-56]. 
2128  Charles et al 1997 Soc Sci Med 681-692. 
2129  Adeleye OA and Tobin EA “Hospitalized patients in a Nigerian community consider informed 
 consent necessary?” 2013 AJOB Prim Res 51-56. 
2130  Molyneux CS et al  2005 Soc Sci Med 443-454 see also Molyneux et al 2004 Soc Sci Med 
 2547-2559 and Gikonyo C et al “Taking social relationships seriously: Lessons learned from 
 the informed consent practices of a vaccine trial on the Kenyan coast” 2008 Soc Sci Med  708-
 720 [718-719]. 
2131  Falagas ME et al “Patients’ perception of quality of pre-operative  informed consent in Athens 
 Greece: A pilot study” 2009 PLoS ONE 4-e8073.  
2132  Sheridan et al and Shared-decision making workgroup of the US preventive services task 
 force. “Shared decision making about screening and chemoprevention: A suggested 
 approach from the U.S. preventive services task force” 2004 Am J Prev Med 56-66. 
2133  Bris P et al “Promoting informed decisions about cancer screening in communities and 
 healthcare systems” 2004 Am J Prev Med 67-80 see also Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 82.   
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7.6 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
Potential limitations to this study include the fact that it was carried out in and urban 
metropolitan municipality in South Africa (Durban), with an arguably better-educated and 
more knowledgeable population of patients by African standards. It is possible that a 
similar study in a rural location in KZN province or other rural parts of Africa may yield a 
different result.  Further, it is also unclear whether a study in a more cosmopolitan South 
African city such as Cape Town or Johannesburg with different population demographics 
may or may not produce a different result. It is possible that similar studies on patients 
utilizing private healthcare services may also produce a different result, because it has 
been suggested that doctors in private healthcare setting in Greece are more likely to 
provide detailed information to patients.2134  
 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This study confirms that majority of patients utilizing South African public hospitals are 
vulnerable because of their indigence and lack of alternative means of obtaining 
healthcare. This study also shows that despite their evident vulnerability, most patients in 
this setting are generally aware of their right to information disclosure, human rights and 
dignity in healthcare. Patients want to be informed and to participate in informed or shared 
healthcare decision-making. This study partly supports previous reports by doctors and 
nurses regarding the IC practices in South Africa as discussed in chapters 5 and 6 of this 
thesis, although there were some areas of inconsistency in actual practice, with patients 
and HCPs differing on certain items of information disclosure, such as right of refusal; and 
the methodology of information disclosure, such as use of interpreters. The major cultural 
factors militating against IC in this cohort include poverty and poor communication skills 
by HCPs. One can therefore conclude that there is need to further educate patients and 
HCPs on patients’ rights and the legal requirements of IC, with continuous professional 
training of HCPs in ethics, medical law and communication skills. This will improve the 
doctor or HCP-patient relationship, and enhance patient’s rights and human dignity. 
                                                          
2134  Falagas et al 2009 PLoS ONE 4-e8073 [5].  
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Future research should focus on details of informed and shared healthcare decision-
making, as well as comparative studies of IC in public and private healthcare facilities, in 
order to improve the overall quality of curative and preventive healthcare services in South 
Africa.  
 
7.8 Summary of chapter 7 
 
This chapter summarizes the findings from patients who participated in this empirical 
study. It provides patients perspectives on the practice of IC by HCPs at provincial 
hospitals in KZN province.  To summarize the findings from this aspect of the study: Four-
hundred and four (404) patients completed the patients questionnaire of which majority 
were female (67%) and 56% were unmarried. Most of the patient participants completed 
the study questionnaires on their own behalf (88%), while about 9% were surrogate 
parents or guardians completing on behalf of minors or others. The majority of participants 
in this study were IsiZulu speakers (55%). The major findings in this part of the study was 
that majority of patients attending public hospitals were indigent, with 66% being 
unemployed and 56% having no monthly earnings whatsoever. In terms of IC and 
information disclosure, majority of respondents said they were informed about their 
diagnosis (81%); risks of treatment (57%) and benefits of treatment (61%). Fewer patients 
were informed about recommended treatment (28%); risks of refusing recommended 
treatment (25%) and the right of refusal (28%). Most patients said HCPs communicated 
with them verbally using the English language. Patients also said they were satisfied with 
the amount of information disclosed (74%), but most would prefer disclosure of “all risks” 
during IC. However, some patients only wanted ‘some risks’ disclosed, while a few did not 
want any information regarding risks of treatment. In terms of voluntariness, most patients 
said they made decisions regarding their treatment choices by themselves, voluntarily, 
and without any form of coercion, although a small number of respondents did ask for 
input from surrogates including family members or HCPs. When asked if they were afraid 
to ask questions about their treatment from HCPs, majority of respondents said ‘no’; 
however a few participants said they were afraid to ask questions because they could not 
afford to lose the free treatment benefits provided in public hospitals. Most patients wanted 
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to be involved in their healthcare decision-making process, and urged HCPs to improve 
their communication skills and time management. Based on comparisons between 
doctors, nurses and patients, one was able to identify some inconsistences between the 
responses by HCPs when compared to patients. For example, while doctors and nurses 
claimed that IC was obtained in writing in most cases, patients reported that they gave IC 
verbally (73%), compared to 51% of doctors and 49% of professional nurses who reported 
that they usually obtained IC in writing. Further, while between 24 to 28% patients said 
they were not informed regarding recommended treatment, risks of refusing 
recommended treatment, and right of refusal; most doctors and nurses (65-88%) claimed 
that they disclosed such information to patients.  
 
From this study, I was able to conclude that majority of patients attending public hospitals 
in KZN are vulnerable due to poverty and indigence, consistent with the criteria for 
vulnerability, which includes, poverty, low education and lack of alternative means for 
obtaining healthcare.2135,2136 Although patients from this study were poor and indigent, 
they were still aware of their rights to IC, since the majority of patient respondents 
preferred full information disclosure and wanted shared decision-making with regard to 
their own healthcare. Some parts of this study have been published as a peer-reviewed 
journal article in an accredited biomedical journal.2137 A hard copy of the published journal 
article is attached in Annexure 3 of this thesis. 
                                                          
2135 Chima A gateway to biomedical research in Africa 19-38 see also Chima A primer on medical  law 
 169. 
2067 CWG “Summary of discussions on vulnerability criteria and targeting” (Cash working Group 
 Jordan 2013) www.CWG-schematicsvulnerabilitycriteriaandtargeting-June2013.pdf (Date of use: 
 27 November 2017. 
2137 Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S46-S56. 
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CHAPTER 8: SYNTHESIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In first part of this chapter, I will analyse the legal, ethical, and socio-legal findings  
pertaining to IC and its implications. While in the second segment I will summarize the 
justifications and findings from the empirical research studies conducted among HCPs 
and patients attending public hospitals in within EThekwini metropolitan municipality, KZN. 
Finally I will summarize the implications of the findings from both the literature review and 
empirical studies for the practice of informed consent in South Africa. 
 
8.2 Recent developments in South African jurisprudence on informed consent since 
enactment of the National Health Act 2003 
 
8.2.1 Impact of constitutional provisions on the informed consent doctrine 
 
Informed consent has been defined as a person’s “knowing choice” about a medical 
treatment or procedure made after a physician or other HCP discloses whatever 
information a reasonably prudent provider in the medical community would give to a 
patient regarding the risks involved in the medical treatment or procedure.2138  IC has also 
been defined as “an autonomous authorization by individuals of a medical intervention or 
participation in research based on full information disclosure and complete understanding 
of all the consequences.”2139 Informed consent is an established doctrine in South African 
law based on court judgments in cases such as Stoffberg v Elliot 19232140 and Esterhuizen 
v Administrator Transvaal 19572141 and the Castell case.2142 Informed consent in South 
African law operates under the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, that is, to a willing person; 
no harm can be done; as argued by authoritative South African legal scholars.2143 
                                                          
2138   Garner BA (ed) Black’s law dictionary 10th ed (West Publishing Minnesota 2017) 346. 
2139  Chima Consent and patients’ rights 35 see also McCormick “Informed consent its basis 
 problems uncertainties” http://depts.washington.edu/bioethx/ (Date of Use: August 2013). 
2140  Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 CPD 148-150. 
2141  Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T). 
2142  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) 408. 
2143  Van Oosten LLD Thesis 1989 see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 875-
 876. 
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However, in recent times, the foundational basis for IC practice is derived from the 
Constitution.2144  
 
Section 12(2) (b) of the Constitution states that: 
  
Everyone has a right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right – 
(b)To security in and control over their body” 
(c)Not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent. 
(emphasis added) 
 
Section 12(1) of the Constitution further states that: 
  
Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right-  
(b)To be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources. 
 
It has been argued that the Constitution provides clear provisions with regard to an 
individuals’ physical integrity, whereby such integrity can only be interfered with, based 
on the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria.2145 In the case of Christian Lawyers Association v 
Minister of Health,2146 the court stated as follows: 
 
 The concept of [informed consent] is not alien to our common law, it forms basis of the doctrine 
 of volenti non fit injuria conduct that would otherwise have constituted a delict or crime if it took 
 place without the victim’s informed consent. More particularly, day to day invasive medical 
 treatment, which would otherwise have constituted an invasion of a patient’s privacy and personal 
 integrity, is justified and is lawful only because, as a requirement of the law, it is performed with 
 the patient’s informed consent. 
 
Some authorities have suggested that the statements of “security in” and “control over” 
their own body as stated in section (12) (2) (b) of the Constitution refer separately to the 
right to bodily integrity against intrusion from “either public or private sources”; while the 
                                                          
2144  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
2145  Barit A The doctrine of Informed Consent in South African Medical Law 9. 
2146 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health (Reproductive health Alliance as Amicus 
 Curiae)  2005 (1) SA 509 (T) see also Carstens v Pearmain Foundational Principles 983. 
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term “control of” would refer to the right to be left alone to live life as one chooses.2147  This 
is also related to privacy rights as stipulated in section 14 of the Constitution.2148 It is 
important to understand that the constitutional protections for bodily integrity and privacy 
are not unfettered, in that some trivial or other forms of interference to bodily integrity 
could be allowed based on the constitutional provision relating to the limitation of rights.2149 
Section 36 of the Constitution on the limitation of rights states: 
 
 (1)The rights in the Bill of Rights maybe limited only in terms of law of general application to 
 the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
 based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors 
 including- 
 (a) the nature of the right; 
 (b) the importance and purpose of the limitation 
 (c) the nature and extent of the limitation 
 (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
 (e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
Such limitations have been used in South African courts to limit the rights to bodily integrity 
and privacy, as was applied by a high court judge the case of Minister of Safety and 
Security v Gaqa.2150 In this case, the court allowed a police request for extraction of bullets 
from the body of an accused criminal, which was to be used as evidence in his criminal 
trial. The judge justified this decision by referring to the constitutional provisions on the 
limitation of rights, based on public interests, as well as provisions in the Criminal 
Procedure Act,2151 which allowed police to examine individuals against their will or by force 
in section 27,2152 or in order to obtain identifying marks and features e.g. fingerprints as 
stipulated in section (37) (1) (c) of the same Act.2153 By contrast, the High Court in the 
                                                          
2147 Currie I and De Waal J The bill of rights handbook (Juta & Company Ltd Cape Town 2014) 
 287 see also MDCN v Okonkwo (2002) AHLR 159 (NgSC 2001) and Chima A primer on medical 
 law 74. 
2148   The Constitution (s14). 
2149  Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law 10. 
2150  Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa 2002 (2) SACR 654 (C). 
2151  Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
2152  Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (s27). 
2153 Criminal Procedure Act (s37) (1) (c). 
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case Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba,2154 denied a similar police request for the 
removal of bullets from the body of an accused criminal, to be used in his criminal trial. 
The judge in this case stated that granting such a request would contravene the 
individual’s constitutionally protected rights to bodily integrity and privacy, and that 
sections stated by the former judge with regard to sections 27 and 37 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act2155 did not permit forceful removal of an object from the body of a person. 
The judgment in the former case has been duly criticized by some legal scholars on basis 
that it was grounded on a misapplication of the limitation of rights clause in the 
Constitution, as well as a misinterpretation of Criminal Procedure Act.2156 It must be said 
that such contradictory and inconsistent judgments by South African courts regarding the 
constitutionally protected right to bodily integrity may send mixed messages to the legal 
fraternity and society in South Africa pertaining to the doctrine of informed consent and 
individual autonomy. In conclusion, the Bill of Rights has richly contributed to the current 
demands for the individual rights to bodily integrity, self-determination, privacy, equality, 
dignity, full information disclosure, administrative and social justice, subject to the 
limitations imposed by section 36 of the Constitution.2157 
 
8.2.2 Impact of the National Health Act on the informed consent doctrine 
 
The National Health Act,2158  which was assented to by the President of the Republic of 
South Africa and gazetted in 2004,2159 codified the requirements for informed consent by 
giving effect and providing details to the principles established in the Constitution.2160 The 
act stipulates in section 7(1) that: 
 
Subject to section 8, a health service may not be provided to a user without the user’s informed 
consent,   
                                                          
2154  Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003 (2) SA 703 (D). 
2155  Criminal Procedures Act 51 of 1977 (S 27 and 37). 
2156  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles [924-926].  
2157   The Constitution (chapter 2) see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 875. 
2158  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2159  National Health Act 61 of 2003 Government Gazette Vol 469 No 26595 Cape Town 23 July 
 2004. 
2160  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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Further, section 7(2) of the same Act states that: 
  A health care provider must take all reasonable steps to obtain the user’s informed consent. 
 
In section 7(3), the Act defines informs consent as follows:  
 
 For the purposes of this section “informed consent” means consent for the provision of a 
specified health service given by a person with legal capacity to do so and who has been informed 
as contemplated in section 6.  
 
Furthermore, section 8(1) the Act requires that healthcare users must be able to 
participate in healthcare decision-making where it states that: 
 
A user has the right to participate in any decision affecting his or her personal health and 
treatment. 
 
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent, that lawful informed consent before medical 
treatment is a requirement of South African law. Section 6 of the Act further stipulates that 
healthcare “users to have full knowledge” by specifying the elements of such full 
knowledge to include: 
 
6. (1) Every health care provider must inform a user of- 
 (a) the user’s health status except in circumstances where there is substantial evidence that 
 the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the best interests of the user; 
 (b) the range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the user; 
 (c) the benefits, risks, costs and consequences generally associated with each option; and 
 (d) the user’s right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, obligations of 
 such refusal. 
    (2) The health care provider concerned must, where possible, inform the user as contemplated in 
 subsection (1) in a language that the user understands and in a manner which takes into  account 
 the user’s level of literacy. 
 
Sections 7 and 8 of the Act further detail conditions under which treatment may be 
provided without the users informed consent, or where the healthcare user does not have 
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the capacity to provide consent. A detailed analysis of the elements and subsections in 
section 6 of the Act will show what information a HCP is obliged to give to a patient or 
healthcare user prior to obtaining informed consent. Section (6) (2) further provides that 
HCPs must take into consideration the healthcare users’ language and literacy level; 
which shows that a HCP must assess each patient to determine not only the language 
they will understand, but also the extent of their literacy in order to provide this information 
in such a way that the healthcare user will comprehend and appreciate it enough to give 
the required consent or refusal. It has also been argued that the requirement for only 
‘knowledge’ and the absence of the requirement for ‘appreciation’ is a deficiency which 
may need to be remedied in the National  Health Act, since it provides a legal lacuna 
which requires a  somewhat superficial and incomplete IC process only and which could 
be exploited by HCPs.2161  
 
According to Van Oosten, ‘knowledge’ during informed consent must also include 
‘appreciation’ whereby “information as a sine qua non for informed consent must include 
both knowledge and appreciation”.2162 Finally, it has also been submitted that the use of 
the phrase ‘where possible’ with regard to the requirement for language creates another 
lacuna, in that the absence of a translator during the IC process, where required, patients 
affected by this absence may not be able to fully exercise their constitutionally guaranteed 
rights to full information disclosure prior to consenting to treatment.  
 
However, provisions in the Constitution related to the progressive and gradual realisation 
of socio-economic rights (e.g. health care specifically, as found in sections 27(1), 24(a) 
and 35 of the Constitution), may provide a valid justification due the unavailability of 
resources, to provide an interpreter in all cases. Chapters five to seven of this thesis, 
report on recent empirical studies, which were designed to evaluate quantitatively and 
qualitatively whether the key elements of the National Health Act, especially the detailed 
criteria for information disclosure prior to obtaining informed consent as stipulated in 
sections 6 to 9, where actually understood and being adhered to by HCPs practising in 
                                                          
2161  Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law [16-17]. 
2162  Van Oosten LLD Thesis 1989 [20]. 
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South African public hospitals. The purpose of the empirical study, reported in chapter 7, 
was to evaluate whether healthcare users or patients, actually understood or ‘had 
knowledge’ of the information disclosed to them. That is, in terms of meeting the criteria 
for valid consent, whether patients actually had knowledge and appreciation of the 
information provided by HCPs prior to providing IC. Some of the findings have already 
been discussed in chapters’ five to seven of this thesis, but will be further summarized 
and discussed below in this chapter of the thesis. 
 
 
8.2.3 Impact of South African case law 
 
A landmark judgment in the case of Castell v De Greef2163 arguably introduced the 
subjective prudent patient and material risks standards of IC into South African medical 
jurisprudence.2164 Since the landmark judgment in the Castell case by the full bench of 
the Cape High Court, other judgments regarding informed consent in South Africa law 
have tried to live up the exalted standards established in this case. The full details of this 
first-mentioned judgment were discussed above in chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. The 
facts of the case are briefly as follows: a patient presented to surgeon for cosmetic breast 
surgery. After the surgery, the female patient developed complications in the operated 
breasts and eventually brought a suit against the surgeon for failure to obtain valid 
informed consent, based on incomplete disclosure. The patient further argued that if she 
had been adequately, or fully informed regarding the potential complications of the breast 
surgery, she might not have consented to the procedure. In arriving at a judgment in this 
case, Ackerman J opined that “in the South African context, the doctor’s duty to disclose 
a material risk must be seen in the contractual setting of an unimpeachable consent to the 
operation and its setting”.2165 The Court held that for consent to serve as a defence during 
medical procedure, the following criteria must be fulfilled: 
i. The consenting party must have had knowledge and been aware of the extent of the harm 
or the risk 
                                                          
2163  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C).   
2164  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 171-175. 
2165  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [79]. 
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ii. The consenting party must have appreciated and understood the extent of the harm or the 
risk 
iii. The consenting party must have consented to the harm or assumed the risk 
iv. The consent must be comprehensive, that is extend to the entire transaction inclusive of 
its consequences.2166 
 
These criteria suggest that the consenting party must have both knowledge and 
appreciation of all the consequences of the medical procedure, including all the benefits, 
harms or risks before providing consent.2167 Further, the consent provided must 
encompass the entire transaction including any future complications. In other words, by 
contrast to the National Health Act, simply having knowledge of the medical procedure or 
treatment, without realizing or appreciating all its consequences, including complications, 
may not make for true or valid consent.2168 With regards to risk disclosure, the Court asked 
what the extent of risks that a HCP must be expected to disclose in other to discharge this 
onus, are. In answering this question, the Court referred to and quoted from the judgment 
of the Australian court in Rogers v Whitaker,2169 where the court stated that:  
 
The law should recognize that a doctor has a duty to warn a patient of a material risk inherent in the 
proposed treatment […] 
 
And that 
 
a risk is material if, in the circumstances of a particular case, a reasonable person in the patients 
position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it, or if the medical 
practitioner is or should  reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, 
would be likely  to attach significance to it. This duty is subject to therapeutic privilege. 
 
                                                          
2166  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425] see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational 
 Principles 684. 
2167  Strauss SA Doctor, patient and the law: A selection of practical issues (Van Schaik Publishers  
 Pretoria 2004) 8 see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 690. 
2168  Khan et al Clinical Negligence 2nd ed (Cavendish Publishing Limited London 2002) 44. 
2169  Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58 (1993) 4 Med LR 79 see also Khan et al Clinical 
 Negligence 185. 
399 
 
The judge then defines the material risks standard in the South African context by 
specifying that: 
 
 A risk being material in the circumstances of the particular case where: 
a) A reasonable person in the patients position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it; or 
b) The particular medical practitioner is, or should reasonably be aware, that the particular patient, if 
warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.2170 
 
Similarly, Lord Scarman in the English case of Sidaway2171 stated as follows:  
 
 The critical limitation is that the duty to warn patients of risks inherent in treatment, is confined 
 to material risk. The test of materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case 
 the court is satisfied that a reasonable person in the patient’s position would likely attach 
 significance to the risk.2172 
 
Therefore, from the above judgments, it becomes obvious that the expected standard of 
information disclosure is the subjective material risk standard, in terms of which a 
reasonable person in the patient’s situation, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach 
significance to it, or if the HCP is reasonably aware that a particular patient, if warned of 
the risk, will likely attach significance to it.  
 
Despite the judgment and rules laid down in the Castell case,2173 in more recent South 
African court judgments such as the Oldwage case2174 and McDonald v Wroe,2175 South 
African courts have made some controversial and contradictory judgments, such as in the 
Oldwage case, discussed previously in chapter three of this thesis. Briefly, a patient 
presented to his general practitioner (GP) with complaints of severe pain in the leg. Having 
made a preliminary diagnosis of vascular insufficiency, the GP referred the patient to a 
                                                          
2170  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [426]. 
2171  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital (1985) 1 AC 871. 
2172  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital (1985) 1 AC 871 [889] see also Khan et al Clinical 
 Negligence 44. 
2173  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2174  Louwrens v Oldwage (2006) 1 SA 197 (SCA). 
2175  McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C). 
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specialist vascular surgeon for further treatment. The surgeon performed an investigation 
in the form of a contrast aided radiological test (angiogram) which revealed substantive 
blockage in some of the patients’ lower limb arteries. The surgeon concluded that the 
patient was suffering from severe ischaemic disease, which was the cause of the pain and 
recommended and urgent bypass surgery. The surgery performed was a cheaper 
“femoro-femoro” or illio-femoral bypass rather than a more expensive “aorto-bifemoral 
bypass”, which the patient could not afford. However, after the vascular surgery the patient 
still felt severe pain and discomfort, requiring him to consult a neurosurgeon who then 
diagnosed a degenerative lumbar disc, which required further surgery in the form of a 
laminectomy. After the laminectomy, the patient’s pain and discomfort then disappeared 
and he felt much better, but not fully recovered. The plaintiff, Mr Oldwage then turned 
around to sue the vascular surgeon Dr Louwrens for misdiagnosis, and failure to obtain 
valid informed consent due to the fact that he did not disclose the issue of a “steal 
syndrome” as a possible complication of the illio-femoral bypass surgery. In the High 
Court, the case hinged on the question whether the surgeon was negligent in not making 
a full disclosure regarding this potential complication, and whether the surgeon had 
missed the diagnosis of the degenerated lumbar disc which could be classified that the 
patient had a dual pathology, namely two disorders occurring at the same time, at the time 
of his initial presentation or diagnosis. In the High Court judgment, Yekiso J accepted the 
opinion of the expert witnesses for the plaintiff as being more logically acceptable as 
established in the English case of Bolitho v City and Hackney HA.2176 The judge further 
referred in detail to the judgment of the full bench of the Cape High Court in the Castell 
case with regard to the material risks standard of information disclosure.2177 He further 
resolved the dispute of facts based on the rules laid down in SFW Group and Another v 
Martin et Cie.2178 In this case, the SCA held that resolving a dispute of facts should be 
based on credibility of expert witnesses, amongst other issues. In the Oldwage case, the 
judge preferred the opinion of the expert witnesses for the plaintiff, who had produced 
statistics that a known complication of the illio-femoral bypass was a “steal syndrome” 
which could occur in about 4% of cases, rather than the opinion of the expert witnesses 
                                                          
2176  Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority (1998) AC 232(HL) [241-243]. 
2177  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425-426]. 
2178  SFW Group and Another v Martin et cie & Others 2003 1 SA 11 (SCA) 
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for the defendant who claimed that based on more recent literature, this complication only 
occurred in 2% of cases.2179 In arriving at his decision, the High Court judge referred to 
the South African case of Mitchell v Dixon,2180 which held that the mere fact that the 
accident occurred, was not itself prima facie proof of negligence.”2181  The judge further 
referred to the English case of Whitehouse v Jordan2182 where the English CA held that 
“a mere error of judgment” on the part of a medical practitioner did not necessarily 
constitute negligence. However, based on logical reasoning as outlined in Michael and 
Another v Linksfield Park Clinic,2183 he accepted the opinion of the plaintiff’s witnesses as 
being more reasonable and defensible.2184 On the issue of consent, the judge contented 
that for consent to be considered valid, it must be “informed”, citing a quotation from which 
it is said: 
 A consent to treatment will only be “informed” if it is based on substantial knowledge 
 concerning the nature and the effect of the act consented to. Thus a medical practitioner is 
 obliged to warn a patient of the material risks and consequences which may ensue during and 
 consequent to the proposed treatment.2185 
 
In arriving at his decision, the judge further referred to the dictum established by Ackerman 
J in the Castell case2186 regarding to the defence of consent. He also referred to the 
judgment of the English CA in Chester v Afshar2187 where it was held that: 
 
  There is a duty on the medical practitioner properly to inform the patient of the risks 
 attendant on his or her treatment and its dangers. The object is to enable the patient to decide 
 whether or not to run the risk of consenting to the treatment or procedure proposed.2188 
 
                                                          
2179  Louwrens v Oldwage (2004) 1 All SA 532 (C) [55-60]. 
2180 Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519. 
2181  Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519 [525]. 
2182  Whitehouse v Jordan and another (1981) 1 All ER 267(HL) [281]. 
2183  Michael & Another v Linksfield Park Clinic (Pty) Ltd 2001(3) SA1188 (SCA). 
2184  Louwrens v Oldwage [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C) [60-61]. 
2185  Claasen NJB and Verschoor T Medical negligence in South Africa (Butterworth Publishers 
 Pty Ltd  South Africa 1992) 62. 
2186  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425]. 
2187  Chester v Afshar (2002) 3 All ER 552 [572]. 
2188 Louwrens v Oldwage [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C) [89]. 
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He then considered the judgment of the South African court in the case of Richter and 
Another v Estate Hamman,2189 where the court said that:  
 
 In reaching a conclusion (as regards the disclosure of a risk by the doctor) a court should be 
 guided by medical opinion as to what a reasonable doctor, having regard to all, the 
 circumstances of the particular case, should or should not do. The court must, of course, 
 make up its own mind, but it will be assisted in doing so by medical evidence.2190 
 
In contrast to the Richter case, where the court based its decision on the ‘reasonable 
doctor’ standard of information disclosure, the full bench of the Cape High Court had 
considered this option in the Castell case, but rejected it. Yekiso J therefore held in the 
Oldwage case that he was bound by this decision. In the final analysis, the judge found, 
based on a balance of probabilities that the vascular surgeon, Dr. Louwrens, was 
negligent due misrepresentation of facts, lack of full information disclosure, and therefore 
was guilty of failure to obtain valid informed consent.2191 The surgeon appealed this ruling 
to the SCA, asking it to determine inter alia what standard of disclosure should be used in 
cases of informed consent. The SCA, in its judgment, overruled the High Court by applying 
the discredited ‘reasonable doctor standard’2192 rather than the more recent judgment of 
the  Cape High Court in the Castell case, which had accepted the ‘prudent patient and 
material risks standards’ of information disclosure as the accepted standards for informed 
consent’ in South African jurisprudence.2193 The judgment in the Oldwage case has been 
criticized by legal scholars, such as Carstens and Pearmain2194 and others.2195 Despite 
ongoing criticism and controversy surrounding the judgment in the Oldwage case, this 
misguided judgment has been carried forward in more recent cases. For example, in the 
case of McDonald v Wroe,2196 a Cape High Court judge found a dentist negligent for failure 
to obtain valid informed consent due to failure to disclose a risk of nerve damage and 
                                                          
2189  Richter and Another v Estate Hamman 1976(3) SA 226(C) 
2190  Richter and Another v Estate Hamman 1976(3) SA 226(C) [232]. 
2191  Louwrens v Oldwage [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C) [115-118]. 
2192  Louwrens v Oldwage (2006) 1 SA 197 (SCA). 
2193 Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2194  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles [683] 
2195  Britz and Roux-Kemp 2012 S Afr Med J 746-748. 
2196  McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C) 
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facial paralysis following extraction of wisdom teeth. Expert opinion was that there was 
about 1% risk of this complication occurring, especially where such surgery is not 
performed by a specialist maxillo-facial surgeon. This decision was recently overturned 
by a full bench of the Cape High Court, based on the question of causation.2197   
 
Facts of the McDonald case:  In this case, the patient and plaintiff had developed 
repeated bouts of pericoronitis (inflammation) around her wisdom teeth, and the dentist 
correctly advised her that it was necessary for her wisdom teeth to be surgically extracted 
under general anaesthesia. The surgery was performed by the dentist. However, post-
operatively, the patient experienced numbness on the left side of her face. This numbness 
was the result of damage to her inferior alveolar nerve, which appeared to be permanent 
in nature.  The risk of permanent nerve damage to the inferior alveolar nerve was a known 
risk and complication arising due to surgery in that area of the jaw. Expert witnesses were 
of the opinion that this complication could occur in about 1% of cases. However, other 
experts suggested that this complication was less likely to arise if the procedure was 
performed by a maxillo-facial surgeon, rather than by a general dentist. The patient 
brought a claim against the defendant dentist, based on the fact that he had failed to warn 
her of this risk/ complication, and further that the dentist had not offered her the option of 
having the procedure performed by a specialist, while obtaining consent for the surgical 
procedure. Expert witnesses also testified that only about 10% of such procedures were 
performed by general dentists in the Cape area. 
 
Judgment: In the High Court judgment, the judge cited the rules for material risks and 
informed disclosure as established in the Castell case.2198 He further established that 
though the dentist performed the procedure effectively, there was a proximate nexus or 
foreseeability between the procedure and the patient’s subsequent facial paralysis and 
nerve damage. Therefore, the dentist had not obtained valid informed consent due to lack 
of full disclosure of all the material risks. He further outlined the onus of proof required in 
South African law as:  
                                                          
2197  Esterhuyse S “Medical Negligence” www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/tax/medical-negligence 
 (Date of use: 25th October 2017). 
2198  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425-426]. 
404 
 
 
 If a medical practitioner through his/her wrongful and negligent conduct causes damage to 
 a patient, the practitioner will be delictually liable to the patient if there was a causal nexus 
 between the conduct of the practitioner and the damage suffered by the patient. The medical 
 practitioner cannot be liable if his/her conduct has not caused any damage.2199 
  
Further: 
 
 The conditio sine qua non theory, also known as the “but-for” test, requires proof on a balance 
 of probabilities that the relevant act of commission or omission was a necessary condition of 
 the harmful event.  Legal causation is present in the event that there is a close enough 
 relationship between the wrongdoers conduct and its consequence for such consequence to 
 be imputed to the wrongdoer in view of policy considerations based on reasonableness, fairness 
 and justice.2200 
 
In arriving at his judgment, Fourie J also partly relied on the judgment of the English House 
of Lords in Chester v Afshar2201 where the Court noted that:  
 
 Standing back from the detailed arguments, I have come to the conclusion that, as a result 
 of the surgeon’s failure to warn the patient, she cannot be said to have given informed consent 
 to the surgery in the full legal sense. Her right to autonomy and dignity can and ought to be 
 vindicated by a narrow and modest departure from traditional causation principles…. On a 
 broader basis I am glad to have arrived at the conclusion that the claimant is entitled in law to 
 succeed. This is in accordance with one of the most basic aspirations of the law, namely to right 
 wrongs. Moreover, the decision announced by the House today reflects the reasonable 
 expectations of the public in contemporary society. 
 
Therefore using a broader consideration of causation and justifiable public interests, the 
judge found the defendant dentist negligent, due to failure to obtain appropriate informed 
consent based on non-disclosure of all material risks, and also applying the principles of 
                                                          
2199  McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C) [568]. 
2200  Neethling J, Potgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of Delict 7th ed (LexisNexis Durban 2015) 186-
 195. 
2201  Chester v Afshar [2004] 4 All ER 587 [596]. 
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reasonableness, fairness and justice based on the constitutional rights to bodily integrity 
and self-determination.2202 
 
The dentist appealed this decision of the judge to a full bench of the Cape High Court 
based on the question of causation. In its judgment, the full bench of the High Court 
argued that: 
 
The defendant’s wrongful and negligent failure to warn the Plaintiff of the risk involved resulted in 
the plaintiff consenting to defendant performing the surgery.  He performed the surgery correctly 
without negligence. The experts were unable to fault the manner in which he performed the surgery 
in any way. The harm, which the plaintiff suffered, is due to a risk which is inherent in the surgical 
procedure in question and which can ensue without negligence on the part of the practitioner, be it 
a general practitioner or a specialist, who performs the procedure. The harm which the plaintiff 
suffered, is harm she might equally probably have suffered in any event if the surgery had been 
performed by a specialist surgeon. There is, therefore, no direct causal link between the defendant’s 
negligence (in failing to warn the plaintiff of the risk) and occurrence of the harm, unless it is shown 
that the plaintiff, upon being warned of risk, would not have undergone the procedure at all. That is 
not the plaintiff’s case.2203 
 
Based on the above considerations, the full bench of the Cape High Court overturned the 
judgment of Fourie J by reaffirming causation as an element deeply entrenched in the 
South African law of delict. Based on this judgment, a patient who intends relying on the 
argument of lack of informed consent bears the onus to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that (1) the healthcare professional was negligent in so far as he or she failed to warn the 
patient of the particular risk or complication; and (2), the healthcare professional’s 
negligent omission as such caused the damages suffered by the patient.2204,2205  
 
As demonstrated by the cases above, recent judgments on informed consent rendered by 
South African courts have led to controversial rulings which mean that further clarifications 
                                                          
2202  The Constitution (s12). 
2203  Nicola McDonald v Dr Graham Wroe (2006) 3 All SA 565 (C) [para 34]. 
2204 Esterhuyse S “Medical Negligence” April 13 2007 
 www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/tax/medical-negligence (Date of use: 25th October 2017). 
2205  Baron M McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA (C) Deneys Reitz General Case Law Update March 
 2007 http:// www.denysreitz.co.za/directors/monique_baron.html (Date of use: 25 October 2017). 
406 
 
are required, and that in addition to clarification, there is a need to further develop the 
legal position relating to IC as espoused in NHA2206 and regulations, and affirmed in the 
Constitution.2207 This need is illustrated by the judgments in two recent cases, namely that 
of Sibisi NO v Maitin2208 and Pane v MEC Free State.2209 These cases were discussed in 
detail in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
 
However, for the sake of continuity and comprehensiveness, the cases are briefly 
summarized here, as they may be perceived to have introduced new requirements, such 
as that of a “dual burden of proof”2210 regarding the doctrine of informed into South African 
jurisprudence.  Specifically noteworthy is the judgment of the SCA in the Sibisi case,2211 
where it was held that the plaintiff in a case of informed consent must prove both 
negligence and wrongfulness to discharge the onus of proof in informed consent 
cases.2212 According to the court, the “plaintiff did not discharge the onus of proving 
negligence on the part of the doctor” and that informed consent cannot be considered an 
issue once negligence is not established.2213 This case was referred on appeal from the 
KwaZulu-Natal High Court. The facts of this case are related to issues arising from the 
delivery of a large (macrosomic) baby by a specialist obstetrician, which resulted in 
permanent injury to the baby after delivery. The plaintiff in this matter instituted a claim on 
behalf of her minor daughter, who had suffered bodily injuries following natural birth.  
 
These injuries and sequelae included damage to the infant’s brachial plexus as a result 
of alleged excessive traction during childbirth; resulting in a medical condition called Erb’s 
palsy. In addition, there was injury to the child’s left eye, which required ongoing treatment 
and permanent damage to the child’s vision, upper eye and facial features. The plaintiff’s 
claim was based on medical negligence, and the absence of informed consent in the 
                                                          
2206  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s6-9). 
2207  The Constitution. 
2208  Sibisi NO v Maitin 2014 (6) SA 533 (SCA). 
2209  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
2210 Zwartz L “Sibisi NO v Maitin: A dual burden of proof?” June 2015 De Rebus 33. 
 www.derebus.org.za/sibisi-no-v-maitin-a-dual-burden-of-proof/ (Date of use: 28 October 2017). 
2211        Sibisi NO v Maitin 2014 (6) SA 533 (SCA). 
2212  Hogan Lovells “The doctor’s duty to inform” 2014 www.hoganlovells.com/publications/the-
 doctors-duty-to-inform (Date of use: 28 October 2017). 
2213  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 1 October 2014 [1]. 
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alternative.2214 The plaintiff also asked the court to develop the common law on informed 
consent in line with the constitutional rights to bodily integrity and autonomy by 
establishing that the test for whether a doctor has obtained a patient’s informed consent 
is whether, a patient in the position of the plaintiff would have elected not to undergo the 
procedure and instead elect another one, if the patient was fully informed of the available 
options by the defendant.2215 The facts of the case include the fact that Dr. Maitin did not 
inform the pregnant woman that she was pregnant with a baby weighing over 4kg, and 
that such a large baby might likely lead to shoulder dystocia and a difficult vaginal delivery. 
This condition materialized during labour and the doctor was forced to use an emergency 
manoeuvre (McRoberts manoeuvre) to deliver the baby. During delivery, the excessive 
traction associated with the manoeuvre and the size of the big baby caused the child’s 
postpartum injuries.   
 
At court, the doctor admitted that he used his own discretion or expertise in deciding on 
what information to disclose the pregnant woman (akin to the reasonable doctor 
standard). Expert witnesses agreed that one could not readily predict the occurrence of 
shoulder dystocia based simply on the size or weight of a baby. It was further agreed by 
that necessary force was required in performing the McRoberts manoeuvre to deliver a 
baby in an emergency. On the other hand, the plaintiff argued that she should have been 
informed regarding the potential impact of the large baby and the option of delivery by 
caesarean section (C/S). She therefore alleged that failure to inform her amounted to lack 
of informed consent against the obstetrician. However, the plaintiff did assert that she 
depended on the doctor to make the right decision on her behalf, and may not have 
chosen the option of a C/S even if she were advised of this option beforehand.2216 The 
High Court found the doctor not to have been negligent.  On appeal, the SCA also found 
that Dr. Maitin was not negligent. The SCA held that Mrs Sibisi, as the plaintiff, bore the 
onus of showing that the obstetrician with the reasonable skill and diligence possessed 
                                                          
2214  Zwartz L “Sibisi NO v Maitin: A dual burden of proof?” June 2015 De Rebus 33. 
 www.derebus.org.za/sibisi-no-v-maitin-a-dual-burden-of-proof/ (Date of use: 28 October 2017). 
2215  Hogan Lovells “The doctor’s duty to inform” December 2014 
 www.hoganlovells.com/publications/the- doctors-duty-to-inform (Date of use: 28 October 2017). 
2216  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 [52]. 
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by that branch of the medical profession, would have foreseen the possibility of shoulder 
dystocia and taken steps to mitigate the risk, as established the case of Van Wyk v 
Lewis.2217 The Court found that the plaintiff did not discharge that onus of negligence 
because there was no mismanagement of the pregnancy, labour and delivery on the part 
of Dr Maitin, hence he was not negligent. The Court held that any reasonable obstetrician 
in Dr Maitin’s position would not have foreseen the possibility of shoulder dystocia in this 
case, and would have proceeded on the same basis that Dr Maitin did.2218  
 
The Court also reasoned that once the plaintiff has failed to establish medical negligence, the 
question of informed consent and of wrongfulness automatically became moot. The Court 
held that the plaintiff ‘…would still have to establish negligence on the part of the defendant 
to succeed in the action […].’2219  Therefore, the defendant was absolved from liability on both 
grounds. In arriving at its decision, the SCA again referred to the reasonable doctor 
standard as established in Richter and Another v Estate Hamman2220 where the court 
said: 
 
 A doctor whose advice is sought about an operation to which certain dangers are attached-and 
 there are dangers attached to most operations-is in a dilemma. If he fails to disclose the risks, he 
 may render himself liable to an action for assault, whereas if he discloses them he might well 
 frighten the patient into not having the operation when the doctor knows full well that it would be  
 in the patient’s interests to have it.2221 
 
The SCA however asserted that in keeping with the rights to autonomy and bodily 
protection, now entrenched in the Constitution,2222 the test should rather be whether the 
reasonable patient, in her position, if warned of the risk, would attach significance to it. On 
the issue of negligence and informed consent, the SCA referred to the judgment in the 
Castell case where the court held : 
 
                                                          
2217  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 [444]. 
2218 Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 [39]. 
2219  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 [22]. 
2220  Richter & Another v Estate Hamman 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) 
2221  Richter & Another v Estate Hamman 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) [232]. 
2222  The Constitution (s12). 
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 [….] that, in our law, for a patient’s consent to constitute a justification that excludes the 
 wrongfulness of medical treatment and its consequences, the doctor is obliged to warn a patient 
 so consenting of a material risk inherent in the proposed treatment; a risk being material if, in the 
 circumstances of the particular case: 
 (a) A reasonable person in the patient’s position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to  attach 
 significance to it; or 
 (b) The medical practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if 
 warned  of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it.2223 
 
The SCA in the Sibisi case held that: 
 
 
  This passage makes it clear, however, that the question of informed consent goes to the 
 wrongfulness element of the Aquilian action. Negligent conduct on the part of the doctor will 
 be wrongful if the patient has not given informed consent. Where there is no negligence proved, 
 however, the test for wrongfulness does not even arise.2224 
 
The SCA concluded that since Mrs Sibisi had not proved negligence on the part of Dr. 
Maitin, there was no need to establish which standard of information disclosure should be 
applicable in informed consent cases, thereby failing to extend the South African common 
law and jurisprudence on informed consent as required by the Constitution on the 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights.2225 The principle of the ‘dual burden of proof’ derived 
from the judgment of the SCA in the Sibisi case has since been applied at the high court 
level in a judgment in the case of Pane v MEC Free state,2226 where the court held that in 
the absence of a proof of negligence, the defendant could not establish lack of informed 
consent, or that the argument regarding lack of informed consent by HCPs could not be 
further pursued against an offending doctor or other HCP.2227 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2223  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [426]. 
2224  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 [50]. 
2225  The Constitution (s39). 
2226  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
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8.2.4 Further implications of the SCA judgment in the Sibisi case on extension of the 
common law on informed consent in South Africa  
 
The evidence placed before the Court in the Sibisi case2228 was that shoulder dystocia, 
while a risk of vaginal delivery, could not be reasonably foreseen based on the weight or 
size of a foetus. This was based on the evidence by two expert witnesses invited to assist 
the Court in this case. In addition, the Court relied on a guideline issued by the Royal 
College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG), on the foreseeability of shoulder 
dystocia, which advised that while there is a relationship between foetal size and shoulder 
dystocia, “it is not a good predictor. The large majority of infants with a birth weight of 
[more than] 4500g do not develop shoulder dystocia and, equally importantly, 48% of 
incidences of shoulder dystocia occur in infants with a birth weight less than 4000 g”.2229 
The guideline also pointed out that clinical foetal weight estimation is unreliable, and even 
ultrasound scans have a ten per cent margin of error. The guideline further advised that 
“elective caesarean section is not recommended for suspected fetal macrosomia 
(estimated fetal weight over 4.5 kg) without diabetes. Estimation of fetal weight is 
unreliable and the large majority of macrosomic infants do not experience shoulder 
dystocia. In the USA, a decision analysis model estimated that an additional 2345 
caesarean deliveries would be required, at a cost of US$4.9 million, to prevent one 
permanent injury from shoulder dystocia.” 2230 The expert witness for Mrs Sibisi contended 
that if the doctor had shown up earlier during labour, a C-section could have been 
performed. He also suggested that application of the McRoberts manoeuvre in the wrong 
position was negligent. He conceded, however, that the weight of the foetus was not a 
good correlate of shoulder dystocia and that failure to estimate the weight accurately by 
Dr. Maitin was not negligent.  
 
                                                          
2228  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156. 
2229   RCOG Shoulder dystocia-Green-top guideline No. 42 2nd ed updated February 2017 (RCOG 
 London 2012) https:// www.rcog.org.uk/en/guidelines-research-services/guidelines/gtg/42/ 
 (Date of use: 28 November 2017). 
2230  RCOG Shoulder dystocia Green-top guideline No. 42 2nd ed (RCOG London 2012) as 
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The SCA made the point that informed consent goes to the wrongfulness of a medical 
practitioner’s negligent conduct.2231 In arriving at its decision, Lewis J referred to the 
judgments in the case of Van Wyk v Lewis2232 arguing that Mrs Sibisi, as the plaintiff, bore 
the onus of showing that an obstetrician with the reasonable skill and diligence possessed 
by that branch of the profession would have foreseen the possibility of shoulder dystocia 
and taken steps to mitigate the risk.  The judge held that she did not discharge that onus, 
thereby basing part of its judgment on the ‘reasonable doctor’ standard of information 
disclosure. Further, the Court referred to the controversial judgment in Richter v Estate 
Hamman2233 stating that “[o]ur courts have in the past held that in order to determine 
whether a doctor is under a duty to disclose the risks of a procedure we must determine 
whether a reasonable doctor, in the position of the defendant, would have disclosed risks 
however remote”, quoting Watermeyer J as saying:  
 
… It may well be that in certain circumstances a doctor is negligent if he fails to warn a patient, 
and, if that is so, it seems to me in principle that his conduct should be tested by the standard of 
the reasonable doctor faced with the particular problem. In reaching a conclusion a Court should 
be guided by medical opinion as to what a reasonable doctor, having regard to all the 
circumstances of the particular case, should or should not do. The Court must, of course, make up 
its own mind, but it will be assisted in doing so by medical evidence.” 2234 
 
The Court suggested that Mrs Sibisi’s argument implied that by applying the reasonable 
doctor standard, “[…] this approach leaves the determination of a legal duty to the 
judgment of doctors appointed in their own cause.”2235 Further, the Court cited the 
judgment in Castell v De Greef2236 and the international cases referred to in that judgment, 
which stated that “in keeping with the rights to autonomy and bodily protection, now 
entrenched in the Constitution, the test should rather be whether the reasonable patient, 
in her position, if warned of the risk, would attach significance to it.”2237  The Court opined 
                                                          
2231 Hogan Lovells http://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-doctors-duty-to-inform (Date of 
 use: 28 September 2017) see also Sibisi NO v Maitin [2014] ZASCA 156 [50]. 
2232  Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 [444]. 
2233  Richter & another v Estate Hamman 1976 (3) SA 226 (C).  
2234  Richter & another v Estate Hamman 1976 (3) SA 226 (C) [232G-H]. 
2235  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [47]. 
2236  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2237  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [47] 
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that the test established in Castell v De Greef2238 by a full bench of the Cape High court 
accepted that this ought to be the test. The Sibisi Court quoted Ackermann J as saying 
that South African courts ought to follow the approach of an Australian decision in Rogers 
v Whitaker,2239 which also took into account English and Canadian decisions that 
previously adopted a similar approach “suitably adapted to the needs of South African 
jurisprudence”.2240 Lewis J quoted Ackerman in Castell v De Greef as follows:  
 
It is in accord with the fundamental right of individual autonomy and self -determination to which 
South African law is moving. This formulation also sets its face against paternalism, from many 
other species whereof South Africa is now turning away. It is in accord with developments in 
common law countries like Canada, the United States of America and Australia, as well as judicial 
views on the continent of Europe [….] I therefore conclude that, in our law, for a patient’s consent 
to constitute a justification that excludes the wrongfulness of medical treatment and its 
consequences, the doctor is obliged to warn a patient so consenting of a material risk inherent in 
the proposed treatment; a risk being material if, in the circumstances of the particular case […]2241 
 
The judge concluded that the above passage makes it clear that the question of informed 
consent goes to the wrongfulness element of the Aquilian action. Negligent conduct on 
the part of the doctor will be wrongful if the patient has not given informed consent.  
However, negligence is still a requirement, as affirmed in the Castell case.2242 Where there 
is no negligence proved, however, the test for wrongfulness does not even arise.2243  
 
It has been argued elsewhere in this thesis that courts have now conclusively 
demonstrated that informed consent falls within the element of wrongfulness relating to a 
claim based on delict. In order to found this element of wrongfulness on a doctors’ or other 
HCPs conduct, the conduct must be negligent. You cannot have one without the other, as 
then there would be no claim in delict. Although Mrs Sibisi was not successful in her claim 
against Dr Maitin, this case highlighted the importance of HCPs gaining their patient’s 
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2243  Sibisi NO v Maitin 311/13 [2014] 156 [49-50] 
413 
 
informed consent. Furthermore, it has also shown that, even in circumstances where a 
HCP has done everything within his or her skill set to assist a patient, a medical 
malpractice claim can still arise in any litigious society. Doctors or other HCPs are required 
to assess the circumstances and determine what their patients need to know when coming 
to a decision whether or not to undergo a procedure, and the courts currently leave that 
in their hands. Further, it has been suggested by some legal authorities that informed 
consent may prove valuable in defending medical malpractice claims and should not be 
dismissed as a mere formality by HCPs.2244  
 
8.2.5 Comparative law 
 
Section 39(1) of the South African constitution2245 stipulates that “when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum- 
a) Must consider international law; and  
b) May consider foreign law”2246 
 
Judge McNair J in the English case of Bolam v Friern HMC,2247 where the reasonable 
doctor standard or ‘Bolam principle’ or doctrine was established as the expected standard 
of care in negligence cases made the following observation: 
 
 I myself would prefer to put it this way, that he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in 
 accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled 
 in that particular art. I do not think there is much difference in sense. It is just a different way 
 of expressing the same thought. Putting it the other way round, a man is not negligent, if he is 
 acting in accordance with such a practice, merely because there is a body of opinion who 
 would take a contrary view […].2248  
 
However, in the case of Hills v Porter Hirst J opined that: 
                                                          
2244  Hogan Lovells http://www.hoganlovells.com/en/publications/the-doctors-duty-to-inform (Date of 
 use: 28 September 2017). 
2245 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
2246        The Constitution (s39). 
2247  Bolam v Friern Barnet Health Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
2248  Bolam v Friern Barnet Health Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 [587].  
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  I do not accept that…by adopting the Bolam principle, the court in effect abdicates its power 
 of decision to the doctors. In every case the Court must be satisfied that the standard 
 contended for on their behalf accords with that upheld by a substantial body of medical opinion, 
 and that this body of medical opinion is both respectable and responsible, and experienced in 
 this particular field of medicine.’2249 
 
The Bolam principle2250 has been the major doctrine or ‘reasonable doctor standard’ 
applied in English common law cases regarding negligence and informed consent since 
the late 1950s, despite dissenting opinions in landmark cases such as the Sidaway2251 
case where Lord Scarman advocated for the adoption of the informed consent doctrine 
as applied by north American courts.2252 In the Sidaway case, the majority of the bench at 
the English House of Lords (HL) adopted a broad standard of information disclosure as 
established in Chatterson v Gerson,2253 where it was held that the patient needs to be only 
informed in broad terms, as determined by an accepted body of medical practitioners in 
that particular field as established in Bolam.2254 According to Bristow J in the Chatterson 
case, “[…] once the plaintiff is informed in broad terms of the nature of the procedure 
which is intended, and gives her consent, that consent is real, and the cause of action…is 
negligence, not trespass […].”2255   
 
North American common law jurisdictions in the USA and Canada, in contrast, have long 
adopted as the basis of informed consent, the material risks standard of information 
disclosure, as established in the landmark judgments of Canterbury v Spence2256 and 
Reibl v Hughes.2257 In the Canterbury case it was held that “[a] risk is… material when a 
reasonable person in that the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s position, 
would likely attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in determining whether or not 
                                                          
2249  Hills v Porter [1984] 1 WLR 641 [653]. 
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2251  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital (1985) 1 AC 871. 
2252  Khan et al 2nd Clinical Negligence 44. 
2253  Chatterson v Gerson [1981] 1 All ER 257. 
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to forego the proposed therapy.2258 In the Canadian case of Reibl v Hughes,2259 a 
physician failed to disclose a 10% risk of a stroke resulting from surgery, which was 
regarded as remote and as one that might not have affected the plaintiff or patients 
decision, except that he was nearing retirement and would have been eligible for a full 
pension. The risk of a disabling stroke was, however, very significant to this particular 
patient, because he would not have wanted to risk his pension by undergoing the 
surgery.2260 Consequently, the court in Reibl ruled with regard to the material risk standard 
that: “[…] the test is based on the decision that a reasonable person in the patients position 
would have made. I should make it clear that the patient’s particular concerns must also 
be reasonably based […].”2261  
 
The material risks standard of information disclosure has also been adopted by Australian 
courts in landmark judgments and cases such as Rogers v Whittaker2262 and F v R.2263 In 
the case of Rogers, a woman, partially blind in one eye, developed a severe infection in 
her second eye which needed a surgical procedure. The woman was very concerned 
about losing sight in her ‘good eye’ and made enquiries regarding complications arising 
from the surgery. Despite these enquiries, the surgeon did not inform her that there was 
a 1 in 14000 chance of sympathetic opthalmoplegia. Unfortunately, this risk did materialize 
and the patient became almost completely blind in her previously partially ‘good eye’. She 
sued the surgeon for negligence. The Australian High Court found on the plaintiff’s behalf 
against the defendant surgeon, stating: 
 
 […] that standard is not determined solely or even primarily by reference to the practice  followed 
 or supported by a responsible body of opinion in the relevant profession or sphere...further…in the 
 field of non-disclosure of risk and the provision of advice and information, the Bolam principle has 
 been discarded and instead, the courts have adopted the principle that, while evidence of 
 acceptable medical practice is a useful guide for the courts, it is for the courts to adjudicate on what 
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 is the appropriate standard of care giving weight to the  paramount consideration that a person is 
 entitled to make his own decisions about his life.2264 
 
The full bench of the Cape High Court also examined the material risks standard of 
information disclosure in the Castell case,2265 and adopted it as the accepted standard of 
care in South African jurisprudence.2266 This standard was further re-examined by the 
SCA in the cases of Broude v McIntosh2267 and Louwrens v Oldwage2268 where the SCA 
did not overrule these judgments. However, in recent judgments such as McDonald v 
Wroe2269 and Sibisi No v Maitin,2270 the SCA seems to have contradicted itself by reverting 
to the reasonable doctor standard as established in Richter and Another v Estate 
Hamman.2271 Further, the SCA and other South African High Courts seem to have 
introduced a dual burden of proof in informed consent cases, as shown the Sibisi case2272 
and that of Pane v MEC Free State,2273 by requiring that a claimant must prove not only 
negligence, but also lack of informed consent, and once there was no proof of negligence, 
consideration of failure to obtain valid informed consent automatically falls away.2274  
 
This state of affairs requires further reconsideration by the SCA by reference to recent 
judgments in foreign case law, as exemplified by the 2015 judgment of the UK Supreme 
Court Scotland in the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire,2275 referred to briefly in chapter 
3 of this thesis. The plaintiff in this case was a diminutive and well-known diabetic patient 
who was pregnant with her first child. It is a well-known fact that women who are diabetics 
have a tendency to produce macrosomic or big babies with an increased chance of 
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2272  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 
2273  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99 
2274  Zwartz L “Sibisi NO v Maitin: A dual burden of proof?” June 2015 De Rebus 33. 
 www.derebus.org.za/sibisi-no-v-maitin-a-dual-burden-of-proof/ (Date of use: 28 October  2017) 
 see also Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 [50-51]. 
2275  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11. 
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shoulder dystocia.2276 Generally, the alternative to vaginal delivery of a baby in such cases 
would include the option of delivery by C-section (C/S). Further, the plaintiff and pregnant 
woman in this case was of a short stature, about 5 feet tall, which would make the chances 
of delivering a big baby even more difficult, due to cephalopelvic disproportion. Dystocia 
was described as “a major obstetric emergency associated with a short and long term 
neonatal and maternal morbidity and associated neonatal mortality” by one of the expert 
witnesses at trial. Despite knowing these facts about the patient, her attending specialist 
obstetrician did not disclose all the potential complications to the patient; neither did she 
offer the patient the option of delivery by C/S. The obstetrician proceeded to deliver the 
baby via normal vaginal delivery, basing her decision on her usual and accepted practice 
similar to that of other specialists in England and Scotland, by arguing that most of the 
pregnant women in the plaintiff’s position would readily elect the option of a C/S. This, 
however, increases the number of babies delivered by C-section, generally considered 
undesirable, with increased costs and depletion of resources, etc. Shoulder dystocia is 
also presents risks for the baby, including damage to the brachial plexus estimated at 
around 0.2% (1 in 500 cases), and risk of entrapment of the umbilical cord estimated at 
about 0.1%. The defendant doctor accepted that the risk of dystocia occurring in diabetic 
mothers was around 9 to 10%, yet she did not disclose the risks and potential 
complications to the pregnant woman. According to guidance from the Royal College of 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists regarding shoulder dystocia:2277  
 
 There can be a high perinatal mortality and morbidity associated with the condition, even  when it 
 is managed appropriately. Maternal morbidity is also increased, particularly postpartum 
 haemorrhage (11%) and fourth-degree perineal tears (3.8%), and their incidence remains 
 unchanged by the manoeuvres required to effect delivery.   
 
In this case, because of the big size of the baby, there was difficulty in delivering the 
baby’s shoulders through the birth canal. Following a very difficult delivery by the plaintiff, 
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which included a partial symphisiotomy (division of the symphysis pubis), assisted forceps 
delivery, and considerable traction, her baby was delivered alive but consequently 
developed both cerebral palsy due to oxygen deprivation and Erb’s palsy due to damage 
to the brachial plexus during delivery. Mrs Montgomery, the patient and claimant, brought 
a claim of medical negligence and failure to obtain true informed consent against her 
obstetrician doctor. In arriving at a decision in this case, in a judgment rendered by Lords 
Kerr and Reed, the Supreme Court examined the entire history of English jurisprudence 
on informed consent and negligence starting from the opinion of the English House of 
Lords in Maynard v West Midlands Regional Health Authority,2278 where the court 
approved the dictum of Lord Clyde in Hunter v Hanley2279 that the true test for establishing 
negligence in diagnosis or treatment on the part of a doctor is whether the doctor has 
been proved to be guilty of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if 
acting with ordinary care, consistent with the Bolam principle.2280 The Court further 
considered in detail the Sidaway case,2281 especially the dissenting judgment of Lord 
Scarman who took as his starting point “the patient’s right to make his own decision, which 
may be seen as a basic human right protected by the common law.”2282 Lord Scarman 
inferred that:  
 
 If, therefore, the failure to warn a patient of the risks inherent in the operation which is 
 recommended does constitute a failure to respect the patient’s right to make his own decision, 
 I can see no reason in principle why, if the risk materialises and injury or damage is caused, 
 the law  should not recognise and enforce a right in the patient to compensation by way of 
 damages.2283  
 
Further, if (a) the patient suffers damage, (b) as a result of an undisclosed risk, (c) which 
would have been disclosed by a doctor exercising reasonable care to respect her patient’s 
right to decide whether to incur the risk, and (d) the patient would have avoided the injury 
if the risk had been disclosed; then the patient will in principle have a cause of action 
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based on negligence. Lord Scarman argued that the decision whether to consent to the 
treatment proposed did not depend solely on medical considerations, rather, “the doctor's 
concern is with health and the relief of pain. These are the medical objectives. But a 
patient may well have in mind circumstances, objectives, and values which he may 
reasonably not make known to the doctor but which may lead him to a different decision 
from that suggested by a purely medical opinion.”2284  
 
Lord Scarman then concluded as follows:  
 
 To the extent that I have indicated I think that English law must recognize a duty of the doctor 
 to warn his patient of risk inherent in the treatment which he is proposing: and especially so, if 
 the treatment be surgery. The critical limitation is that the duty is confined to material risk. The 
 test of materiality is whether in the circumstances of the particular case the court is satisfied 
 that a reasonable person in the patient's position would be likely to attach significance to the 
 risk. Even if the risk be material, the doctor will not be liable if upon a reasonable assessment 
 of his patient's  condition he takes the view that a warning would be detrimental to his  patient's 
health.2285 
 
The Supreme Court next considered the judgment of the English House of Lords in Pearce 
v United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust 2286 where Lord Woolf observed that: 
 
In a case where it is being alleged that a plaintiff has been deprived of the opportunity to make a 
proper decision as to what course he or she should take in relation to treatment, it seems to me to 
be the law, as indicated in the cases to which I have just referred, that if there is a significant risk 
which would affect the judgment of a reasonable patient, then in the normal course it is the 
responsibility of a doctor to inform the patient of that significant risk, if the information is needed so 
that the patient can determine for him or herself as to what course he or she should adopt.2287 
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The Pearce case2288 involved an expectant mother whose pregnancy was over term. Her 
consultant obstetrician took the view that the appropriate course was for her to have a 
normal delivery when nature took its course, rather than a C-section at an earlier date, 
and advised her accordingly. In any event, the baby died in utero. The case turned on 
whether the mother ought to have been warned of the risk of death in utero of an over 
term baby.2289 The Court in Montgomery next referred to the judgment of the English HL 
in Chester v Afshar,2290 which was based on the issue of causation, where the court held 
that “that the doctor in question had been under a duty to warn the patient of a small (1%-
2%) risk that the proposed operation might lead to a seriously adverse result.”2291 The 
House of Lords held that the rationale for this duty to warn was “to enable adult patients 
of sound mind to make for themselves decisions intimately affecting their own lives and 
bodies”.2292 The Court further held that “in making a decision which might have a profound 
effect on her health and well-being, a patient was entitled to information and advice about 
possible alternative or variant treatments.”2293 In arriving at its decision, the Court in 
Montgomery also referred to international law as applied in the Canadian case of Reibl v 
Hughes,2294 and considered in more detail the judgment of the Australian High Court in 
Rogers v Whittaker,2295 where the Court reformulated the test of the materiality of a risk 
to encompass the situation in which, where the doctor knows or ought to know, the actual 
patient would be likely to attach greater significance to a risk than the hypothetical 
reasonable patient might do with certain exceptions. In this case, the Court stated that:  
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  [A] risk is material if, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the 
 patient's position, if warned of the risk, would be likely to attach significance to it or if the medical 
 practitioner is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient, if warned of the risk, 
 would be likely to attach significance to it.2296 
 
The Scottish Supreme Court, in allowing the appeal of Mrs Montgomery, concluded that: 
 
 The correct position, in relation to the risks of injury involved in treatment, can now be seen to 
 be substantially that adopted in Sidaway by Lord Scarman, and by Lord Woolf MR in 
 Pearce,2297 subject to the refinement made by the High Court of Australia in Rogers v 
 Whitaker2298 […] An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the 
 available forms of treatment to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment 
 interfering with her bodily integrity is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take 
 reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in any 
 recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or variant treatments. The test of 
 materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the particular case, a reasonable person in the 
 patient’s position would be likely to attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should 
 reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.2299 
 
In its judgment, the Supreme Court also gave some exceptions to its decision regarding 
information disclosure to include where it would not be in the best interests of the patient, 
in cases of necessity such as due to unconsciousness or based on therapeutic 
privilege.2300 The court further adumbrated three important issues that ought to be taken 
into consideration in such cases: 
 
 (a) Assessment of whether a risk is material cannot be reduced to percentages. The 
significance of a given risk is likely to reflect a variety of factors besides its magnitude, 
including the nature of the risk, the effect which its occurrence would have upon the life of 
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the patient, and the importance to the patient of the benefits sought to be achieved by the 
treatment and the alternatives.2301  
(b) The doctor’s advisory role would involve dialogue, to ensure that the patient 
understands the seriousness of her condition, and the anticipated benefits and risks of the 
proposed treatment and any reasonable alternatives, so that the patient is then in a 
position to make an informed decision. This role be performed effectively only if the 
information is provided to a patient in a comprehensible manner rather than by 
bombarding the patient with technical information which a patient cannot reasonably be 
expected to understand, and also not by routinely demanding patients’ signature on a 
consent form.2302  
(c) The therapeutic exception should not be abused, rather it is a limited exception to the 
general principle that the patient should make the decision whether to undergo a proposed 
course of treatment. Therefore, it is not intended to subvert that principle by enabling the 
doctor to prevent the patient from making an informed choice where the patient is liable 
to make a choice, which the doctor considers to be contrary to his or her best interests.2303  
 
In addition to the preceding points, while discussing its decision, the Supreme Court 
considered other socio-legal issues arising from changes in society in recent times. This 
include the recognition and adoption of the human rights doctrine in national and 
international laws, which recognize the patient as an individual with the right of autonomy, 
whose rights ought to be recognized and respected, rather than the Hippocratic tradition, 
whereby doctors are considered as providing beneficent services to patients based on the 
paternalistic concept of ‘doctor knows best’. Further, the Court alluded to the development 
of consumer rights in healthcare, where patients had acquired the rights of consumers of 
healthcare services, and HCPs were providers, creating a new dynamic in the doctor-
patient relationship.2304 The Court finally contended that the decisions referring to doctors 
are equally applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all HCPs.2305 
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It is hence submitted, following from the above judgment, that South African courts ought 
to re-evaluate recent judgments in cases such as Louwrens v Oldwage,2306 McDonald v 
Wroe 2307and Sibisi NO v Maitin,2308 while taking into consideration the injunctions and 
intent of the South African Constitution2309 which urges adjudicators to consider ‘foreign 
law’ as well as relevant fundamental rights considerations expounded in the Constitution 
and recent South African legislation, such as the National Health Act2310 and regulations, 
as well as the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) in their judgments.2311,2312 For example, the 
CPA requires healthcare providers to disclose prices or specific cost estimates including 
variables, prior to provision of healthcare services except in emergency situations.2313,2314 
 
8.2.6 Distinguishing between the common law doctrines of negligence, wrongfulness, 
assault, battery and lack of informed consent 
 
Recent judgments by South African courts appear to have introduced a new dimension 
into the adjudication of cases of failure to obtain informed consent, including placing 
plaintiffs’ in the difficult position of providing a dual burden of proof,2315 as shown in recent 
the judgment by the SCA in the case of Sibisi NO v Maitin.2316 In this case, the court held 
that if a plaintiff was unsuccessful in proving negligence on the part of the HCP, then any 
allegation of lack of informed consent falls away and automatically becomes a moot point. 
This reasoning has also been applied by the High Court recently in case the case of Pane 
v MEC Free State.2317   
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Historically, the charge of ‘negligence’ in informed consent cases was first introduced in 
the American case of Natanson v Kline2318 by the Supreme Court of Kansas. Prior to that, 
cases of lack of informed consent were tried under the charge of battery or trespass as 
shown in the landmark Schloendorf case 2319 and also illustrated by the South African 
case of Stoffberg v Elliot.2320  
 
Negligence in English common law refers to the dictum quoted by the court in Hunter v 
Hanley,2321 namely that “the true test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment 
on the part of a doctor is whether the doctor has been proved to be guilty of such failure 
as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of if acting with ordinary care”, later adopted 
by McNair J as the Bolam principle in the case of Bolam v Friern HMC.2322 In South African 
jurisprudence, negligence has been described as occurring “when the conduct of a person 
falls short of the standard which the law expects of the reasonable person in the particular 
circumstances of the case.”2323 The test for negligence was established in South African 
law in the case of Kruger v Coetzee2324 where the court held that for the purposes of 
liability, culpa arises when a diligent pater familias in the position of the defendant:  
 
(i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct injuring another in his person or 
property and causing him patrimonial loss, and 
(ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such occurrence, and 
(iii) the defendant failed to take such steps.2325 
 
In English Common Law, the test for negligence is based on a four-way test consisting of 
(a) duty of care (b) breach of duty (c) causation and (d) foreseeability.2326 South African 
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common law, on the other hand, requires that the five elements of a delict, vis-à-vis; 
conduct, causality, wrongfulness, capacity and fault; must be proven in order to succeed 
with a delictual claim. The fault element may take either the form of dolus or culpa. 
However, if a claim is based on medical negligence as the ground of liability, negligence 
rather than intent, must be proven,2327 due to the fact that negligence is considered a non-
intentional tort, while assault or battery is an intentional tort.2328 The test for medical 
negligence relates to reasonable skill and care, foreseeability, and preventability of 
ensuing harm, and is measured against the standard of the reasonable expert in the 
circumstances, as established the cases of Mitchell v Dixon2329 and Van Wyk v Lewis.2330 
It has been shown in various South African cases such as  Lymberg Jeffries,2331 Richter 
and Another v Estate Hamman,2332 and Broude v McIntosh,2333 that  failure to obtain 
informed consent can been deemed negligent, consistent with the English case of Bolam 
v Friern HMC,2334 and other  judgments in common law jurisdictions, as discussed in the 
preceding section on comparative law.2335  
 
Failure to obtain informed consent prior to medical or surgical treatment is technically 
considered as ‘assault’ or ‘battery’.  Assault is defined as the “[…] intentional application 
of force or violence … to the person of another,” as shown the case of Rex v Jolly and 
Others.2336  In assault cases, the fault element takes the form of intention. By definition, 
“an assault is an act which causes another person to apprehend the infliction of 
immediate, unlawful force on his person, while battery is the actual application of unlawful 
force on another person”,2337 as shown in the English case of Collins v Wilcock.2338 
Sometimes there could be an assault without battery, as demonstrated in the English case 
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of Stephens v Myers,2339 where the defendant threatened the plaintiff with a clenched fist, 
making him believe that he was about to be hit, but was stopped before hitting the plaintiff. 
He was therefore found guilty of assault, but not of battery. Therefore, a surgeon who 
operates without consent commits a battery, although his intention, far from being hostile, 
is designed to benefit the patient.2340 Therefore, injury need not result for assault to be 
founded in law, because assault is an intentional tort. Previously, failure to obtain informed 
consent had been largely accepted as constituting assault as shown in South African 
cases such as Stoffberg v Elliott,2341 and Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal.2342 
However, in recent cases such as the Sibisi case2343 and Pane v MEC Free state,2344 
South African judgments have suggested that once a case of negligence is not proved, 
then the charge of lack of informed consent becomes moot.2345 This begs the question 
whether if negligence is not proven, why the failure to obtain informed consent by 
defendant doctors or other HCPs is not be considered an assault and therefore unlawful? 
The standard for wrongfulness or unlawful action in South African common law has been 
established in the case of Minister van Polisie v Ewels,2346 where it was stated that : 
  Our law has developed to the point where an omission is regarded as unlawful conduct when 
 the circumstances of the case are of such a nature that the omission not only incites moral 
 indignation but also that the legal convictions of the community demand that the omission 
 ought to be regarded as unlawful and that the damage suffered ought to be made good by the 
 person who neglected to do a positive act. In other to determine if there is unlawfulness the 
 question, in a given case of omission, is thus not whether there was the usual “negligence” of the 
 bonus pater familias, but whether regard being had to all the facts, there was a duty in law to 
 act reasonably.2347  
 
In light of the above, it is reasonable to argue that the act of obtaining informed consent 
is one prescribed by law and that omission to obtain informed consent in this day and age, 
                                                          
2339  Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C & P 349 see also Jones Textbook on Torts 509. 
2340  Jones Textbook on Torts 511. 
2341  Stoffberg v Elliott 1923 CPD 148. 
2342 Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal 1957 (3) SA 710 (T). 
2343  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156 
2344  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
2345  Zwartz L “Sibisi NO v Maitin: A dual burden of proof?” 2015 De Rebus 33. 
2346  Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590. 
2347  Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 [597] see also Barit The doctrine of informed  consent 
 in South African medical law 29. 
427 
 
would violate the rights of individual autonomy and the boni mores based on public 
policy.2348 The South African Constitution guarantees the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity, amongst other rights.2349 The only way for HCPs to observe and protect these 
rights, is by obtaining appropriate informed consent from patients or healthcare users.  
Stated differently, it is submitted that a failure to obtain informed consent prior to medical 
treatment constitutes a violation of fundamental rights and a redressable wrong, 
consistent with the observation of Lord Scarman in the case of Sidaway, that the right to 
self-determination is a basic human right: “The existence of the patients right to make his 
own decision, which may be seen as a basic human right protected by the common 
law.”2350  
 
In law, righting a wrong is based on the law of torts or delict, whereby the objective is to 
put the patient back in the position they would have been, if injury had not occurred - “the 
law of tort is primarily concerned with providing a remedy to persons who have been 
harmed by the conduct of others.”2351 However, looking at the result of the judgments in 
the case of Sibisi NO v Maitin,2352  where the plaintiff lost her appeal at the SCA and was 
left with a disabled child to care for in perpetuity, and without support and compensation 
from any source for the wrong intentionally or unintentionally inflicted on her child, and 
similarly, in Pane v MEC Free state,2353 where the plaintiff was left with a colostomy bag 
in place and financially destitute, having lost her children and her means of livelihood, one 
may argue that such judgments, despite the legal arguments, appear inconsistent with the 
spirit and intent of the new South African Constitution, which is based on foundation of 
respect for human rights, justice and fairness.2354  
 
                                                          
2348  Slabbert International encyclopaedia of laws [107-108] see also Carstens and Pearmain 
 Foundational Principles 937. 
2349 The Constitution (s12). 
2350  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 [649]. 
2351  Jones Textbook on torts [1]. 
2352  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156. 
2353  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
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In the final analysis, Van Oosten quite aptly commented as follows regarding the case of 
Castell v De Greef:2355  
 
[T]he court’s preference to place the doctor’s duty of disclosure, and its concomitant, the 
patient’s informed consent, within the framework of the wrongfulness element (with volenti 
non fit iniuria […] rather than the fault element of (intention) of delict [….] This is certainly 
correct where a medical intervention has been performed without the patient’s informed 
consent, but with due care and skill, and has proved to be beneficial to the patient’s health: 
Here the appropriate action would be assault or iniuria, as the case maybe, rather than 
negligence.2356 
 
 
8.3 The importance of using empirical methods to study informed consent  
 
This second part of this thesis was designed to use an empirical methodology including 
quantitative data analysis to evaluate whether HCPs (doctors and nurses) practising in 
public hospitals in South Africa were knowledgeable about the ethical and legal doctrine 
of IC, and the current regulatory framework guiding IC in medical practice in South Africa.   
 
In recent times, applied ethicists have started to combine established social scientific 
methods of inquiry with normative ethical reflection and analysis. 2357,2358 This is based on 
the criticism that philosophical bioethics is too abstract and insensitive to social realities 
and context. According to Emmanuel, “the two most common criticisms of bioethics is that 
it is divorced from reality and the actual issues that arise in medical practice, research, 
and health policy debates; and secondly that bioethicists are willing to layout arguments 
but skittish about actually deciding anything.” 2359 One symbol of this divorce from reality 
is the lack of engagement of philosophical ethics with empirical data or ‘experience’.2360 
Because of such observations, some authors have tried to define empirical ethics or 
                                                          
2355  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2356  Van Oosten FFW 1995 De Jure 178 see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 
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2357  Sulmasy and Sugarman Methods of medical ethics 3-18. 
2358  De Vries and Gordijn 2009 Bioethics 193-201. 
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bioethics as “normatively oriented medical ethical research that directly integrates 
empirical research”.2361  In this way empirical ethics encompasses both empirical research 
with normative arguments and analysis, and tries to integrate both elements in such a way 
that new knowledge is produced, which might not have been possible without combining 
both methods.2362  
 
According to Emmanuel, the issue is not whether bioethics should focus on conceptual 
analysis or empiric research but that it must focus on both.2363  In terms of practical 
applications of empirical bioethics, it has been suggested that empirical bioethics may 
serve three valuable functions in healthcare or contemporary medical practice that 
enriches the field of bioethics. In this context, empirical data or bioethics can assist with 
(1) debunking widely held but erroneous views; (2) assessing the importance of ethical 
concerns; and (3) facilitating the realization of certain ethical values.2364 Other areas in 
which empirical bioethics and data analysis could play a role would include “assessing the 
importance of ethical concerns” by helping to resolve the conflict in informed consent 
regarding the comprehensiveness of information disclosure and understanding of 
information disclosed, as well as determining the methodological or the ethical concerns 
surrounding the storage and use of human biological specimens. It can also assist with 
the realization of ethical values such as respect for autonomy, and in some cases just 
allocation of scarce healthcare resources.2365 Empirical studies have also shown that 
people generally have problems in understanding the risks and benefits of medical 
treatment and decision-making, and this could influence the actual application of existing 
laws.2366  In view of these multiple roles for empirical bioethics, De Vries and Gordijn2367 
have grouped the potential uses of empirical ethics into a five-fold typology as previously 
elucidated in chapter one of this thesis. Meanwhile Sulmasy and Sugarman summarized 
two potential reasons for studying the actual conduct of a group with regards to 
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2365  Emanuel The relevance of empirical research for bioethics 104-105. 
2366  Musschenga Reasoning in ethics and law 183-204. 
2367  De Vries and Gordijn 2009 Bioethics 194-196. 
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compliance with moral and ethical dilemmas. One would be to describe compliance with 
existing moral norms, and secondly, to determine whether policies and procedures 
designed to operationalise certain moral norms have been successful.2368 Consequently, 
in recent times, applied ethicists have shifted towards combining empirical, especially 
social scientific research with normative ethical analysis. Proponents of this approach 
called ‘empirical bioethics’ or ‘empirical ethics’ have argued that the study of people’s 
actual moral beliefs, behaviour and reasoning should be the starting point of ethics. 
Therefore, it has been suggested that the methodologies of the social sciences, especially 
quantitative and qualitative research, using surveys, interviews and questionnaires is 
probably the best way to map the reality of peoples actual moral norms.2369  
 
In view of the above observations, I decided to evaluate the practice of IC as stipulated 
by the National Health Act,2370 and current ethical codes for HCPs, by conducting a cross-
sectional quantitative empirical research study to see if HCPs practicing at public hospitals 
in South Africa, are actually practicing in compliance with the current regulations. Further, 
to evaluate from the point of view of patients, how compliant HCPs are with current laws 
and ethical guidelines. In the first part of this thesis, I analysed the ethical, case law and 
socio-legal issues surrounding IC in medical practice. Based on that analysis I was able 
establish and define certain issues that may affect the understanding and practice of IC 
by HCPs in the South African setting.  
 
8.4 The meaning of consent to treatment  
 
According to some authorities in medical ethics and law; ‘consent to treatment’ can be 
regarded as a special type of agreement which is not governed by the general rules of 
contractual relationships. Gillon2371 has argued previously that consent as a simple 
agreement is not applicable to the field of medical treatment. He suggests that consent to 
treatment means “a voluntary, uncoerced decision, made by a sufficiently competent or 
                                                          
2368  Sulmasy and Sugarman in Methods of medical ethics 14. 
2369  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 1–3. 
2370 National Health Act 61 of 2003 (s6-9). 
2371  Gillon R Philosophical medical ethics (John Wiley & Sons Chichester 1985). 
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autonomous person on the basis of adequate information and deliberation, to accept 
rather than reject some proposed course of action that will affect him or her.”2372 Based 
on this assertion, Mclean2373 has suggested that consent in medical treatment may consist 
of two parts, described as “consent as an agreement” and “consent as a permission”.2374 
In the former case, consent obliges the doctor or HCP to perform certain duties agreed 
on between the HCP and the patient. This was illustrated in the American case of  Grimes 
v KKI,2375 where the Maryland Court of Appeals held that consent can create a contract 
enforceable by law if consent agreements contain provisions, where “mutual assent, offer, 
acceptance, and consideration exist”. The court found that researcher/human subject IC 
in non-therapeutic research can create a contract, where a contract would mean “a written 
or spoken agreement intended to be enforceable by law.”2376  
 
It has been suggested that consent, when viewed as a contractual agreement would not 
give the patient or consenter the unilateral and autonomous right to withdraw from a 
medical procedure, which entails invasion of bodily integrity, privacy and freedom of 
choice.2377 On the other hand, “consent as permission” entails an agreement where the 
consenter, in this case the patient, has the ability and right to terminate such permission 
at any time by withdrawing the consent or permission given. This has been illustrated in 
the case of Ciarlariello v Schactr2378 where the Supreme Court of Canada held that:  
 
An individual’s right to determine what medical procedure will be accepted must include the right to 
stop the procedure…the patients right to bodily integrity provides the basis for the withdrawal of a 
consent to a medical procedure even while it is underway. Thus if it is found that the consent is 
effectively withdrawn during the course of the procedure, then it must be terminated.2379  
 
                                                          
2372  Gillon Philosophical medical ethics 60. 
2373  Mclean AR Consent to medical treatment and the competent adult (PhD thesis University of 
 Glasgow 2006).   
2374  Mclean Consent to medical treatment and the competent adult 131-132.   
2375 Grimes v Kennedy Krieger Institute Inc 366 MD 29 782 A2d 807 (MD 2001). 
2376  Grimes v KKI 62-64. 
2377  Mclean Consent to medical treatment and the competent adult 131-132.   
2378  Ciarlariello v Schactr SCR 1993 100 DLR 94th 609 SCC.  
2379  Ciarlariello v Schactr SCR 1993 100 DLR 94th 609 SCC [119].  
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This understanding of consent as a permission which can be withdrawn by a patient at 
any time was again demonstrated in the American case of Moore v Webb2380 where the 
Missouri Court of Appeals stated that the relationship between doctor and patient is based 
on a fiduciary duty of trust and not merely an arms-length contract as in other trade 
agreements. According to the Court: 
 
This question is not to be ruled by the law of trade and commerce governing transactions between 
parties who deal at arms-length in the market place. It is to be viewed in the light of the physician-
patient relationship which existed between the parties […]. A physician occupies a position of trust 
and confidence as regards his patient-a fiduciary position. It is his duty to act with the utmost good 
faith. This duty of the physician flows from the relationship with his patient and is fixed by law...The 
law's exaction of good faith extends to all dealings between the physician and the patient…Hence, 
all transactions between physician and patient are closely scrutinized by the courts which must be 
assured of the fairness of those dealings. In regard to any contract between physician and patient, 
it is the rule that the physician has the burden of proving that the patient entered into it voluntarily 
and advisedly, and without undue influence.2381 
 
The above observations may lead one to conclude that “consent to treatment is either not 
an agreement or it is a particular kind of agreement that does not impose a binding 
obligation on the consenter.”2382 One can therefore conceive of consent to treatment and 
healthcare decision-making as comprising two aspects, which include consent as an 
‘agreement’ and consent as ‘permission’. Whereas the former creates obligations 
between the HCP and the patient, the latter waives the obligation of non-interference with 
the patient’s bodily integrity and well-being.2383 Therefore as suggested by other 
commentators, one can also conclude that consent to treatment is a process of shared 
healthcare decision-making that can encompass both the ethical principles of respect for 
autonomy and beneficence within the doctor-patient relationship. 2384 Ultimately, consent 
in medical law plays the role of licensing that which would otherwise be battery.2385 “The 
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other role of consent to treatment is to provide the rights bearer with control of that right, 
which it does by transforming an illegitimate act into a permitted one.”2386 According to 
Alexander,2387 consent functions as a moral transformative by altering the obligations and 
permissions that determine the rightness or wrongfulness of others actions.2388 
 
8.5 The validity of informed consent  
 
My analysis of the ethical norms of consent also suggest that IC given by patients in 
clinical situations in resource-poor settings, where patients are vulnerable due to low 
education, poverty, and lack of alternative means of obtaining healthcare, as prevalent in 
most developing countries including South Africa, may not always be valid or true consent. 
Before a person can give a valid or true consent2389 in the context of medical treatment; 
this requires that the individuals decision must be based on an adequate understanding 
of what is involved in the medical procedure before giving permission or refusing the 
medical treatment in question. This requires broadly that such a decision must be made 
by a person with (a) capacity, (b) based on adequate information, and (c) voluntarily, and 
without any undue influence or coercion.2390, 2391 According to the American court in 
Canterbury v Spence:2392 
 
True consent to what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an 
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each...the 
patient's right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. That right can be 
effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information to enable an intelligent 
choice.2393 
 
The court goes on to state that the patient’s reliance on the physician for information is 
“well-nigh abject” because of the asymmetry of knowledge between a learned/trained 
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physician HCP and a patient. 2394 Therefore, it has been suggested that the doctor or HCP 
must be willing and has a duty to explain a clinical procedure without necessarily turning 
the patient or their surrogate decision makers into students of medicine.2395  
 
How much information should a HCP give to a patient or the patient’s surrogate before 
they feel informed enough to make a decision? The issue of the nature and amount of 
information disclosure is a contested area in medical jurisprudence which has been 
discussed in previous chapters of this thesis, but will be further summarized below. 
Nonetheless, it has been established that there are five key elements that make IC valid. 
This would include: 
 
(i) Competence or capacity  
(ii) Voluntariness 
(iii) Information disclosure 
(iv)  Understanding, and 
(v) Authorization (agreement or refusal) to give consent2396  
While there is general agreement by many authorities regarding the key elements of IC 
as adumbrated above,2397,2398 there is evidence to show from the literature review in 
chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis, that many HCPs sometimes misunderstand the 
requirements of IC and the ethical principle of respect for autonomy. For example, one 
author described the concept of respect for autonomy as, “autonomy within ethics means 
that individuals have the right to information and, on the basis of this, the right to agree or 
refuse to participate in research”.2399 Such an incomplete definition leaves out important 
aspects of IC including, capacity, comprehension of information disclosed, and 
voluntariness of action in agreeing or refusing the recommended treatment. Such 
misconceptions about respect for autonomy and the key elements of IC may lead to 
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misapplication of the doctrine during nursing care and clinical practice.2400 It has been 
stated that the doctrine of IC is founded on the premise that self-determination should not 
to be blind,2401 that patients’ interests and well-being are best served when patients 
understand their medical situation and participate in decisions affecting their own 
health.2402 Appelbaum and Roth2403 have also suggested that the requirement that 
consent to treatment be made by competent patients ensures that some policy goals 
regarding IC are actually achieved. Firstly, that the autonomy of the competent patient is 
recognized, secondly that the rights of the incompetent patient is protected, and thirdly 
that the mandate that the wishes of the competent patient is respected fosters respect for 
individual autonomy.2404 
Some commentators distinguish judgments of capacity from judgments of competence by 
arguing that while HCPs may determine capacity and incapacity, whereas it is the courts 
who will usually make judgments about competence and incompetence.2405 However, 
others have suggested that when doctors make a determination that a patient lacks 
decision-making capacity (DMC), the practical effect is the same as a legal determination 
of incompetence.2406 One of the controversial areas or elements of IC relates to 
determining patients’ DMC. This is somewhat related to the age of consent to treatment, 
fluctuating capacity, the status of incompetent patients and mature minors. In South 
Africa, as in other jurisdictions, the age of consent to treatment is legally stipulated as 12 
years of age.2407 This is much lower than the age of consent in other jurisdictions, such 
as England, where the age of consent is 16 years.2408 Children who are found to be ‘Gillick 
competent’,2409  or mature minors, are allowed to consent to certain medical treatments 
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e.g. access to contraceptives, but are denied the right to consent or refuse more complex 
healthcare services or procedures, such as organ transplantation or life-saving blood 
transfusion.2410,2411 Similarly, in South Africa, while the age of consent to routine medical 
treatment is legally set at 12 years, mature minors may be able to consent to other 
treatments, however, refusal of beneficial treatment can be overridden by a parent or the 
court as upper guardian of minors.2412 In South Africa, the age of consent to abortion or is 
also subject to the restrictions and regulations imposed by the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act,2413 where the law stipulates that ‘any woman of any age’ can consent to 
termination of pregnancy, thereby creating an anomaly if compared to the above situation 
with regard to the termination of a pregnancy. These subtle differences in the law are 
issues which ought to be known to the average HCP practicing in South Africa.  
As will be summarized in sections below, based on the empirical data analyzed in chapters 
5 to 7 of this thesis, some of these basic legal regulations were not known to many HCPs 
practicing in this setting as previously reported.2414 
 
8.6 Standards of information disclosure   
 
One of the more contested areas of medico-legal jurisprudence is on the standard of 
information disclosure required for IC. In other words, how much information should be 
disclosed by the HCP to the patient for IC to be considered valid? As explained previously, 
for a patient or healthcare user to make an informed decision regarding treatment or 
refusal of treatment, there is concomitant obligation on the part of the HCP to provide all 
the necessary information to the patient to enable an informed choice. On this 
consideration, there are two contesting schools of thought. On the one hand there is the 
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‘reasonable doctor standard’ based on English common law as outlined by McNair J in 
Bolam v Friern HMC,2415 generally known as the Bolam principle, which states that:  
 
A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with the practice accepted as 
proper by a responsible body of men skilled in that particular art, […] putting it the other way round, 
a doctor is not negligent, if he is acting with such a practice, merely because there is a body of 
opinion that takes a contrary view.2416 
It has been argued that English courts have opted for a paternalistic approach by 
following the ‘reasonable doctor standard’, which based information disclosure on the 
clinical judgement or accepted practice of medical practitioners2417 as established in 
Bolam2418 and reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the Sidaway case,2419 where Lord 
Templeman observed that:  
At the end of the day, the doctor bearing in mind the best interests of the patient and bearing in 
mind the patients right to information which will enable the patient to make a balanced judgement, 
must decide what information should be given to the patient, and what terms that information should 
be couched.2420  
This idea of abridged information disclosure has also been applied in other court cases 
such as Chatterton v Gerson,2421 where Bristow J said that the patient should be informed 
in ‘broad terms’, thereby implying that not all information is required and the nature and 
amount of it to be disclosed to a patient would be based on reasonable doctor standard 
rather than on the requirements of the patient.   
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8.6.1 South African case law on information disclosure 
 
Similarly, in South African common law, the reasonable doctor standard was applied in 
the case of Richter and Another v Estate Hamman,2422 and more recently by the SCA in 
the case of Louwrens v Oldwage,2423 contrary to the ‘prudent patient standard’ as 
established by Ackerman J in the Castell case2424 and consequently applied by Yekiso J 
at the High Court in the Oldwage case.2425  These conflicting judgments appear to have 
created some confusion in South African case law regarding the standards of information 
disclosure required for IC.  In the context of South African jurisprudence, prior to the more 
recent cases of Castell v De Greef2426 and the enactment of the NHA,2427 earlier South 
African court judgments demonstrate that doctors were not required by law to disclose all 
the possible consequences and complications of medical treatment. It was enough that 
the patient was informed in broad terms about the serious risks and dangers inherent in 
the treatment, as demonstrated in cases such as Lymberg v Jefferies2428 and Richter and 
another v Estate Hamman,2429 where it was argued that HCPs are not expected to 
disclose to their patients unusual, uncommon, or remote risks or complications.2430 
According to the court in the case of Rompel v Botha:2431  
 
 There is no doubt that a surgeon who intends operating on a patient must obtain the consent 
 of the patient. In such cases where it is frequently a matter of life and death I do not intend to 
 express any opinion as to whether it is the surgeon's duty to point out to the patient all the 
 possible injuries which might result from the operation, but in a case of this nature, which may 
 have serious results to which I have referred…I have no doubt that a patient should be 
 informed of the serious risks he does run. If such dangers are not pointed out to him then, in 
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2426  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C).  
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 my opinion, the consent to the treatment is not in reality consent-it is consent without 
 knowledge of the possible injuries.2432 
 
Therefore it has been suggested that generally in South Africa, the duty to disclose 
consists in fully informing the patient of “the nature purpose and benefits and the probable, 
substantial and inevitable risks and consequences of the medical intervention, irrespective 
of whether they are therapeutic or diagnostic in nature.”2433  In recent times, however, the 
South African standards for information disclosure during IC appear to have changed with 
the judgment of the Ackerman J in the Castell case, 2434 where the court held that for 
consent to be informed, a patient needs to fully appreciate the nature of the harm or the 
risk to which he or she is consenting. Further, the court held that the standard of disclosure 
required is the ‘material risks standard’ where the test of materiality would be based on 
what a reasonable person in the patient’s position would likely attach significance to, in 
arriving at a decision, or what the doctor ought to have known would be of significance to 
that particular patient in arriving at a decision regarding information disclosure.2435 It has 
been argued that the rationale for the court’s decision in the Castell case arose from the 
South African Constitution of 1996,2436 which recognizes the rights of autonomy by 
entrenching and codifying the rights to human dignity and bodily integrity in sections 10 
and 12(2) of the Bill of Rights.2437 Based on the judgment in the Castell case,2438 one may 
argue that the minimum level of information required to render IC valid based on South 
African regulations would be that: 
 
i. the consenting party must have had knowledge and been aware of the 
nature and extent of the harm or risk 
ii. the consenting party must have appreciated  and understood the nature 
and extent of the harm or risk 
iii. the consenting party must have consented to the harm or assumed the 
risk 
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iv. the consent given by the consenting party must be comprehensive, that is, 
extends to the entire transaction, inclusive of the consequences2439,2440,2441, 
2442,2443 
 
Therefore, in terms of South African law and based on Castell,2444 a doctor needs to 
disclose all material risks associated with the proposed treatment, based on a ‘prudent 
patient standard’, which is a subjective standard of information disclosure rather than an 
objective reasonable person standard. The actual common law test for materiality is based 
on the concept that “a risk is material if the person who consented would not have done 
so, had the risk been made known to him or her”.2445  
 
As discussed in this thesis, the NHA2446 codified the requirements for IC and information 
disclosure as part of the legislative framework regulating healthcare services in South 
Africa. The law recognises the principle of individual autonomy and differentiates between 
‘users’ of healthcare services and ‘healthcare providers’ which refers to all providers of 
health care services registered in terms of the Health Professions Act,2447 and other 
related laws such as the Nursing Act.2448 This means that the requirements for IC are not 
limited to doctors alone but equally to all health care professionals (HCPs). The NHA 
stipulates that all healthcare users (patients), have a right to IC and that users also have 
a right to participate in decisions affecting their personal health, and therefore must have 
full knowledge regarding the proposed treatment. The law describes IC in section 7 of the 
NHA as meaning “consent for the provision of a specified health service given by a person 
with legal capacity to do so and who has been informed as contemplated in section 6.” 
                                                          
2439  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 171-175. 
2440 Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425]. 
2441  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 684. 
2442 Thomas 2007 SALJ 191. 
2443  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 164-179 see also Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 [425]. 
2444  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [426-427]. 
2445  Thomas 2007 SALJ 188-215 [192]. 
2446  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2447  Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 as amended. 
2448 Nursing Act No 33 of 2005. 
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Based on section 6 of the NHA,2449 a healthcare user is required to have full knowledge 
and must be informed of:  
 
 (a) The user’s health status [diagnosis];  
 (b) The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the user  
 (c) The benefits, risks, costs and consequences generally associated with each  option  
 (d) The user’s right to refuse health services and the implications, risks, obligations of such refusal.  
 
However, section 6(1) (d) provides an exception to section (a) which allows the HCP not 
to inform a user of the user’s health status, in circumstances where there is substantial 
evidence that the disclosure of the user’s health status would be contrary to the best 
interests of the user,2450 thereby supporting the exception of ‘therapeutic privilege.’2451 As 
discussed earlier, other exceptions to information disclosure are enumerated in section 7 
of the NHA.2452 For example, where the user is unable to give IC and this is provided by 
a proxy previously mandated by the user in writing, or consent is given by another person 
mandated by law or by the patients recognized next of kin. IC may also be waived in 
circumstances outlined in section 7(c) and section 7(d), discussed earlier. These 
exceptions make provisions for the doctrines of best interests, therapeutic privilege, 
necessity, waiver, and public policy; all of which are generally recognized exceptions to 
the IC doctrine. 2453,2454,2455 The NHA further requires that HCPs inform the user of all this 
information in a language the user understands, and in a manner that takes into account 
the user’s literacy level, by implication the users’ level of education.2456 The level of detail 
provided by the NHA appears to supersede the disclosure requirements outlined in Castell 
v De Greef.2457  
 
                                                          
2449  Section 6 of the National Health Act 2003. 
2450  National Health Act 2003 s 6 (1) (d). 
2451  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med s Afr 42 see also Van Oosten 1991 Med Law 31-41. 
2452  National Health Act 2003 section 7 (a-d). 
2453  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 83-88. 
2454  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr 38-44.  
2455  President’s Commission Report of President’s commission for the study of ethical problems 
 in medicine and biomedical and behavioral research (Washington DC 1982) 1. 
2456  National Health Act 2003 s6 (2). 
2457  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
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It is has been suggested that the requirement of full disclosure, and the right of users to 
participate in healthcare decision-making pertaining to their health, as well as the users’ 
right of refusal, ensures that the NHA,2458 gives effect to respect for patients’ autonomy 
and self-determination, as well as enhancing patients’ dignity, which is enshrined in 
section10 of the Constitution, where it states that “everyone has inherent dignity and the 
right to have their dignity respected and protected”.2459 However it has been reported that 
up to this point in time, the disclosure requirements as outlined in the NHA have actually 
never been applied in any South African court decisions.2460  
 
There is another dimension to the information disclosure debate which relates to the 
patient’s desire for information. This is a socio-legal issue which is applicable to certain 
cultures and religions. For example, it has been reported that certain Native American 
population groups are averse to disclosure of negative information regarding 
healthcare.2461,2462 Similarly, it has been reported that some Nigerian and African patients 
may not be receptive to negative information disclosure due to cultural or religious 
reasons. 2463,2464  Such considerations will also play a part in the amount of information 
disclosed to the patient, based on the patient’s desire for information, or waiver of 
information disclosure.2465 Therefore, HCPs should also be aware of the cultural issues 
and dimensions when considering the amount and nature of information to be disclosed 
to a patient. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2458  National Health Act 2003. 
2459  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (s10). 
2460  Thomas 2007 SALJ 188-215 [209]. 
2461  Asai A 1995 West J Med 36-39. 
2462  Gordon E 1997 Fordham Urb L J 1321-1362. 
2463 Irabor and Omonzejele 2009 Dev World Bioeth 34-42. 
2464  Matthew DB “Race religion and informed consent-lessons from social science” 2008 J Law 
 Med Ethic 149-173. 
2465  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 92-93. 
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8.6.2 Comparative law on information disclosure 
 
Lord Scarman, in Sidaway,2466 argued for a ‘prudent patient standard’ in England, as 
practised in other jurisdictions such as Canada, USA, and even Germany,2467 when he 
stated that “it was a strange conclusion if […] courts should be led to conclude that our 
law […] should permit doctors to determine in what circumstances. […] a duty arose to 
warn.”2468 The courts in North America have maintained in cases such as Canterbury v 
Spence2469 and Reibl v Hughes2470 that a patient must be informed of all material risks, 
where those ‘material risks’ would consist of what a reasonable person, in such a patient’s 
position, would be likely to attach significance to, in deciding whether or not to accept or 
forego the proposed therapy.2471 This requirement for disclosure of all material risks has 
been reaffirmed in more recent cases such as Grimes v KKI2472 where Cathell J asserted 
that a human subject of biomedical research is entitled to all material information. 
However, it must be noted that the standard of disclosure required in biomedical research 
is somewhat more rigorous than that expected in medical treatment, as distinguished by 
the court in the Canadian case of Halushka University of Saskatchewan.2473  
 
The current situation in English common law and jurisprudence is that Lord Scarman’s 
‘prudent patient standard’ of information disclosure has become more accepted, as 
demonstrated in cases such as Pearce v United Bristol Health Trust,2474 where Lord Woolf 
held that a doctor should inform the patient of any significant risks which would affect the 
judgment of a reasonable patient. Further, in Chester v Afshar,2475 Sir Dennis Henry 
argued that it would be considered negligent if the omission to disclose risks fell below the 
professional standard. In Chester v Afshar,2476 the English CA held that a consultant 
                                                          
2466  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643 
2467  Gilbert M “Agreements, coercion and obligations” 1993 Ethics 679-691. 
2468  Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital [1985] 1 All ER 643[888-889]. 
2469  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d 772. 
2470  Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1. 
2471 Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d 772 [787]. 
2472  Grimes v KKI 366 MD 29 782 A2d 807(2001) [64]. 
2473 Halushka v University of Saskatchewan [1965] 52 WWR 608 see also Morin 1998 J of Leg Med 
 215-218. 
2474  Pearce v United Bristol NHS Healthcare Trust [1998] 48 BMLR 18. 
2475  Chester v Afshar [2002] 3 All ER FR 552. 
2476  Chester v Afshar [2002] 3 All ER FR 552[47]. 
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surgeon was negligent for failing to disclose a 1 to 2% risk of nerve damage, even when 
an enquiry was made by the patient.2477 Nevertheless, the Bolam principle persisted in 
English legal jurisprudence, despite the dissenting opinions by Lord Scarman in 
Sidaway2478 and the judgment of the House of Lords in Bolitho v City and Hackney,2479 
where it was finally suggested that decisions regarding information disclosure must be 
subjected to judicial review for logicality and reasonableness. However, in the most recent 
decision by the UK Supreme Court in the case of Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health 
Board,2480 the Court decided that the current position in UK law should be based on a 
‘prudent patient and material risks standard’ of information disclosure. The facts and 
judgment in this case were discussed elsewhere in this thesis. Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court (Scotland) arrived at a decision, which states that the current position in UK law 
should be that: 
 
An adult person of sound mind is entitled to decide which, if any, of the available forms of treatment 
to undergo, and her consent must be obtained before treatment interfering with her bodily integrity 
is undertaken. The doctor is therefore under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient 
is aware of any material risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable 
alternative or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of the 
particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to attach significance 
to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that the particular patient would be likely 
to attach significance to it.2481 
 
In concurring with the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court rendered by Lords Kerr 
and Reed, Lady Hale cited a passage from the Principles of medical law2482 whereby the 
authors were of the opinion that in view of the judgments of English Courts in Sidaway,2483 
Pearce,2484 and Chester v Afshar,2485 the Bolam doctrine2486 had more or less been 
                                                          
2477 Chester v Afshar [2002] 3 All ER FR 552[11]. 
2478  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors and Others [1985] 1 All ER 643. 
2479 Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1988] AC 232 HL. 
2480  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11. 
2481  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11 [87]. 
2482  Grubb et al Principles of Medical Law 465. 
2483  Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors and Others [1985] 1 All ER 643 
2484  Pearce v United Bristol NHS Healthcare Trust [1998] 48 BMLR 18. 
2485 Chester v Afshar [2002] EWCA Civ 724. 
2486  Bolam v Friern Health Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. 
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supplanted in English law, stating “with a reasonable degree of confidence that the 
doctrine of informed consent had become entrenched in English law.”2487 The Lady then 
asserted that based on the judgment in Montgomery v Lanarkshire,2488 Scottish law could 
now say the same.  
 
In view of discussion above, one may conclude that the Bolam principle, based on the 
reasonable doctor standard, has now been supplanted by the ‘prudent patient’ and 
‘material risks’ standards as prevalent in most common law jurisdictions, and in some 
cases in South African common law.2489 With regard to other common law jurisdictions 
similar to South Africa, such as Australia, the standard of information disclosure tended 
towards the Canadian and North American standards, as established in Reibl v 
Hughes2490 and Canterbury v Spence.2491 For example, in the case of F v R 1983,2492 the 
Australian Supreme court, per King CJ, was of the opinion that: 
 
The ultimate question, however, is not whether the defendant's conduct accords with the practices 
of his profession or some part of it, but whether it conforms to the standard of reasonable care 
demanded by the law. That is a question for the court and the duty of deciding it cannot be delegated 
to any profession or group in the community.2493  
 
The court suggested further that the amount of information to be disclosed to a patient by 
a responsible doctor was determined by many complex factors, including ”the nature of 
the matter to be disclosed; the nature of the treatment; the desire of the patient for 
information; the temperament and health of the patient; and other surrounding 
circumstances.”2494 The judge therefore concluded that, "to allow expert medical evidence 
to determine what risks are material and, hence, should be disclosed and, correlatively, 
what risks are not material is to hand over to the medical profession the entire question of 
                                                          
2487  Grubb et al Principles of Medical Law 465. 
2488  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11[107]. 
2489  Castel v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2490  Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1. 
2491  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
2492 F v R (26) (1983) 33 SASR 189. 
2493  F v R (26) (1983) 33 SASR 189 [194]. 
2494  F v R (26) (1983) 33 SASR 189 [200-205]. 
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the scope of the duty of disclosure, including the question whether there has been a 
breach of that duty.”2495 It held that while expert medical evidence was relevant to findings 
as to the risks that reside in or result from recommended surgery or other treatment. It will 
also have a bearing on their materiality, but this is not a question that is to be concluded 
on the basis of the expert medical evidence alone.2496 The rule of information disclosure 
was previously outlined in Natanson v Kline2497 where the court stated with regard to IC 
that: “[…] [t]his rule in effect compels disclosure by the physician in order to assure that 
an informed consent of the patient is obtained.”  The duty of the physician to disclose, 
however, is limited to those disclosures that a reasonable medical practitioner would make 
under the same or similar circumstances.”2498 In the Natanson case 2499 the court held that 
the extent of disclosure required of the physician was to: “[…] disclose and explain to the 
patient in language as simple as necessary the nature of the ailment, the nature of the 
proposed treatment, the probability of success or of alternatives, and perhaps the risks of 
unfortunate results and unforeseen conditions within the body.”2500 Therefore, in the 
American cases of Canterbury v Spence,2501  Natanson v Kline,2502 and Salgo v Leland 
Stanford Jr,2503 American courts established a duty of information disclosure, albeit limited 
by exceptions for therapeutic privilege and occasional abeyance to the reasonable doctor 
standard.2504  
 
The Canterbury2505 Court went further to debate and rejected the objective reasonable 
doctor and reasonable patient standards as a basis for evaluating the extent of information 
disclosure arguing that:   
 
                                                          
2495 F v R (26) (1983) 33 SASR 189 [192-193]. 
2496  F v R ((26) (1983) 33 SASR 189 [201-205] see also Giesen D “The patient’s right to know-a 
 comparative law perspective” 1993 Med Law 556. 
2497  Natanson v Kline 186 Kan 393 (1960) 350 P2d 1093 
2498  Natanson v Kline 186 Kan 393 (1960) 350 P2d 1093 [400]. 
2499  Natanson v Kline 186 Kan 393 (1960) 350 P2d 1093 
2500  Natanson v Kline 186 Kan 393 (1960) 350 P2d 1093 [408]. 
2501  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d 772 (DC Cir). 
2502  Natanson v Kline 186 Kan 393 (1960) 350 P.2d 1093 
2503  Salgo v Leland Stanford Board of Trustees [1957] 154 Cal.App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170. 
2504  Faden and Beauchamp History and Theory of Informed Consent [114-150] see also 
 Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d [47-49]. 
2505  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d. 
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Consonantly with orthodox negligence doctrine, the physician's liability for nondisclosure is to be 
determined on the basis of foresight, not hindsight; no less than any other aspect of negligence, the 
issue on nondisclosure must be approached from the viewpoint of the reasonableness of the 
physician's divulgence in terms of what he knows or should know to be the patient's informational 
needs.2506 
 
The Canterbury court alluded to the ‘subjective patients’ and ‘material risk’ standards, by 
stating that: 
 
The scope of the physician's communications to the patient… must be measured by the patient's 
need, and that need is the information material to the decision. Thus the test for determining whether 
a particular peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentially 
affecting the decision must be unmasked. And to safeguard the patient's interest in achieving his 
own determination on treatment, the law must itself set the standard for adequate 
disclosure…Optimally for the patient, exposure of a risk would be mandatory whenever the patient 
would deem it significant to his decision, either singly or in combination with other risks. Such a 
requirement, however, would summon the physician to second-guess the patient, whose ideas on 
materiality could hardly be known to the physician. That would make an undue demand upon 
medical practitioners, whose conduct, like that of others, is to be measured in terms of 
reasonableness…If, but only if, the fact-finder can say that the physician's communication was 
unreasonably inadequate is an imposition of liability legally or morally justified…2507 
 
From the foregoing, the court in Canterbury,2508 while recognizing the need to disclose all 
material risks, was not able to base the disclosure on the ‘subjective’ reasonable patient 
standard, arguing that this would place an onerous burden on doctors and HCPs to try to 
second-guess what each patient would have wanted to know in hindsight. Others have 
argued that basing information disclosure on the reasonable person standard on the other 
hand, would not fully recognize individual autonomy, but would rather use the proverbial 
standard of a reasonable person, which would not take into consideration individual needs 
such, as personal cultural or religious belief systems, or individual idiosyncrasies.   
 
                                                          
2506  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d [42]. 
2507 Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 2d772 (DC Cir 1972) [41-42]. 
2508  Canterbury v Spence 464 F.2d 772 (DC Cir 1972). 
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8.7 Comprehension of information disclosed  
 
Although information disclosure and knowledge of that information are necessary for the 
comprehension of information, plain ‘knowledge’ is generally not sufficient. The patient or 
person consenting must also have appreciation of the information disclosed. According to 
Van Oosten, “information as a conditio sine qua non means that information must also be 
appreciated.”2509 Real comprehension would involve the ability to use information 
rationally. Therefore, for a patient to understand the information imparted by a HCP, the 
patient must not only be able to listen attentively to the HCP, but the HCP must also 
appreciate that for information to have been communicated successfully, it requires 
comprehension by the patient, in that the patient must pay attention to that information, 
understand it, accept, retain the information and then put that information to use in a 
rational manner.2510 Francis and Johnston2511 argue that the true test for comprehension 
is the patient’s capacity to understand information; and that the HCP needs to ascertain 
that the patient actually has the capacity to understand the information conveyed in a non-
technical language.2512 The British Medical Association (BMA)2513 guidelines stipulate with 
regard to understanding that the patient must be shown to: 
 
 Understand in simple language what the medical treatment is, its purpose and 
nature and why it is being proposed 
 Understand its principal benefits, risks and alternatives 
 Understand in broad terms what will be the consequences of not receiving the 
proposed treatment 
 Retain the information for long enough to make and effective decision 
 Make a free choice (free from pressure or undue coercion) 
                                                          
2509  Van Oosten 1989 LLD thesis [448-452] see also Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South 
 African  medical law 17. 
2510  President’s Commission 89 see also Van Oosten1989 LLD Thesis 455 and Carstens and 
 Pearmain Foundational Principles 885-886. 
2511  Francis R and Johnston C Medical treatment: Decisions and the law-the mental capacity Act in 
 action 2nd ed (Bloomsbury Professional London 2010) Chapter 2 see also Chima  Consent and 
 patients’ rights in human biomedical research 40. 
2512  Francis and Johnston Medical treatment: Decisions and the law (Bloomsbury Professional 
 London 2010) 2. 
2513  British Medical Association BMA Consent Toolkit 2009 http//www.bma.org.uk/-
 /media/files/pdfs/.../consenttoolkitdec2009_full.pdf (Date of use: 20 February 2016). 
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8.7.1 Language and effective communication  
 
Although the above requirements are generally applicable in medical treatment, the 
magnitude of difficulty for understanding required in multicultural and multilingual 
communities and developing countries could be even higher,2514 especially in countries 
which have multiple languages, such as the 11 official languages of South Africa.2515  
 
Parts of the empirical data reported in this thesis reveal that the population groups using 
public healthcare services in South Africa are not highly educated.2516,2517 In addition, 
many of the patients do not speak the same primary language as the HCPs especially 
doctors.2518  In these types of settings it may be necessary to obtain the services of and 
interpreter or an intermediary, such a patient advocate or other healthcare worker (HCW), 
to  assist in putting the information in the patient’s native language, or  ‘in language 
understandable to the patient’, in order to fulfil the obligation for understanding prior to IC; 
consistent with the requirements in the NHA, which stipulates that: “The health care 
provider concerned must, where possible, inform the user…in a language that the user 
understands and in a manner which takes into account the user’s level of literacy.”2519 
Language barriers can have a negative impact on healthcare services, leading to errors 
such as misdiagnosis, failure of preventive healthcare and non-adherence by patients to 
prescribed medications. 2520 This could ultimately lead to accusations of negligence and 
award of damages against doctors and other HCPs.2521,2522   
 
                                                          
2514  Bhan A, Majd M and Adejumo A “Informed consent in international research: Perspectives 
 from India, Iran and Nigeria” 2006 MUMJ 36-41. 
2515  EThekwini municipality EThekwini language policy 
 http://www.Durban.gov.za.eThekwiniLanguagepolicy.pdf (Date of use: 19 August 2014). 
2516  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 51. 
2517  Clark et al 2011 J Surg Educ 145. 
2518  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [13]. 
2519  National Health Act 61 of 2003 section 6(2). 
2520  Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 230. 
2521 Schenker et al 2007 J Gen Intern Med 294–299 see also Yeo S “Language barriers and access 
 to care” 2004 Annu Rev Nur Res 59-73 [63-65]. 
2522        Perkins J “Overcoming language barriers to health care” 1999 Popular Government 38-44. 
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Issues of language difficulty and informed consent related to healthcare services are not 
limited to South Africa. 2523,2524 A previous report related to this study indicates that the 
absence of appropriately trained interpreters is a major barrier to IC for doctors working 
in public hospitals, as reported in chapter 5 of this thesis and elsewhere.2525 Another study 
from Limpopo province, South Africa, reports that language difficulties create significant 
problem for HCPs and could impact on patients’ rights to IC and confidentiality in that 
healthcare setting.2526  
 
Considerations such as these have led the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences (CIOMS) 2527 to recommend that, “informing the individual patient must 
not be simply a ritual recitation of the contents of a written document”, but rather that “the 
investigator or HCPs must convey the information, whether orally or in writing, in language 
that suits the individual's level of understanding”, bearing in mind that the “prospective 
subject’s ability to understand the information necessary to give IC also depends on that 
individual's maturity, intelligence, education, and belief system,” as well as “the HCPs 
ability and willingness to communicate patiently and with sensitivity.”2528,2529 
 
8.8 Socio-cultural factors impacting on informed consent in South Africa 
 
Cultural issues may be described as all aspects of the society that influence beliefs, 
opinions, and choices, such as economic globalization, religion, and politics, amongst 
others. There are complex issues that face every country regarding education, healthcare, 
and governance. The ability or inability to explore these cultural influences may impact on 
decisions affecting citizens, and may be critical to solving pervasive problems and 
conflicts.2530 Some have suggested that culture plays a crucial role in the contemporary 
                                                          
2523  Tate et al 2016 Prehosp Emerg Care 1-11.  
2524  Clark et al 2011 J Surg Educ 143-147. 
2525  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [8-9]. 
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discourse on development, and policy makers have acknowledged that the social and 
cultural norms of a people can influence their attitude and choices.2531  However, one of 
the criticisms leveled against traditional bioethics has been that it ignores the role of social 
and cultural factors in the ethical-decision making process, prompting some scholars from 
the developing countries, to see the globalization2532 as a form of neocolonialism and 
attempt by the developed world agencies to advance their biomedical agenda on resource 
poor countries and communities.2533 Such critics have gone on to call for the recognition 
of truly global bioethics that acknowledge the existence of alternative ethical 
frameworks.2534 Some commentators have argued for culturally sensitive bioethics or 
‘ethnoethics’, described as the examination of ethical issues in biomedicine in a non-
western cultural context: 
 
This would include moral norms and issues in health care as understood and responded to by 
members of these societies. Ethnoethics should be informative not only about cross-cultural 
variation in ethical principles of medicine, but also about variations in issues which in different 
societies become defined as morally relevant or problematic. Ethnoethical information should 
contribute to the discourse of medical ethics, not only by illuminating culturally distinctive moral 
views and problems, but also by helping to provide a more realistic and knowledgeable basis for 
the exploration of cross-cultural ethical similarities.”2535 
 
When applying culture in the context of South Africa, the first consideration may be the 
issue of high unemployment, with approximately 25-30% of the population currently 
unemployed,2536,2537 as well as that of the low a labour force participation rate of about 
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 Soc Anth 97-98. 
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54%, compared to the global average of 69%.2538 There are also historical and residual 
inequities within South African population groups, because of apartheid2539,2540,2541,2542  
Under such circumstances, basic health care is unaffordable, and out of reach of the 
majority of the population who are mostly unemployed and indigent.2543  There is also a 
dichotomy in the organization of  South African healthcare services, consisting of private 
healthcare services patronized by about (20%) of the population who can afford health 
insurance, or have financial means to pay for private healthcare, compared with the public 
health services which are used by the majority (80%) of indigent patients and 
citizens.2544,2545 This dual healthcare system is further characterized by better 
infrastructure in private hospitals because of commercial competition and better funding, 
and arguably better educated and more knowledgeable patients and consumers of 
healthcare services. The dual healthcare system may influence the practice of IC in South 
Africa,2546 similar to what has been reported elsewhere.2547  
 
Furthermore, most African societies being culturally complex and paternalistic in nature, 
may require that consent approval be obtained from community elders/extended family 
members, or men as heads of households before the actual patients or human subjects 
of research, can provide consent.2548, 2549 The challenge in this setting then, is to ensure 
that IC is truly voluntary and that community or surrogate consent is not substituted for 
individuals’ consent, which ideally should be obtained voluntarily in the absence of 
coercion and other undue influences.2550  
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The issues and considerations outlined above present challenges to ensuring that IC 
obtained from patients in clinical practice in South Africa is based on full information 
disclosure, and that it is comprehensible, voluntary and autonomous. The empirical study 
in this thesis was directed at an investigation of the role of HCPs, specifically medical 
doctors and professional nurses in the ensuring that IC provided by patients during routine 
healthcare services in South Africa is truly valid. A discussion of the findings from the 
empirical study is detailed below. 
 
8.9 FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDY  
 
8.9.1 Information disclosure  
 
In terms of information disclosure, the empirical part of this study confirms that some 
components of the requirements for information disclosure, as stipulated by the NHA,2551 
are being complied with by HCPs in South Africa. This includes information about 
diagnosis (health status of the user); disclosed by 97% of doctors and 77% of nurses. This 
disclosure was also corroborated by 81% of patients sampled. Further, treatment options, 
benefits of treatment, treatment risks and risks of refusing recommended treatment was 
disclosed by over 80% of doctors. This information was corroborated by 60-80% of nurses, 
while 50-60% of patients agreed with the disclosure of treatment risks and benefits, as 
shown in table 8.1 below. On the other hand, this study also reveals that there were some 
inconsistences and incompleteness in the amount of information disclosed by HCPs to 
patients. For example, in the case of ‘recommended treatment’, only 28% of patients 
agreed that this information was disclosed as previously reported,2552 when compared 
with 89% of doctors,2553 and 65% of nurses.2554  
 
                                                          
2551   National Health 61 of 2003 s6 (1). 
2552   Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 51. 
2553  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics 7. 
2554 Chima “Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South   
 Africa” 97. 
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With regard to ‘risks of refusing recommended treatment’, while 83% of doctors and 89% 
of nurses said this information as disclosed, only 25% of patients acknowledged receiving 
this information. Finally, in terms of ‘right of refusal’ which is required by South African 
regulations as contained in the NHA,2555 only 28% of patients agreed that this information 
was disclosed,2556 while 65% of doctors, and 67% of nurses, reported that this information 
was usually disclosed.2557,2558 Such inconsistencies could indicate a lack of appreciation 
or misunderstanding of information, or lack of recall of disclosure, or partial recall by 
patients, as reported from other studies.2559,2560,2561 It could also indicate that while HCPs 
are theoretically aware of these legal requirements, in practice they rarely convey this 
information to patients as required by law. Overall, both HCPs and patients agreed that 
the amount of information disclosed was adequate with majority of respondents agreeing 
that enough information was disclosed as reported by 74-85% of all participants as shown 
in table 8.1 below. 
 
8.9.2 Standards of information and risk disclosure  
 
It has been argued that the ‘prudent patient and material risks’ standards were adopted 
into South African jurisprudence after the Castell case.2562,2563,2564 However from our 
current study it appears that these standards have not been clearly understood or adopted 
by HCPs in South Africa. Based on results from this empirical study, the vast majority of 
doctors (92%) and nurses (80%) generally disclosed only the ‘most common risks’ to 
                                                          
2555  National Health 61 of 2003 s6 (1). 
2556  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 51. 
2557  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [7]. 
2558  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97]. 
2558  National Health 61 of 2003 s6 (1). 
2559        Stunkel L et al “Comprehension and informed consent: Assessing the effect of a short consent 
 form” 2010 IRB: Ethics & Human Research 1-9. 
2560       Schenker Y “Interventions to improve patient comprehension in informed consent for medical 
 and surgical procedures: A systematic review” 2011 Med Decis Making 151–173. 
Lindegger G et al “Beyond the checklist: Assessing understanding for HIV vaccine trial 
participation in South Africa” 2006 J Acquir Immune Defic Syndr 560-566 see also Taiwo and 
Kass “Post-consent assessment of dental subjects understanding of informed consent in oral 
health research in Nigeria” 2009 BMC Med Ethics 11. 
2562  Van Oosten FFW 1995 De Jure 164-179. 
2563   Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 711-716. 
2564  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
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patients, while doctors (88%) would also disclose the ‘most serious’ risk.2565,2566  Further, 
from the current study only, 21% of doctors and 36% of nurses reported disclosing all 
material risks (see table 8.2), as suggested by the judgment in the Castell case.2567,2568  
The majority of patients from this study on the other hand preferred to know ‘all of the 
risks’ (78%) involved in treatment, before medical procedures as previously reported2569 
(see table 8.2). Similarly, when asked what is the required standard of information 
disclosure in South Africa, 60% of doctors and 56% of nurses chose the ‘reasonable 
doctor standard’, while 48% of doctors and 47% of nurses chose the ‘prudent patient 
standard”. In this study, only 21% of doctors and 36% of nurses chose the ‘material risks’ 
standard as the required standard for risk disclosure as shown in table 8.2 below. This 
suggests that there is no clear appreciation or understanding of the ‘prudent patient’ and 
‘material risks’ standards as the current standard of information disclosure by South 
African HCPs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2565 Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [8]. 
2566  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97]. 
2567  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [426] 
2568  Van Oosten FFW1995 De Jure 164-179 see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational 
 Principles 711-716. 
2569  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52. 
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*Treatment costs are reportedly free at public hospitals in South Africa. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION 
DISCLOSED 
 
Doctors (168) 
Yes 
Number (%) 
 
Nurses (355) 
Yes 
Number (%) 
 
Patients (404) 
Yes 
Number (%) 
 
P- value 
Pearson chi-squared 
test 
 
Diagnosis 
 
 
162 (96.4) 
 
 
265 (76.6) 
 
326 (80.9) 
 
Chi square = 31.040;  
p = 0.000 
 
Treatment options 
 
 136 (81.0) 
 
233 (67.5) 
 
 165 (40.9) 
Chi square = 97.504 
p = 0.000 
 
Recommended  
treatment 
 
149 (88.7) 
 
223 (64.5) 
 
113 (28.0) 
Chi-square= 
204.858; 
 p = 0.000 
 
Risk of refusing 
recommended 
treatment 
 
140 (83.3) 
 
277 (80.1) 
 
99 (24.6) 
 Chi square 294.192;  
    p = 0.000 
 
 Risks of 
Treatment 
 
 
 147 (87.5) 
 
 238 (68.8) 
 
 229 (56.8) 
 
Chi square = 51.272 
p = 0.000 
Benefits of 
Treatment 
 
 
150 (89.3) 
 
 246 (71.1) 
 
245 (60.8) 
Chi square = 46.127; 
p = 0.000 
 
Right of refusal 
 
109 (64.9) 
 
 232 (67.1) 
 
113 (28) 
Chi square = 
132.788; 
p= 0.000 
Enough    
information 
(satisfaction with 
disclosure) 
 
126 (76.4) 
 
 294 (85) 
 
 290 (74.2) 
Chi square =134.884 
p = 0.000 
 
Costs of treatment 20 (11.9) 81 (23.4) Not asked* Chi-square = 9.482; 
  p= 0.002 
Table 8.1: Information disclosed by doctors and nurses to patients 
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8.9.3 Methods of obtaining IC from patients  
 
Most HCPs in this study (51%) doctors and 49% of nurses claimed that they usually 
obtained ‘written consent’ from patients as previously reported2570, 2571Another 35% of 
doctors and 39% of nurses said they used both methods to obtain consent from patients 
(see table 8.3). By contrast, 73% of patients in this study claimed that consent was 
obtained ‘verbally’ while only 5% agreed that both verbal and written consent was used to 
obtain IC by HCPs.2572  This obvious inconsistency cannot be easily explained. In this 
case, one can suggest that either HCPs are unaware that the proper method of obtaining 
consent legally in complex cases, is in writing, 2573 and therefore claimed this method in 
order to avoid any accusations of impropriety. However, from the patient’s responses it is 
clear that usual practice of obtaining IC is verbally. It could also be that the majority of 
patients who participated in this study were involved in minor procedures not requiring 
written consent, since written consent is only required in specific cases such as biomedical 
research or complex surgical procedures.2574,2575 However, it must be stated that both 
verbal and written consent are legally valid as long as all the key elements of IC are 
observed when communicating with patients before obtaining IC and treatment 
authorization.2576,2577 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2570  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics 8. 
2571  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97]. 
2572 Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52. 
2573  National Health 61 of 2003 (s9). 
2574  National Health 61 of 2003 (s9). 
2575  HPCSA Guidelines for good practice in the healthcare professions: Seeking patients’ 
 informed consent-the ethical considerations (HPCSA Pretoria 2008) 10-11. 
2576 HPCSA Guidelines for good practice in the healthcare professions (HPCSA Pretoria 2008) 10.    
2577  Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics 57-112. 
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Table 8.2: Nature of risks disclosed by doctors and nurses and preferred disclosure by patients 
Risks Disclosed Doctors 
   Yes (%) 
                                 
No (%) 
    Nurses 
Yes (%) 
 
No (%) 
P- value 
Pearson χ2 
 
Most common Risks 
 
152/165(92) 
 
13/165 (8) 
 
256/320 (80) 
 
59/320 (18) 
   
Ρ = 0.002 
 
Most Serious Risks 
 
144/164 (88) 
 
18/164 (11) 
 
134/319 (42) 
 
177/319 (56) 
   
Ρ = 0.000 
 
All Material Risks 
 
35/165 (21) 
 
117/165 (71) 
 
114/318 (36) 
 
183/318 (58) 
  
 Ρ = 0.004 
      
 
Patients                                               
     
           
Preferred risk 
disclosure 
 
Yes (%) 
    
 
All of the risks 
 
304 (78) 
    
 
Some of the risks 
    
 22  (6) 
 
    
None of the Risks 
 
Don’t Know 
 22  (6) 
43 (11) 
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
459 
 
Table 8.3: Methods of obtaining IC and enhancing patient understanding 
 
 
 
8.9.4 Understanding of information disclosed  
 
As previously reported, the majority of patients participating in this study (91%) said they 
understood the information disclosed or provided by HCPs as previously reported,2578 and 
discussed in chapter 7 of this thesis. With regard to asking questions about their treatment, 
70% of patients also responded affirmatively, while those who did not ask questions 
claimed that they either did not know what to ask, trusted the HCPs, or were already 
familiar with their medical condition and the treatment involved. Others complained that 
the HCPs were sometimes too busy for them to be able to ask questions.2579 In order to 
enhance patient understanding most doctors and nurses claimed the used the patients 
local language in addition to English to communicate with patients. Further, doctors in this 
study also to admitted to using diagrams and pictures (20-40%), to try and enhance patient 
                                                          
2578  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52. 
2579  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 53. 
Methods of 
obtaining or 
providing 
consent 
 
Doctors 
 Yes (%) 
 
Nurses  
Yes (%) 
 
Patients  
Yes (%) 
 
P-value 
Pearson λ2 
 
Written 
Verbal 
Both 
It depends 
 
84/165 (50.9) 
11/165 (6.7) 
 57/165 (34.5) 
 13/165 (7.9) 
 
167/343 ( 48.7) 
26/343 (7.6) 
135/343 (39.4) 
15/343 (4.4) 
 
19/374 (19.0) 
 274/374 (73.3) 
19/374 (5) 
(2.7) 
 
 
ρ = 0.000 
Methods used 
to explain to 
patients 
 
 
  
 
 
Words (verbal) 
 
Pictures/photos 
 
Diagrams 
 
Interpreters 
162/168 (96.4) 
 
34/168 (20.2) 
 
70/168 (41.7) 
 
121/168 (72) 
 
 
 358/404 (89.3) 
 
32/404 (8) 
 
21/404 (5.2) 
 
14/404 (3.5) 
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understanding (see table 8.3 above). Another 72% of doctors and 56% of nurses claimed 
they used interpreters in order to be able to communicate effectively with patients. 2580,2581 
However, regarding the use of interpreters, this assertion by HCPs was only confirmed or 
corroborated by 4% of patients.2582 The reasons for such a large discrepancy are not very 
clear, however, one may suggest that the reason could be related to the fact that most 
interpretations in this setting are usually carried out by co-opted nurses2583 as part of their 
role of ‘cultural brokerage’, in addition to other HCWs,2584 and sometimes family 
members.2585 It is therefore possible that patients may have misunderstood ‘interpreter 
services’ as part of the regular HCW role during healthcare services, while doctors and 
nurses would be better situated to understand that interpretation is outside of the normal 
job description for HCPs.2586,2587,2588  
 
8.9.5 Time spent on informed consent by HCPs  
 
With regard to the amount of time spent on IC by HCPs, most doctors (53%)2589 and 
majority of nurses (41%) reported that they spent about 5 to10 minutes on obtaining IC 
from patients.2590 This was followed by 20% of doctors who spent 10 to 20 minutes, and 
another 24% who reported spending less than 5 minutes on IC.2591 In addition, 24% of 
nurses reported spending 10 to 20 minutes, while another 16% spent less than 5 minutes 
on IC.2592 From the patient’s perspective; 29% of patients reported that HCPs spent about 
                                                          
2580  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [9]. 
2581  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97]. 
2582  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52. 
2583  Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497-513 see also Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 507. 
2584  Stellenberg and Dorse 2014 Curationis Art #38 http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 
 (Date of use: 19 April 2016). 
2585  Perkins J “Overcoming language barriers to health care” 1999 Popular Government 39-40. 
2586  Stellenberg and Dorse” 2014 Curationis http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/curationis.v37i1.38 (Date of 
 use: 19 April 2016). 
2587  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [9] See also Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497-513 and 
 Shaibu  2007 Nurs Ethics 503-509. 
2588  Perkins 1999 Popular Government 38-44. 
2589  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [6-8]. 
2590  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97-98]. 
2591  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [6-8]. 
2592  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97-98]. 
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5 to 10 minutes on IC, another 23% said 10 to 20 minutes was spent, while about 15% 
reported that HCPs spent less than 5 minutes.2593 From these corroborative observations, 
it is clear that the majority of HCPs spent less than 20 minutes overall on the IC process 
(see figure 8.1 below). However, whether this represents the length of the entire clinical 
encounter between HCPs and patients, or just the amount of time spent on IC is not clear 
from these results. On the other hand, the reported length of less than 20 minutes is 
consistent with reports from the USA where doctors generally spend approximately 15 
minutes on each outpatient visit by a patient.2594 This range of time is also reasonably 
consistent with the National PHC staffing norms of 1:30 patients for Medical Officers (16 
minutes per patient per day); and 1:40 patients for professional Nurses (12 minutes per 
patient per day) in an 8-hour working period.2595 One can therefore suggest from this 
study, that the amount of time reported here likely represents the length of the entire 
consultation between HCPs and patients in this setting, rather than the amount of time 
spent on IC alone. Further, many doctors in this cohort reported that the amount of time 
was not enough for a proper IC process with the patients, due to  large patient workloads 
and other reported challenges and barriers to IC in this setting as shown in  figure 8.2 and 
table 8.4 below. 
 
Figure 8.1: Time spent on informed consent according to doctors, nurses and patients 
                                                          
2593  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 51. 
2594  Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 81‑83 [81]. 
2595     KwaZulu-Natal Strategic plan 2010-2014 (KZN DOH 2010) 14. 
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Figure 8.2: Challenges and barriers to IC identified by doctors and nurses 
 
 
8.9.6 Barriers to informed consent 
 
In the current study, the number one challenge or barrier to IC identified by HCPs (both 
doctors and nurses) was the issue of ‘language barriers’, which was identified by 88% 
doctors2596 and 73% nurses.2597 Other barriers also ranked highly by HCPs include the 
issues of ‘time constraints and workload’, ‘lack of education’ and lack of administrative 
support in the form of interpreters’, as shown table 8.4 and figure 8.2. The three combined 
issues of language, poor education, and the need for interpreters, point to the importance 
of language in the practice of IC in this setting consistent with studies reported from other 
multicultural jurisdictions.2598   
 
                                                          
2596  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [8]. 
2597  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97]. 
2598  Perkins 1999 Popular Government 38-44 see also Schenker 2011 Med Decis Making 151–
 173. 
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Time Constraints
Work Load
Language difficulties
Lack of administrative support
(interpreters)
Cultural barriers
Lack of education
Medical paternalism ( doctor knows best)
Nurses Doctors
463 
 
It has been demonstrated that language barriers may have a deleterious effect on 
healthcare practice generally; leading to such unforeseen outcomes like misdiagnosis, 
failure of preventive advice, or non-compliance with prescribed medications which may 
result on charges of medical negligence against doctors and other HCPs.2599,2600 The 
problems of language barriers during IC and clinical practice are not limited to South 
Africa, and has been reported in multicultural developed countries such as the 
USA.2601,2602,2603  
 
Another South African study conducted at district hospitals in the Limpopo province found 
evidence of language as a barrier that impacts negatively on patients’ rights to 
confidentiality, IC, and the overall quality of healthcare practice.2604 This is compounded 
by the problem of lack of professional interpreters in local hospitals, which increases the 
workload of nurses who are usually called upon to act as interpreters in this setting, in the 
practice of cultural brokerage.2605,2606 This may also explain the increased patient 
workload reported by nurses in this study and others, leading to a high turnover of nurses 
due to job pressures and lack of job satisfaction.2607,2608,2609,2610 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2599  Wu A et al “The interpreter as cultural educator of residents” 2006 Arch Pediatr Adolesc Med 
 1145-1150. 
2600 Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 230. 
2601  Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 229-331. 
2602  Schenker et al 2007 J Gen Intern Med 294–299. 
2603  Gordon 1997 Fordham Urb L J 1321-1362. 
2604  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1086. 
2605  Jezewski1990 West J Nurs Res 497-513. 
2606  Shaibu S 2007 Nurs Ethics 503-509. 
2607  Pillay R 2009 Hum Resour Health 7-15. 
2608  Matlakala MC "The views of intensive care nurses regarding short-term deployment” 2015 
 Curationis Art1#1478 http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/ curationis.v38i1.1478 (Date of use: 19April 
 2016). 
2609  Hamilton K and Yau J The global tug-of-war for health care workers (IOM World Migration 
 Report  2009) http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display (Date of use: 21 
 November 2014).  
2610  Zelnick and O'Donnell 2005 J Public Health Policy I63-185. 
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Table 8.4: Barriers to informed consent identified by doctors and nurses 
Challenges Respondent  Median score P-value 
 Doctors  
Yes (No.) 
Nurses 
Yes 
(No.) 
 
Doctors/Nurses 
 
Time Constraints 
 
Work Load 
 
Language difficulties 
 
Lack of administrative support,  
(E.g. Interpreters) 
 
Cultural barriers    
 
Lack of education  
 
Medical paternalism  
(Doctor knows best)                                                                  
 
146 
143 
147 
138 
134 
142 
131 
216 
216 
259 
203 
207 
220 
183 
2.00/3.00 
3.00/2.00 
2.00/1.00 
4.00/3.00 
5.00/3.00 
4.00/3.00 
7.00/6.00 
0.120 
0.171 
0.002 
0.022 
0.000 
0.002 
0.000 
 Note: p-value calculated using Independent samples Mann-Whitney U test; significance level = 0.05 
 
 
8.9.7 Voluntariness of informed consent in practice 
 
One of the more difficult parts of IC that cannot be easily assessed using empirical 
methods is the voluntariness of IC. This is due to the fact that voluntariness is generally 
based on the “state of mind of the patient” relative to the decision to be made at a particular 
time.2611 Voluntariness may also be impacted by the patient’s clinical condition and cultural 
belief system in relation to the concept of volition. In more traditional societies such as in 
Africa, 2612, 2613 and Asia,2614,2615,2616 the influence and respect for family and elders within 
the community may be important in decision-making due to cultural norms.2617,2618 While 
these types of interference or involvement in healthcare decision-making could be 
                                                          
2611  Nelson RM et al “The concept of voluntary consent” 2011 AJOB 6-16. 
2612  Ezeome and Marshall 2009 Dev World Bioethics 138-148. 
2613  Gordon 1986 Fordham Urb LJ 1321-1362. 
2614  Susilo et al 2013 Nurs Ethics 413-425. 
2615 Lee et al 2009 Int J Nursing Stud1580-1584. 
2616 Masaki et al 2014 BMC Med Ethics 15. 
2617  Tindana et al 2006 IRB 1-6. 
2618  Frimpong-Mansoh 2008 Dev World Bioeth 104-114. 
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considered undue influence in Western societies focused on individual libertarian 
autonomy, African communities generally thrive on communalism based for example on 
the concept of Ubuntu which proclaims, “I am, therefore we are”. This ideology is derived 
from an understanding of collective responsibility and acquiescence to the will and goals 
of the community rather than individual welfare.2619,2620 It is generally recognized that 
voluntariness in IC relates to the absence of coercion, undue influence, fraudulent 
misrepresentation or deception which are generally agreed as being unethical.2621 In the 
current study, I tried to determine the voluntariness of participants by asking indirect 
questions from HCPs, such whether they would allow patients to choose a particular 
procedure or treatment during a clinical encounter. On this question, 53% of doctors 
answered affirmatively, while only 40% nurses said they would allow patients to choose a 
particular treatment. With regard to voluntary actions or choices by patients; when patients 
were asked if they made the decision regarding treatment choices of their own free will, 
the majority of patients in this cohort (76%), said they made their decisions without an 
input from any other person.2622 A few however said they involved surrogates in their 
decision-making, such as family members and friends, and occasionally a HCP for a 
second opinion.2623 However, a minority of patients said they were afraid to ask questions 
because they might be refused treatment by HCPs, while another said that patients were 
sometimes in a difficult position where they had to say yes to everything. Table 7.6 in this 
thesis presents the reported verbatim responses from patients. In this regard.2624 
 
8.9.8 Use of implied and presumed consent by HCPs  
 
HCPS in this study were also asked explain to what extent they used implied and/or 
presumed consent during clinical practice. On this question, around 65% of doctors said 
they would use it when the patients showed up at the clinic or were admitted to the ward; 
while 57% of nurses said they would act likewise. Most doctors and nurses said they were 
                                                          
2619   Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S1-S7. 
2620  Metz and Gaie 2010 J Moral Educ 273-90. 
2621 Beauchamp and Childress Principles of biomedical ethics [93-98]. 
2622  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract [51-53]. 
2623  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 53. 
2624  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52. 
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more likely to use implied or presumed consent in emergency situations (43%); as per 
table 8.5 below. In terms of how often they actually used implied or presumed consent in 
practice, about 59% of doctors said they used it sometimes or rarely, while about 43% of 
nurses answered likewise. Another 24% of doctors said they ‘never’ used implied or 
presumed consent, compared to 40% nurses. On the other hand, about 11% of doctors 
and 16% nurses said they used it ‘all the time’ (see figure 8.3 below). However, when 
asked to actually define what they understood by implied or presumed consent; the 
responses from doctors and professional nurses seemed to suggest that there was a 
misunderstanding of the concept of implied or presumed consent;  implying some residual 
of elements medical paternalism during clinical practice, with the potential to compromise 
patients’ autonomy in this setting. In defining implied or presumed consent, many doctors 
and nurses suggested that when a patient showed up at the clinic or the doctor’s office 
for consultation, that this automatically implied ‘seeking help’ from the patient and that the 
HCP could presume that the patient was consenting to treatment. Health care 
practitioners’ understanding of implied/ presumed consent included statements such as: 
“By routine of the patient coming to the healthcare facility- he is consenting to treatment.” 
Others, “by virtue of the fact that you have sought my help” and “patient presents 
themselves requesting treatment.” On the other hand, when patients were asked whether 
they could change their minds regarding the treatment recommended by a HCP, about 
87% of patients said they could. However, a few patients said they could not change their 
minds because of lack of alternative means of obtaining healthcare and fear of losing or 
being denied the free treatment provided in public hospitals.2625  See verbatim responses 
from patients as shown table 7.6 of this thesis. Overall the patients in this study seemed 
to have acted voluntarily when accessing treatment from public hospitals, while the use of 
implied and presumed consent by HCPs may denote residual aspects of ‘doctor knows 
best’ or medical paternalism in this clinical setting.2626,2627 
 
 
 
                                                          
2625 Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52. 
2626  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52. 
2627  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [10]. 
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Table 8.5: Use of implied/presumed consent by HCPs in clinical practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 Figure 8.3: Use of implied/presumed consent-doctors vs. nurses 
 
 
 
Implied/presumed consent Doctors 
Yes (%) 
Nurses 
Yes (%) 
Total 
% 
p- 
value 
When do you use implied/presumed consent: 
When patients’ present at the clinic?  
When patients are admitted to the ward?  
In an emergency?                      
 
49/145 (33.8) 
45/144 (31.3) 
    69/145 (47.6) 
 
73/280 (26.1) 
87/281 (31) 
117/284 (41.2) 
 
122/425(28.
7) 
 
132/425(31.
1) 
 
186/429(43.
4) 
 
 
ρ=0.004 
 
ρ=0.057 
 
ρ=0.211 
How often do you use implied/presumed 
consent? 
Some of the time or occasionally 
Seldom or rarely 
All of the time 
Never        
 
 
53/137 (38.7) 
36/137(26.3) 
15/137(10.9) 
33/137 (24.1) 
 
 
44/218 (20.2) 
51/218 (23.4) 
35/218 (16.1) 
88/218 (40.4) 
 
 
 
 
ρ=0.000 
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8.9.9 The problem of hospital consent forms  
 
When asked whether the current generic consent forms used in public hospitals are 
adequate or satisfactory, 63% of doctors and 81% of nurses responded affirmatively (see 
table 8.7 below). Those doctors who responded negatively gave various reasons 
regarding the inadequacy of the current form used in public hospitals. Some said the 
consent form does not give an opportunity for detailing complications or what was 
discussed with patients, since different clinical conditions may require certain mandatory 
disclosures. Others complained that the current form does not take into consideration 
‘privacy, language and cultural values’. Others complained that the forms as currently 
constituted somehow forced patients to answer ‘yes’ to everything, while others 
complained that the form contains no binding space to specify that consent was obtained 
or that treatment alternatives were discussed.2628 Further evidence of inadequacy of 
consent forms in provincial hospitals was obtained indirectly in the case of Pane v MEC 
Free State,2629 where one of the expert witness complained that the current consent form 
was so inadequate that he had to design his own for personal use during clinical practice. 
It has been argued that the current consent forms used in in South African public hospitals 
are too vague, and due to this vagueness, local courts may classify such documents as 
void.2630  Such voiding usually occurs “where the vague and uncertain language justifies 
the implication that the parties were never ad idem, or where the unspecified details of the 
contract are questions of fact only capable of determination by evidentiary analysis.”2631 It 
has also been stated that getting a patient to sign a consent form, where full information 
had not been disclosed to the patient, might not be effective defense in cases of 
negligence or assault, since the consent had been expressed in form only, and is not truly 
valid consent as suggested in Chatterson v Gerson.2632 Further, the judge in the English 
case of Taylor v Shropshire2633 concluded that he regarded the consent form signed 
before an operation as “pure window dressing [in that case] and designed simply to avoid 
                                                          
2628  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [6-8]. 
2629  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
2630  Van Dokkum N “Hospital consent forms” 1996 STELL LR 249-255 [253]. 
2631  Van Dokkum 1996 STELL LR 254. 
2632  Chatterson v Gerson 1981 QB 432 [443]. 
2633 Taylor v Shropshire Health Authority (1998) Lloyds Rep Med 395 QBD. 
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the suggestion that a patient has not been told.”2634 In any event, patients’ consent to a 
medical procedure or treatment is limited to that procedure alone, therefore standard 
consent forms which may state in part that “I the undersigned, do hereby consent and 
agree to all medical treatments, operations, anesthetics, deemed advisable by the 
attending surgeons, specialists and doctors…,”2635 or which tend to exculpate the 
employer and all employees from liability for negligence may be too vague to entitle 
enforcement in a court of law.2636 Therefore, it has been suggested that a customized 
consent form, spelling out all potential sequelae of the procedure 2637 or an abstract form 
which provides space for the HCP to detail what was disclosed and what must be done 
for the patient,2638 are probably preferable options for clinical practice in South Africa. The 
latter options are arguably more responsive to the complaints and observations by doctors 
in this study and may suggest a need for reformatting of current hospital consent forms in 
light of the new requirements imposed by the National Health Act.2639 Van Dokkum rightly 
asserts that, “with the movement of South African law towards the patient-orientated 
approach, as evinced in Castell v De Greef,2640 it is apparent that the standardised 
consent form so widely used in our hospitals has become inadequate and 
inappropriate”.2641 This is an untenable situation, which requires urgent remedy to avoid 
liability by hospitals and HCPs. 
 
8.9.10 Decision-making capacity or competence  
 
In the common law, there is a general presumption of capacity, in that any adult is 
presumed to have the capacity to consent to treatment, unless proven otherwise based 
on acceptable evidence. According to Lord Donaldson in the case of Re T:2642 
                                                          
2634  Taylor v Shropshire Health Authority (1998) Lloyds Rep Med 395 QBD see also Hocton The law 
 of consent to medical treatment 12. 
2635  Van Dokkum1996 STELL LR 251. 
2636  Hocton Law of consent to medical treatment 12-13. 
2637  Van Dokkum1996 STELL LR 254-255. 
2638  Van Oosten FFW “Disclosure documents and informed consent: The pros and cons” 1993 
 Med Law 651-656. 
2639  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (sections 6-9). 
2640  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2641  Van Dokkum1996 STELL LR 255. 
2642  Re T (An adult: Consent to medical treatment) [1992] 2 FLR 458. 
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Prima facie every adult has a right and capacity to decide whether or not he will accept medical 
treatment, even if refusal may risk permanent injury to his health or even lead to premature death 
[…]. However, the presumption of capacity to decide, which stems from the fact that the patient is 
an adult is rebuttable […]. An adult may be deprived of his capacity to decide either by long-term 
mental incapacity, or retarded development, or temporary factors such as unconsciousness or 
confusion, or the effects of fatigue, pain or drugs. 2643 
 
Lack of capacity cannot be established by a person’s appearance, intelligence, 
educational level, or any condition or aspect of behavior which might make others to 
believe or make unjustified assumptions regarding the person’s mental capacity.2644,2645 
In the current study, about 67% of doctors said they would presume that an adult has the 
capacity to consent to treatment. However only 59% of doctors routinely tested their 
patients for DMC.2646 On the other hand, 55% of nurses said they would presume that 
their patients had capacity, while 76% said they would routinely assess their patients for 
DMC prior to treatment. When asked to rank certain criteria such as age, level of 
consciousness, educational level, appearance and sex as factors associated with or used 
in assessing mental capacity, the majority of doctors and nurses were able to rank these 
factors accurately in descending order of importance. When asked what methods they 
would use to assess patients’ mental capacity in difficult cases, most doctors said they 
would use the mini-mental state examination (MMSE), Glasgow coma scale (GCS), or 
orientation in time place and person to ascertain a patient’s capacity in difficult cases.2647 
Nurses generally gave similar responses to doctors, with more nurses adding they were 
more likely to assess patient’s DMC based on the patient’s level of consciousness. Also, 
more nurses than doctors responded that they did not know the correct answer to this 
question, probably related to nurses’ experience and perception of their role in clinical 
practice. It is interesting to note however that previous studies in other jurisdictions 
regarding methods used for assessing mental capacity by physicians concluded that both 
                                                          
2643 Re T (An adult: Consent to medical treatment) [1992] 2 FLR 458 [115] see also Hocton Law 
 of consent to medical treatment 66. 
2644  Chima 2009Trans J Coll Med S Afr 42-43.  
2645  UK Mental Health Act 2005. 
2646  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [9]. 
2647  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [9]. 
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the MMSE and the GCS should be considered as “blunt instruments” when assessing 
patient’s capacity clinically.2648  
 
It has been shown that decisions about a patients’ capacity are ultimately based on legal 
judgments,2649 while in practice, the assessment of patients DMC to give or withhold 
consent to medical treatment is a more often a matter of clinical judgment.2650,2651  
However, some authorities  have asserted that there is no difference in assessment  of 
competence between clinicians and the courts, because it usually clinicians, especially 
psychiatrists, that are involved in assessment of capacity in routine clinical practice based 
on the fact that it would probably be impracticable and expensive to approach the courts 
in every single case for assessment of capacity.2652 In the context of South Africa, it must 
be noted that in the terms of the Mental Health Care Act,2653 all medical doctors are also 
considered to be to be mental health care practitioners and are required to be able upon 
request to ascertain a patient’s DMC in both clinical and medico-legal cases. 
 
8.9.11 General knowledge of current local laws and regulations pertaining to informed 
consent by HCPs 
 
To assess the basic knowledge of local laws relating to medical treatment in South Africa, 
HCPs were asked to identify the current age of consent to routine medical treatment in 
South Africa. On this question, only 71% of doctors2654 could correctly identify 12 years 
as the current age of consent to treatment for minors in South Africa as stipulated in the 
Children’s Act.2655 On the other hand, only 30% of nurses could accurately identify the 
                                                          
2648  Appelbaum PS “Assessment of patients’ competence to consent to treatment” 2007 N Engl J 
 Med 1834-1840. 
2649  Richmond v Richmond (1914) 111 LT 273 see also Re MB (an adult: medical treatment)  [1997] 
 8 Med LR 217. 
2650  The BMA with the Law Society Assessment of medical capacity: Guideline for doctors and 
 lawyers (BMA London 1995) 66. 
2651  Biggs H Euthanasia: Death with dignity and the law (London Bloomsbury 2001) 83.  
2652  Appelbaum and Roth 1981 Am J Psychiatry 1462-1467. 
2653  Mental Health Care Act 17 of 2002. 
2654  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [10]. 
2655  Children’s Act 38 of 2005 as amended. 
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age of consent to treatment for minors in South Africa.2656 Furthermore, when asked to 
identify the age of consent to termination of pregnancy (TOP) in South Africa as 
established in the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act,2657 only about 30% of doctors 
(47/159),2658 and 8% of nurses(25/327),2659 could accurately pinpoint the correct answer 
as ‘any woman of any age’ as established by law.2660 On the other hand, about 25% of 
patients could accurately identify the current age of consent to treatment as 12 years as 
stipulated by current South Africa law. Conversely, only 30% of nurses were able to 
pinpoint the age of consent to treatment as ‘12years’. See table 8.6 below. These 
responses clearly indicate that most HCPs practicing in South Africa are not as 
knowledgeable as one would expect about basic legal requirements, which implies that 
HCPs, especially nurses, may not have an adequate understanding of legal requirements 
relating to IC and routine medical treatment, in order to provide the necessary advice to 
the patients, in terms of their role of ‘cultural brokerage’ in this setting.2661  Further, with 
regard to knowledge of the age of consent to treatment, the percentage of correct 
responses between nurses and patients show that professional nurses are not any more 
knowledgeable than their untrained or unqualified patients. Similarly, it must be indicated 
that the level of knowledge displayed by patients with regard to age of consent is also 
poor, considering that the majority of patients in this cohort have some form of secondary 
or tertiary education.2662 These observations may have implications for the patients’ ability 
to demand their rights when challenged. With regard to age of consent for TOP, it was 
further disappointing that the majority of professional nurses who were more than 90% 
female in this cohort, could not correctly identify the age requirements for TOP. This 
observation is at variance with their role relating to ‘cultural brokerage’2663 and anticipated 
leadership role in healthcare services in resource poor communities like South 
                                                          
2656 Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [97]. 
2657  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
2658        Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [9]. 
2659  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 
 [98]. 
2660  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
2661  Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497-513 see also Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 503-509. 
2662  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 50. 
2663  Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 503-509 see also Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497-513. 
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Africa.2664,2665,2666 It may also indirectly influence patients’ ability to exercise their right to 
reproductive health as stipulated in the Constitution.2667 Further, the age of consent to 
treatment was reduced by the government to take into consideration, the issue of child-
headed households in South Africa,2668 which increased as a result of the AIDS pandemic. 
Similarly, the age of consent to TOP is now the decision of a woman of any age, in an 
attempt to mitigate the issue of illegal abortions and maternal morbidity associated with it.  
 
It is rather disconcerting that such laudable objectives may be compromised by some 
HCPs inability to keep up with important changes in the law, which could deny patients 
adequate and timely treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2664  Ditlopo P et al “Contestations and complexities of nurses’ participation in policy-making in 
 South Africa” 2014 Glob Health Action http://dx.doi.org/10.3402/gha.v7.25327 (Date of use: 
 19 April 2016). 
2665 Shariff N and Potgeiter E “Extent of East-African nurse leaders’ participation in health policy 
 development” 2012 Nurs Res and Pract doi:10.1155/2012/504697. 
2666  World Health Organisation Strategic directions for strengthening nursing and midwifery services 
 2011-2015 (WHO Geneva 2011) www.who.int/hrh/resources/nmsd/en/index.html  (Date of use: 19 
 April 2016). 
2667  The Constitution s12 (2) (a). 
2668  Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (s129-130 and s137). 
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Table 8.6: Knowledge of basic local healthcare laws by HCPs and Patients 
 
 
12years 
No.  (%) 
15years 
Yes (%) 
18years  
Yes (%) 
21years 
Yes (%) 
Don’t Know 
     (%) 
P-value 
Pearson λ2 
Age of consent 
to treatment in 
South Africa? 
      
 
ρ = 0.000 
 
Doctors 
111/157 
(70.7%) 
17/157 
(10.8%) 
24/157 
(15.3%) 
3/157 
(1.9%) 
2/157 (1.3%)  
Nurses 99/331 
(29.9%) 
33/331  
(10%) 
183/331 
(55.3%) 
12/331 
(3.6%) 
4/331 (1.2% 
 
 
Patients 94/373 
(25.2%) 
 
96/373 
(25.7%) 
122/373 
(32.7%) 
40/373 
(10.7%) 
21/373 (5.6% 
 
 
       
At what age 
can a woman 
request TOP in 
South Africa? 
12 years 
No. (%) 
15years 
No. (%) 
18years 
No. (%) 
Any age 
No. (%) 
Don’t know 
No. (%) 
 
ρ= 0.000 
 
Doctors 
81/159 
(50.9%) 
21/159 
(13.2%) 
 
6/159 
(3.8%) 
47/159 
(29.6%) 
4/159  
(2.5%) 
 
Nurses 190/327 
(58.1%) 
25/327  
(7.6%) 
76/327 
(23.2%) 
25/327 
(7.6% 
11/327 
(3.4%) 
 
Patients Not asked      
 
Notes: TOP = termination of pregnancy; Age for TOP= not included in patients questionnaire. In 
terms of South African law, the age of consent for routine medical treatment in South Africa is 
‘12years’;2669 and for TOP ‘any woman of any age’2670 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2669 Children’s Act 38 of 2005 as amended. 
2670  Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996. 
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Table 8.7: Comparison of doctors and nurses current knowledge and practice of informed consent 
Relevant questions Doctors(Yes ) 
No. (%) 
Doctors  
No. (/%) 
Nurses( Yes) 
No (%) 
Nurses (No) 
No. ( %) 
P-value 
Pearson 
λ2 
Language of communication?      
English 108/168(64%) 60/168(36) 135/350(39) 213/350(61) ρ=0.000 
Patients local language 75/168 (45) 90/168(54) 206/350(59) 140/350(40) ρ=0.010 
Both English & Local 116/168 (69) 49/168(29) 195/350(56) 150/350(43) ρ=0.011 
Methods of obtaining consent?      
   Verbal 11/165(7)  26/343(8)   ρ=0.333 
   Written 84/165(51)  167/343(49)   
  Both verbal and written 57/165(35)  135/343(39)   
 Who normally obtains consent?      
             Nurse 10/165(6) 155/165(94) 50/342(15) 292/342(85) ρ=0.003 
            Junior doctors 74/166(45) 92/166(55) 71/342(21) 271/342(79) ρ=0.000 
HCP performing procedure/treating 110/166(66) 56/166(34) 270/342(79) 72/342(21) ρ=0.002 
Any available HCP 18/166(11) 148/166(89) 25/342(7) 317/342(93) ρ=0.122 
Standard to be used for 
information disclosure 
     
 ‘Reasonable doctor’ standard 97/161(60) 46/161(27) 165/295(56) 82/295(28)  ρ=0.329 
 ‘Prudent patient’ standard 76/159(48) 60/159(38) 138/291(47) 107/291(37) ρ=0.928 
Responsibility for adequate 
Information disclosure 
     
HCP responsibility 100/162(62)   62/182(38) 196/325(60) 129/325(40) ρ=0.762 
Patients responsibility 8/162(5) 154/162(95) 40/326(12) 286/326(88) ρ=0.006 
HCP & Patient jointly responsible 66/162(41) 96/162(59) 121/325(37) 204/325(63) ρ=0.257 
Time Spent on  
information disclosure 
     
  Sufficient or adequate 93/168(55) 66/168 (39) 185/353(52) 145/353(41) ρ=0.769 
Current hospital consent form      
       Satisfactory or Adequate 105/168(63) 51/168(30) 281/345(81) 42/345(12) ρ=0.000 
      
   
Notes: HCP = Healthcare professional; minor scores of ‘don’t know’ and, ‘it depends’ not shown 
 
 
8.9.12 Comparison of informed consent aggregate scores (ICAS) between HCPs  
 
To compare knowledge, understanding and practice of IC across different categories of 
HCPs and occupational ranks of doctors and nurses, I developed an aggregate score 
using a modified version of the criteria and method described by Sugarman and others.2671 
. In this study, I selected a series of 12 questions from the questionnaire for HCPs2672 by 
extracting questions relating to information disclosure, voluntariness, capacity, and 
                                                          
2671  Sugarman et al 2005 Clinical Trials 34-41. 
2672  See Appendix 1 of this thesis 
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understanding of IC,2673  as per table 8.9 below. The selected questions are also 
consistent to the requirements for information disclosure as stipulated in section 6 of the 
NHA.2674 Each of the selected questions was given a rank score of 1 (one), and the 
aggregate score represents the ICAS. The questions used to calculate the ICAS are 
shown Table 5.7 of this thesis. The internal consistency of the questions used for ICAS 
was evaluated using Cronbach’s alpha.2675 In this case the alpha score for this questions 
was 0.646. This scoring is within the range of ‘high’ which denotes the fact that questions 
are moderately closely related and have a high reliability.2676 
 
In terms of ICAS scores, overall, the difference in scores between all categories of doctors 
and nurses was statistically significant with doctors having a median ICAS of 10, 
compared to nurses with a median score of 8. This difference between doctors and nurses 
was statistically significant using the Mann-Whitney U test for independent variables 
ρ<0.001. Further, comparison of ICAS scores between different ranks of doctors showed 
that interns and registrars had the lowest median score of  around 9, while medical officers 
and consultant/specialists had a median score of 10 (see figure 8.4 below). However, this 
difference was not statistically significant.2677 Comparison of doctors ICAS by clinical 
specialty using the Kruskal-Wallis test showed that anesthesiologists and radiologists had 
the lowest ICAS score with a median of 7 and 8 respectively, while the highest median 
score of 10.5 was achieved by OBGYN doctors, internists, and general practitioners,2678 
(see figure 8.5 below). On the other hand, comparison of the ICAs score between 
professional nurses and enrolled nurses showed that professional nurses’ ICAS was 9 on 
average, while enrolled nurses scored 7. However this difference was not statistically 
significant using the Mann-Whitney U test for independent variables (ρ = 0.090).2679 
                                                          
2673  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [12]. 
2674  National Health Act 61 of 2003 section 6(1). 
2675         Statistical Consulting Group UCLA “Introduction to SAS”  
              www.https://stats.idre.ucla.edu/sas/modules/sas-learning-module-introduction-to-the-features-              
 of-sas (Date of use: 30 January 2018). 
2676 Tavakol and Dennick “Making sense of Cronbach’s alpha” 2011 IJME 53-55 see also Flores 
 JWC https: //www.researchgate.net/post/How_do_i_interpret_my_Alpha_value (Date of use: 30 
 January 2018). 
2677  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [12]. 
2678  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [12]. 
2679  Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 98. 
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Further analysis showed that there was no statistical difference between various nursing 
domains, even though nurses working in trauma and casualty had the highest ICAS of 10. 
This difference in ICAS scores amongst nurses working in various nursing domains was 
not statistically significant when compared using Kruskal-Wallis test (ρ = 0.293). The 
implications of these ICAS scores appear to show some differences in the knowledge and 
consequent application of IC regulations amongst different categories of HCPs. However, 
doctors showed more overall knowledge regarding IC regulations than nurses, which 
could be expected, considering there different roles in the clinical setting and the IC 
process. More importantly, there appeared to be no statistical difference in knowledge 
between professional nurses with a minimum 4 years nursing qualification and enrolled 
nurses with a minimum of 2 years nursing diploma in terms of knowledge of current legal 
and ethical positions regarding IC. Ordinarily, one would say that doctors should be more 
familiar with the rules and regulations pertaining to IC because they have more direct 
diagnostic and treatment responsibilities in the healthcare context. However, the NHA2680 
implies that the IC rules apply to all HCPs.2681 Further; other legal authorities have 
suggested that the informed consent regulations should apply mutatis mutandis to all 
HCPs.2682 This implies that all categories of HCPs involved in patient care, including 
nurses and others, must become familiar with the rules and regulations regarding informed 
consent. The results of this study suggest that the knowledge of professional nurses in 
South Africa regarding the rules and local laws governing IC in clinical practice may not 
be up to the required standard, as suggested by other reports.2683,2684,2685 
 
 
                                                          
2680 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11[87]. 
2681  National Health Act 61 0f 2003 S (6) (1). 
2682  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11[87]. 
2683  Richards L and Potgeiter E “Perceptions of registered nurses in four state health institutions on 
 continuing formal education” 2010 Curationis 41-50. 
2684  Morolong and Chabeli “Competence of newly qualified registered nurses from a nursing college” 
 2005 Curationis 38-50. 
2685  Mandava A et al “The quality of informed consent: mapping the landscape. A review of 
 empirical data from developing and developed countries” 2012 J Med Ethics 356e365.  
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Figure 8.4: Doctors ICAS by occupational rank 
 
 
 
Figure 8. 5: ICAS scores by clinical sub-discipline or specialty 
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8.10 Summary of chapter 8 
 
This chapter summarises and synthesises the findings from both the literature review, 
especially relevant case law pertaining to IC in South Africa, and the empirical research 
findings from this study. In this analysis, I took into consideration the perspectives derived 
from the background studies and literature review on the legal and ethical doctrine of IC 
as stipulated by law, policy and ethical guidelines. At the beginning of this chapter, I 
describe the role of empirical research as a tool or methodology, which can be used to 
evaluate moral norms, such as the rules and regulations that have been put in place to 
ensure that certain basic standards of practice are achieved in the healthcare setting, with 
particular reference to IC regulations in medical practice.  This is followed by an analysis 
of the meaning of consent in medical treatment. From this analysis, I conclude that 
consent to treatment may be considered as a special type of agreement between a doctor 
or HCP and the patient, which is different from the usual arms-length contractual 
relationship between individuals or juristic persons. In this sense, ‘consent to treatment’ is 
based on the fiduciary relationship between a HCP and the patient, which may allow the 
patient to withdraw from the contractual relationship or the consent given for a specific 
medical treatment or procedure, or to terminate the agreement, without any legal 
repercussions. 
 
Further, I analysed the factors that would make IC valid during medical treatment and 
concluded that this is based on the fulfilment of the five key elements of IC between a 
patient and the HCP, which should include full information disclosure, capacity to 
understand the information disclosed, comprehension of that information, and 
voluntariness, while taking into consideration patients’ language, literacy levels, and 
cultural values, based on a subjective reasonable patient standard. Valid IC also requires 
volition on the part of the patient or consenter which denotes the power to use one’s free 
will in the absence of any undue influence, coercion or manipulation by the HCP; and 
finally agreement or authorization of the medical procedure or intervention by the patient.  
 
Moreover, I analysed current South African case law and comparative foreign case law, 
and observed that South African common law is lagging behind international practice or 
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standards of IC, in the context of recent judgments by the SCA and provincial high courts 
in cases such as the Oldwage case,2686 McDonald v Wroe,2687 Sibisi No v Maitin,2688 and 
Pane v MEC Free State.2689  
 
Based on analysis of the judgments in these cases, I concluded that South African courts 
are somewhat inconsistent in their application of the informed consent doctrine based on 
the prudent patient and material risks standards of information disclosure as established 
in Castell v De Greef.2690 Further, South African courts appear reluctant to expand the 
South African jurisprudence on informed consent by reference to applicable foreign laws 
and court judgments, as stipulated in the Constitution.2691 By contrast, related common 
law jurisdictions such as England and Australia, as well as the courts in North America, 
have fully adopted the doctrine of informed consent based on the prudent patient and 
material risks standard of information disclosure; as illustrated by cases such as the recent 
judgment of the UK Supreme Court, Scotland, in the case of Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire,2692 as well as the well-established judgment of the Australian High Court in 
Rogers v Whitaker,2693 and the Canadian Supreme Court in the case of Reibl v 
Hughes.2694 American case law has previously adopted this standard in the landmark 
judgment of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Canterbury v Spence.2695 I 
have further analysed the importance of empirical studies in bioethics, which shows that 
empirical bioethics can help facilitate the move from philosophical ethical analysis to 
ethically justifiable behaviour. Further, empirical data may be used to enhance ethical 
analysis, and justify it by testing consequentialist claims, and in evaluating current practice 
when compared to expected normative behaviour, as well helping to identify and 
                                                          
2686  Louwrens v Oldwage [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C). 
2687  McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C) [568]. 
2688  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156. 
2689  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
2690  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2691  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa1996 s39 (1) (b-c). 
2692  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11. 
2693  Rogers v Whitaker [1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
2694  Reibl v Hughes (1980) 114 DLR (3d) 1 (SCC). 
2695  Canterbury v Spence (1972) 464 F 2d 772. 
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document new moral dilemmas. 2696,2697 I also identified some socio-cultural factors that 
could impact on the practice of informed consent in the multicultural setting of South 
Africa.  
 
In the second part of this chapter, I summarized and analysed the findings and 
implications of the empirical research study reported in chapters 5 to 7 of this thesis. Some 
pertinent findings include the fact that HCPs (doctors and nurses) generally disclose most, 
but not all of the key requirements for IC as stipulated by the NHA2698 and related ethical 
guidelines.2699 I also reported that the majority of participants in this research study 
including doctors, nurses, and patients, were generally satisfied by the amount of 
information disclosed during medical treatment. Further, based on the finding from this 
study, one can conclude that most HCPS are not fully aware or conversant with the legal 
and ethical standards of IC, including the requirement that the current standard of 
information disclosure should be based on the ‘prudent patient and material risks 
standards’. In addition, knowledge of basic healthcare laws by HCPs is deficient 
particularly amongst professional nurses. Based on data triangulation, was I also able to 
identify some inconsistences between the responses by HCPs and patients. For example 
while HCPs reported that IC was obtained in writing in the majority of cases; patients on 
the other hand reported that they gave IC verbally during most clinical encounters. 
Furthermore, while HCPs claimed to have disclosed certain elements of IC such as 
recommended treatment, risks of refusing treatment, and the right of refusal, to patients, 
the majority of patient respondents reported that this was not the case.  
 
I also identified and analysed some barriers or challenges associated with obtaining IC in 
this setting, which include language barriers, educational level of patients, large patient 
                                                          
2696  Solomon MZ “Realizing bioethics’ goals and practice: ten ways ‘is’ can help ‘ought’ 2005 Hast 
 Cent Rep 40-47 see also Mbugua K “Respect for cultural diversity and the empirical turn in 
 bioethics: a plea for caution” 2012 J Med Ethics Hist Med 2 and Ives J “Encounters with 
 experience: empirical bioethics and the future” 2007 Health Care Anal 1-6. 
2697  Sulmasy and Sugarman Methods of medical ethics 13-18 see also Borry et al “Empirical research 
 in bioethics journals: a quantitative analysis” 2006 J Med Ethics 240-245.  
2698  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2699  HPCSA Guidelines for good practice in the healthcare professions: Seeking patients’ 
 informed consent-The ethical considerations (HPCSA Pretoria 2008). 
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workloads, and the absence of interpreters and administrative support. Further, I identified 
the fact that there was a difference in the level of knowledge regarding the ethical and 
legal guidelines for IC amongst HCPs with professional nurses showing more deficiency 
of knowledge about basic healthcare laws and regulations, when compared to doctors. I 
also identified and analysed the fact that the majority of HCPs generally spent about 5 to 
10 minutes on IC process and the typical clinical consultation in this setting. However, this 
was consistent with and comparable to the length of time spent on a clinical outpatient 
encounter between and patients and doctors in other jurisdictions, including developed 
countries. This amount of time spent in public hospitals under study is also consistent with 
the recommended national public health staffing norms and workload for South Africa.2700 
Furthermore, I was able to show that the current informed consent forms used in provincial 
hospitals appear inadequate in the context of the new IC regulations and the respect for 
patients’ rights and human dignity, evinced by the South African Constitution. Finally, it 
was concluded that the major barrier to informed consent in this setting is due to language, 
which needs to be remedied, as recommended in chapter 9 of this thesis. 
  
                                                          
2700  Kwazulu-Natal Strategic plan 2010-2014 (KZN DOH 2010) 14. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
It makes sense to conclude this research report by summarizing some of the advantages 
of using an empirical research methodology to study the legal and ethical norms of IC in 
this setting or specifically in the context of clinical practice in South Africa.  
 
It has been argued that, unlike issues in biomedical research ethics, ethical challenges 
arising in the daily clinical care of medicine in Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have 
not yet been studied in a systematic manner.2701 Further, that this aspect of medical law 
and ethics has to be viewed as distinct entity from human biomedical research,2702 even 
though some of the ethical guidelines and laws regulating IC and clinical practice are the 
same.2703 Most patients in SSA are more likely to require medical treatment than become 
human subjects of biomedical research during their lifetime, due to the endemic infectious 
diseases and other clinical conditions prevalent in Africa.2704,2705 Unfortunately, more 
attention is usually devoted to the ethical issues regarding biomedical research than 
clinical practice in most African countries and communities. However, it is important to 
recognize that recent research studies from developed countries, such as the USA, have 
identified the significance of IC as an important tool for preventive medicine.2706 In recent 
times, advocates of shared and informed healthcare decision-making have also 
demonstrated that IC promotes patient comprehension and autonomy, reduces unwanted 
                                                          
2701  Sippel D et al “Clinical ethics in Gabon: The spectrum of clinical ethical issues based on findings 
 from in-depth interviews at three public hospitals” 2015 PLoS ONE e0132374. 
2702  Sippel et al 2015 PLoS ONE e0132374. 
2703  Chima 2006 BMJ 848-851. 
2704  Chima Contemporary ethical issues and regulation of biomedical research in Africa 19-38 see 
 also Chima SC and Mamdoo F “Ethical and legal dilemmas around termination of pregnancy 
 for severe fetal anomalies: A review of two African neonates presenting with ventriculomegaly 
 and holoprosencephaly” 2015 Niger J Clin Pract S31-38. 
2705 Chima SC et al “Progressive multifocal leukoencephalopathy and JC virus genotypes in West 
 African patients with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome: A pathological and DNA sequence 
 analysis of 4 cases” 1999 Archiv Pathol Lab Med 395-403 see also Famoroti TO, Fernandes L 
 and Chima SC “Stigmatization of people living with HIV/AIDS by healthcare workers at a tertiary 
 hospital in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa: A cross-sectional descriptive study” 2013 BMC Med 
 Ethics S6. 
2706  Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 81‑83. 
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medical procedures and malpractice claims, improves patient compliance to treatment,2707 
and decreases overall costs of healthcare service delivery.2708,2709 Therefore, if practiced 
properly, IC and shared healthcare decision-making can become valuable tools in 
preventative medicine which is sorely needed in South Africa and other developing 
countries.  
 
Empirical bioethics have been defined as a form of research enterprise that integrates 
both normative ethical analyses with empirical research data to produce new knowledge 
that would not have been generated without a combination of both methodologies.2710 The 
ultimate goal of empirical inquiry is to improve the overall quality of healthcare. 2711,2712 In 
this role, Kon2713 has described four hierarchical categories of empirical bioethics, which 
can build on one another to assist in final ethical decision-making. These categories of 
empirical ethical enquiry are described as: (1) “lay of the land” studies which are usually 
overviews of current practices and the status quo; (2) “ideal versus reality studies”, which 
attempt to map out how well clinical practice matches normative ethical principles or ideas; 
(3) “improving care studies”, which focuses on how we can bring ethical ideals closer to 
match normative practice; and (4) “changing ethical norms” studies, which focus on how 
we can bring together data from various empirical studies to inform or change current 
ethical norms.2714 Other ethicists, such as Borry and others,2715 have described three 
possible roles for empirical research in bioethics. Firstly, it can assist in describing morally 
relevant facts; secondly, it can assist in the analysis of moral questions since empirical 
research possesses “the normative power of the factual”.2716 Thirdly, empirical research 
can assist in evaluating the decision-making process by pointing out unanticipated 
                                                          
2707  Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 229-331 see also Schenker et al 2007 J Gen Intern Med 294–299. 
2708 Kaplan 2004 Am J Prev Med 81‑83. 
2709  King and Moulton 2006 Am J Law Med 429‑501. 
2710  Mertz M et al “Research across the disciplines: a road map for quality criteria in empirical  ethics 
 research” 2014 BMC Med Ethics 17. 
2711  Emanuel The relevance of empirical research for bioethics 99-110. 
2712  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 42. 
2713  Kon AA “The role of empirical research in bioethics” 2009 AJOB 59-65. 
2714 Kon 2009 AJOB 59-62. 
2715 Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 41-53 see also Solomon MZ “Realizing bioethics’ 
 goals and practice: ten ways ‘is’ can help ought” 2005 Hast Cent Rep 40-47. 
2716  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 43. 
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conflicts, consequences or alternative outcomes.2717 It has been suggested by 
Maguire,2718 that ethical and moral questions should be based on a six point algorithm of, 
“what, why, how, who, where and when”.2719 Further it is argued that correctly responding 
to these six questions can resolve some ethical dilemmas or moral conflicts easily, while 
answering only a few of these questions would mean that whatever decision made would 
only be based on a partial reality.2720 Again, it has been proposed that ethics should not 
be merely content with describing facts, but should also engage on judgments about those 
facts to arrive at a right decision. Finally, decisions arrived at must always be subjected to 
further analysis and evaluation in the light of new evidence. Therefore, doctors and other 
HCPs as well as ethicists, should be willing to change or alter their positions in future 
based on the emergence of new facts or evidence.2721  
 
In view of the above observations, the current study was designed to ascertain whether 
IC as practiced by HCPs in public hospitals in South Africa, was consistent with the legal 
and ethical framework guiding IC, since description of the actual conduct of a group has 
been identified as one of the goals of empirical ethics.2722  
 
In addition, I wanted to ascertain the actual moral opinions of the people involved in the 
practice of IC in this setting, vis-a-vis, patients, doctors and nurses; by using a quantitative 
methodology including data triangulation to evaluate whether such practice is consistent 
with the expected norms, or if there are any variations or barriers to the actual practice of 
IC in this setting. The overarching idea is to make ethics more context-sensitive as well 
as evaluate the actual reasoning patterns of those involved IC practice in South African 
public hospitals. 
 
                                                          
2717  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 43. 
2718  Maguire D Death by choice (Doubleday & Co New York 1984) 66. 
2719  Maguire Death by choice 66. 
2720  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 41-53. 
2721  Borry et al 2004 Med Health Care Philos 41-53 see also Chima A primer in medical law 334-
 344. 
2722  De Vries and Gordijn 2009 Bioethics 193. 
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9.2 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW AND CURRENT SOUTH 
AFRICAN LEGISLATION 
 
Overall, this study reveals that the regulatory framework for IC practice in South Africa is 
robust, based on the legal requirements in the NHA,2723 and the principles laid down in 
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.2724 This is further supported by some common law 
judgments, especially the landmark judgment of a full bench of the Cape High Court in the 
Castell case,2725 which arguably adopted the ‘prudent patient’ and ‘material risks’ 
standards of information disclosure during IC into South African legal jurisprudence.2726 
Unfortunately, recent judgments by the SCA in the Oldwage case2727 and Sibisi NO v 
Maitin2728 appear to show the SCA vacillating between the reasonable doctor standard as 
applied in the case of Richter and another v Estate Hamman2729 and the prudent patient 
standard as established in the Castell case.2730 This thesis demonstrated that the 
approach adopted by the SCA in the Oldwage case2731 is in total contrast and in conflict 
with the judgment in Castell v De Greef.2732 According to some legal authorities, “the two 
judgments in the context of the liability of a doctor for failure to inform the patient are 
mutually destructive on the same facts and cannot co-exist in harmony.”2733 Furthermore, 
it has been argued that the provisions of the Constitution relating to the rights to bodily 
and psychological integrity, as well as the right  to security and control over one’s body, 
as stipulated in section 12(2) of the Constitution,2734 have not been fully addressed or 
implemented in the recent judgments by the SCA and other South African court 
judgments.2735,2736 In addition, the applicable legislative requirements as adumbrated in 
                                                          
2723  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2724  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
2725  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2726  Van Oosten 1995 De Jure 171-175 see also Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 
 681-694. 
2727  Louwrens v Oldwage [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C). 
2728  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156. 
2729  Richter v Estate Hammann 1976 (3) SA 226 (C). 
2730  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) [425-426]. 
2731  Louwrens v Oldwage [2004] 1 All SA 532 (C). 
2732  Castell v De Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C). 
2733  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational principles 686. 
2734 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
2735  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational principles 686 see also Britz and Roux-Kemp 2012 S Afr 
 Med J 746-748. 
2736  Zwart L “Sibisi NO v Maitin: A dual burden of proof?” June 2015 De Rebus 33. 
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sections 6 to 8 of the NHA2737 are not being implemented by South African courts.2738 As 
illustrated by court judgments in the Sibisi case,2739 and Pane v MEC Free State,2740 South 
African courts also appear to have introduced a secondary standard of proof in informed 
consent cases, which may now impose on aggrieved plaintiffs a dual burden,2741 whereby, 
a claimant or plaintiff needs to prove both negligence, as well as lack of informed consent, 
to succeed in informed consent cases. In both cases mentioned above, the plaintiffs lost 
their claims for damages regarding failure to obtain informed consent by doctors, when 
the courts concerned ruled that once the claimant is unable to prove negligence, then the 
claim for lack of informed consent automatically falls away or becomes moot.2742 This new 
standard of proof in informed consent cases is criticized by some legal scholars. 2743,2744 
In another questionably contradictory judgment, a full bench of the Cape High Court 
overruled the judgment of a high court judge in the case of McDonald v Wroe.2745 The 
court a quo had found on behalf of the plaintiff in this case, based on the fact that the 
dentist did not fully disclose the potential risks of undergoing a wisdom teeth extraction, 
especially by a general dentist rather than a specialist surgeon. The said risk materialized 
in the form of facial palsy due to injury to the inferior alveolar nerve, and the patient claimed 
damages for negligence and lack of informed consent by the dentist.2746 In its later 
judgment, the full bench of the High Court overturned this judgment basing its decision on 
direct causation, rather than the indirect causation or public policy interests as established 
by the English House of Lords in the case of Chester v Afshar.2747 This recent judgment 
                                                          
2737  National Health Act 2003. 
2738  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 686 see also Britz and Roux-Kemp 2012 S Afr 
 Med J 746-748. 
2739  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA 156. 
2740  Pane v MEC Free State Department of Health [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
2741  Zwart 2015 De Rebus 33. 
2742  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA156 [44-51] see also Pane v MEC Free State DOH 
 [2016] ZAFSHC 99 [23-25 and 45-50]. 
2743  Zwart 2015 De Rebus 33 see also Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African 
 medical law 26-35 and Klinck E “Law in  practice: Informed consent-Old rules in new formats?” 
 www.elsabeklinckassociates.co.za (Date of use: 29 October 2017) as well as Esterhuyse  
 www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/tax/medical-negligence (Date of use: 25 October 2017). 
2744  Hogan Lovells www.hoganlovells.com/publications/the-doctors-duty-to-inform (Date of use: 28 
 October 2017). 
2745  McDonald v Wroe [2006] 3 All SA 565 (C) [568]. 
2746  Ellis E “Dentist to pay damages after wisdom teeth op” 11 March 2006 http//: 
 www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa (Date of use: 5 November 2017) see also Baron 
 http//:www.deneysreitz.co.za/directors/Monique_baron.html (Date of use:  5 November 2017). 
2747  Chester v Afshar (2004]) 4 All ER 587 [596]. 
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has also been criticized for its failure to take the patients’ constitutional rights into 
consideration, 2748 as well as the informed consent regulations as stipulated in the 
NHA.2749  
 
In light of the above contradictory and conflicting judgments by South African courts, a 
need arises to re-evaluate the doctrine of informed consent by the constitutional court, 
based on public policy considerations, with a view to clearly define the standard of 
information disclosure to be followed by South African courts, in cases of failure to obtain 
valid informed consent. This needs to be done in the context of constitutional obligations 
to respect and enhance human dignity, as stipulated in section 10 of the Bill of Rights, as 
well as the individual’s rights to bodily and psychological integrity as stipulated in section 
12. 2750  In re-evaluating this standard, the court ought to take into consideration foreign 
law judgments, as provided for by section 39(1) (c) of the Constitution. 2751 Of particular 
interest would be the recent judgment of the UK Supreme Court, Scotland, in the case of 
Montgomery v Lanarkshire,2752 which thoroughly re-examined and accepted the prudent 
patient and material risks standard as the accepted standard of information disclosure, 
with regard to the legal doctrine of informed consent in English law, as well as all notable 
common law jurisdictions. Secondly, the Constitutional court ought to also re-evaluate the 
dual burden of proof currently imposed on claimants, by differentiating between the failure 
of a HCP to obtain valid informed consent as intentional wrongdoing, assault or iniuria, as 
distinct from the unintentional tort of negligence in informed consent cases, consistent 
with similar observations by other South African and international legal scholars.2753,2754 
 
 
 
                                                          
2748 Esterhuyse www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/tax/medical-negligence (Date of use: 25 October 
 2017). 
2749   National Health Act 2003 (S6-9). 
2750  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (s12). 
2751 The Constitution (s39) (1) c. 
2752  Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11 [87]. 
2753  Carstens and Pearmain Foundational Principles 681 see also Van Oosten 1989 M&L 443-
 456 [452] and Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law 26-35. 
2754   Jones Textbook on Torts 8th ed [507-511 and 527-528]. 
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9.3 CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Analysis of the responses by HCPs and patients in this study reveals that while many 
HCPs, especially doctors, appear conversant with the key elements of the IC doctrine, the 
implementation of this doctrine in clinical practice fell short of the expected standard.  
 
One can determine the level of knowledge and extent of implementation by reference to 
the original objectives of this study, which were to ascertain whether sufficient and 
comprehensive information was provided to patients prior to consent to medical treatment; 
whether patients actually understand the information provided by HCPs, including the 
risks and benefits of the treatment; whether patients giving IC generally have the capacity 
to consent to such treatment; and whether patients give consent or refusal to 
recommended treatment voluntarily without coercion, undue influence or manipulation; 
and finally, whether IC provided by patients undergoing medical treatment in South African 
public hospitals, is truly valid and consistent with current regulations. 
 
Information disclosure: In terms of information disclosure, while the majority of doctors 
and nurses reported disclosing elements such as diagnosis, benefits and risks of 
treatment, a lesser percentage of HCPs were not disclosing information about the 
patients’ rights of refusal, treatment options, and risks of refusing recommended 
treatment.  From the empirical data obtained, although the HCPs in this study claimed to 
have disclosed the latter requirements adequately; triangulation of results by comparison 
with patients’ responses, revealed that the HCPs responses were inconsistent with the 
actual reported patterns of disclosure by patients.2755 This poor implementation in practice 
with regard to IC appears consistent with previous studies from South Africa.2756 This 
observation of poor implementation of the IC doctrine in clinical practice is further 
corroborated by studies on IC practice by doctors from other countries in Africa such as 
Nigeria2757 and Gabon,2758 and more developed countries such as Spain2759 and the 
                                                          
2755  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 52-53. 
2756  Henley L et al 1995 SAMJ 1273-1278. 
2757  Ogundiran and Adebamowo 2010 J Med Ethics 741-745.  
2758  Sippel et al 2015 PLoS ONE e0132374. 
2759  Lopez PR “Informed consent in surgery-distance between theory and practice” 2013 C i r Esp 
 551-553. 
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USA.2760 From the patients’ perspective, however, most patients in this study reported 
being generally satisfied with the level of information disclosure, with over 90% responding 
positively.2761 However, this overwhelming response should be interpreted cautiously, 
since most patients may not be fully aware of the legal requirements for IC and the extent 
of patients’ rights to information disclosure, as stipulated by law. Further, studies from 
other countries also reveal that while patients may respond enthusiastically regarding the 
level of information disclosure during clinical practice, when challenged by questioning, 
most patients may not actually remember the details and nature of information 
disclosed.2762 
 
Comprehension of disclosed information: The major barrier to IC identified by this 
cohort of HCPs was due to ‘language barriers’, which were ranked as the number one 
challenge by both doctors and nurses. This was followed by ‘lack of education’, ‘workload 
and time constraints’, and ‘lack of administrative support, such as interpreters’.2763,2764 The 
findings from this study with regard to language as a barrier to IC has been reported by 
other authors from  South Africa,2765 as well as from other multilingual and multicultural 
societies such as the USA.2766, 2767Generally, because of such language barriers, several 
authors have suggested that nurses and other HCP have had to take on the additional 
role of interpretation for doctors as a form of ‘cultural brokerage’,2768,2769 which would 
further increase nurses’ workload, already complicated by large patient numbers. The 
issues of workload and time constraints were also major challenges reported by nurses 
and doctors from this study, as additional reasons for spending less time on the IC 
                                                          
2760   Bazemore N “Not all doctors get informed consent-Here's why it's hurting patients” 
 Forbes.com 
 LLC™http://www.forbes.com/sites/amino/2016/03/28/notalldoctorsgetinformedconsentheresw
 hyitshurtingpatients/print/ (Date of use: 6 April 2016). 
2761  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 53. 
2762  Burns P, Keogh I and Timon C “Informed consent: a patients’ perspective” 2005 J Laryngol 
 Otol 19-22. 
2763  Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [13]. 
2764 Chima Understanding and practice of informed consent by professional nurses in South Africa 97. 
2765  Schlemmer and Mash 2006 SAMJ 1084-1087. 
2766 Flores 2006 N Engl J Med 229-331. 
2767 Schenker et al 2007 J Gen Intern Med 294-299. 
2768  Shaibu 2007 Nurs Ethics 507. 
2769  Jezewski 1990 West J Nurs Res 497-513. 
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process.  One may conclude that the additional role of ‘nurse as interpreter’ and cultural 
broker imposed on nurses, may be associated with increased job attrition, lack of job 
satisfaction, and ‘burn-out’, especially amongst nurses, as previously reported from 
KwaZulu-Natal and other provinces in South Africa.2770,2771,2772,2773   
 
Additional enquiries from HCPs regarding methods used to enhance comprehension by 
patients yielded information that apart from interpreters, doctors also used audio-visual 
aids, such as diagrams and pictures as well as communicating with patients in English 
and their local language. Similarly, many nurses claimed to communicate with patients 
using the patient’s local language. However, these responses were not corroborated by 
patients, who said most of the communication from HCPs occurred verbally by means of 
English language.2774 However, despite these observations, the majority of patients 
(90%), said they understood the information provided by HCPs. Based on the above, one 
concluded that despite the limited information disclosed by HCPs to patients, the evidence 
suggests that this information was understood and comprehended by the patients. 
However, lack of appreciation of the information as previously discussed, could also be a 
hindrance to informed consent,2775 in this setting. 
 
Voluntariness of IC: In terms of voluntariness, most doctors in this study said they would 
be willing to allow patients to choose their own treatment amongst different options, while 
only 40% of nurses would agree to this. To further explore if HCPs were respecting 
patients voluntariness during healthcare decision-making, I asked HCPs if they used 
either implied or presumed consent during clinical practice. In this case, over 50% of 
doctors and nurses said they would use it when patients were admitted to the ward or 
                                                          
2770 Mmamma et al 2015 Curationis Art #1566 http://dx.doi. org/10.4102/curationis.v38i2.1566 
 (Date of use: 20 April 2016). 
2771  Khunou SH and Davhana- Maselesele M “Level of job satisfaction amongst nurses in the  North-
 West Province South Africa: Post occupational specific dispensation” 2016 Curationis Art  #1438 
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2772  Pillay 2009 Hum Resour for Health 7-15. 
2773  Zelnick and O'Donnell “The impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on hospital nurses in KwaZulu 
 Natal South Africa: Nurses' perspectives and implications for health policy 2005 JPHP 163-
 185. 
2774 Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 50-52. 
2775  Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law 17 see also Van Oosten 
 1989 LLD thesis 20. 
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showed up at the clinic. The majority of HCPs also admitted that they used implied or 
presumed consent mostly in emergency situations. During regular practice, however, 
about 60% of HCPS said they used it sometimes or rarely, while a minority said they used 
it all the time. On the other hand, when patients were asked if they made their decisions 
freely without coercion or undue pressure, the majority of patients, about 95%, answered 
affirmatively, with only a few claiming they sought assistance from surrogates. When 
asked if they could reject the treatment recommended by a doctor or HCP if they wanted 
to, the majority of patients said yes, but some said they only did as ordered by doctors: 
“The doctors tell you what needs to be done and you do it,” which shows that there are 
still elements of paternalism or ‘doctor knows best’ in local medical practice. Other patients 
reported that they were afraid to ask questions or reject the treatment provided even if 
they did not like it; to avoid losing the free treatment provided in public hospitals or 
because they did not have alternative means of obtaining healthcare. Based on this 
evidence, one can conclude that the IC provided in this setting was relatively voluntary, 
but this voluntariness was sometimes limited by the patient’s belief systems, poverty, 
indigence and vulnerability. However, the reported use of implied and presumed consent 
by HCPs, as well as the some patient’s unquestioning compliance with HCP instructions, 
means that there are still residual elements of medical paternalism, albeit ‘soft’ or ‘weak’ 
paternalism2776,2777 being practiced in this setting. 
 
Capacity to consent to treatment:  When HCPs were asked if they generally presumed 
that most patients had the capacity to consent to treatment, majority of HCPs answered 
affirmatively. However, some HCPs correctly identified that it depends on the patient’s 
level of consciousness among other considerations. Most HCPs were also able to 
correctly rank the criteria for establishing capacity in patients. Further, many were able to 
accurately identify some criteria for assessing patient capacity in difficult situations. 
However, when asked to identify the correct age of consent to treatment in South Africa, 
only 70% of doctors and 30% of nurses, could accurately identify the age of ‘12 years’ as 
correct age as stipulated by current law.2778 This indicates that while HCPs were aware of 
                                                          
2776 Weiss GB “Paternalism modernized” 1985 J Med Ethics 184-187. 
2777  Chima 2009 Trans J Coll Med S Afr 43. 
2778  Children’s Act 38 of 2005 as amended. 
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the clinical criteria for ascertaining patient consciousness and DMC capacity, many were 
deficient in their knowledge of the legal requirements relating to capacity to consent and 
IC. On the other hand, only 25% of patients were able to accurately identify the age of 
consent to treatment as 12 years. This percentage was closer to the 30% accuracy level 
reported by nurses, which implies that knowledge of this aspect of basic healthcare law 
by nurses was no different from the general population, probably indicative of inadequate 
training amongst this category of HCPs. 
 
Consent or authorization of treatment and voluntariness. The final element in the IC 
process is the authorization of treatment by patients after full information disclosure and 
comprehension. In terms of the methods for obtaining actual authorization of treatment 
from patients, a majority of HCPs claimed that IC was obtained in written format, which 
was inconsistent with the majority of patients in this study who reported that treatment 
authorization or consent was obtained verbally in most cases.2779 It must be noted, 
however, that valid consent can be provided either in writing or verbally, as long as the 
patient has the necessary capacity, and has understood the information disclosed.2780 
When patients were asked whether they were advised that they had the right to either 
accept or reject the recommended treatment, only 42% of patients said they were told 
they could accept or refuse the treatment. When asked if they felt threatened or were 
afraid to say ‘no’; 91% of patients said they did not feel threatened or afraid to say no. 
Patients who said they were afraid, said they did so because they did not want to lose the 
free treatment provided or be ignored by the HCPs.2781 When patients were asked if they 
were given any perverse incentive or persuaded to accept any particular treatment, the 
majority about 97% answered negatively. From these responses, one may conclude that 
the authorization of treatment by patients in this setting was generally free of undue 
influence and coercion, and substantially voluntary.  
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Time spent on IC: Most HCPs in this study spent about 5 to 10 minutes on the IC process, 
with the majority spending a total of 5 to 20 minutes on the IC process, or the entire clinical 
encounter as corroborated by patients. This amount of time is consistent with the reports 
from other parts of the world like USA, where the reports of the average time at a primary 
care visit was estimated at around 15 minutes.2782 This time duration is also consistent 
with the national PHC norms for time spent and workload for HCPs in South Africa.2783 
 
General knowledge of IC principles and medico-legal regulations: There was a 
statistically significant difference in knowledge of basic ethical and legal principles of IC 
between doctors and nurses; as well as between different categories of doctors, with 
specialist doctors, medical officers and general practitioners being more knowledgeable 
than trainee doctors (registrars and interns).2784 There was also a gap in knowledge of 
basic local laws among HCPs, with about 30% of doctors and 70% of nurses not being 
aware of the current legal age of consent to routine medical treatment in South Africa.2785 
Further, a majority of HCPs in this study did not know the unique legal position regarding 
the age of consent to TOP, as stipulated by the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 
in South Africa.2786 Furthermore, a majority of the patients reported that they were not 
coerced by HCPs or influenced by other surrogates, including family members, during the 
process of healthcare decision-making. These responses by patients are inconsistent with 
reports from other parts of Africa or other multicultural societies, where family and 
community involvement in healthcare decision-making are the norm.2787,2788,2789 However, 
this may suggests that most South African patients may be westernized in their approach 
to individual autonomy, or are more aware of patients’ rights due to wide dissemination of 
the Patients’ Rights Charter, as required by law in South African hospitals.2790  
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Patient-identified barriers to IC in this study, included poor communication skills by HCPs, 
especially with some patients claiming they were unable to ask questions because doctors 
were too fast, too aggressive, and needed to improve their communication skills. Other 
potential barriers revealed by this study was the problem of poverty and indigence, 
because many of the patients using South African public hospitals are unemployed2791 
and therefore may be considered vulnerable due lack of alternative means of obtaining 
healthcare consistent with certain criteria for vulnerability.2792,2793,2794   
 
General conclusions:  From the above, one may draw the following general conclusions 
from the empirical research study.  
 
This study confirms previous observations that doctors and nurses practising in South 
Africa were generally aware of the key elements of IC, but implementation in practice was 
inadequate. Secondly, HCPs were somewhat deficient in their knowledge of basic local 
laws. Further, there were real barriers in the practice of IC in this setting due to language 
difficulties and the absence of administrative support in the form of trained interpreters to 
assist with patient communication and this may interfere with the quality of healthcare 
service delivery. In addition, the current consent forms used in public hospitals were also 
considered inadequate by doctors.  
 
The study also confirms that the majority of patients using the public healthcare services 
were indigent and vulnerable due absence of alternative means of obtaining healthcare, 
poverty, and low educational levels. Therefore, patients’ rights may not be fully respected 
due to this vulnerability and the power asymmetry between HCPs, especially doctors and 
their patients. Thus, many HCPs in this study reported using implied and presumed 
consent, especially when patients showed up to the clinic or were admitted to clinical 
                                                          
2791  Chima 2015 Niger J Clin Pract 50-51. 
2792  Chima SC Contemporary ethical issues and regulation of biomedical research in Africa 19-38. 
2793  Chima A primer on medical law 169. 
2794  Kwazulu-Natal Strategic plan 2015-2019 (KZN DOH 2015) 15-22. 
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wards in public hospitals; indicating some residual practices of medical paternalism at 
public hospitals in EThekwini municipality, KZN province, South Africa. 
 
9.4 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 
The results from this study must be examined in the light of the fact that it was conducted 
in an urban metropolitan municipality in South Africa, with the possibility that patients in 
this region may be more educated and knowledgeable than those from the rural areas in 
South Africa, in terms of their knowledge and awareness regarding patients’ rights and 
IC. It is possible that a study from a more rural population group in KZN or elsewhere in 
South Africa may yield a different result. Further, there is also a possibility that because 
the study was located in a major city with teaching hospitals and potentially more 
knowledgeable HCPs, the HCPs examined may be more aware of the ethical and legal 
rules of IC, therefore studies from other cohorts of HCPs, either those practicing in rural 
areas or more cosmopolitan cities like Cape Town or Johannesburg, may yield a different 
result based on alternative responses. Further, as the number of medical doctors that 
participated in this study was limited to 168, it possible that a larger cohort might yield 
different outcome or results, although the fact that the HCPs included were from all the 
major clinical domains in public hospitals, with different training and professional 
backgrounds. For these reasons, it is more likely than not that the results obtained in this 
study are consistent with normal practice of IC by HCPs in South Africa.  
 
Finally, in conducting this study, I assumed that both HCPs and patients provided and 
accurate and truthful response to the questions asked. If this is not the case, then the 
results may not be factually accurate; however, the process of randomization applied in 
participant and hospital selection, and the voluntary and anonymous nature of the study, 
as well as the technique of triangulation, helped to ensure consistency and minimize bias 
in the empirical study reported here. Future studies may be directed at replicating the 
results from this study in a private practice setting, as well conducting more detailed 
comparative studies using either qualitative or quantitative methodology to further 
elucidate on the practice IC in South Africa. 
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9.5 CENTRAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the findings in from study I was able to arrive at the following central 
conclusions: 
 
I. Informed consent regulations as stipulated by domestic laws, regulations and 
ethical codes are generally consistent with international best practice and 
guidelines. However, analysis of case law from this study has revealed some 
inconsistencies and contradictory judgments by South African courts, which are not 
consistent with the current legislation regarding informed consent as stipulated in 
the National Health Act 2003.2795 Furthermore, such judgments appear to be at 
variance with constitutional provisions for bodily and psychological integrity in 
section 12(2) (b), as well the requirements for respect for human dignity as 
stipulated in section 10 of the Constitution.2796 Finally, comparative law from other 
common law jurisdictions seem to indicate that while South African courts are 
vacillating between the ‘reasonable doctor’ and the prudent patient’ standards of 
information disclosure with regards to informed consent, other comparable 
common law jurisdictions have firmly adopted and accepted the ‘prudent patient 
and material risks standards’ as the required standard in most common law 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, South African courts do not seem to heed the call to 
‘consider foreign law’, as stipulated by section 39(1) (c) of the Constitution.2797 
II. Informed consent as practiced in local public hospitals by HCPs is only partially 
compliant with the requirements stipulated by the National Health Act 2003. 
III. Knowledge of the South African legal framework relating to the practice of informed 
consent by HCPs is somewhat deficient, especially amongst professional nurses. 
IV. The main barriers to the informed consent process in the South African public 
hospitals was due to ‘language barriers’, followed by ‘lack of education’ by patients, 
excessive workload and time constraints on HCPs, coupled with ‘lack of 
administrative support’, such as interpreters. All of these factors arguably combine 
                                                          
2795  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2796  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 s12 (2) (b). 
2797  The Constitution s39 (1) c. 
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to interfere with the process of obtaining informed consent in the South African 
public hospitals, and may influence the healthcare professional-patient 
relationship, job satisfaction amongst HCPs, and the overall quality of healthcare 
service delivery.  
V. The current ‘consent forms’ used in local hospitals are inadequate and may need 
to be modified to comply with current standards of information disclosure relevant 
local laws, especially the information disclosure requirements as stipulated in 
section 6(1)(a)-(d) of the National Health Act.2798 
VI. Patients using public hospitals in South Africa may be considered vulnerable, 
consistent with WHO definition of vulnerability which includes poverty, poor 
education and lack of alternative means of obtaining healthcare.2799 
VII. Despite their vulnerability however, the majority of patients in this setting still want 
to be involved in decisions regarding their healthcare, exhibiting a preference for 
shared decision-making, rather than simple informed consent, and requesting 
better communication skills from HCPs. 
 
Based on the above conclusions from this research study, I was able to make the following 
recommendations regarding the understanding and practice of informed consent by 
HCPs, the need for continuing professional education on healthcare law and ethics for 
HCPs and patients in South Africa. 
 
9.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
1. One major recommendation arising from this study would be the need for 
establishment of a cadre of ‘professional interpreters’ cum patient advisors into 
local public healthcare services, to help improve the quality of HCP-patient 
communication and clinical practice in general. It also suggested that the 
introduction of this cadre of workers would generally improve the overall quality of 
                                                          
2798  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2799 UNAIDS International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights-Consolidated version 
 (UNAIDS Geneva 2006) 79-81 see also Chima A primer on medical law 169. 
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healthcare services, by reducing nurses’ and other HCWs workloads; who are 
generally required to act as impromptu interpreters and advisors as part of ‘cultural 
brokerage’ in public hospitals. One may speculate that the introduction of this cadre 
of interpreters/patient advisors into the local healthcare workforce, may assist in 
minimizing job attrition, by reducing HCPs ‘burn-out’ and increased job satisfaction, 
thereby improving treatment outcomes and the overall quality of healthcare service 
delivery in South African public hospitals. 
2. The second important recommendation would be continued professional 
development training for HCPs in the areas of medical law, bioethics and human 
rights, especially by introducing courses in bioethics and medical law into nursing 
schools curricula, where they do not currently exist. In addition, that these courses 
should be taught by appropriately trained HCPs with a professional background 
and specific training in medical law and ethics. This recommendation is consistent 
with previous recommendations by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) in 1996 which stated that: 
 
Training in human rights must be a fundamental and integral aspect of curricula for 
healthcare professionals. This training should address factors affecting human rights 
practice, such as knowledge, skills, attitudes, and ethical research practices. Knowledge of 
and competence and proficiency in the standards (both national and international) to which 
[health professionals] will be held accountable should be a requirement for qualification and 
registration.2800 
 
3. The third important recommendation in this report arises from analysis of current 
South African case law on informed consent cases. There is a need for a re-
evaluation of recent judgments by South African courts to eliminate contradictory 
and conflicting judgments by different courts, including the need to resolve the 
question of information disclosure standards in the light of current legislation and 
the principles laid down in the Constitution. There is also a need to resolve the 
question of the ‘dual burden’ of proof for plaintiffs in informed consent cases, as 
                                                          
2800  Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report “Institutional hearings: The health sector” (CTP 
 Book Printers Cape Town 1998)109-164. 
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well as a need to distinguish between intentional ‘wrongdoing’ or assault due to 
deliberate failure of a HCP to obtain informed consent in accordance with the 
guidelines stipulated in the National Health Act;2801 as opposed to unintentional 
‘negligence’ occurring during healthcare practice, whereby a plaintiff would need to 
prove all the required elements of clinical negligence in other to be awarded 
damages. It is suggested that a resolution of this question would be in accordance 
constitutional requirements to respect human dignity.2802 For example, in two 
recent cases by South African courts, discussed in this thesis, that is, Sibisi NO v 
Maitin2803 and Pane v MEC Free state,2804 both claimants were left without un-
indemnified and in a terrible position following loss of their claims due to inability to 
prove negligence. Such judgments are not consonant with spirit and intent of the 
human rights and dignity provision in the Constitution and related South African 
and international laws. 
4. The current ‘consent forms’ used in public hospitals in South Africa ought to be 
revised to comply with the information disclosure requirements adumbrated in the 
National Health Act. This may be done by adding a list of required questions or 
disclosures derived from section (6) (1) (a)-(d) of the National Health Act.2805 Such 
a list of questions has been elucidated in the questions used for ICAS2806 evaluation 
in this thesis. A similar “informed consent checklist” derived from the National 
Health Act has also been advocated by other legal scholars on informed consent 
in South Africa.2807 
5. There should ongoing publicity and general education of the populace regarding 
their rights to informed consent and other patients’ rights issues, as enshrined in 
South African law, especially the ‘rights and duties of healthcare users and 
providers’ as codified in chapter two of the National Health Act.2808 
                                                          
2801  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
2802  Section10 of the Bill of Rights and Constitution. 
2803  Sibisi NO v Maitin (311/13) [2014] ZASCA156. 
2804  Pane v MEC Free State DOH [2016] ZAFSHC 99. 
2805  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (S6).  
2806  ICAS (Informed Consent Aggregate Score) see Chima 2013 BMC Med Ethics S3 [11]. 
2807  Barit The doctrine of informed consent in South African medical law 69. 
2808  National Health Act 61 of 2003 (chapter 2). 
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6. HCPs ought be further educated in the areas of  enhanced communication skills to 
improve patient outcomes, preventive healthcare, and the need for shared and 
informed healthcare decision-making, as requested by patients in this study. 
7.  With regard to future research, the empirical aspect of this study is somewhat 
consistent with the four-fold typology and hierarchy of empirical ethics suggested 
by Alexander Kon.2809 This study conforms most closely to the “lay of the land” and 
“ideal versus reality” studies as postulated by Kon.2810 Therefore, future studies 
may be directed first, at comparative studies of IC in private hospitals in South 
Africa, to see if there are any significant differences in the practice of IC in the 
private healthcare setting when compared to the practice in public hospitals 
reported in this thesis. More detailed studies using qualitative or quantitative 
methodology could then explore IC practice in different hospital departments, 
clinics and units as well as studies in hospital wards, to see how nursing practices 
are actualized at the unit level. These latter studies will conform more to Kon’s 
“improving care” and “changing ethical norms in practice” aspects of empirical 
ethics.2811 All of these future studies will assist in improving the overall quality of 
informed consent and patient care, as well preventive services in South African 
hospitals and medical practice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2809  Kon AA “The role of empirical research in bioethics” 2009 AJOB 59-65. 
2810 Kon 2009 AJOB 60. 
2811  Kon 2009 AJOB 61-63. 
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Abstract 
Background:  
Informed consent is a legal and ethical doctrine derived from the principle of respect for 
autonomy. Generally two rights derived from autonomy are accorded legal protection. 
The constitutional right to bodily integrity followed by the right to bodily well-being, 
protected by professional negligence rules. Therefore healthcare professionals treating 
patients' without valid consent may be guilty of infringing patients' rights. Many 
challenges are experienced by doctors obtaining informed consent in complex 
multicultural societies like South Africa. These include different cultural ethos, 
multilingualism, poverty, education, unfamiliarity with libertarian rights based autonomy, 
and power asymmetry between doctors and patients. All of which could impact on the 
ability of doctors to obtain legally valid informed consent. 
Methods: 
The objective of this study was to evaluate whether the quality of informed consent 
obtained by doctors practicing in South Africa is consistent with international ethical 
standards and local regulations. Responses from 946 participants including doctors, 
nurses and patients was analyzed, using a semi-structured self-administered 
questionnaire and person triangulation in selected public hospitals in Durban, KwaZulu-
Natal, South Africa. 
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Results: 
The median age of 168 doctors participating was 30 years with 51% females, 28% 
interns, 16% medical officers, 26% registrars, 30% consultant/specialists. A broad range 
of clinical specialties were represented. Challenges to informed consent practice include 
language difficulties, lack of interpreters, workload, and time constraints. Doctors spent 
5-10 minutes on consent, disclosed most information required to patients, however 
knowledge of essential local laws was inadequate. Informed consent aggregate scores 
(ICAS) showed that interns/registrars scored lower than consultants/specialists. ICAS 
scores were statistically significant by specialty (p = 0.005), with radiologists and 
anaesthetists scoring lowest, while internists, GPs and obstetricians/gynaecologists 
scored highest. Comparative ICAS scores showed that professional nurses scored 
significantly lower than doctors (p ≤ 0.001). 
Conclusions: 
Keywords: Africa, Autonomy, Patients’ rights, Informed consent, Doctors, 
Empirical ethics, Nurses, Laws, Regulations 
 
Background 
Informed consent is a legal doctrine in medical practice, derived from the ethical 
principle of respect for autonomy. It has been argued that "prima facie, every competent 
adult has the right to decide whether to consent or refuse any medical treatment, even if 
such refusal could lead to death" [1]. However, this right to respect for autonomy is a 
rebuttable right, which could be overridden under certain conditions such as where there 
is temporary or permanent mental incapacity due to unconsciousness, infancy, or severe 
mental retardation [2]. Respect for autonomy in medical law and ethics refers to self-
determination or freedom of choice. This ethical principle that each person has a right to 
determine what can be done to his or her own body during medical treatment has found 
expression in many national health statutes and international ethical codes through the 
doctrine of informed consent. Autonomy itself has never been found to be a legally 
enforceable right; rather two other rights derived from the principle of respect for 
autonomy have been universally accorded legal protection. The first is the right to bodily 
integrity protected by legal rules against assault or battery. The second is the right to 
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bodily well-being, protected by professional negligence rules [2, 3]. Next to these is the 
right to liberty or the condition of being free [4]. A patient's right to autonomy and 
informed consent during medical treatment was popularized as a legal doctrine by 
Cardozo J in the Schloendorf case [5] where he opined that, "every human being of 
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body, and the surgeon who performs and operation without his patients consent 
commits and assault for which he is liable in damages". This opinion was later 
reaffirmed by the US Supreme Court in the Cruzan case [6] where the court stated that: 
 
No right is held more sacred or is more carefully guarded by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, 
free from all restraint or interference of another. 
 
Therefore a physician, who treats a patient without consent or exceeds the consent 
given by a patient, may be guilty of infringing the patient's right to bodily integrity and 
bodily well-being [7]. As summarized by Lord Goff in Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland [1]: 
 
The first point to make is that it is unlawful so as to constitute both the tort and crime of 
battery, to administer medical treatment to an adult who is conscious and of sound mind, 
without his consent...such a patient is completely at liberty to decline to undergo 
treatment, even if the result of his doing so will be that he will die. 
 
Informed consent as an ethical doctrine. 
 
The UNESCO International Bioethics Committee (IBC) report on consent argues that, 
'autonomy implies responsibility'. That the power to decide for one's self entails ipso 
facto acceptance of the consequences of one's actions, which can have far reaching 
consequences especially in matters of health [8]. Therefore, a person needs to be 
informed of the precise consequences of his/her choice, and this in turn leads one to 
consider the conditions under which consent is obtained. Respect for the autonomy of 
persons making decisions, while taking responsibility for those decisions, is closely 
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aligned to article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which holds 
that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed 
with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood [8, 9]. In view of the foregoing, it could be argued that the doctrine of 
informed consent has evolved into a rule of law that requires that no diagnostic or 
therapeutic procedure should be performed on a patient, without full disclosure of the 
risks of the procedure and any alternatives to it, prior to giving consent. 
 
The nature of informed consent 
Informed consent has been defined as an autonomous authorisation by individuals of a 
medical intervention [10,11]. Others have described a complementary view of informed 
consent as a conversation that follows specific rules [12]. Such a conversation, should 
ideally be initiated by the physician or healthcare professional and involves 
transparency, engagement by both parties, and continues throughout the period of 
healthcare intervention. This conversation may also require evidence that it occurred in 
the form of a witnessed signature, co-signed consent documents, or medical progress 
notes [12]. As a general rule, medical treatment should not proceed unless the doctor 
has first obtained the patient's consent which may be either express or implied. The 
consent given by a patient can be withdrawn at anytime [13] and could be vitiated by 
any change in circumstances, which are not communicated to and approved by the 
individual consenting. 
 
What makes consent valid? 
Generally, for consent to be considered valid or truly informed, five key requirements 
must be fulfilled [10, 11, 14]. These would be: 
(a) Information disclosure: provision of adequate information 
(b) Competence: capacity to understand that information 
(c) Voluntariness: decision making in the absence of coercion or deception  
(d) Comprehension: understanding of information provided 
(e) Consent: agreement to the proposed treatment or procedure 
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It has been argued that informing the patient must not be simply a ritual recitation of the 
contents of a written document. Rather the healthcare professional must try to convey 
the information, whether orally or in writing, in language that suits the individual's level of 
understanding [15]. The healthcare professional obtaining consent should bear in mind 
that the prospective subject's ability to understand the information necessary to give 
consent depends on that individual's maturity, intelligence, educational level, and belief 
system. It also depends on the clinician's ability and willingness to communicate with 
patience and sensitivity [16]. According to the US District Court of Appeal in Canterbury 
v. Spence [17]: 
 
The patient's right to self-determination can be effectively exercised only if the patient 
possesses enough information to enable intelligent choice...True consent to what 
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of choice and that entails an opportunity to 
evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon each. From 
these axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn the requirement, of a 
reasonable divulgence by the physician to the patient to make such a decision possible. 
 
It was further asserted in the case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford University that: "A 
physician may violate his duty to his patient and subject himself to liability if he withholds 
any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient 
to proposed treatment" [18]. Because of this potential for violation of patient's rights and 
dignity during the informed consent process, it has been suggested the quality of 
informed consent given by patients during various clinical encounters, should be 
scientifically investigated for validity, completeness, and consistency with established 
ethical and legal principles.[19, 20]. 
 
Informed consent in South Africa 
 
Informed consent before medical procedures is constitutionally protected right in South 
Africa. This was demonstrated in the case of Minister of Safety and Security v. 
Xaba [21]. Here the police wanted a court order to compel an accused person to 
undergo a surgical procedure in order to obtain a bullet to be used in evidence against 
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the accused. The Court refused this request; arguing that such and order would violate 
the defendant's constitutional rights to bodily and psychological integrity, including the 
right to security and control of one's body [22]. Patients consent, as a requirement for all 
lawful medical interventions, is a well-established principle in South African common law 
[23]. The earliest cases in this area were Stoffberg v. Elliot 1923 [24] and Esterhuizen v. 
Administrator Transvaal 1957 [25]. In the former case a patient whose member was 
wrongfully amputated due to penile cancer without informed consent, sued his doctors 
for damages in action for assault. While instructing the jury, Watermeyer J opined that: 
 
In the eyes of the law, every person has certain absolute rights, which the law protects. 
They are not dependent upon a statute or upon a contract, but they are rights to be 
respected, and one of those rights is the right of absolute security of the person....Any 
bodily interference with or restraint of a man's person which is not justified in law or 
excused by law, or consented to, is a wrong, and for that wrong the person whose body 
has been interfered with has a right to claim such damages as he can prove he has 
suffered owing to that interference. 
 
In the case of Esterhuizen v. Administrator Transvaal, a 10-year-old child diagnosed with 
Kaposi's sarcoma was initially treated with superficial radiation with her parents' consent. 
However, following recurrence of the tumour she was subjected to radical radiation 
therapy which resulted in severe burns necessitating amputation of her limbs. The Court 
held that while the superficial radiation was duly performed with appropriate consent 
from the parents, the latter procedure was performed without the informed consent of 
the child's guardians. The court rejected the defence arguments for implied consent 
based on the fact that her parents had previously consented to a similar treatment, as 
well as arguments that the treatment was in the child's best interest. Holding that 
because the radical treatment was vastly different from the prior superficial radiation, it 
was necessary that the child's parent should have been adequately informed of the 
dangers inherent in the new treatment, before such consent to be considered valid [25]. 
A more recent judgment in the case of Castell v. De Greef [26] by Ackerman J seems to 
have consolidated the doctrine of informed consent into South African jurisprudence. 
The consequences of the latter decision on South African medical law were that the 
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following principles have generally been adopted into the clinical practice of medicine 
locally [22, 27]: 
a shift from medical paternalism to patient autonomy 
a shift from the 'reasonable doctor' standard to the 'prudent patient' standard 
a shift in disclosure to the 'material risk' standard, where the level of disclosure required 
is what a reasonable patient would consider pertinent before making a decision 
 
It has been suggested that the Court appears to place the patients' informed consent 
within the framework of volenti non fit injuria or voluntary assumption of risk rather than 
delict [22, 27]. The National Health Act (NHA) promulgated in 2003 [28] codified the 
requirements for informed consent into South African law. Section 7 of this act stipulates 
that health services may not be provided to a healthcare user without the user's 
informed consent, unless "the user is unable to give informed consent and such consent 
is given by another person, mandated by the user in writing to grant consent on his or 
her behalf; or authorized to give such consent in terms of any law or court order; or 
where the user is unable to give informed consent and no person is mandated or 
authorized to give such consent" [22, 28]. The law further requires that every health care 
provider must inform a user of "the user's health status except in circumstances where 
there is substantial evidence that the disclosure of the user's health status would be 
contrary to the best interests of the user" [28]. Section 6 of the NHA stipulates that 
information disclosed to patients must include the following: 
 
(a)The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options generally available to the 
user. 
(b)The benefits, risks, and consequences generally associated with each option; and 
(c) The user's right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, 
obligations of such refusal [22, 28]. The NHA also requires that the health care providers 
must inform the user of this information in a language that the user understands and in a 
manner which takes into account the user's level of literacy [28]. 
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The potential impact of the socio-cultural milieu in South Africa on informed consent 
 
In South Africa about 25% of the population is unemployed, with a low labour force 
participation rate of 54% compared to a global average of 69% [29]. There are also 
historical inequities within population groups because of the legacy of apartheid [30, 31]. 
Therefore basic health care is unaffordable or out reach for most of the local population, 
therefore the majority still patronize traditional healers for healthcare services. It has 
been suggested that in this environment, the practice of informed consent is light years 
away for the majority of the black population [30]. Under such circumstances, any offer 
of medical assistance is often seen as better than nothing, thus encouraging undue 
influence, coercion and medical paternalism [30, 32]. There is a further dichotomy in the 
organization of the healthcare services in South Africa, which is dual in nature consisting 
of private hospitals or medical practice patronized by about 20% of the population who 
can afford health insurance or possess the financial means to pay for private healthcare. 
Meanwhile the public health services are patronized by the remaining 80% of indigent 
citizens [33]. This evident dichotomy in healthcare service delivery may also influence 
the practice of informed consent in South Africa. Furthermore, most African societies 
being culturally complex and paternalistic in nature may require that approval be 
obtained from community elders, extended family members, or men/husbands as heads 
of households, before the actual patients can provide consent [34]. One of the 
challenges in this environment is how to ensure that informed consent is truly voluntary 
and that community or surrogate consent is not substituted for individuals' consent [35]. 
The issues and considerations outlined above present challenges to ensuring that 
consent provided in clinical practice in African communities is informed, comprehensible 
and autonomous. For the purposes of this study I have focussed my investigation on 
evaluating the quality of informed consent practices by medical doctors in public 
hospitals in South Africa, while taking into consideration the various key elements of 
informed consent, such as information disclosure, competence, voluntariness and 
comprehension by patients. 
The benefits of using empirical methods to study informed consent 
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Sulmasy and Sugarman have described two potential reasons for studying the actual 
conduct of a group with regards to compliance with moral and ethical dilemmas. The first 
is to establish compliance with existing moral norms, and the second is to determine 
whether policies and procedures designed to operationalise certain moral norms have 
been successful [36]. In many countries including South Africa, current law requires that 
doctors must obtain informed consent from patients before involving them in medical 
treatment, where informed consent is defined as, "consent for the provision of a 
specified health service given by a person with legal capacity to do so and who has 
been informed as contemplated in section 6", NHA [22, 28]. However, empirical studies 
have shown that people generally have problems in understanding the risks and benefits 
of medical treatment and decision making, and this could impact on the actual 
application of existing laws [37]. For example, a previous study on Dutch nurses charged 
with taking care of nursing home residents with due consideration to patients’ rights and 
respect for autonomy, revealed that these nurses did not comply with existing 
regulations [38]. Based on such observations, it has been suggested that to guide 
action; ethical guidelines must be based in reality and should be formulated in such a 
way that they are continuous with accepted moral norms [39]. Further, it is has been 
suggested that empirical ethics should be used to defend or criticize concrete moral 
principles or practices rather than make general claims about moral concepts [40]. 
Consequently, in recent times, applied ethicists have shifted towards combining 
empirical, especially social scientific research methods with normative ethical analysis. 
Proponents of this approach to empirical ethics have argued that the study of people's 
actual moral beliefs, behaviour and reasoning should be the starting point of ethics. It is 
acknowledged that the methodologies of the social sciences, especially quantitative and 
qualitative research, using surveys, interviews and questionnaires is probably the best 
way to map the reality of peoples actual moral norms [41]. In view of the above I have 
used the methodology of empirical ethics, by means of a quantitative semi-structured 
questionnaire based survey and person triangulation [42, 43] to study the contemporary 
practice of informed consent amongst healthcare professionals and patients in KwaZulu-
Natal (KZN) province, South Africa. Here I report the result of findings from medical 
doctors practising in EThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban), KZN. 
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Methods 
 
Objectives of the study 
 
The general objective of this study was to evaluate the quality of informed consent 
obtained by doctors and nurses from patients attending public hospitals in South Africa. 
Specifically I wanted to establish whether sufficient information was provided to patients 
before consent is sought. To establish whether patients involved in clinical procedures 
understand the information given to them. To establish whether consent is obtained from 
patients is voluntary, and to confirm if the informed consent provided by patients 
attending public hospitals in South Africa is truly valid. 
 
Research design 
This study was a descriptive cross-sectional study in contemporary clinical practice 
settings. I also tried to apply the technique of triangulation [42, 43] by obtaining data 
from medical doctors, professional nurses, and patients simultaneously using separate 
semi-structured questionnaires. Questionnaires were distributed to participants in 
hospital clinics and wards in real-time during clinic hours. The real-time approach within 
the hospital environment allowed doctors, nurses and patients to describe their 
experience with the informed consent process as it is, thereby bringing out the required 
information. Three trained research assistants distributed and collected the 
questionnaires from healthcare professionals over a 3-month period from April to June 
2012. They also conducted patient interviews using the appropriate questionnaire. To 
increase the response rate repeated visits was sometimes necessary to collect 
completed questionnaires from doctors and nurses. 
 
Research instruments 
Data was collected using a self-administered semi-structured questionnaires for 
healthcare professionals (doctors and nurses), and face-to-face interviews for patients. 
Two different semi-structured questionnaires were applied to patients and healthcare 
professionals respectively. The questionnaire for healthcare professionals consisted of 4 
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sections. The first section collected information on participant demographics. The 
second section was used to gather information on informed consent practices, such as 
time spent on obtaining informed consent, patient workload, information disclosed to 
patients, language and methods used, understanding of information by patients, and 
challenges faced by healthcare professionals when obtaining informed consent. The 
third section dealt with generic questions on local laws and regulations on informed 
consent such as the legal age of consent and standards of information disclosure. The 
fourth section dealt with understanding and use of implied and presumed consent by 
doctors and nurses (Additional file 1). The questionnaire for healthcare professionals 
was informally evaluated by selected healthcare personnel and modified prior to 
distribution to participants. Questionnaires were distributed by hand to all participants. 
The study design and research instruments were evaluated and approved by a qualified 
biostatistician. 
 
Study location and sampling procedure 
The study was conducted in the outpatient clinics and wards at randomly selected public 
hospitals within EThekwini metropolitan municipality, KZN. EThekwini comprises a major 
urban city (Durban) surrounded by semi-urban areas (townships). The population of this 
area is approximately 3.2 million (2010 estimate) [44]. According to information from 
KZN department of Health, there are 17 public hospitals within this municipality ranging 
from tertiary to district hospitals [45]. Multi-stage stratified random sampling was used to 
select participating hospitals. The 17 hospitals identified were then arranged 
alphabetically for stratified sampling. It has been statistically estimated 30% of any 
population is adequate when conducting a descriptive study [46]. Purposive sampling 
was also used to include the two central tertiary hospitals within the municipality 
because they contain the largest number of medical doctors including specialists as well 
as professional nurses. The rest of the public hospitals within the municipality were 
randomly sampled. A total of 5 hospitals from Durban and one outlying hospital in 
nearby Pietermaritzburg with rotating surgical registrars from Durban were included in 
the study. Therefore a total of 6 provincial public hospitals were included in this study. 
Target population 
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Medical doctors, professional nurses and patients at selected public hospitals were 
randomly targeted to participate in this study. 
 
Inclusion criteria 
Almost all medical doctors, professional nurses and patients within the selected 
hospitals were eligible to participate in the study. 
 
Sample size 
Preliminary sample size for each group of study participants was calculated using a web 
based freely accessible sample size calculator, Raosoft® [47]. Based on the formula for 
sample size and margin of error from Raosoft, the estimated sample size for each 
category of participants was for the recruitment of 360 medical practitioners; 373 
professional nurses and 385 patients. Giving a total estimated sample size of 1118 
participants. Available data on healthcare personnel indicated that that there were about 
5670 medical doctors and 24360 professional nurses registered in KZN in 2010, 
although there are disagreements on the total number of doctors practicing within South 
Africa and its provinces with high mobility and vacancy rates [33, 48]. Due to the fact 
that hospitals within the municipality serve as institutions for training of doctors and 
nurses, there is a constant rotation of medical personnel throughout the district and the 
province, and since the results were to be extrapolated to the practice of doctors 
generally in South Africa, I based my initial estimates on the total number of doctors and 
nurses practicing within KZN province as obtained from health personnel statistics [49]. 
Overall, because of the low numbers of health personnel, there was minimal difference 
in estimated sample size regardless of whether sample calculations were based on 
healthcare professionals within the municipality, practicing in the public sector, or within 
the province [47, 49]. 
 
Data analysis and statistical methods 
Data from the questionnaires were captured directly into statistical package for social 
sciences (SPSS) by a research assistant. The captured data was then checked for 
completeness and accuracy by the PI (SCC) and a qualified biostatistician. Data was 
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later analyzed using SPSS (version 21) [50]. Descriptive statistics such as proportions, 
median, mode and interquartile range were used to summarize the data. Scores for 
comprehension, understanding, information disclosure, voluntariness and informed 
consent aggregate scores were worked out from the responses. The Mann-Whitney test 
was used to examine the difference in scores between different categories of healthcare 
professionals in public hospitals. Kruskal-Wallis test was used to examine the 
relationship between area of specialization and scores, and occupational rank and 
scores. Chi-square or Fisher's exact tests were used to test for association between 
categorical variables in the study. 
 
Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was obtained from a sub-committee of University of South Africa 
(UNISA) Research Ethics Committee. The study including the biostatistics methodology 
was also reviewed and approved by the health research and knowledge management 
sub-component of the KZN Department of Health. Approval was also obtained from the 
CEOs or medical managers of each of the randomly selected hospitals included in the 
study. Finally, written informed consent was obtained from each participant after full 
information disclosure prior to participation in the study. 
 
Results 
Demographic characteristics of participating doctors are as shown in Table 1. There was 
a broad representation of all clinical specialties with participating doctors from all major 
clinical specialties (Table 1). The overall response rate for this study was 85%, with a 
total of 946 respondents including doctors, nurses and patients, out of an initial estimate 
of 1118 participants. After a critical review of captured data a total of 19 participants 
were excluded due to ineligibility. Therefore a total of 927 individuals were finally 
included in the study, comprising 168 doctors, 355 professional nurses and 404 patients. 
Here I report the results of doctor's responses to the questionnaires on the quality of 
informed consent. The response rate for doctors was 47% of initial estimates. The 
cohort of participating doctors was then regrouped into 8 major clinical disciplines or 
specialities for further analysis (Figure 1). The average number of patients seen by 
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doctors in this cohort ranged from 1 to 120 patients/day (median = 20 patients/day). The 
majority of doctors spent about 5 to 10 minutes providing information to patients prior to 
treatment decision (Figure 2). When asked whether the amount of time was sufficient, 
55.4% of doctors answered 'yes' (Table 2). Those who thought the time spent was 
inadequate gave various reasons including language barriers and uneducated patients 
requiring more time for explanations. Others complained of time constraints, 
administrative responsibilities and large patient numbers being factors militating against 
spending more time explaining procedures in order to obtain valid informed consent 
from patients (Table 3). While others explained that the time spent depends on the 
procedure. Some stated that the time spent was "definitely inadequate" with comments 
like "in an ideal world, patients [should be] counselled for at least 30 minutes with 
enough time for questions and clarifications". 
 
Table 1 Participant demographics 
Doctor characteristics   Valid percent (%) 
AGE     
Median 30 years   
Range 22-77 years   
Gender     
Male 78 49.1 
Female 81 50.9 
Missing data 9 - 
Occupational Ranks     
Interns 47 28 
Registrars 44 26.2 
Medical Officers (MO) 26 15.5 
Consultant/Specialists 51 30.4 
571 
 
Doctor characteristics   Valid percent (%) 
Total 168 100 
Clinical disciplines/ sub-disciplines     
Paediatrics 42 25 
Obstetrics and Gynaecology 18 10.7 
Internal Medicine 23 13.7 
General Surgery 13 7.7 
Urology 11 6.5 
General Practice (GP) 11 6.5 
Orthopaedic s 8 4.8 
Dermatology 5 3 
Radiology 5 3 
Anaesthetics 4 2.4 
Cardiology 2 1.2 
Gastroenterology 2 1.2 
HIV Medicine 1 0.6 
Emergency Medicine 1 0.6 
Maxillofacial Surgery 1 0.6 
Neurology 1 0.6 
Neonatology 1 0.6 
Oncology 1 0.6 
Medical management 1 0.6 
Practice location     
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Doctor characteristics   Valid percent (%) 
Public 166 99.4 
Private 1 0.6 
Missing data 1 - 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Participating doctors by clinical sub-discipline or specialty. 
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Figure 2 Time spent by doctors on giving information to patients. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Information given to patients by doctors prior to obtaining consent 
Information disclosed to patients Yes (%) No (%) 
Don't know 
(%) 
Diagnosis 
162 
(96.4) 
6 (3.6) - 
Treatment options 136 (81) 32 (19) - 
Recommended treatment 
149 
(88.7) 
19 
(11.3) 
- 
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Information disclosed to patients Yes (%) No (%) 
Don't know 
(%) 
Risk of refusing recommended treatment 
140 
(88.3) 
28 
(16.7) 
  
Cost of medical treatment 
20 
(11.9) 
148 
(88.1) 
  
Information on general risks 
147 
(87.5) 
21 
(12.5) 
  
Information on benefits 
150 
(89.3) 
18 
(10.7) 
  
Information on right of refusal 
109 
(64.9) 
59 
(35.1) 
  
Probing questions       
Do you think the information you provide is 
sufficient? 
121 (72) 
27 
(16.1) 
19 (11.4) 
Do you think this amount of time spent is 
sufficient? 
93 
(55.4) 
66 
(39.3) 
9 (5.4) 
Do you think the hospital consent form is 
adequate? 
105 
(62.5) 
51 
(30.4) 
12 (7.1) 
 
 
 
Table 3 Major challenges to obtaining informed consent by doctors 
Challenges Median score P-value 
Lack of admin. support e.g. interpreters 4 0.013 
Time constraints 2 0.226 
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Challenges Median score P-value 
Work load 3 0.110 
Lack of education 4 0.915 
Cultural barriers 5 0.551 
Language barriers 2 0.453 
Medical paternalism (doctor knows best) 7 0.300 
Notes: (a) Challenges were ranked from 1-7, with 1 being most difficult and 7 being least difficult, median 
scores are reported here. (b) Tests of statistical significance across all clinical disciplines were done using 
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent samples, significance level is P = 0.05 
 
Information given to patients before obtaining consent 
When asked about what types of information was generally disclosed to patients prior to 
obtaining consent. The majority of doctors provided information on 'diagnosis' (96.4%), 
89.3% provided information on the 'benefits of treatment', 81% provided information on 
'treatment options', 88.7% recommended a specific treatment. About 83.3% gave 
information on 'risk of refusing treatment', while 64.9% advised patients on 'the right of 
refusal'. Only 11.9% of doctors provided information on the 'cost of treatment' (Table 2). 
When asked specifically whether they explained the benefits of the procedure to a 
patient, 97% of doctors answered affirmatively, while 95% explained the risk of the 
procedure to patients (Table 4). When doctors were asked whether they thought the 
amount of information provided to patients was sufficient for valid informed consent, 
72.5% answered 'yes', 16.1% answered 'no'; while 11.4% answered 'don't know'. 
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Table 4 Nature of risks disclosed to patients 
Types of risks disclosed Yes (%) No (%) 
Don't know 
(%) 
Most serious risks 
144 
(85.7) 
18 
(10.7) 
2 (1.2) 
Most common risks 
152 
(92.1) 
13 (7.9) - 
All material risks 
35 
(21.2) 
117 
(70.9) 
13 (7.9) 
Do you explain risks of the procedure to 
patients? 
158 
(94.6) 
8 (4.8) 1 (0.6) 
Do you explain benefits of the procedure to 
patients? 
162 (97) 4 (2.4) (0.6) 
 
Hospital consent forms 
When asked whether the current consent form used to obtain informed consent from 
patients is adequate, 62.5% (105) doctors thought it was adequate, while 30.4% (51) 
answered 'no' and 7.1% (12) answered 'don't know'. When asked to explain why the 
current universal consent forms used in public hospitals was inadequate, many doctors 
complained that the current form does not give opportunity to detail specific 
complications because different clinical conditions may require different mandatory 
disclosures. Some suggested that the consent forms should contain tick-boxes for more 
detailed information disclosure. Others complained that the current form does not take 
into account "privacy, language and cultural values". For example the form is "done 
briefly in a language not the patients first language (sometimes cannot get an 
interpreter), so we take for granted the patients understands when he/she says yes to 
everything". Others complained that the form contains "no binding space that consent 
was given or alternatives discussed" or that it was "not specific to minors; when guardian 
577 
 
details must be recorded". Others concluded that the current form has not "not kept up 
with current progress in medico-legal teaching". 
 
Nature of risks disclosed to patients 
Information about specific risks of each procedure was provided to patients by about 
95% of doctors. When asked what types of risks were disclosed to patients? About 92% 
of doctors said they disclosed the 'most common risks', 86% disclosed 'the most serious 
risks', while only 21% disclosed 'all material risks' to patients (Table 4). Chi-squared 
tests were used to test for statistical significance on the types and nature of information 
disclosed to patients across different clinical specialties. Information on disclosure of 
'clinical diagnosis' was statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001), with radiologists least likely to 
give patients information on diagnosis. Similarly there was statistical difference in 
disclosure of information on 'recommended treatment' (p = 0.002), with anaesthetists 
and radiologists least likely to recommend treatment to patients. Finally information 
disclosure on 'treatment options" was also statistically significant across different 
specialities (p = 0.004), with 60% of radiologists, 50% of anaesthetists and 32.6% of 
paediatricians least likely to discuss treatment options with their patients. All other 
categories of information disclosed were not statistically significant across different 
clinical specialties (Table 2). 
 
Methods used to obtain consent from patients 
When asked how patients normally provide consent for clinical procedures. About 6.7% 
of doctors said 'verbally', 50.9% answered 'written', 34.5% said both verbally and written, 
while 7.9% answered 'it depends'. Doctors who answered 'it depends' gave various 
reasons for obtaining consent using different formats. Most stated that it depends on the 
type of procedure. Others said it depends if it is an 'emergency' or if the patient is 
unconscious or a minor. Others obtained telephonic consent when parent/guardian was 
not available, while others said sometimes the hospital superintendent would give the 
necessary consent in an emergency. Some doctors said it depends if written consent is 
required by law. There was no statistical difference across specialities or occupational 
ranks in methods of obtaining consent (p = 0.587). 
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Comprehension/understanding of information disclosed 
To examine the extent of patients understanding of informed disclosed by doctors, we 
asked questions about the language and methods used to obtain informed consent from 
patients. When communicating with patients, 64.3% (108) doctors used 'English 
language', 44.6% (75) used the 'patients' local language', while 69% (116) doctors said 
they used 'both English and the patients local language'. To enhance or facilitate 
understanding of information disclosed to patients, 96.4% (162) doctors used 'words' or 
communicated verbally, 20.2% (34) used 'pictures', 41.7% (70) used 'diagrams', while 
72% (121) used 'interpreters' to communicate with patients. When doctors were asked if 
they think patients understood the information given to them; 76.4% (126) answered 
'yes'; 3.6% (6) answered 'no'; 12.7% (21) answered 'don't know', while 7.3% (12) said 
they 'didn't think so'. 
 
Competence or capacity to give informed consent 
When asked whether they generally presumed that patients had the capacity to consent 
to treatment, 67.3% (113) doctors answered 'yes', 31% (52) answered 'no', while 1.8% 
(3) answered 'don't know'. When asked whether they routinely assessed a patient's 
capacity to give consent to treatment, 58.9% (99) doctors answered 'yes', 37.5% (63) 
answered 'no'; while 3.6% (6) said they 'don't know'. When asked to rank the most 
important factors in assessing patients' capacity, 73% (123) doctors ranked 'level of 
consciousness' first, 74% (125) ranked 'age' second; 72.6% (122) ranked 'educational 
level' third, 65.5% (110) ranked 'appearance, fourth while 66.67% (112) ranked 'sex' of 
the patient last in terms of importance. 
 
 
 
Methods used to assess capacity 
When asked to rank methods used in assessing patients' capacity when confronted with 
difficult cases, 72.6% (122) doctors ranked 'mental status examination' first, 70.8% (119) 
ranked 'psychiatric consultation' second, 66.1% (111) and 58.9% (99) doctors ranked 
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'ethics consultation' and 'use of surrogates' equally third respectively, while 'court 
adjudication' was ranked fourth by 62.5% (105) doctors. About 28.6% (48) of doctors 
said they would use 'none of the above' methods. When asked to specify what method 
they routinely used in assessing patients capacity when dealing with difficult cases, 
majority of doctors said they used a mini- mental status exam (MMSE), followed by level 
of consciousness or orientation in time place and person, and the Glasgow coma scale 
(GCS) in difficult cases. Others said they would involve parents/guardians especially in 
paediatric cases, while some said they would use other surrogates such as a social 
worker/psychologist, family members or the hospital superintendent. There was no 
significant difference across clinical specialties in terms of 'presumption of capacity' (p = 
0. 110) or routine assessment of capacity (p = 0.698). 
 
Consent in emergency situations 
When doctors were asked whether they obtained consent in emergency cases, 54.2% 
(90) doctors answered 'yes', 19.9% (33) answered 'no', 24.1% (40), said 'it depends', 
while 1.8% (3) said they 'don't know'. Doctors who answered 'it depends' gave various 
reasons for not obtaining consent in emergency cases, including level of consciousness 
or mental status of the patient, availability of parent or guardian to serve as surrogate. 
Others said if the patient was in a stable condition and able to comprehend, then they 
would obtain consent. Others said if patient is incapacitated, then proxy consent is 
obtained from the consultant or medical superintendent of the hospital. Others indicated 
that it depends on the procedure and whether it was a life threatening situation. 
 
Voluntariness and consent to treatment 
When doctors were asked whether they would 'allow patients to choose a medical 
procedure or treatment', 53% (88) doctors answered 'yes', 44.6% (74) said 'no', while 
2.4% (4) answered 'don't know'. To further explore whether doctors allowed their 
patients to exercise choice or act on their own free will during clinical encounters, 
doctors were asked about their understanding and use of implied and presumed consent 
in practice. 
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Implied or presumed consent practices 
When doctors were asked whether they ever used implied or presumed consent when 
treating patients, 53% of doctors said 'yes', while 47% answered 'no'. More doctors said 
they used implied consent in an emergency rather than in the than in the hospital wards 
or clinics (Table 5). When asked how often they used implied or presumed consent in 
practice, about 39% of doctors used implied or presumed consent sometimes or 
occasionally, while 26% used it on rare occasions. Only about11% used it all of the time, 
while 24% said they never used it at all (Figure3). About 66% of doctors also said they 
obtained specific consent for certain procedures, especially for minor and major surgical 
procedures or blood transfusions (Table 5). The issues surrounding voluntariness and 
consent to treatment will be evaluated further from the point of view of patients, when 
patients' data are analysed. 
 
 
 
 
                                           Figure 3 Use of implied or presumed consent by doctors. 
 
 
Table 5 Use of implied or presumed consent in clinical practice 
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Implied/presumed consent Yes (%) No (%) 
Don't know 
(%) 
Do you ever use implied/presumed 
consent in practice? 
80/168 (53) 71/168(47%)   
When do you use implied/presumed 
consent: 
      
   1. When patients' present at the 
clinic? 
49/168 (34) 95/168 (66) 1/168 (1) 
   2. When patients are admitted to 
the ward? 
45/168 (31) 98/168 (68) 1/168 (1)) 
   3. In an emergency? 69/168 (48) 73/168 (50) 3/168 (2 
How often do you use implied/presumed 
consent? 
      
Some of the time or occasionally 
53/168 
(38.7) 
    
Seldom or rarely 36/168(26.3)     
All of the time 
15/168 
(10.9) 
    
Never 
33/168 
(24.1) 
    
Do you obtain consent for other specific 
procedures? 
95/168 (66) 49/168 (34)   
    
 
 
 
Major challenges to obtaining informed consent 
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Doctors were asked to rank a series of potential challenges experienced while obtaining 
informed consent in practice, on a seven point scale of 1-7, with 1 being most difficult 
and 7 as least difficult (Table 3). The major challenges identified by doctors in this 
setting included 'language difficulties', ranked highest by 87.5% of doctors, 'time 
constraints' ranked second by 86.9% doctors, followed by 'work load' 85%, lack of 
education 84.5%, and lack of administrative support e.g. interpreters' 82% of doctors. 
The least important constraints identified were 'cultural barriers', by 79.8%, 
while medical paternalism (doctor knows best)' was ranked last by 78% of doctors 
(Figure 4). Cultural barriers identified by doctors included religious beliefs such as 
Jehovah's witnesses or cultural abhorrence of organ transplantation, amputations and 
blood transfusions. The need to obtain approval from husbands or family members prior 
to giving consent, preference for traditional healers, cultural taboos, and 'disempowered 
caregivers' according to one respondent. A test of statistical significance using the 
Kruskal-Wallis test for independent variables, showed that the 'lack of administrative 
support e.g. interpreters' was statistically significant across all clinical specialities (p = 
0.013) (Table 3). 
 
 
Figure 4 Challenges to obtaining informed consent by doctors. 
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General knowledge of basic informed consent laws and regulations 
 
To test for general know of informed consent laws and regulations in South Africa, 
doctors were asked some specific questions. When asked to select the current age of 
consent to routine treatment in South Africa, only 70.7% of doctors were able to correctly 
answer '12 years'. This question was answered wrongly by many doctors with 10.8% 
saying '15 years', 15.3% answered '18 years'; 1.9% answered '21 years', while 1.3% did 
not know. Further, when asked to select the correct age when women can consent to 
termination of pregnancy (TOP) in accordance with South African law, only 29.6% of 
doctors correctly answered 'any age'. Majority gave the wrong answer with 50.9% 
choosing '12 years', 13.2% chose '15 years', 3.8% chose '18 years', while about 2.5% 
did not know the correct age. Chi-squared tests were used to test for statistical 
significance in terms of general knowledge of informed consent laws and regulations 
across all specialities. There was no statistical significance detected in terms of age of 
consent, age for women to request for TOP, or standards of information disclosure. 
 
Responsibility for obtaining consent 
When asked whose responsibility it was to assure that adequate information was 
provided before informed consent, only 61.7% (100) doctors thought it was the 'doctor or 
healthcare professional's responsibility'. About, 41% (66) answered that 'both the doctor 
and patient were jointly responsible', while 5% (8) thought it was 'the patient's 
responsibility'. 
 
Standards for information disclosure 
When asked whether the current standards for information disclosure were based on a 
'reasonable doctor' or 'prudent patient standard'. Most doctors, 60.2% (97) answered 
that was based on a 'reasonable doctor standard', while 47.8% (76) correctly 
answered 'prudent patient standard'. When asked whose duty it was to obtain consent 
from patients in practice, 66.3% (110) doctors correctly answered that it was 
responsibility of the 'doctor performing the procedure or treating the patient'. About 6.1% 
(10) doctors said 'nurses', were responsible, 44.6% (74) said 'junior doctors' were 
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responsible, while 10.8% (18) thought it was the responsibility of 'any available 
healthcare professional', 3.6% (6) doctors did not know. 
 
Informed consent aggregate scores (ICAS) 
To compare informed consent practices across occupational ranks of doctors and 
nurses, as well as between clinical specialties. I developed an aggregate score using a 
modified version of the method described by Sugarman and others [51]. While the 
previous authors used a series of seven questions derived from a brief informed consent 
evaluation protocol (BICEP) during research studies [51]. Here I have selected a series 
of questions from the questionnaire which relate to information disclosure, voluntariness, 
assessment of capacity and understanding or comprehension (Table 6). A total of twelve 
questions from the questionnaire were adjudged to satisfy these criteria. Each of the 
selected questions was given a rank score of one (1) and the aggregate score is the 
sum of the scores (12) (Table 6). ICAS aggregate scores for all doctors by occupational 
rank ranged from 1 to 12, with a median score of 10 (SD = 2.28). The lowest scores 
were recorded by interns and registrars with a median score of 9, while medical officers 
and consultants/specialists recorded a median score of 10 respectively (Figure 5). Tests 
of statistical significance for ICAS scores by occupational rank of doctors was not 
statistically significant (p = 0.174). However, comparison of ICAS scores by clinical 
speciality using the Kruskal-Wallis test was statistically significant (p = 0.005). In this 
case anaesthetists and radiologists had the lowest ICAS scores with a median score of 
7 and 8, respectively, while the highest scores were obtained by OBGYN, Internal 
medicine and GP doctors with a median score of 10.50 (Figure 6). Finally when the 
ICAS scores of doctors was compared with that of professional nurses. Scores by 
professional nurses was lower than that of doctors with a median score of 8, while the 
median score for doctors was 10. The difference in scores between doctors and nurses 
was highly statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001), using the Mann-Whitney U test for 
independent samples at a significance level of 0.05. 
 
Table 6 Questions used to calculate ICAS 
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A. Information disclosure: 
ICAS 
Score 
What information do you routinely provide to your patients?     
  Yes No 
Diagnosis 1 0 
Treatment options 1 0 
Recommended treatment 1 0 
Risks of refusing recommended treatment 1 0 
General risks 1 0 
Benefits 1 0 
Right of refusal 1 0 
B. Capacity/Competence     
Do you routinely assess the competence of your patients to consent to 
treatment? 
1 0 
Do you generally presume that your patients have the capacity to consent to 
treatment? 
1 0 
C. Voluntariness     
Do you allow your patients to choose a procedure or particular treatment? 1 0 
D. Understanding     
Do you think your patients understand the explanations given to them? 1 0 
E. Consent or agreement     
Do you think the information you provide is sufficient to procure valid informed 
consent? 
1 0 
Total: Informed consent aggregate score (ICAS) 12 0 
Note: The question about cost of medical treatment is excluded from this ICAS calculation in this cohort 
because the cost of healthcare services public in hospitals is free 
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Figure 5 ICAS of doctors by occupational rank. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 ICAS scores of doctors by clinical sub-discipline or specialty. 
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Discussion 
Most studies evaluating the quality of informed consent especially in developing 
countries have focused on informed consent practices in clinical research. These include 
previous studies from Nigeria [52], Uganda [53], South Africa [54] and Mali [55]. Most of 
these studies reported problems with comprehension and understanding of the informed 
consent process by patients including the right of withdrawal [52, 53, 54, 55]. Other 
studies from developed countries have contended with problems of subject's therapeutic 
misconception, voluntariness and measurement of capacity to consent during 
biomedical research and clinical trials [51, 56, 57, 58]. While many studies on informed 
consent have focused on clinical trials and biomedical research, very few studies have 
actually looked at the quality of informed consent in clinical practice, especially in Africa 
[59, 60, 61]. The paucity of studies in the area of clinical practice is surprising 
considering that patients or individuals are more likely to seek treatment for routine 
medical care than be involved in biomedical research. Nonetheless most of the studies 
from developing country settings have highlighted the need for more education in 
biomedical ethics for researchers, healthcare practitioners, as well as patients or human 
subjects of biomedical research [52, 53, 54, 55]. Some studies have identified the need 
to improve the quality of informed consent documents, including the need for simplified 
language to enhance participant understanding [62]. Others have highlighted the 
different notions of informed consent such as the moral and legal dimensions of consent 
which have the potential to impact on the quality and practice of informed consent, 
including information disclosure, understanding and shared decision making [63]. 
Standards of information disclosure 
One of the more controversial areas of informed consent in practice has hovered around 
the amount of information disclosure required before consent can be considered valid. 
On this consideration there are two contesting schools of thought. One is the 
'reasonable doctor standard' based on English common law as outlined by McNair J 
in Bolam v Friern HMC [64] generally known as the Bolam test, which states that: "A 
doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with the practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of men skilled in that particular art...". It has 
been argued that English courts have opted for a paternalistic approach by following the 
588 
 
reasonable doctor standard which bases disclosure on the clinical judgement or 
accepted practice or substantial risk/normal/usual risk principles as established 
in Bolam [22, 23] and reaffirmed by the House of Lords in the case of Sidaway case 
where Lord Templeman argued that [65]: 
"At the end of the day, the doctor bearing in mind the best interests of the patient and 
bearing in mind the patients right to information which will enable the patient to make a 
balanced judgement, must decide what information should be given to the patient, and 
what terms that information should be couched..." 
However, Lord Scarman in the same case suggested the use of a 'prudent patient 
standard' arguing that: " It was a strange conclusion if our courts should be led to 
conclude that our law...should permit doctors to determine in what circumstances...a 
duty arose to warn." [65]. The Courts in North America, have maintained in cases such 
as Canterbury v Spence [17] and Reibl v Hughes [66] that a patient must be informed of 
all material risks, where those 'material risks' would consist of what a reasonable person, 
in such a patients position, would be likely to attach significance to, in deciding whether 
to accept or forego a proposed treatment. In South African case law the issue of how 
much information should be disclosed to patients has been the subject of debate 
since Lymberg v Elliot [67] where the Court was of the opinion that a 'doctor is not 
obliged to disclose all the conceivable complications that may arise during a medical 
procedure.' However in Castell v De Greef the Court concluded, that a doctor is obliged 
to warn the patient of all the 'material risks' inherent in the proposed treatment. Where 
material risks is based on a 'prudent patient standard' [26]. Therefore the current 
requirements for information disclosure in South Africa are consistent with the practice in 
North America as outlined in section 6 of the NHA [28]. These requirements reaffirm the 
need for disclosure of all material risks with few exceptions. In the current study, the 
results show that while the majority of South African doctors complied substantially with 
the requirements of the NHA in terms of information disclosure (Table 2), only about 
21% of doctors complied with the 'material risks' standard in terms of risk disclosure 
(Table 4). Further, a majority of doctors (60%) chose the 'reasonable doctor' rather than 
the 'prudent patient' standard as the required standard for information disclosure in 
clinical practice. Therefore the current practice by doctors in terms of information 
589 
 
disclosure is inconsistent with ethical guidelines from the HPCSA [68] or current local 
laws [26, 27, 28]. 
 
Comprehension of information disclosed 
It has suggested that in developing countries such as South Africa, where education 
standards and literacy levels are low, knowledge and power asymmetry usually exist 
between patients and health care professionals [34, 35]. It is also important to recognize 
the historical backdrop of colonialism and racism, and ongoing challenges of poverty 
and exploitation [30, 31, 32]. In spite of such considerations however, doctors still have 
an obligation to adequately explain clinical procedures to patients without turning them 
or surrogates into students of medicine [69]. The ability to use written information is 
important to comprehension and understanding [70], as such barriers to communication 
arising from illiteracy and language differences may prevent a common understanding of 
medical procedures, thereby putting patients at risk of providing consent without 
comprehension [71]. It is therefore important that healthcare providers ensure that 
patients understand the proposed treatment or procedure prior to providing consent. 
Some authorities have suggested a verbal or written test to ascertain patient capacity, 
competence or understanding before considering informed consent valid [58]. 
 
Language 
In the current study one of the major barriers towards obtaining valid consent by doctors 
has been listed as 'language difficulties', ranked highest by 88% of doctors in this cohort. 
This was supported by complaints about 'lack of education' (85%) and lack of 
interpreters by 82% of doctors (Figure 4). Therefore it cannot be overemphasized that 
one of the major barriers to obtaining valid informed consent in this environment is the 
issue of language. It has been argued that language barriers can have a deleterious 
effect on healthcare service delivery, leading to such errors as misdiagnosis, failure of 
preventive therapy or non-adherence to prescribed medication, which could ultimately 
lead to charges of medical negligence and award of substantial damages against 
doctors [72]. The issues of language difficulties and the necessity for appropriately 
trained interpreters, is not limited to developing countries, but is also a barrier to proper 
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healthcare services delivery in developed countries such as the USA or any 
multicultural/multilingual society [72]. Currently South Africa has 11 official languages; 
therefore language barriers, especially the absence of adequately trained interpreters to 
assist healthcare professionals in providing care to patients is a major problem. In 
another study at a South African district hospital, the authors concluded that language 
barriers in hospitals create significant problems for healthcare professionals and can 
impact negatively on patients' rights to confidentiality, informed consent and the quality 
of healthcare service delivery [73]. Other cultural barriers identified by doctors in this 
study include different cultural beliefs about blood transfusion and amputations. The 
impact of family members in decision-making, especially husbands within the traditional 
African cultural ethos. All of these can serve as barriers to the appropriate practice of 
informed consent in developing country settings [34, 74]. To further improve 
understanding and comprehension during the informed consent process, the US 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) has suggested that community 
participation is acceptable, which may include providing written information sheets for 
discussions with family members and holding community meetings, but cautions that 
family permission should not replace the requirement for individual informed consent 
[75, 76]. 
 
Capacity 
In the common law there is a presumption that any adult person has the capacity to 
consent or refuse medical treatment unless proven otherwise by acceptable evidence. A 
lack of capacity cannot be established merely by reference to a person's age, 
appearance, and intelligence, level of education, or any condition or aspect of behavior, 
which might lead others to make unjustified assumptions about capacity [2]. According 
to the Court in Richmond v. Richmond [77]: 
Capacity is ultimately a legal not a medical decision... it is for the court to decide the 
question of capacity, although the court must pay attention to the evidence of experts in 
the medical profession who can indicate the meaning of symptoms and give some idea 
of the mental deterioration which takes place in cases of this kind.... 
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Thorpe J summarized the common law test for capacity in Re C [78] where he said that: 
the patient must be able to (a) comprehend and retain the information (b) believe it (c) 
weight it in the balance so as to arrive at a choice. The UK Mental Capacity Act [79] 
further simplified this test, which now states that a person is deemed incapable of 
making a decision and exercising autonomy rights where that person is unable: 
a)To understand the information relevant to the decision,  
b) To retain that information 
c)To use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
d) To communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means) [2, 78, 79].  
 
In the current study about 67% of doctors said that they would presume that patients 
have the capacity to consent to treatment, although this low percentage may have been 
influenced by the large number of pediatricians within our study cohort, who would 
normally assume that their patients could not provide consent based on their age. 
Similarly, only 59% of doctors in this cohort routinely tested their patients for capacity to 
prior to treatment. On the other hand the majority of doctors accurately ranked factors 
such as level of consciousness, age, educational level, appearance and sex, in 
descending order, as being factors used in the assessment of capacity. Also, only 71% 
of doctors accurately identified 12 years as the age of consent to routine medical 
treatment in South Africa, while only 30% of doctors correctly identified the age of 
consent to TOP as 'any age", as stipulated in the Choice on termination of pregnancy 
Act [80]. This evidence suggests inadequate knowledge of current local laws and 
regulations on informed consent in South Africa. When assessing capacity in difficult 
cases, majority of doctors responding said they would use a MMSE, GCS or orientation 
in time place and person, to ascertain patient's capacity to give consent to treatment. 
This is contrary to previous studies on capacity assessment tools for medical treatment 
which concluded that both the MMSE and GCS should be viewed as blunt instruments 
when determining patients' capacity [56]. Perhaps more sensitive capacity assessment 
tools, such as the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool--Treatment (MacCAT-T) 
should be evaluated for use in this setting [56, 58]. 
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Voluntariness and consent or agreement to treatment 
Voluntariness of consent has been one of the more difficult areas to assess by empirical 
methods because of the variations in patients' clinical condition and cultural norms 
associated with the concept of voluntariness [14, 57,63]. In African traditional societies 
the influence and respect for family, friends and elders is very important in accordance 
with cultural ethos. Therefore, it is not unusual for individuals to seek the advice of 
family, friends and relatives before making important decisions related to healthcare 
[34, 59, 63]. While these types of interference may be considered undue influence in 
western cultures, with their history of libertarian autonomy and individual rights. African 
societies are more accepting of collective decision making, based on a different concept 
of autonomy derived from Ubuntu or "sumus, ergo sum, (we are, therefore I am)" [81]. It 
is generally recognized that voluntariness in informed consent means that the patients' 
consent must be given voluntarily, devoid of any undue influence or coercion either by 
fraudulent misrepresentation or trickery from the physician or family or friends [14, 76]. 
According to Lord Donaldson in Re T [82]: 
 
If...his will was overborne; the refusal will not have represented a true decision. In 
this context the relationship of the persuader to the patient-for example, spouse, 
parents or religious adviser-will be important, because some relationships more 
readily lend themselves to overbearing the patient's independent will than others. 
 
In our current study I have tried to study voluntariness by asking some indirect questions 
from doctors such as whether doctors would allow patients to choose a particular 
procedure or treatment, only 53% answered affirmatively. Similarly when asked whether 
doctors ever used implied or presumed consent in practice, 53% answered in the 
affirmative. When further asked how often they used implied or presumed consent in 
practice, 39% said occasionally, 26% said rarely, while 11% said all of the time. Only 
24% of doctors said they 'never' used implied or presumed consent in practice 
(Figure 3). This suggests some elements of medical paternalism are still prevalent in 
clinical practice in this environment. It appears that many doctors resort to 
implied/presumed consent in lieu of obtaining legally valid consent, contrary to ethical 
593 
 
guidelines from the HPCSA, which advices doctors not to simply presume that patients 
have given consent when they lay down on the examination table [68], consistent with 
the injunction of the Court in Stoffberg v. Elliot [24] which stated that: 
 
A man by entering a hospital does not submit himself to such surgical operations 
as the doctors in attendance upon him might think necessary...he retains his 
rights of control and disposal of his own body; he still has the right to say what 
operation he will submit to, and unless consent to an operation is expressly 
obtained, any operation performed on him without his consent is an unlawful 
interference with his right of security and control of his own body." 
 
Perhaps this unquestioned practice could be explained by the power asymmetry that 
exists between doctors and patients or special respect shown to doctors by patients in 
this environment as described in another study from Nigeria [59]. It may also be 
associated with the many challenges experienced by doctors practicing in this 
environment including heavy workload and lack of administrative support (Figure 4). 
 
Comparative analysis of ICAS scores 
Analysis of ICAS scores showed that interns and registrars scored lower than medical 
officers and consultant/specialists. This could be explained by the fact that interns and 
registrars are still trainees and it should be expected that their knowledge of informed 
requirements would be lower than that of their trainers and supervisors. Across clinical 
subspecialties radiologists and anaesthetists scored lower than internists and surgeons 
and GPs. This is somewhat consistent with findings from another study in Croatia where 
anaesthetists scored lower than internists and surgeons on informed consent [83]. The 
plausible explanation is that because radiologists and anaesthesiologists are ancillary 
subspecialties, they may not be required to provide information to patients such as 
diagnosis treatment options etc. and may also depend on primary care physicians to 
obtain prior informed consent prior to referral for supplementary services [68]. In the 
case of nurses and doctors, it should be expected that doctors are more knowledgeable 
about informed consent regulations, because doctors are generally better trained in the 
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areas of medical law and ethics and are required to make final decisions regarding 
patient care, therefore the requisite knowledge about regulations and practice maybe 
more rigorously enforced by the regulatory authorities. 
 
Conclusions 
Previous studies on informed consent in Africa have shown that while doctors are 
generally knowledgeable about the ethical doctrine of informed consent, the application 
and adherence to the legal and ethical requirements of informed consent is usually 
lacking in practice. Analysis of data from this study confirm these observations by 
showing that doctors practicing in public hospitals in South Africa are generally 
knowledgeable about some aspects of informed consent, such as information 
disclosure. However not all adhered to the critical elements as specified in the NHA, or 
the requirements based on international standards of care or local ethical guidelines. 
The major challenges militating against the proper practice of informed consent as 
identified in this study were related to issues of language barriers and lack of 
administrative support, especially interpreters to assist with communicating with patients. 
Others factors identified include large patient numbers with associated time constraints 
and workload. These results show that while the majority of doctors spent an average of 
5-10 minutes on obtaining informed consent, this amount of time was considered 
inadequate by many doctors. Knowledge of essential local laws such as the age of 
consent for routine medical treatment or age of consent for TOP in South Africa was not 
universally known by doctors. Similarly, the majority of doctors still believed in the 
paternalistic concept of a 'reasonable doctor standard' rather than more currently 
accepted 'prudent patient standard' and the disclosure of all material risks. This study 
suggests that doctors were statistically more knowledgeable about informed consent 
than professional nurses, however it remains to be seen whether this translates into 
clinical practice. Finally, there was evidence of overuse of implied and presumed 
consent by doctors with implications for medical paternalism and lack of voluntariness in 
consent. This study was limited to public hospitals in an urban setting and the study 
period was restricted to 3 months. It is possible that future studies in private hospitals or 
in a more rural setting may provide different results. Based on the findings in this study, 
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one can recommended the recruitment and training of a 'corps' of interpreters as part of 
medical teams in South African hospitals, to assist in improving the quality of doctor-
patient communications, informed consent, confidentiality, and healthcare service 
delivery in public hospitals. It would also be useful to modify the current universal 
hospital consent form to better reflect current teaching in medico-legal practice, by 
including translations in local languages, or options for specific consent for certain 
procedures or mandatory disclosures as required by law. It would also be useful for 
patient information leaflets to be produced in local languages to enhance patient 
education and understanding prior to providing consent. Finally, continuing education for 
doctors and other healthcare professionals in ethics and medical law will go a long way 
towards improving the overall quality of healthcare service delivery in South African 
hospitals. 
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   Abstract    
 
Background: Informed consent (IC) is a legally enforceable right in South Africa based 
on constitutionally protected rights to bodily integrity and well-being. In terms of the law, 
patients cannot be involved in medical treatment or research without IC. Healthcare 
providers must inform patients about diagnosis, risks, benefits, treatment options, and 
right of refusal in a language patients understand based their literacy level. This study 
reports an empirical study on patients' perceptions of IC as practiced by doctors and 
nurses in South Africa. 
Materials and Methods: A cross-sectional study, using a bilingual semi-structured 
questionnaire was conducted among patients attending randomly selected public 
hospitals in eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (Durban), KwaZulu-Natal province. 
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Competent patients or legal surrogates were eligible for inclusion. IC was obtained from 
all participants. 
Results: Four hundred and four participants completed questionnaires of which 68% 
were female. The median age of participants was 35 years (range 11–91 years). Most 
respondents spoke IsiZulu (55%), were single (56%), unemployed (66%), and with 
secondary school education (69%). Patients were generally informed about the 
diagnosis (81%), risks (57%), and benefits of treatment (61%). Few were informed about 
treatment options (41%), recommended treatment (28%), and right of refusal (25%). IC 
was obtained verbally in 73% of cases. Patients favored disclosure of all material risks 
(78%) and few consulted surrogates before decision-making (76%). There was an 
association between participant's age and knowledge of the age of consent (P = 0.005). 
Most patients were satisfied with information disclosed (91%) and did not feel coerced. 
Some were afraid to ask questions for fear of losing free treatment (8%). 
Conclusion: This study reveals that South African patients are aware of the right to IC, 
but many were vulnerable due to indigence. Barriers to IC include poverty, language, 
and low educational level. South African patients prefer disclosure of all material risks, 
better communication skills by healthcare workers, and a shift toward informed or shared 
healthcare decision-making. 
Keywords: Africa, doctors, healthcare decision-making, hospitals, informed consent, 
insights, nurses, patients 
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   Introduction   
 
 
 
The above direct quotation from a patient (because I want to be informed; to be part of 
the decision-making); desiring full disclosure prior to giving consent to medical 
treatment, reflects the changing face of modern medical practice from the paternalistic 
notion of "doctor knows best" to informed or shared decision-making. According to other 
patients: 
 
"Because I want to know what the options are, and weigh them myself." 
 
"Because I want to know what is going to happen or why; I also look up info on the 
internet." These statements from knowledgeable and inquisitive patients who approach 
healthcare professionals imbued with consumer rights, rather than passive recipients of 
benevolent healthcare, has made contemporary medical practice a more contested and 
ethically challenging enterprise. 
 
According to the World Medical Association: [1] 
 
Until recently, physicians generally considered themselves accountable only to 
themselves, to their colleagues in the medical profession and for religious believers, to 
God. Nowadays, they have additional accountabilities to their patients, to third parties 
such as hospitals and managed healthcare organizations, to medical licensing and 
regulatory authorities, and often to courts of law. These different accountabilities can 
conflict with one another. 
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Due to recent controversies surrounding the ethics of healthcare decision-making, a 
central dilemma has arisen in modern medical practice which can be summarized as 
whether the principle of respect for autonomy should have priority over professional 
beneficence?[2] It has been argued that persistence with professional beneficence by 
doctors creates a culture of medical paternalism which does not fully respect patients' 
autonomy.[3] In these situations, the ethical principles of beneficence and respect for 
autonomy may conflict with one another, thereby creating a tension in the doctor-patient 
relationship.[1],[2],[3] To promote patients' autonomy it has been advocated by common 
law cases such as Canterbury v Spence [4] that: 
 
The patients' right to self-determination can be effectively exercised only if the patient 
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice. True consent to what 
happens to one's self is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an 
opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant 
upon each… From these almost axiomatic considerations springs the need, and in turn 
the requirement, of a reasonable divulgence by physician to patient to make such a 
decision possible. 
 
In view of the above, informed consent (IC) has become the legal and ethical "standard 
of care" for medical practice since the late 20th century. More recently, others have 
argued for shared decision-making rather than informed decision-making. Distinguishing 
informed decision-making as "an individual's overall process of gathering relevant 
information from both the clinician and other clinical and nonclinical sources with or 
without independent clarification of values."[5] 
 
Whereas shared decision-making may be defined as a particular process of decision-
making by the patient and clinician in which the patient: 
 
Understands the risk or seriousness of the medical condition 
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Understands the medical procedure including the risks, benefits, alternatives, and 
uncertainties 
Has weighed his or her personal values regarding the potential benefits and harms 
associated with the healthcare service 
Has engaged in decision-making at a level at which he or she feels comfortable, and 
finally 
Has come to a joint decision in association with the healthcare provider'. Advocates of 
shared decision-making argue that it promotes patient comprehension and autonomy, 
reduces unwanted medical procedures and malpractice claims, improves patient 
compliance, and decreases overall costs of healthcare service delivery.[5],[6],[7],[8] 
 
Informed consent to medical treatment 
 
In its ideal legal and ethical contexts, IC requires five key elements to establish validity. 
These key elements must include (i) competence, (ii) voluntariness, (iii) information 
disclosure, (iv) understanding of information disclosed, and (v) authorization or consent 
to the medical procedure or treatment.[9],[10] In medical practice, IC should ideally involve 
a conversation between a doctor or healthcare worker (HCW) and the patient, initiated 
by the healthcare professional. This conversation must involve complete transparency, 
engagement by both parties, continuity and may require evidence that it occurred, such 
as eyewitnesses or a signed consent form.[2],[9],[10] IC could be withdrawn at any time by 
the patient and maybe vitiated by any changes in material facts not previously 
communicated to, or approved by the patient.[2],[9],[10] In accordance with some state 
laws, any exculpatory statements intended to deny any claim rights of the individual 
giving consent in order to protect responsible parties are expressly forbidden and may 
nullify IC.[11] Further, valid consent in accordance with certain state regulations[10],[11] and 
case law, strongly require the absence of coercion, undue influence or deception, as 
demonstrated in the English case of Re T.[12],[13],[14] Here, a patient refusing blood 
transfusion because of coercion and undue influence by the mother who was a 
Jehovah's witness was held not to have consented freely because her will was 
overborne. Therefore, her refusal did not represent an independent choice. It has been 
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observed that US courts have become increasingly reluctant to dismiss personal injury 
claims on the on the grounds that the victims consented to the injury causing risks. 
Therefore, these courts have disfavored consent-based defenses such as assumption of 
risk, and product warning as a form of defense against negligence or battery.[15] 
 
Informed consent and patients' rights 
 
Patient's rights may be defined as a combination of claims, liberties, powers, and 
immunities that ensure the protection of the patient's dignity and moral autonomy.[9] This 
definition forms the core claims which patients may have against clinicians and defines 
the duties of clinicians to patients. Patient rights ensure access to data and information, 
protection from most kinds of unconsented activities. It suggests that patients may do no 
wrong by choosing to accept or refuse any recommended medical 
intervention.[9] Wear et al. have described patient's rights and IC as enabling and 
empowering a patient population that has traditionally been largely powerless and mute 
in the face of medical expertise and authority.[16] In this way, patient's rights while 
remaining based on the legal autonomy model also extends beyond the confines of any 
particular legal system.[15],[16] Patient's rights during medical treatment and research 
have only risen to prominence in the later part of the 20thcentury, especially after the 
reported abuses of human subjects of biomedical research [17],[18],[19] and the moral 
conflicts between respect for autonomy and professional beneficence.[1],[2] Further, 
recent advances in biomedical technology have also led to a constant rethinking of the 
rights of individuals utilizing the beneficial aspects of modern science.[20] Prior to these 
recent evolutions in bioethics and medical practice, with subsequent challenges to the 
status quo, the rights of patients have previously been based on medical 
paternalism.[3] Patient's right was solely dependent on the goodwill of doctors and the 
presumption that doctors would act in the best interests of the patients.[1],[2],[3] With 
revelations of physician/researcher abuses; however, and ongoing unethical 
research,[16],[17],[18],[19] ethicists and legal scholars began to question whether it was still 
appropriate for a patient to rely entirely on the judgment of doctors, and if not, how 
patients should be involved in the healthcare decision-making process?[21] Further, as 
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medical practice has become more industrialized and sophisticated, patients have 
become consumers of healthcare services rather than involuntary participants in the 
healthcare decision-making process, raising the questions about consumer 
rights.[15],[16],[20],[21] One aspect of the recognition of the moral autonomy of the patient 
has been the recognition of the need for adequate information disclosure, which would 
enable the patient to accept, reject or choose between different medical therapies as 
first recognized in cases such as Canterbury v Spence [4] or as debated by the House of 
Lords in the English case of Sidaway.[22] Another aspect of this debate has been 
whether to persist with the "reasonable doctor standard" as established in Bolam [21] or 
to follow the "prudent patient standard" as suggested by Lord Scarman in 
Sidaway.[22] Information disclosure is an important aspect of enhancing the patient's 
moral autonomy and ability to choose. As suggested by Mclean, its potential 
invasiveness and its social and political potential make it an area ripe for rights 
discourse.[23] Debates in this area have, therefore, focused on several issues including 
whether the doctors' duty to disclose based on the patients' right to receive information 
can be tested independently of patient understanding.[23] 
 
However, if the patient is unable to understand, what is the point of disclosure? 
Therefore is there a duty imposed on clinicians to ensure patient understanding prior to 
providing IC? There might also be issues with the rationality of patient's decision-
making, with regards competence and incapacitated patients, minors, and other 
vulnerable members of society.[3],[23] In light of the above, questions about competence, 
information disclosure, understanding, and rights of vulnerable population groups have 
dominated contemporary debate on patient's rights, respect for autonomy and 
IC.[18],[19],[20],[21],[22],[23] Some have questioned whether providing information about risks, 
benefits, and alternatives actually improve patients' decision-making.[15] Schuck 
identified two obligations imposed on the doctors by these requirements. First, the 
fiduciary duty of care, i.e. the duty imposed on doctors to put patients' interests above 
their own. Second, the problems associated with cost and resource allocation since the 
obligation on full information disclosure may increase the burden on healthcare 
resources.[15] Others have argued that shared decision-making may decrease 
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healthcare costs for well-informed patients.[5],[6],[7],[8] These observations suggest IC 
should also be viewed in terms of cost-effectiveness.[15] Therefore, there may be need to 
reconceptualize IC to suit the particular geographical or sociocultural environment 
involved.[6] For example, there may be a need to reduce consent procedures in "minimal 
risk" research or treatment while providing more information in "high-risk" situations. 
Further, not all patients require the same level of information disclosure, either due to 
personal choice or cultural belief systems.[24],[25],[26],[27] For example, it has been reported 
that among certain South Asian populations the disclosure of negative information may 
be considered harmful,[24] while some Nigerian African population groups are averse to 
negative information disclosure due to religious beliefs.[25],[26] Consequently, one can 
argue that IC needs to be viewed as a normative variable, not an empirical constant, 
due to its cultural plasticity.[9],[10],[15] Therefore, effective implementation of IC should 
allow for cultural belief systems and differences in regional or geographical medical 
practice.[15],[24],[25],[26],[27] However, the protections enshrined in the UNESCO Convention 
on Bioethics and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights among other instruments is 
emphatic about an acceptable IC.[28] 
 
Informed consent in South Africa 
 
As previously reported,[10] IC before treatment is a constitutionally protected right in 
South Africa.[10] This has been demonstrated in landmark South African cases such as 
Stoffberg v Elliot 1923,[29] Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal 1957,[30] and more 
recent cases of Minister of Safety and Security v Xaba 2003[31] and Castell v De Greef 
1993.[32] Generally, South African Courts have defended the patients' right to bodily 
integrity and the need for full information disclosure prior involvement in any medical 
treatment or procedure. Failure to follow these guidelines may result in offending HCWs 
being found guilty of assault, battery, or negligence.[29],[30],[31],[32] Following the De Greef 
case, it was suggested that South African Courts appear to have shifted from a 
"reasonable doctor standard" to the "prudent patient standard" in terms of information 
disclosure.[32],[33] Further, there was a shift in risk disclosure to the objective "material 
risks" standard which is based on what a reasonable patient would attach importance to, 
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in arriving at a decision whether to accept or refuse a recommended 
treatment.[6],[10],[33] The National Health Act 2003 (NHA)[34] codified the requirements for 
IC before treatment by requiring that every healthcare provider before treating a patient 
must among other requirements disclose the following: 
 
The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options, generally, available to the 
user 
The benefits, risks, and consequences, generally, associated with each option 
The user's right to refuse health services and explain the implications, risks, obligations 
of such refusal 
Finally, healthcare providers must give the user this information in a language that the 
user understands and in a manner which takes into account the user's level of 
literacy.[10],[33] 
 
 
Other factors which may impact on the practice of IC in African communities include 
sociocultural issues such as language, education and literacy level, and other 
socioeconomic factors.[10],[24],[25],[26],[35],[36],[37],[38] South Africa is a multicultural middle-
income country, with a population of around 54 million people [39] who speak eleven 
official languages.[39],[40],[41] The country has historical, sociocultural inequities resulting 
from apartheid which left a section of the local population marginalized with a high 
unemployment rate currently estimated at 25.5%.[39],[40],[41] Because of these inequities 
there is a dichotomy in the provision of healthcare service delivery with the majority 
indigent population, about 88% uninsured in KwaZulu-Natal province (KZN) using 
publicly funded healthcare services, while the minority affluent populace using privately 
funded healthcare services.[41] This has led to a situation whereby doctors may be 
unable to comply with the legal requirements of IC, especially in public 
hospitals.[10],[35],[36],[37] It has also been reported that there may be geographic and 
cultural barriers to the practice of IC even in developed countries such as the 
USA.[6],[27],[42],[43] This has led most international ethical guidelines to recommend that 
cultural factors and language must be taken into consideration when obtaining IC from 
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patients, especially those in developing countries during biomedical research or 
treatment.[28],[44],[45],[46] Previously, I reported on the understanding and practice of IC by 
medical doctors in South African hospitals.[10] Here, I analyze and report patient's actual 
experiences, perceptions, and evaluation of the IC process at local public hospitals in 
eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (Durban), South Africa. This study was conducted 
simultaneously with an interview of doctors and professional nurses practicing in KZN.[10] 
 
 
   Materials and Methods   
 
 
Objectives 
 
The general objective of this study was to establish whether IC is obtained from patients 
prior to medical treatment in South African public hospitals. Specific objectives were to 
establish whether sufficient information is provided to patients. Whether patients 
understand the information provided, whether patients providing IC to treatment are 
generally competent to consent to such treatment, and to establish whether IC is 
obtained from patients voluntarily. Finally, whether IC provided by patients is truly valid 
and consistent with the requirements of the NHA.[34] 
 
Study population and location 
 
The study location and stratified random sampling of selected public hospitals and 
patient populations were previously described in detail.[10]Briefly, this study was 
conducted in the outpatient clinics and inpatient wards of selected public hospitals in 
eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality (Durban). Inclusion criteria were such that any 
patient attending the selected hospitals during the period of study (March–June 2012), 
who was willing to participate voluntarily, was eligible for inclusion in the study. 
Exclusion criteria were mental incapacity and absence of parent or guardian to provide 
consent for children below the age of consent in South Africa. 
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Study instruments 
 
The main study instrument was a semi-structured questionnaire in English language, 
which was also translated into IsiZulu, the dominant language spoken by about 81% of 
the population of KZN.[47] Professional translation was done by the Department of IsiZulu 
studies, University of KZN. Questionnaires consisted of three sections. The first section 
collected sociodemographic data; the second part was designed to collect information 
on patient experiences of IC practices by healthcare providers during clinical 
encounters. The third part asked questions about patient's general knowledge, 
understanding, and opinions on IC. Participants were interviewed by three trained 
bilingual research assistants. Those who preferred were allowed to complete the 
questionnaire by themselves. Respondents had the option of completing questionnaires 
either in English or IsiZulu. The study was conducted in various hospital departments 
shown in [Figure 1]. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage of participants by clinical departments 
 
Click here to view 
 
 
Study design and statistical analysis 
 
Preliminary sample size for this study was calculated using a web-based sample size 
calculator, Raosoft ®.[48] Based on the formula for sample size and margin of error from 
Raosoft, a representative sample size of 385 ± 20 patients was calculated (95% 
confidence interval; P = 0.05). Data from questionnaires were transcribed directly into 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), IBM Corp. Armonk New York, 
NY.[49] The captured data were then checked for completeness and accuracy by both 
the principal investigator and a qualified biostatistician. Data were later analyzed using 
SPSS (version 21).[49] Descriptive statistics such as percentages, proportions, median 
mode, and interquartile range were used to summarize the data. Scores for 
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comprehension, understanding, information disclosure, and voluntariness were worked 
out from the responses. Fisher's exact test was used to test for association between 
categorical variables and groups of patients. Pearson's Chi-squared test was used to 
test for differences in responses between patients and HCWs (doctors and nurses). One 
sample Kolmogorov–Smirnoff test was used to test for normal age distribution. 
 
Ethical considerations 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from a local Research Ethics Committee at the University 
of South Africa (UNISA). The study and biostatistics methodology was also reviewed 
and approved by the health research and knowledge management subcomponent of the 
KZN Department of Health. Approval was also obtained from the management of each 
of the hospitals included in the study. Finally, written IC was obtained from each 
respondent after full information disclosure prior to participation in the study. 
 
 
   Results   
 
 
 
Demographic characteristics 
 
Four hundred and four valid questionnaires were completed by respondents with few 
missing data. The sociodemographic characteristics of participants are summarized 
in [Table 1] and [Table 2]. The majority of questionnaires were completed by the patients 
themselves (88.2%, 351/398), while the remainder were completed by surrogates 
including parents/guardians (8.2%, 33/398). Most participants were female (68.2%; 
272/399), single (56%, 225/403), or married (37%, 149/403). The age of participants 
was not normally distributed (P < 0.001, median = 35.5 years; range = 11–91 years). 
Most of the participants were bilingual, IsiZulu speakers (55%, 222/403), English (49%, 
195/403), IsiXhosa (8%, 32/403), and Afrikaans (2%, 9/403). Other minority languages 
spoken include Hindi, Tamil, Tswana, and Sesotho. The majority of patients had a 
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secondary education (69%, 278/401), some tertiary education (16%, 65/401), primary 
education (12%, 49/401), and no education (2%, 9/401). Most respondents were 
unemployed (66%, 262/398), with (27%, 106/398) employed. The majority of 
participants reported no monthly income (56%, 227/404). Detailed earnings of 
participants are shown in [Figure 2]. 
 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of respondents (n=404) 
 
Click here to view 
 
Table 2: Secondary demographic and social stratification data 
(n=404) 
 
Click here to view 
 
Figure 2: Monthly earnings of participants. *Salaries are shown in 
South African Rands (ZAR). 1$ (USD) ≥11.5 ZAR 
 
Click here to view 
 
 
Information disclosure 
 
The majority of patients/respondents reported that an HCW (doctor or nurse) explained 
the treatment or procedure to them (88%, 355/403). Information provided to patients 
included diagnosis (81%, 326/403), general risks (57%, 229/403), and benefits (61%, 
245/403). Less than half were informed about treatment options, (41%, 165/403), 
recommended treatment (28%, 113/403), and the risks of refusing recommended 
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treatment (25%, 99/403). Only 28%, (113/403) were given information about their right 
of refusal [Table 3]. 
 
Table 3: Information provided to patients by healthcare 
professionals prior to IC 
 
Click here to view 
 
 
Time spent on information disclosure 
 
Time spent by patients with doctors or other HCWs during a clinical encounter, including 
obtaining IC ranged from <5 min (15%, 58/399); 5–10 min (29%, 115/399); 10–20 min 
(23%, 91/399); 20–30 min (13%, 51/399) to >30 min (15%, 59/399) [Figure 3]. 
 
Figure 3: Time spent on informed consent/clinical encounter by 
healthcare workers 
 
Click here to view 
 
 
Patients choice on risk disclosure 
 
The majority of patients reported that they would prefer to receive information on "all the 
risks" associated with the treatment or procedure (78%, 304/391), while (6%, 22/391) 
said they would like to know only "some of the risks," another (6%, 22/391) preferred to 
know "none of the risks," while (11%, 43/391) answered "don't know." Relevant reasons 
given by patients for requesting full disclosure of material risks are shown in [Table 4]. 
Some respondents wanted to know the side-effects of the drugs because they were 
allergic to some medications or were concerned about the health effects on their 
children, pregnancy, or current health status. Those who preferred partial or none 
disclosure of risks gave varying reasons for their choices as shown in [Table 4]. 
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Table 4: Selected verbatim responses from patient to questions 
on IC 
 
Click here to view 
 
 
Undue pressure or coercion 
 
When patients were asked whether they were advised that they could accept or reject 
the treatment or procedure, (42%, 153/370) answered "yes." When asked if they felt 
threatened or were afraid to say "no," (8%, 30/379) answered "yes," while (91%, 
343/379) said "no." Patients', who said they were afraid to say "no," gave various 
reasons as detailed in [Table 4]. Some patients complained that they were afraid 
because the doctor was simply too rude or aggressive or that they would be asked why 
they were refusing help. When patients were asked if they were given any perverse 
incentive or persuaded to accept any particular treatment, 9 patients (2.4%, 9/377) 
answered "yes," while (97%, 365/377) said "no." Some of those who responded 
affirmatively said they were given some pills and money for bus fare. "They gave me 
money, and they said it was bus fare?" Another, "there are pills that they say we must 
take for them to see if they are working and they gave us R120." Another was 
persuaded by being told it would benefit her in the end. 
 
Methods of obtaining consent 
 
The majority of patients reported that consent was obtained "verbally" (73%, 274/374), 
"written" (19%, 71/374); while (5%, 19/374) said both methods were used. Information 
disclosure to patients was rendered using "words" in most cases (89%, 358/401). 
English language was used in (66%, 255/384) and IsiZulu (32%, 124/384). Methods 
used to enhance information disclosure included pictures (8%, 32/401); diagrams (5%, 
21/401), and interpreters (3.5%, 14/401). 
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Understanding of information disclosed 
 
The majority of participants said they understood the information provided (91%, 
355/392), while about (8%, 31/392) answered "no." When asked if they asked any 
questions about their treatment (70%, 275/391) said "yes," while (29%, 113/391) said 
"no." Reasons for not asking questions about treatment elicited responses such as 
"Doctor knows best" or "I didn't know what to ask." Others said they were already 
familiar with their medical diagnosis or treatment regimen. Some complained that they 
did not have time to ask questions because the doctors were in a hurry or too busy. "The 
doctor was too fast he didn't give me time to ask, he didn't have time at all." 
 
Voluntariness of consent 
 
When patients were asked if the amount of information provided was enough, (74%, 
290/391) answered "yes," while (24%, 92/391) said "no." When asked whether they 
made the treatment decision of their own free will, (95%, 348/366) respondents 
answered affirmatively. However, some respondents said they only followed orders from 
the doctor, with one stating: "The doctors tell you what needs to be done and you do it." 
When asked if they could change their mind if they did not like the recommended 
treatment, about (87%, 309/356) answered "yes," while (12%, 41/356) said "no." Several 
patients who stated that they could not change their mind said it was because they could 
not afford alternative treatment [Table 4]. There was no significant association between 
patients age and knowledge of the right of refusal (P = 0.334), educational level and the 
right of refusal (P = 0.404), or income and right of refusal (P = 0.480). 
 
Involvement of surrogates in patients' decision-making 
 
When patients were asked whether they sought assistance any other person before 
deciding to accept or reject recommended treatment. Most patients (76%, 274/363) said 
"no," while (24%, 86/363) said "yes." Of those who sought help from surrogates, (11%, 
42/370) involved parents, (6%, 21/369) from another family member, (3%, 11/369), from 
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a husband, (2.4%, 9/369) from a friend, about (1%, 4/369) from a wife, and <1% from a 
child. A few patients sought assistance from a doctor or nurse, the internet, or another 
patient. Most of those seeking assistance from parents did so because they were minors 
currently dependent on parents/guardians. Those seeking assistance from doctors or 
nurses felt that HCWs knew better or were seeking a second opinion. 
 
General knowledge of informed consent regulations by patients 
 
When asked about the age of consent to treatment by children in South Africa, most 
respondents answered wrongly with (26%, 96/373) choosing, "15 years;" (33%, 
122/373) chose "18 years;" (11%, 40/373) "21 years," while (6%, 21/373) did not know. 
Only (25%, 94/373) participants correctly answered "12 years." There was a statistically 
significant association between participant's age and knowledge of the age of consent in 
South Africa (P < 0.005). Older age groups were more likely to respond correctly. There 
was no association between educational level or income and knowledge of the age of 
consent (P = 0.080) and (P = 0.334), respectively. 
 
 
   Discussion   
 
 
 
This study assesses patients understanding and perceptions on the quality of IC as 
practiced by healthcare professionals (doctors and nurses) in an urban municipality in 
South Africa. Patients were generally satisfied with the level of information disclosure 
during medical treatment with about 74% expressing satisfaction regarding information 
disclosure. Patients also confirmed that doctors provided most of the information 
headings required by the NHA 2003,[34] including diagnosis, general risks, and benefits 
of treatment. This was consistent with a previous study on doctors practicing in the same 
region.[10] However, 25–41% of patients were not given information on the right of 
refusal, treatment options, recommended treatment, and risks of refusing recommended 
treatment. With regards to the understanding of information, over 90% of patients stated 
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that they understood the information provided and about 70% said they were able to ask 
questions about their treatment. Although about 30% stated they were afraid to ask 
questions for fear of losing the free treatment provided in public hospitals since they 
were indigent and did not have any alternatives. This observation is consistent with a 
similar study in Kenya, where it was reported that patients were too timid or afraid to ask 
questions because of the fear of losing the benefits of free treatment provided during 
clinical trials or research.[38],[50] In terms of voluntariness of consent, the majority of 
patients reported making their decisions of their own free will, while those who sought 
assistance from surrogates reported the involvement of mostly family members, friends, 
and occasionally HCWs. Most patients reported the absence of coercion or undue 
influence with over 90% reporting that they were not afraid to say "no" if they felt 
uncomfortable with recommended treatment. This is somewhat unusual for developing 
country, especially in Africa, where cultural and family influences are thought to play a 
major role in healthcare decision-making as reported from studies in Nigeria [25],[26] and 
Kenya.[38],[50] This may indicate that South African patients are more aware of patient's 
rights and more sophisticated in terms of their understanding of IC when compared to 
patients from other developing countries in Africa and elsewhere.[25],[26],[38],[50] This may 
be a complement to the passage and wide publication of the NHA in South Africa and 
the patients' rights charter displayed by law in all public hospitals in South Africa. This 
observation may provide a good example to other countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, 
who are yet to pass or legally enforce healthcare laws in their own jurisdictions. While 
the Nigerian Health Act was passed into law in late 2014, its active implementation 
remains a future target.[51],[52] Most patients reported that there was no perverse 
influence on their decision-making such as financial inducement or threats, except few 
who reported being given money for "bus fare." The latter were probably patients 
involved in ongoing clinical trials that were financially compensated for participation, 
although the amount of 120 ZAR reported is less than the nationally recommended rate 
of 150 ZAR (≤15 USD) per day.[53] Time spent on IC as reported by most patients is 
within the range of 5–20 min as previously reported by doctors.[10] However, it is not 
clear from the patients account whether time spent with patients refers to time 
specifically spent on obtaining IC, or time spent on the entire clinical encounter. 
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Probably the latter, since most doctors in the public hospitals are very busy with a large 
case load, thereby militating on time spent on IC as previously observed.[10] The 
timeframe of <20 min is also consistent with the entire clinical encounter as reported 
from other jurisdictions like the USA, where the estimated duration of an average 
primary care visit is 15 min.[5] Cultural factors impacting on IC in this population include 
the unemployment and poverty with over 65% unemployed and 56% reporting no 
monthly income in this cohort. Other cultural issues identified include language 
difficulties, with the majority of patients speaking IsiZulu or other African languages, 
while communication with HCWs on IC was predominantly in English language. 
Language as a barrier to IC was previously reported in other studies in South 
Africa [10],[35],[36] and the USA.[42],[43] However, this barrier did not seem to affect patient 
understanding with over 90% of respondents claiming they understood the information 
provided. There was some inconsistency with previous reports where doctors claimed 
that IC was obtained in writing in 51% of cases,[1] compared patients in this study who 
reported that IC was obtained verbally in over 75% of cases. Moreover, doctors reported 
giving patients information on the right of refusal in 65% of cases, while patients 
reported only 28%. Further, doctors reported using interpreters in 72% of cases when 
obtaining IC,[10] while patients reported that interpreters were involved in only 3.5% of 
clinical encounters. This inconsistency cannot be readily explained; however, it could be 
due to the practice of "cultural brokerage," whereby nurses maybe used to "translate, 
mediate, and negotiate on behalf of patients."[36],[54] In this situation the patient may not 
readily recognize or relate this to the use of interpreter while a doctor may report 
otherwise. Finally, patients showed a poor knowledge of the legal age for consent in 
South Africa, with only 25% identifying the current age of consent to routine treatment. 
Overall patients were satisfied with their encounter with healthcare professionals in this 
setting; however, they wanted to be involved in the healthcare decision-making process 
via informed decision-making.[5],[6],[7] This finding is consistent with reports from other 
parts of Africa such as Nigeria [55] and Kenya,[38],[50] as well as Greece [56] where were 
patients felt that while IC was important, they also wanted to be involved in decisions 
affecting their healthcare. It has been suggested by some American researchers that 
informed and shared decision-making are important elements of preventive 
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medicine.[57],[58] Recommendations by patients on improving IC practices in the 
environment include improved communication skills by HCWs, with many patients 
complaining that doctors were too busy, rude, or aggressive while recommending that: 
"Bit more time spent with each patient will help," and "communicate better with patients." 
Others said, "doctors need to give all the important information without patients asking." 
Another, "I think nurses must try to spend more time explaining the treatment because 
sometimes they just right (write) in your card and you can hardly see what is written." 
And another, "I think they must be more careful with our documents, and they must also 
learn how to speak to patients." Finally, "I think they need to manage their time better." 
 
Potential limitations of this study include the fact that it was carried out in and urban 
metropolitan municipality in South Africa (Durban), with an arguably better educated and 
more knowledgeable population group by South African standards. It is possible that a 
similar study in a rural location in KZN may yield a different result as reported elsewhere, 
although accurate sociodemographic data for proper comparison was not provided 
another study from rural KZN.[36] It is also unclear whether a study in a more 
cosmopolitan South African city such as Cape Town or Johannesburg with different 
population demographics may or may not produce a different result. It is possible that 
similar studies on patients utilizing private healthcare services may produce a different 
result because it has been suggested that doctors in private healthcare setting in 
Greece are more likely to provide detailed information to patients.[56] 
 
 
   Conclusion   
 
 
This study confirms that majority of patients utilizing South African public hospitals are 
vulnerable because of their indigence and lack of alternative means of obtaining 
healthcare. This study also shows that despite their evident vulnerability, most patients 
in Africa are generally aware of their right to information disclosure, human rights, and 
dignity in healthcare. Patients want to be informed and participate in informed or shared 
healthcare decision-making. This study supports previous reports by doctors and 
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patients regarding the IC practices in South Africa, although there were some areas of 
inconsistency in actual practice with patients and doctors differing on the content and 
methodology of information disclosure. The major cultural factors militating against IC 
include language barriers, poverty, and poor communication skills by HCWs. One can 
conclude that there is a need to further educate patients and HCWs on patients' rights, 
the legal requirements of IC, with improved communication skills and training CPD of 
HCWs in ethics and medical law. This will enhance the doctor-patient relationship, 
patient's rights, and human dignity. Future research should focus on informed and 
shared healthcare decision-making in order to improve preventive healthcare services in 
Africa. 
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ANNEXURE 3 
 
Understanding and Practice of Informed Consent by Professional Nurses in South 
Africa: An Empirical Study-Brief Report 
Sylvester Chima, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa 
The Asian Conference on Ethics, Religion & Philosophy 2017 Official Conference 
Proceedings 
Abstract 
Background: Informed consent (IC) is a legal and ethical doctrine, constitutionally 
protected in South Africa by rights to bodily integrity, privacy, and self-determination. 
The National Health Act 2003 codified requirements for IC; stipulating that healthcare 
professionals (HCPs) must inform patients about diagnosis, treatment risks, benefits, 
options, and right of refusal, while taking into consideration patients language and 
literacy levels. However, multicultural societies are challenged by problems of poverty, 
education, language, and cultural ethos, which may influence IC practice. 
Methods: This was a cross-sectional quantitative study using semi-structured 
questionnaires at randomly selected public hospitals in Durban city. Data analyzed with 
SPSS, used descriptive statistics and chi-squared tests to compare results between 
nurses, doctors, and patients. Local RECs and IC approved the study was obtained from 
all participants. 
Results: Three hundred fifty-five (355) registered nurses completed the study. 
Majority female (92%), with 1-41years professional experience. Information disclosed by 
nurses included diagnosis (77%); treatment options (68%); benefits (71%), risks (69%), 
recommended treatment (65%). Inconsistencies observed between nurses and patients 
included non-disclosure of right of refusal, treatment options and risks (25-41%). Nurses’ 
knowledge of basic laws like age of consent was deficient, (30%) accuracy. 
Conclusions: This study showed that professional nurses in South Africa are deficient 
in knowledge of local regulations regarding IC, and would benefit from additional training 
in healthcare law and ethics. Barriers to IC include language, education, and workload. 
Provision of trained interpreters will minimize language barriers, reduce nurses’ 
workload, and improve overall quality of healthcare service delivery 
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Introduction 
Informed consent (IC) is a legal and ethical doctrine derived from the principle of respect 
for autonomy and is constitutionally protected in South Africa through the rights to bodily 
integrity, privacy and self-determination. (The Constitution of South Africa, 1996). To 
enhance transparency of consent regulations in South Africa, the National Health Act 
(NHA) (South Africa Government Gazette, 2003) codified requirements for IC by 
stipulating that healthcare professionals (HCPs) must inform patients about diagnosis, 
risks, benefits, treatment options, and the right of treatment refusal, while taking into 
consideration patients’ language and literacy levels. Further, a South African High Court 
decision in the case of (Castell v De Greef, 1994)impacted on South African medical 
jurisprudence; leading to a shift from the paternalistic ‘reasonable doctor’ to a ‘prudent 
patient’ and ‘material risks’ standards regarding information disclosure. Arguably, a key 
domain of transparency in healthcare involves the open sharing of information and 
shared healthcare decision-making between HCPs and patients. It has been suggested 
that it is very important to understand that transparency in healthcare begins with the 
process of informed consent whereby a HCP and patient engage in open and 
transparent conversation regarding IC which should include discussion about the 
diagnosis, risks, benefits of treatment, alternatives to the recommended treatment if any, 
costs, risks of refusing treatment, and right of refusal. (Mayer, 2012). This is followed by 
an opportunity to ask questions prior to ‘consent’ i.e. acceptance or rejection of 
recommended treatment by the patient. It has been argued that transparency in medical 
practice begins with respect for autonomy and IC, although many physicians still view IC 
as a bureaucratic legalism’ which may interfere with patient care (Brody, 1989). Some 
have suggested that IC should be understood as a fundamental aspect of good 
healthcare practice whereby any doctor not possessing skills to obtain valid consent, 
could be considered as lacking essential skills for modern medical practice. To enhance 
transparency of IC regulations in South Africa, the NHA (South Africa,2003) codified 
requirements for IC by stipulating that HCPs must inform patients about diagnosis, risks, 
benefits, treatment options, and the right of treatment refusal, at a language and literacy 
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level understandable to the patient. The NHA further requires that the information 
disclosed must include: (a) The range of diagnostic procedures and treatment options 
generally available to the user; b) The benefits, risks, and consequences generally 
associated with each option; and (c) The users’ right to refuse health services and 
explain the implications, risks, and obligations of such refusal. The law further requires 
that every health care provider must inform a user of: “the user’s health status except in 
circumstances where there is substantial evidence that the disclosure of the user’s 
health status would be contrary to the best interests of the user”. Section 7 of the NHA 
provides some exceptions to IC where it stipulates that health services may not be 
provided to a healthcare user without the users informed consent unless- 
1. The user is unable to give informed consent and such consent is given by a 
person- 
(a) Mandated by the user in writing to grant consent on his or her behalf; or 
(b) Authorized to give such consent in terms of any law or court order; or where 
2. The user is unable to give informed consent and no person is mandated or authorized 
to give such consent. 
 
Historical Background to Informed Consent in South Africa 
According to Ferdinand van Oosten, patients consent, as a requirement for all lawful 
medical interventions, is a well-established principle in South African common law (Van 
Oosten, 1989). The earliest leading cases in this area were the cases of (Stoffberg v 
Elliot, 1923) and (Esterhuizen v Administrator Transvaal, 1957). More recently in the 
case of (Castell v De Greef, 1994), the judgment of Ackerman J seems to have 
established the doctrine of informed consent within South African medical jurisprudence 
(Van Oosten, 1995). Further the South African Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) revisited 
this judgement and doctrine in (Broude v McIntosh, 1998) but did not overrule this 
decision despite some technical reservations (Carstens & Pearmain, 2007); thereby 
reaffirming the doctrine of informed consent as part of South African medical law. I have 
previously asserted that informed consent before medical procedures is constitutionally 
protected right in South Africa (Chima, 2013).This was further illustrated in the case of 
(Minister of Safety and Security v Gaqa, 2002), where the police wanted a court order to 
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compel an accused person to undergo a surgical procedure to obtain a bullet to be used 
as evidence in a prosecution. The court asserted that such and order would violate the 
defendant’s constitutional rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity, and privacy. The 
consequences of the decision of the Court in (Castell v De Greef, 1994) on South 
African medical jurisprudence were that the following principles were generally adopted 
(Van Oosten, 1995): 
1. A shift from medical paternalism to patient autonomy. 
2. A shift from the ‘reasonable doctor standard to the ‘reasonable patients’ standard. 
3. A shift in disclosure to the ‘material risk’ standard, where the level of disclosure 
required is what a reasonable patient would consider pertinent/important before making 
a healthcare decision 
4. The Court appears to place the patients’ informed consent within the framework of 
volenti non fit injuria or voluntary assumption of risk rather than delict (Van Oosten, 
1995). 
 
Standards of information disclosure 
One of the more contested areas of medico-legal jurisprudence is in standard of 
information disclosure required for informed consent. In other words, how much 
information should be disclosed by the treating physician or healthcare professional to 
the patient for informed consent to be considered valid? On this consideration, there are 
two contesting schools of thought. On the one hand, there is the ‘reasonable doctor 
standard’ based on English common law as outlined by McNair J in (Bolam v Friern 
Health Management Committee, 1957) and generally known as the Bolam principle, 
which states that: A doctor is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with 
the practice accepted as proper by a responsible body of men skilled in that particular 
art… putting it the other way round, a doctor is not negligent, if he is acting with such a 
practice, merely because there is a body of opinion that takes a contrary view. It has 
been argued that English courts have opted for a paternalistic approach by following the 
reasonable doctor standard which bases disclosure on the clinical judgement/ accepted 
practice/substantial risk/normal/usual risk principles (Van Oosten, 1991), as established 
in (Bolam v Friern Health Management Committee,1957) and reaffirmed by the House of 
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Lords in (Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal Bethlem Hospital, 1985), where Lord 
Templeman said: At the end of the day the doctor bearing in mind the best interests of 
the patient and bearing in mind the patients right to information which will enable the 
patient to make a balanced judgement, must decide what information should be given to 
the patient, and what terms that information should be couched… (Sidaway, 1985) 
This idea of abridged information disclosure has since been applied in several court 
cases such as (Chatterton v Gerson, 1981) where Bristow J said that patients should be 
informed in ‘broad terms’, thereby implying that not all information is required and the 
nature and amount of it to be disclosed to a patient would be based on reasonable 
doctor-standard rather than on the requirements of the patient. Lord Scarman in 
Sidaway argued for a ‘prudent patient standard ‘as practiced in other jurisdictions such 
as Canada, USA, and even Germany when he said: “It was a strange conclusion if our 
courts should be led to conclude that our law…should permit doctors to determine in 
what circumstances...a duty arose to warn.” (Sidaway v Board of Governors of Royal 
Bethlem Hospital, 1985). 
 
What makes informed consent valid? 
 
1. Information disclosure: provision of adequate information 
2. Competence: capacity to understand that information 
3. Voluntariness: decision making in the absence of coercion or deception 
4. Comprehension: understanding of information provided 
5. Consent: agreement to the proposed procedure/treatment or participation in a 
research study. Therefore, informing the patient must not be simply a ritual recitation of 
the contents of a written document. Rather the healthcare professional or researcher 
must convey the information, whether orally or in writing, in language that suits the 
individual’s level of understanding (Tekola et al., 2009). 
 
 
Socio-cultural Issues Impacting on the Practice of Informed Consent in South 
Africa 
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The socio-cultural milieu of South Africa shows that about 25%- 30% of the population is 
unemployed, with low labour force participation rate of 54% compared to a global 
average of 69% (Vollgraaff, 2011). Therefore, basic health care is unaffordable for most 
of the local South African population (Chima, 2015). There are also historical inequities 
within population groups with some authors asserting that informed consent is light 
years away from the black South Africans’ (Mhlongo & Mdingi, 1997). Further, there is a 
dichotomy in the organization of the South African healthcare system, which is dual in 
nature consisting of private hospitals/medical practice which is patronized by the fewer 
patients (20%) who have health insurance or financial means to pay for private 
healthcare services, compared with the public health services which accounts for the 
majority (80%) of indigent patients and citizens (KwaZulu-Natal Department of Health, 
2010). 
 
Impact of socio-cultural factors on informed consent practice in South Africa 
This evident dichotomy in health services may influence the practice of informed consent 
in South Africa. Furthermore, most African societies being culturally complex and 
paternalistic in nature may require that consent or approval be obtained from community 
elders/extended family members, or men as heads of households before the actual 
patients/human subjects can provide consent (Irabor & Omonzejele, 2007). The 
challenge here then is to ensure that informed consent is truly voluntary and that 
community or surrogate consent is not substituted for individuals’ consent, which ideally 
should be obtained voluntarily in the absence of coercion (Ijsselmuiden & Faden, 1999). 
 
Methods 
 
Study rationale-justifications for using empirical methods to study informed consent 
 
Sulmasy and Sugarman (2001) have described two potential reasons for studying the 
actual conduct of a group with regards to compliance with moral and ethical dilemmas. 
(a) To describe compliance with existing moral norms and 
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(b) To determine whether policies and procedures designed to operationalize certain 
moral norms have been successful (Chima, 2013; Sulmasy & Sugarman, 2001).Other 
empirical studies have shown that people generally have problems in understanding the 
risks and benefits of medical treatment and decision making, and this could impact on 
the actual application of the existing law (Musschenga, 1999). For example, a study by 
means of a questionnaire on Dutch nurses charged with taking care of nursing home 
resident with due respect for their libertarian rights and respect for autonomy revealed 
that the nurses were not complying with the existing regulations (van Theil & van 
Delden, 1997). Based on the above observations, it has been suggested by that to guide 
action; ethical guidelines must be based on reality and should be formulated in such a 
way that it is continuous with accepted moral norms (Birnbacher, 1999). Others have 
suggested that empirical ethics should be used to defend or criticize concrete moral 
principles or practices rather than make general claims about moral concepts (De Vries 
& Gordijn, 2009). Consequently, in recent times, applied ethicists have shifted towards 
combining empirical, especially social scientific research with normative ethical analysis. 
Proponents of this approach called empirical ethics' have argued that the study of 
people’s actual moral beliefs, behaviour and reasoning should be the starting point of 
ethics. It has also been acknowledged that the methodologies of the social sciences, 
especially quantitative and qualitative research, using surveys, interviews and 
questionnaires is probably the best way to map the reality of people’s actual moral 
norms (Borry, Schotsmans, & Dierickx, 2004). However, complex multicultural societies 
in Africa and elsewhere are inherently challenged by problems of poverty, poor 
education, language, and unfamiliarity with libertarian rights-based autonomy, cultural 
issues, and the power asymmetry between doctors and patients. Some of which could 
impact on the practice of IC. To evaluate whether the quality of IC practiced by HCPs in 
South Africa is consistent with current local laws and international standards, I 
conducted an empirical study to evaluate the clinical practice of IC by HCPs at local 
hospitals. The general objective of this study was to establish whether informed consent 
is obtained from patients prior to involvement in clinical procedures in South Africa. 
Specifically, I wanted to establish whether:  
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1. Sufficient information is provided to patients in clinical practice before consent is 
sought. 
2. Patients involved in clinical procedures understand the information given. 
3. Consent is obtained from patients voluntarily. 
4. Whether informed consent provided by patients in clinical practice in South Africa is 
legally and ethically valid 
 
Research design: The study design was a descriptive cross sectional study in 
contemporary clinical practice settings. This is because the time between procuring 
informed consent and treatment is very short and patients are normally in hospital for a 
limited time. The descriptive approach allowed doctors, nurses, and patients to describe 
their experience with the informed consent process as it is, thereby bringing out the 
required information. Further I employed the technique of “triangulation” in this study 
which has been defined as “the combination of methodologies in the study of the same 
phenomenon” (Denzin, 1978). The original purpose of triangulation was to seek 
confirmation of apparent findings- consistency. More recently it has also been used for 
completeness purposes. In this study, I have applied the method of data triangulation 
which involves the use of multiple data sources in the study to get diverse views to aid in 
validating the conclusions, therefore in this study I applied time triangulation, space 
triangulation, and person triangulation. 
 
Study location: This study was carried out at selected public hospitals within 
EThekwini metropolitan municipality district in KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa, 
and its environs. EThekwini municipality comprises a major urban city (Durban) and 
semi-urban areas (townships) with a population of around 3.2 million people (2010 
estimate) (Statistics South Africa, 2011). Based on data from KZN department of Health, 
there are 17 public hospitals in EThekwini district municipality (KZN Department of 
Health 2011). According to Terre-Blanche (2008) 30% of the population is adequate 
when conducting a descriptive study (Terre-Blanche, Durkheim & Painter, 2008). Based 
on these criteria, 6 provincial/public hospitals were finally included in this study. 
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Target populations: This was a simultaneous study involving patients, medical doctors, 
and professional nurses at selected provincial hospitals within EThekwini municipality 
KZN were targeted for the study. All medical doctors and professional nurses within the 
randomly selected hospitals were given an opportunity to participate in the study. 
 
Sampling procedures: Multi-stage stratified random sampling was used to select 
participating hospitals. Purposeful sampling was used to include the two central tertiary 
hospitals within the district because they contain the largest number of medical doctors 
including specialists as well as professional nurses. The rest of the public hospitals 
within the municipality district were randomly sampled. A total of 5 hospitals from Durban 
and one outlying hospital in nearby Pietermaritzburg with rotating surgical registrars from 
Durban were included in the study. Therefore, a total of 6 provincial/public hospitals 
were included in the study population. 
 
Sample size: Preliminary sample size for each group of study participants was 
calculated using a web based sample size calculator by 
Raosoft®(http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html), based on the formula for sample 
size and margin of error. Using this freely available software the estimated sample size 
for each category of participants was calculated. In this case, an estimate of 373 
professional nurses were needed to complete the study at a 95% confidence level. 
 
Inclusion & exclusion criteria for nurses: There are 3 categories of registered nurses 
in South Africa, professional nurses, staff nurses and nursing auxiliaries (South African 
Nursing Council (SANC), 2012). A professional nurse sometimes called a nursing sister 
is an individual who has completed a minimum 4-year degree programme at university 
or tertiary institution, and are certified competent to practice comprehensive nursing and 
midwifery. An enrolled or staff nurse is a registered nurse with a minimum of 2-years 
tertiary nursing education, while an auxiliary nurse has 1 year of nursing education. In 
this study only nurses in the categories of professional nurse and enrolled nurse were 
included (SANC, 2012). 
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Research instruments and data analysis: Data was collected using self-administered 
questionnaires for healthcare professionals and face-to-face interviews for patients. Two 
separate open and close-ended questionnaires were applied to patients and healthcare 
professionals respectively. Doctors and nurses were evaluated using the same 
questionnaire in English language. The data from questionnaires was captured and 
subsequently analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS v.21 
IBM, 2012). Distribution and collection of questionnaires were conducted with the 
assistance 3 trained research assistants. Preliminary data from the questionnaire was 
captured into SPSS by a trained research assistant and this was further validated by the 
principal investigator and a qualified biostatistician. Descriptive statistics such as 
proportions, median, mode and interquartile range were used to summarize the data. 
The scores for information disclosure, capacity comprehension, and volition of informed 
consent were worked out from the responses 
 
Ethical considerations: Ethical approval was obtained from a University of South Africa 
(UNISA) Research Ethics Committee and the KZN Department of Health Research 
Ethics committee. Additional approval was obtained from the management of each 
selected hospital prior to distribution of the questionnaire. Finally, all participants were 
given a full information disclosure prior to providing signed informed consent. 
 
Main Findings 
 
Demographics: A total of 355 nurses completed this study. Majority of participating 
nurses were female (92%) with a median age of 39 years, range (22-62). Nurses had 
between 1 to 41years of professional experience (median = 9). Majority were 
professional nurses (85%), remainder were enrolled/staff nurses (15%) Figure 
1.Professional nurses, a.k.a nursing sisters had a minimum of 4-years University 
education or degrees in Nursing, while enrolled nurses’ a.k.a staff nurses had a 
minimum of 2 years Diploma. Auxiliary nurses, nursing students, and enrolled nursing 
assistants (ENAs) were excluded from the study (SANC, 2012). Nurses from all major 
hospital clinical departments as shown in Figure  
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Figure 1: Nurses by professional category 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Clinical domains and departments of participating nurses 
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Information disclosed by nurses to patients: Information reportedly disclosed by 
nurses included diagnosis (77%); treatment options (68%); recommended treatment 
(65%); risks of refusing recommended treatment (69%); treatment benefits (71%); and 
right of refusal (67%). Triangulation of data revealed some inconsistencies between 
claimed disclosures between nurses and patients as previously reported (Chima, 2015). 
For example, patients reported that they were informed about diagnosis (81%), risks 
(57%), and benefits of treatment (61%). However, fewer were informed about treatment 
options (41%), recommended treatment (28%), and right of refusal (25%). Similarly, 
patients claimed that informed consent was IC was obtained verbally in 73% of cases 
while nurses only 8% of nurses reported obtaining consent verbally. Another interesting 
inconsistent observation involving nurses was the fact previously reported by doctors 
that interpreters were used in communicating with patients in 72% of cases when 
obtaining IC (Chima, 2013). On the other hand, patients reported that interpreters were 
involved in only 3.5% of clinical encounters (Chima, 2015). This inconsistency cannot be 
readily explained; however, it could be due to the practice of ‘cultural brokerage’, 
whereby nurses maybe used to ‘translate, mediate and negotiate on behalf of patients 
(Jezewski, 1990). In this situation, the patient may not readily recognize or relate this to 
the use of interpreter while a doctor or nurse may report otherwise. 
 
Barriers to informed consent reported by nurses: Major challenges to obtaining IC 
reported by doctors and nurses included language barriers, time constraints, lack of 
administrative support e.g. interpreters, and patients’ educational level. Tests of 
significance using Mann-Whitney U test showed that the ‘lack of administrative support 
e.g. interpreters’ was statistically significant across different clinical specialities  
(p ≤ 0.013). The barriers to informed consent was previously reported for doctors 
(Chima, 2013). A comparison of doctors and nurses is shown in Table 1. 
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Table 4: Challenges to informed consent- doctors vs nurses 
Challenges Doctors Nurses Median score 
 
Doctors/Nurses 
P-value 
(Mann-
Whitney 
U test) 
     
     
Time Constraints 146 216 2.00/3.00 0.120 
Work Load 143 216 3.00/2.00 0.171 
Language difficulties 147 259 2.00/1.00 0.002 
Lack of administrative support,  
(E.g. Interpreters) 
138 203 4.00/3.00 0.022 
 
Cultural barriers    
 
Lack of education  
 
Medical paternalism  
(Doctor knows best)                                                                  
 
 
134 
142 
131 
 
207 
220 
183 
 
5.00/3.00 
4.00/3.00 
7.00/6.00 
 
0.000 
0.002 
0.000 
     
Note: p-values calculated using Independent samples Mann-Whitney U test; 
significance level = 0.05 
 
Time Spent on Informed Consent: Majority of nurses (41%) reported spending about 
5-10 minutes on the IC process, consistent 53% of doctors as previously reported 
(Chima, 2013). This Another 24% of nurses spent 10-20 minutes, while 16% spent less 
than 5 minutes on IC as shown in Figure 3. When asked if this amount of time was 
sufficient, majority of nurses 52% answered affirmatively, while 41% responded 
negatively. 
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Figure 3: Time spent on informed consent by nurses 
 
 
General knowledge of IC by healthcare professionals: Questions pertaining to 
general knowledge of IC regulations in South Africa such as age of consent to treatment’ 
and ‘legal age of eligibility for termination of pregnancy’ in terms of (Choice on 
termination of pregnancy Act, 1996) were inserted into the questionnaires for to gauge 
the level of general knowledge of HCPs regarding local laws. Results showed that only 
71% of doctors and 30% of nurses could correctly identify the age of consent for routine 
medical treatment. Similarly, only 30% of doctors and 8% of nurses knew age of consent 
for termination of pregnancy. Further, to compare IC knowledge across occupational 
ranks of doctors and nurses using quantitative means, I developed an Informed Consent 
Aggregate Score (ICAS) (Chima, 2013). Comparison of ICAS scores between doctors 
and nurses ICAS showed that nurses scored lower than doctors with a median score of 
8 versus 10. This difference was statistically significant (p ≤ 0.001). However, there was 
no significant difference in knowledge level between professional nurses with 4 years’ 
degree or more, and enrolled nurses with a minimum of 2 years nursing diploma. 
 
Implications of these findings 
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This study shows that nurses practicing in South Africa are generally aware of the 
importance of informed consent in clinical practice, although not all adhered to the key 
elements as specified in the (NHA, 2003), or are familiar with the requirements based on 
international standards. Generally South African nurses understand the basic elements 
of informed consent such as comprehension, capacity, information disclosure and 
volition. However large percentages of professional nurses are still unaware of general 
changes in South African law, such as the age of consent to treatment or the age at 
which a woman can request for termination of pregnancy. This study also confirmed that 
majority of patients utilizing South African public hospitals are vulnerable because of 
their indigence and lack of alternative means of obtaining healthcare. However, the 
study also indicated that despite their evident vulnerability, most patients in Africa are 
generally aware of their right to information disclosure, human rights and dignity in 
healthcare as previously reported (Chima, 2015). 
Limitations of the study 
Potential limitations to this study include the fact that it was carried out in and urban 
metropolitan municipality in South Africa (Durban), with an arguably better educated and 
more knowledgeable population group by South African standards. It is possible that a 
similar study in a rural location in South Africa may yield a different result. It is also 
unclear whether a study in a more cosmopolitan South African city such as Cape Town 
or Johannesburg with different population demographics may or may not produce a 
different result. Finally, it is also possible that similar studies on patients utilizing private 
healthcare services may produce a different result because it has been suggested that 
doctors in private healthcare setting in Greece are more likely to provide detailed 
information to patients (Falagas et al. 2009). 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
This study identified the major cultural factors militating against IC practice in this setting 
as language barriers, poverty, and poor communication skills by HCWs, consistent with 
findings from studies from other multicultural and multilingual settings South Africa 
(Schlemmer & Mash 2006) and USA (Flores, 2006). One can conclude that there is 
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need to further educate patients and HCWs on patients’ rights and the legal 
requirements of IC. There is a need for further training of nurses on improved 
communication skills and ethics and healthcare law. This will enhance the healthcare 
professional-patient relationship, patient’s rights, and human dignity. Future research 
should focus on informed and shared healthcare decision-making to improve preventive 
healthcare services in Africa. Finally, more continuing education programmes should be 
initiated to further educate South African healthcare workers on the key elements of 
informed consent to meet required international standards and local laws. There is also 
a need for an interpreter ‘corps to aid local language translation and improve patient 
understanding, improve informed consent practices amongst local populations, reduce 
the burden on nurses who have to play the dual role of interpreters and caregivers. This 
will help to minimize nurses’ workload and reduce HCP attrition and improve the overall 
quality of healthcare service delivery. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
Questionnaire for Healthcare professionals (doctors and professional nurses) 
 
SECTION A 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. Age of the Respondent:     
2. Gender 
    ( ) Male      ( ) Female 
 
3. Are you a doctor or a professional nurse?   _________________________ 
 
4. Years of professional experience or rank________________________ 
 
5. Area of specialization, please state ________________________________ 
 
6. Department in the hospital ________________________________ 
 
7. Public ( ) or Private Practice ( ) __________________________ 
 
SECTION B  
8. How many patients do you see on average in a day? 
_______________________ 
 
9. How much time do you spend giving information about a treatment or procedure 
in to a patient during a professional encounter? 
     (  ) < 5 minutes                                          (  ) 5-10 mins      
     (  ) 10-20 mins                                           (  ) 20-30 mins 
     (  ) > 30 mins                                             (  ) None 
 
10. Do you think this amount of time is sufficient? 
    ( ) Yes    ( ) No   ( ) Don’t know 
 
11. If No, Please explain why? ___________________________________________   
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Do you think the information you provide is sufficient to procure valid informed 
consent? 
             ( ) Yes      ( ) No    ( ) Don’t know 
 
13. Do you think the consent form currently used in your hospital is adequate to 
obtain valid informed consent from patients? 
      (  ) Yes                                 (   ) No                                   (  ) Don’t know 
 
      If No, please explain why ____________________________________________ 
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14. What information do you routinely provide to your patients? Please tick or circle 
all that apply 
 
     ( )  Diagnosis   Y or N     ( )   Risks Y or N 
     ( )  Treatment Options Y or N    ( ) Benefits Y or N    
     ( ) Recommended Treatment   Y or N                    (  ) Right of refusal Y or N 
     (  ) Risks of refusing recommended treatment   Y or N  
     (  ) Costs of medical treatment or each option   Y or N 
  
Any additional information? (Please specify)_____________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. Do you allow your patients to choose a procedure or particular treatment? 
             (  ) Yes                         ( ) No                               (  ) Don’t know 
 
 
16. Do you explain the benefits of the procedure to the patient? 
                         (   ) Yes                            (  ) No                                  (  ) Don’t know 
 
17. Do you explain the risks of the procedure to the patient?  
                          (  )  Yes                           (   ) No                                (   ) Don’t know 
 
18. If yes, what types of risks do you routinely explain to the patient? 
 
A. Most common risks     ( ) Yes             ( ) No          ( ) Don’t Know 
B. Most serious risks       ( ) Yes                ( ) No           ( ) Don’t Know 
C. All material risks         ( ) Yes             ( ) No           ( ) Don’t Know 
 
19. What language do you use to explain/obtain informed consent from your 
patients? 
A. English                                       ( ) Yes       ( ) No        ( ) Don’t know 
B. The patients local language         ( ) Yes        ( ) No        ( ) Don’t know 
C. Both English and local language ( ) Yes        ( ) No        ( ) Don’t know 
 
20. Which of the following methods do you use to explain/obtain consent from 
patients? Please tick all that apply. 
( ) Words     ( ) Diagrams 
( ) Pictures                                                                     ( ) Interpreter     
( ) None  
 
 
21. Do you think your patients understand the explanations given to them? 
        (  ) Yes                          (   ) No                   (   ) Don’t know (  ) Don’t think so 
 
22. Do you routinely obtain consent in emergency cases? 
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(   ) Yes                            (   ) No                         (  ) Don’t know   (  ) It depends 
      
      If you choose it depends, please explain_______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________  
23. How do the patients normally provide consent? 
        ( ) Verbally           ( ) Written             (  ) Both             (  ) It depends 
 
        If you choose it depends, please explain_______________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________  
24. Who obtains informed consent from patients in your practice or clinic? 
A. Nurses 
B. Junior doctors 
C. The doctor performing the procedure/treating the patient 
D. Any available healthcare professional 
E. Don’t know 
25. What are the challenges you face in the process of obtaining informed consent 
from a patients in clinical practice?  
Please rank in order of importance (where 1 is most important and 7 is least important): 
A. Time constraints        (   ) 
B. Work load   (  ) 
C. Language difficulties   (  ) 
D. Lack of administrative support e. g. interpreters (  ) 
E. Cultural barriers      (   ). Please specify__________________________ 
F. Lack of education   (    ) 
G. Medical paternalism (Doctor knows best)   (   ) 
 
26. Do you routinely assess the competence of your patients to consent to treatment? 
(  ) Yes                           ( ) No                       ( ) Don’t know 
 
27. If Yes please rank the following criteria in terms of importance in assessing 
patient capacity or competence to consent to treatment (where 1 is most important and 5 
is least important): 
A. Age   (  ) 
B. Sex   (  ) 
C. Appearance (  ) 
D. Educational level (  ) 
E. Level of consciousness (   ) 
 
28. Do you generally presume that your patients have the capacity to consent to 
medical treatment? 
 
         (   )  Yes                                       (   ) No                                          (   ) Don’t Know 
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29.  In difficult cases, which of the following methods do you/ would you use determine if 
a patient has the capacity to consent to treatment (Please rank in order of importance 
where 1 is most important and 6 is least important) 
   A. Mental Status Exam   (  ) Please specify which one_____________________ 
   B. Psychiatric consultation (  ) 
   C. Ethics consultation (   )  
   D. Court adjudication (   ) 
   E. Surrogates              (   ) Please specify_____________________________ 
   F. None of the above   (   ) 
 
 
Section C- Generic questions on informed consent 
 
30. Do you have any suggestions or recommendations regarding informed consent? 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
31. At what age can a minor consent to routine medical treatment in South Africa? 
(Please choose one) 
       12 years   ( )        15 years (   )     18 years      (  )     21 years   (  )     Don’t know   (  ) 
 
32. At what age can a woman request for termination of pregnancy in South Africa?  
(Please choose one) 
 
12 years ( )      15 years ( )          18 years ( )               Any age ( )        Don’t know ( ) 
 
33. In your opinion, which standard do you think should be used for information 
disclosure before obtaining consent from patients? 
 
A. Based on a reasonable doctor standard           ( ) Yes   (  ) No   (  ) Don’t know 
B.  Based a reasonable/prudent patient standard ( ) Yes   (  ) No     (  ) Don’t know 
 
34.  Whose responsibility is it to ensure adequate information disclosure before 
informed consent? 
A. (  ) Doctor or healthcare professionals responsibility           
B. (   ) The patients responsibility          
C. (  )  The patient and healthcare professional are jointly responsible 
 
 
Section D:  
35. Do you ever use implied or presumed consent when treating patients? (  ) Yes or () 
No 
If yes, when do you usually use implied or presumed consent? 
663 
 
A. When the patient present themselves at the Clinic (  ) Yes    ( ) No ( ) I don’t know 
B. When the patient is admitted to the Ward        (   ) Yes    (  ) No       (   ) I don’t know 
C. In an emergency                                               (  ) Yes       (   ) No    (   ) I don’t know 
 
36. What do understand by the term implied or presumed consent? 
 
Implied consent: 
_________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
_ 
Presumed consent: 
_______________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________
_ 
37. How often do you use implied or presumed consent when treating patients? 
A. Some of the time or Occasionally  ( ) 
B. All of  the time                                ( ) 
C. Seldom  or Rarely                          ( ) 
D. Never                                             ( ) 
38. Do obtain any additional or specific consent for certain procedures?  ( )  Yes    ( ) No 
If yes, please list all or any procedures for which you would obtain specific consent from 
the patient: 
______________________________________________________________________
________ 
______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
Thank you for your assistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 
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Questionnaire for Patients 
 
1. Interviewer Initials: _______________________________ 
 
Date of Interview: ________________________________ 
 
Section A- Demographic characteristics 
 
2. Age of respondent: _________________________________  
 
3. Relationship to patient: 
   ( ) Self     ( ) Parent 
   ( ) Guardian     ( ) Other, Please 
specify_______________ 
 
4. Gender 
   ( ) Male                ( ) Female    
 
5. Marital Status 
   ( ) Married      ( ) Separated 
   ( ) Single      ( ) Widowed 
   ( ) Divorced                                                              
  
6. Status of Minors: 
 
 ( ) Orphaned                           (   ) Living with parents                 (   ) Living on my own 
 
7. Languages spoken: 
   ( ) English 
   ( ) IsiZulu 
   (  ) IsiXhosa 
   (   ) Afrikaans 
   ( ) Other, Please specify _______________________ 
 
9. Level of Education 
   ( ) None 
   ( ) Primary 
   ( ) Secondary 
   ( ) Tertiary 
 
10. Occupation 
   ( ) Unemployed       
   ( ) Self employed    
   ( ) Employed 
   ( ) Other – please specify ______________________________ 
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11. How much do you earn in a month: 
( ) No earnings 
( ) Less than   ZAR 1000  
( ) Between   ZAR1001- 3000 
( ) Between   ZAR 3001- 5000 
( ) between   ZAR 5001- ZAR 10,000 
( ) Over   ZAR 10000 
(  ) Don’t know/Refuse to disclose 
 
Section B – Questions on Consent to treatment 
. 
12. Name of the Department in which you are admitted or receiving treatment:  
   ( ) Surgical 
   ( ) Paediatric 
   ( ) Obstetrics & Gynaecology 
   ( ) Medical (Internal Medicine) 
   (  ) Psychiatry 
 
13. Did the doctor or nurse explain the treatment/ medical procedure to you? 
    ( ) Yes  ( ) No   ( ) I do not remember    
 
14. Please tell us the information that was provided to you? 
 
     ( )  Diagnosis Y or N    ( ) Risks Y or N 
     ( )  Treatment Options Y or N   ( ) Benefits Y or N    
     ( ) Recommended Treatment Y or N                    (  ) Right of refusal Y or N 
     (  ) Risks of refusing recommended treatment Y or N 
  
Any additional information (please specify) ________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. How much time did the doctor or nurse take to explain the procedure or treatment? 
          (  ) < 5 minutes                     (  ) 5-10 minutes           
          (  ) 10-20 minutes                 (  ) 20-30 minutes 
          (  ) > 30 minutes                   (  ) None 
 
16. In what language was information on the treatment or procedure provided? 
    ( ) English 
    ( ) IsiZulu 
    (  ) IsiXhosa 
    (  ) Afrikaans 
    (  ) More than one language. Please specify_______________________ 
    ( ) Other, specify______________________________________ 
 
17. Did the doctor or nurse explain the treatment that he/she would provide? 
            ( ) Yes   ( ) No  ( ) I do not remember          
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18.  Which of the following methods did the doctor use to explain the treatment? Please 
tick. 
           ( ) Words     ( ) Diagrams 
            ( ) Pictures                                                       ( ) Interpreter    
 ( ) None 
 
19.  Did you understand the information provided? 
            ( ) Yes   ( ) No  ( ) I do not remember  
 
20. Did you ask any questions concerning the treatment or procedure? 
            ( ) Yes  ( ) No  ( ) I do not remember  
 
    If No, Why not? ______________________________________________________ 
 
21. If you had had a choice would you like to know all the risks or some of the risks 
involved in the treatment or procedure? 
     
      (  ) Yes, I would like to know all the risks,   ( ) No, I would not like to know the risks  
 
      ( ) I would like to know only some of the risks              ( ) Don’t know 
      
22. Please explain your choice __________________________________ 
      __________________________________________________ 
 
23.   Were you advised that you could accept or reject the treatment or procedure? 
    ( ) Yes  ( ) No    (  ) Don’t remember 
 
24. Did you seek assistance in reaching a decision whether to accept or reject the 
treatment or procedure? 
 
         ( )  Yes   ( ) No  ( ) Don’t remember    
 
25.  If yes, why did you seek assistance? 
____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. Please specify from whom you sought assistance from 
 ( ) Parent                               (  ) Child 
 (  ) Husband                           (  ) Wife 
 (  ) Family member                (  ) Friend 
 (  ) Other, specify________________________________ 
  
  
27. Did you make your choice of your own free will? 
    ( ) Yes  ( ) No    ( ) Don’t Remember 
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28. If No, Please explain 
______________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
29. Do you think the amount of information provided to you was enough to enable you 
to make an informed choice? 
 
       (    ) Yes                       (    ) No                                       ( ) Don’t know 
 
30. Did you feel threatened or afraid to say no? 
           (  ) Yes                   (  ) No                                     (   ) Don’t Remember 
 
If yes, please explain______________________________________________________ 
 
31. Were you offered an incentive or persuaded to accept any particular treatment? 
  (  ) Yes                   (   ) No                                     (   ) Don’t remember 
 
 If yes, please explain___________________________________________________ 
 
32. How did you give consent? 
    ( ) Verbally ( ) Written       (   ) Don’t remember 
 
 
Section C- Generic questions on informed consent 
 
33.  Do you have any suggestions or recommendations regarding informed consent? 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
________ 
 
34.  At what age can a minor (young person) consent to routine medical treatment in 
South Africa? (Please choose one) 
12 years   ( )         15 years (   )            18 years (  )         21 years (  )          Don’t know (  ) 
 
35. Finally, if you do not like the treatment that a doctor or nurse is providing to you or 
your child, or if you think it is not working for you. Can you change your mind or 
refuse the treatment at any time? 
(  ) Yes                                   (  ) No                          (   ) Don’t know 
 
If No, Please tell us why? ___________________________________________ 
 
 
Appendix 3 – Questionnaire for patients as translated into IsiZulu 
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Uhlu lwemibuzo lweziguli 
 
1.Amagama obuzayo: _______________________ 
 
Usuku Lwengxoxo: _______________________ 
 
Isigaba A- Imininingwane ngezakhamizi emphakathini  
 
2. Ubudala balona obuzwayo: __________________  
 
3. Ubudlelwane nesiguli: 
   ( ) Wena uqobo      ( ) Umzali 
   ( ) Okugadile     Okunye, Sicela uchaze............   
 
4. Ubulili 
   ( ) Owesilisa               ( ) Owesifazane    
 
5. Isimo somshado/songashadile 
   ( ) Ushadile     ( ) Wehlukanisile 
   ( ) Awushadile     ( ) Umfelokazi 
   ( ) Udivosile                                                              
  
6. Isimo sezingane: 
 
 ( ) Uyintandane                           (   ) Uhlala nabazali                 (   ) Uhlala wedwa 
 
7. Izilimi ozikhulumayo: 
   ( ) ISingisi 
   ( ) IsiZulu 
   (  ) IsiXhosa 
   (   ) ISibhunu 
   ( ) Okunye, Sicela uchaze _______________________ 
 
9. Izinga lemfundo 
   ( ) Ayikho 
   ( ) Eyamabanga aphansi 
   ( ) Eyamabanga aphezulu 
   ( ) Eyesikhungo semfundo ephakeme 
 
10. Umsebenzi 
   ( ) Awusebenzi       
   ( ) Uyazisebenza    
   ( ) Uqashiwe 
   ( ) Okunye– Sicela uchaze_______________________ 
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11.Uhola malini ngenyanga: 
( ) Angiholi lutho 
( ) Ngaphansi kwa   ZAR 1000  
( ) Phakathi kwa   ZAR1001- 3000 
( ) Phakathi kwa   ZAR 3001- 5000 
( ) Phakathi kwa   ZAR 5001- ZAR 10,000 
( ) Ngaphezu kuka   ZAR 10000 
(  ) Angazi/Angifuni ukukuveza 
 
Section B – Imibuzo mayelana ngokuvumelana ngokulashwa 
. 
12. Igama loMnyango lapho ulaliswe khona noma lapho uthola khona ukwelashwa:  
   ( ) Egunjini lokuhlinza/lokuhlinzwa 
   ( ) E-Paediatric 
   ( ) E-Obstetrics & Gynaecology 
   ( ) E-Medical (Internal Medicine) 
   (  ) E-Psychiatry (Egunjini labagula ngokwengqondo) 
 
13. Kungabe udokotela noma unesi uluchazile uhlobo lokwelashwa/okuzokwenzeka 
kuwena? 
    ( ) Yebo  ( ) Cha   ( ) Angisakhumbuli    
 
14. Sicela usitshele ulwazi onikezwe lona? 
 
     ( )  Ukuhlolwa Yebo noma Cha   ( ) Izingozi Yebo noma Cha 
     ( )  Ukwelashwa ongakhetha kuko Yebo noma Cha( ) Imihlomulo Yebo noma Cha 
   
     ( ) Ukwelashwa okuphakanyiswayo Yebo noma Cha  (  ) Ilungelo lokunqaba Yebo 
noma Cha 
 
     (  ) Izingozi zokwenqaba ukwelashwa okuphakanyisiwe Yebo noma Cha 
  
 
Olunye ulwazi (Sicela uchaze) ________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
36. Uthathe isikhathi esingakanani udokotela noma unesi ukuchaza okuzokwenzeka 
noma ukwelashwa? 
(  ) ngaphansi kwa 5wamaminithi               (  ) phakathi kwa 5-10wamaminithi
 (  )phakathi kwa 10-20wamaminithi               (  )phakathi kwa 20-30 wamaminithi 
          (  ) ngaphezu kuka 30wamaminithi                   (  ) Lutho 
 
37. Kungabe ulwazi ngokwelashwa noma okuzokwenzeka kudluliswe ngaluphi ulimi? 
    ( ) ISingisi 
    ( ) IsiZulu 
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    (  ) IsiXhosa 
    (  ) ISibhunu 
    (  ) Ngaphezu kolimi olulodwa. Sicela uchaze_______________________ 
 
38. Kungabe udokotela noma unesi uchazile ukwelashwa azokunika kona ? 
            ( ) Yebo   ( ) Cha  ( ) Angikhumbuli          
 
39.  Eyiphi kulezi ezingezansi izindlela esetshenziswe udokotela ukuchaza 
ukwelashwa.? Beka uphawu. 
           ( ) Amagama     ( ) Imidwebo 
            ( ) Izithombe                                                    ( ) Utolika   
 ( ) akukho lutho 
 
40.  Bewuluqonda ulwazi onikezwa lona? 
            ( ) Yebo   ( ) Cha  ( ) Angisakhumbuli  
 
41. Kungabe uyibuzile imibuzo mayelana nokwelashwa noma okuzokwenzeka? 
            ( ) Yebo  ( ) Cha  ( ) Angikhumbuli  
 
   Uma uphika,kungani ungabuzanga?  
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
42. Uma bewungakhetha, bewungathanda ukwazi ngazo zonke izingozi noma ezinye 
zezingozi ezikhona ekulashweni kwakho noma kokuzokwenzeka? 
     
      (  ) Yebo, ngingathanda ukwazi zonke izingozi,   ( )Cha, ngeke ngathanda ukwazi   
ngezingozi  
 
      ( ) Ngingathanda ukwazi ngezinye zezingozi              ( ) Angazi 
      
43. Chaza ngempendulo oyikhethile 
       ____________________________________________  
      
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
44.  Kungabe welulekiwe ngokuthi ungakuvuma noma ukwenqabe ukwelashwa noma 
okuzokwenzeka? 
    ( ) Yebo  ( ) Cha    (  ) Angikhumbuli 
 
45. Kungabe ulucelile usizo ekuthatheni isinqumo ukuthi kufanele uvume noma 
wenqabe ukwelashwa noma okuzokwenzeka ? 
 
         ( )  Yebo   ( ) Cha  ( ) Angikhumbuli    
 
46.  Uma uvuma, uluceleleni usizo? 
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____________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
47. Balula ukuthi ulucele kubani usizo  
 ( ) Kumzali                               (  ) Enganeni 
 (  ) Kumkhwenyana                           (  ) Kunkosikazi 
 (  ) Kumngane womndeni                (  ) Kumngane 
 (  ) Okunye, chaza________________________________ 
  
  
48. Kungabe uzikhethele ngokuthanda kwakhol? 
    ( ) Yebo  ( ) Cha    ( ) Angikhumbuli 
 
49. Sicela uchaze uma uphika,  
______________________________________________________________________
_ 
 
50. Ucabanga ukuthi ulwazi olunikeziwe belwanele ukukusiza ukwenza isinqumo 
okuyisona? 
 
       (    ) Yebo                       (    ) Cha                                       ( ) Angazi 
 
51. Kungabe bewesaba ukwenqaba? 
           (  ) Yebo                   (  ) Cha                                     (   ) Angikhumbuli 
 
Uma uvuma, chaza..............................................  
 
31.Kungabe kukhona onikezwe kona kokukubonga noma unxenxwe ukuthi uvume uhlobo 
oluthile lokwelashwa? 
  (  ) Yebo                   (   ) Cha                                     (   ) Angikhumbuli 
 
Chaza uma uvuma_________________________ 
 
32.Uvume kanjani ukwelashwa? 
    ( ) Ngomlomo  ( ) Ngokubhala phansi       (   ) Angikhumbuli 
 
 
Isigaba C- Imibuzo ejwayelekile ngokuvumelana okwaziwayo 
 
33.Kungabe unayo imibono noma izincomo mayelana nokuvumelana? 
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
34.Eyiphi iminyaka lapho ingane ingavuma ukwelashwa ngemithi lapha eNingizimu 
Afrika? (Khetha okukodwa) 
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12weminyaka   ( )         15weminyaka (   )     18 weminyaka (  )         21 weminyaka (  )          
Angazi (  ) 
 
35.Okokugcina, uma ungakuthandi ukwelashwa okunikwa wudokotela noma unesi elapha 
ingane yakho, noma ucabanga ukuthi akukusebenzeli. Ungawushintsha umqondo noma 
wenqabe ukwelashwa noma yinini? 
(  ) Yebo                                   (  ) Cha                          (   ) Angazi 
 
Chaza ukuthi kungani uma uphika? 
___________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4- Informed consent document 
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APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL  
For research with human participants (Biomedical) 
 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
Information Sheet and Consent to participate in a Research Study entitled: 
 
“An Investigation of Informed Consent in Clinical Practice in South Africa” 
 
Date: 24 March 2011 
 
My name is Prof Sylvester Chima from the Programme of Bio & Research Ethics and 
Medical Law, Nelson R Mandela School of Medicine, University of KwaZulu-Natal ( 
UKZN) (chima@ukzn.ac.za, 031 2604604). I am also an LLD (Doctor of Laws) 
candidate at the School of Law, University of South Africa (UNISA). 
 
You are being invited to consider participating in a study that involves assessing whether 
patients and healthcare professionals (doctors and nurses) understand and apply the 
ethical principles of informed consent, and comply with the requirements of the law on 
informed consent during medical practice in South Africa. The study is expected to enrol 
a maximum of 1118 participants in total (360 doctors, 373 nurses and 385 patients). The 
study will be conducted amongst doctors, nurses and patients at randomly selected 
provincial and private hospitals in eThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban), Kwazulu-
Natal province (KZN). The study will involve self-completion of a questionnaire by doctors 
and professional nurses and interview of patients based on a questionnaire.  It is 
anticipated that the duration of your participation if you choose to participate will not 
exceed 30 minutes to 1 hour.  
 
There will be no risk or discomfort to you from participating except perhaps the time taken 
to complete the questionnaire. If you choose to participate in this study, the data from the 
questionnaire will be analyzed and reported anonymously so that there will be no 
individually identifiable information included in the final report or publications. 
 
Ethical clearance, Authorization from KZN Department of Health, and Informed 
consent 
 
This study has been ethically reviewed and approved by the UNISA Research Ethics 
Review Committee (URERC) (approval number_____).  Authorization has been obtained 
from KZN Department of Health (DOH) to conduct the study and permission has been 
obtained from the Hospital Management to conduct the study at this hospital. Each 
respondent will be asked to provide written informed consent. The documents describing 
the study and requesting the patient’s participation have also been translated into isiZulu, 
in order to obtain written informed consent from each patient.  
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In the event of any problems or concerns/questions you may contact the researcher at 
chima@ukzn.ac.za or by telephone at 031-260-4604.You may also contact the URERC 
at UNISA through Professor MN Slabbert, Chair of URERC at UNISA as follows:  
 
UNISA RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE (URERC) 
C/O Professor MN Slabbert 
Contact Info 
Tel: + 27 12 429-8305 
Fax: + 27 12 429-3442 
Email: slabbmn@unisa.ac.za 
Department of Jurisprudence  
School of Law 
University of South Africa  
P.O. Box 392 
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
Participation in this research is voluntary and you may withdraw at any point. In the event 
of refusal/withdrawal of participation you will not incur penalty or loss of treatment or other 
benefit to which they are normally entitled. There are no potential consequences to you 
for withdrawal from the study.  
 
No costs will be incurred by you as a result of participation in this study. There is no 
incentive or direct benefit to you for participating in the study. However indirect benefits 
may occur in that the findings of the study may be used to improve the quality of informed 
consent and medical practice in South Africa. The researcher may derive a benefit in the 
award of an academic qualification from UNISA through completion of a thesis and the 
results will be published in scientific journals or a book.  However, your confidentiality will 
be protected as any publications will not include any individually identifiable information.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
CONSENT 
If you agree to voluntarily participate in this research project as described, please 
indicate your agreement by signing this consent form. Please retain this consent cover 
form for your reference. 
 
___________________ (Name) have been informed about the study entitled: “An 
Investigation of Informed consent in Clinical Practice in South Africa” by Sylvester Chidi 
Chima 
 
I understand the purpose and procedures of the study. 
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I have been given an opportunity to ask questions about the study and have had answers 
to my satisfaction. 
 
I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at 
any time without affecting any treatment or care that I would usually be entitled to. 
 
I have been informed about the risks and benefits of the study.  
 
If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I 
may contact the researcher at chima@ukzn.ac.za or by phone at 031-260-4604 
 
If I have any questions or concerns about my rights as a study participant, or if I am 
concerned about an aspect of the study or the researchers then I may contact: 
  
UNISA URERC 
C/ O Professor MN Slabbert 
Contact Info 
Tel: + 27 12 429-8305 
Fax: + 27 12 429-3442 
Email: slabbmn@unisa.ac.za 
Department of Jurisprudence  
School of Law 
University of South Africa  
P.O. Box 392 
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
____________________      ____________________ 
Signature of Participant                            Date 
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Appendix 5- Informed consent document for surrogates 
 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICS APPROVAL 
For research with human participants (Biomedical) 
 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
 
Protocol for Parental/Guardian Informed Consent 
Form for Minor Child or Dependent 
 
Information Sheet and Consent to participate in a Research Study entitled: 
 
“An Investigation of Informed Consent in Clinical Practice in South Africa” 
 
Date: 24 March 2011 
 
My name is Prof Sylvester Chima from the Programme of Bio & Research Ethics and 
Medical Law, Nelson R Mandela School of Medicine, University of KwaZulu-Natal ( 
UKZN) (chima@ukzn.ac.za, 031 2604604). I am also an LLD (Doctor of Laws) 
candidate at the School of Law, University of South Africa (UNISA). 
 
Your child/children  is/are being invited to consider participating in a study that involves 
assessing whether patients and healthcare professionals (doctors and nurses) 
understand and apply the ethical principles of informed consent, and comply with the 
requirements of the law on informed consent during medical practice in South Africa. 
The study is expected to enrol a minimum of 1118 participants in total (360 doctors, 373 
nurses and 385 patients). The study will be conducted amongst doctors, nurses and 
patients at randomly selected provincial and private hospitals in eThekwini metropolitan 
municipality (Durban), Kwazulu-Natal province (KZN). The study will involve self-
completion of a questionnaire by doctors and professional nurses and interview of 
patients based on a questionnaire.  It is anticipated that the duration of you and your 
child/children’s participation will not exceed 30 minutes to 1 hour.  
 
There will be no risk or discomfort to you or your child/children from participating except 
perhaps the time taken to complete the questionnaire. If you choose to participate in this 
study, the data from the questionnaire will be analyzed and reported anonymously so that 
there will be no individually identifiable information included in the final report or 
publications. 
 
Ethical clearance, Authorization from KZN Department of Health, and Informed 
consent 
 
This study has been ethically reviewed and approved by the UNISA Research Ethics 
Review Committee (URERC) (approval number_____).  Authorization has been obtained 
from KZN Department of Health (DOH) to conduct the study, and permission has also 
been obtained from the Hospital Management to conduct the study at this hospital. Each 
respondent/participant will be asked to provide written informed consent. The documents 
677 
 
describing the study and requesting the patient’s participation have also been translated 
into isiZulu, in order to obtain written informed consent from each patient.  
 
In the event of any problems or concerns/questions you may contact the researcher at 
chima@ukzn.ac.za or by telephone at 031-260-4604.You may also contact the URERC 
at UNISA through Professor MN Slabbert, Chair of URERC at UNISA as follows:  
 
UNISA RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW COMMITTEE (URERC) 
UNISA URERC 
C/ O Professor MN Slabbert 
Contact Info 
Contact Info 
Tel: + 27 12 429-8305 
Fax: + 27 12 429-3442 
Email: slabbmn@unisa.ac.za 
Department of Jurisprudence  
School of Law 
University of South Africa  
P.O. Box 392 
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
 
____________________      ____________________ 
Signature of Parent/Guardian                            Date 
 
 
 
____________________      ____________________ 
Signature/Assent of minor child                            Date 
 
 
Participation in this research is voluntary and your child/children may withdraw at any point. In the event of 
refusal/withdrawal of participation you will not incur penalty or loss of treatment or other benefit to which 
they are normally entitled. There are no potential consequences to you for withdrawal from the study.  
 
No costs will be incurred by you as a result of participation in this study. There is no incentive or direct 
benefit to you for participating in the study. However indirect benefits may occur in that the findings of the 
study may be used to improve the quality of informed consent and medical practice in South Africa. The 
researcher may derive a benefit in the award of an academic qualification from UNISA through completion 
of a thesis and the results will be published in scientific journals or a book.  However, your confidentiality 
will be protected as any publications will not include any individually identifiable information.  
 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CONSENT 
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If you agree for your child/children to voluntarily participate in this research project as described, please indicate your 
agreement by signing this consent form. Please retain this consent cover form for your reference. 
 
 
___________________ (Name) have been informed about the study entitled: “An Investigation of 
Informed consent in Clinical Practice in South Africa” by Sylvester Chidi Chima 
 
I understand the purpose and procedures of the study. 
 
I have been given an opportunity to ask questions about the study and have had answers to my satisfaction. 
 
I declare that my child/children’s participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that they may withdraw 
at any time without affecting any treatment or care that they would usually be entitled to. 
 
I have been informed about the risks and benefits of the study.  
 
If I have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study I understand that I may contact the 
researcher at chima@ukzn.ac.za or by phone at 031-260-4604 
 
If I have any questions or concerns about my child/children’s rights as a study participant, or if I am 
concerned about an aspect of the study or the researchers then I may contact: 
  
UNISA URERC 
UNISA URERC 
C/ O Professor MN Slabbert 
Contact Info 
Tel: + 27 12 429-8305 
Fax: + 27 12 429-3442 
Email: slabbmn@unisa.ac.za 
Department of Jurisprudence  
School of Law 
University of South Africa  
P.O. Box 392 
UNISA 
0003 
South Africa 
_______________                  ____________________ 
Signature of Parent/Guardian                            Date 
 
____________________      ____________________ 
Signature/Assent of minor child                            Date 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Appendix 6 
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List of Provincial and Private Hospitals in eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality 
KwaZulu-Natal Province, South Africa 
 
Provincial Hospitals-eThekwini (Durban) 
 
A 
 Addington Hospital  
 
C 
 Charles James Hospital 
 Clairwood Hospital 
 
D 
 Don McKenzie Hospital 
E 
 Ekuhlengeni Psychiatric Hospital 
 
F 
 FOSA TB Hospital 
H 
 Hillcrest Hospital 
I 
 Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital 
K 
 King Edward VIII Hospital  
 
 King George V Hospital 
M 
 
 Mahatma Gandhi Hospital  
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O 
 Osindisweni Hospital 
 
P 
 Prince Mshiyeni Memorial Hospital 
R 
 
 R K Khan Hospital 
S 
 St Mary’s Mission Hospital 
W 
 Wentworth Hospital 
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